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# title: IAM actions for Claude Platform on AWS url: https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/claude-platform-on-aws-iam-actions description: IAM action reference for controlling access to Claude Platform on AWS through AWS policies.

Claude Platform on AWS uses AWS IAM for access control. Every API route maps to an IAM action in the aws-external-anthropic namespace. This page lists all actions, the routes each action authorizes, and the managed policies available for common access patterns. For platform setup and authentication, see Claude Platform on AWS.

# Service details

Attribute Value
IAM service prefix aws-external-anthropic
Resource types workspace

Workspace ARN format:

text
arn:aws:aws-external-anthropic:{region}:{account-id}:workspace/{workspace-id}

The ARN region is always populated and matches the region the workspace is bound to. The resource segment is the tagged workspace ID (wrkspc_...), the same value you pass in the anthropic-workspace-id header.

# Actions

The service defines 71 actions. Actions follow the AWS VerbNoun convention and use verb discipline so that Get* and List* wildcards produce a clean read-only boundary.

# Inference

Action Routes authorized
CreateInference POST /v1/messages
CountTokens POST /v1/messages/count_tokens

# Batch processing

Action Routes authorized
CreateBatchInference POST /v1/messages/batches
GetBatchInference GET /v1/messages/batches/{id} GET /v1/messages/batches/{id}/results
ListBatchInferences GET /v1/messages/batches
CancelBatchInference POST /v1/messages/batches/{id}/cancel
DeleteBatchInference DELETE /v1/messages/batches/{id}
`GetBatchInference` authorizes both reading batch metadata and downloading batch results. The `AnthropicReadOnlyAccess`, `AnthropicInferenceAccess`, and `AnthropicLimitedAccess` policies' `Get*` wildcards include this action.

# Models

Action Routes authorized
GetModel GET /v1/models/{id}
ListModels GET /v1/models

# Files

Action Routes authorized
CreateFile POST /v1/files
GetFile GET /v1/files/{id} GET /v1/files/{id}/content
ListFiles GET /v1/files
DeleteFile DELETE /v1/files/{id}
`GetFile` authorizes both metadata and content download. A principal with read-only access can download file bytes, not just list files.

# Skills

Action Routes authorized
CreateSkill POST /v1/skills
GetSkill GET /v1/skills/{id} GET /v1/skills/{id}/versions GET /v1/skills/{id}/versions/{version} GET /v1/skills/{id}/versions/{version}/content
ListSkills GET /v1/skills
UpdateSkill POST /v1/skills/{id}/versions DELETE /v1/skills/{id}/versions/{version}
DeleteSkill DELETE /v1/skills/{id}
`GetSkill` authorizes both skill metadata and skill-content download. A principal with read-only access can download skill bytes, not just list skills. Creating or deleting an individual skill version maps to `UpdateSkill`, not `CreateSkill` or `DeleteSkill`. A policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Delete*` still allows version deletion, and a policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Create*` still allows version creation. Deny `UpdateSkill` and `CreateSkill` as well if you need to prevent any skill mutation.

# Agents

Action Routes authorized
CreateAgent POST /v1/agents
GetAgent GET /v1/agents/{id} GET /v1/agents/{id}/versions
ListAgents GET /v1/agents
UpdateAgent POST /v1/agents/{id}
ArchiveAgent POST /v1/agents/{id}/archive
Agents support only archive, not hard delete. A policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Delete*` does not block `ArchiveAgent`. Deny `ArchiveAgent`, `UpdateAgent`, and `CreateAgent` if you need to prevent any agent mutation.

# Sessions

Action Routes authorized
CreateSession POST /v1/sessions
GetSession GET /v1/sessions/{id} GET /v1/sessions/{id}/events GET /v1/sessions/{id}/events/stream GET /v1/sessions/{id}/resources GET /v1/sessions/{id}/resources/{id}
ListSessions GET /v1/sessions
UpdateSession POST /v1/sessions/{id} POST /v1/sessions/{id}/events POST /v1/sessions/{id}/resources POST /v1/sessions/{id}/resources/{id} DELETE /v1/sessions/{id}/resources/{id}
ArchiveSession POST /v1/sessions/{id}/archive
DeleteSession DELETE /v1/sessions/{id}
`GetSession` authorizes reading session metadata, the full event stream (conversation history), and session resources. The `AnthropicReadOnlyAccess`, `AnthropicInferenceAccess`, and `AnthropicLimitedAccess` policies' `Get*` wildcards include this action. Creating, updating, or deleting an individual session sub-resource (events or session resources) maps to `UpdateSession`, not `CreateSession` or `DeleteSession`. A policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Delete*` still allows sub-resource deletion, and a policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Create*` still allows sub-resource creation. Deny `UpdateSession`, `CreateSession`, and `ArchiveSession` as well if you need to prevent any session mutation.

# Environments

Action Routes authorized
CreateEnvironment POST /v1/environments
GetEnvironment GET /v1/environments/{id} GET /v1/environments/{id}/work GET /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id} GET /v1/environments/{id}/work/stats
ListEnvironments GET /v1/environments
UpdateEnvironment POST /v1/environments/{id}
ArchiveEnvironment POST /v1/environments/{id}/archive
DeleteEnvironment DELETE /v1/environments/{id}
ProcessEnvironmentWork GET /v1/environments/{id}/work/poll POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id} POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id}/ack POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id}/heartbeat POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id}/stop
A policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Delete*` does not block `ArchiveEnvironment`. `ProcessEnvironmentWork` is not matched by `Create*`, `Update*`, `Delete*`, or `Archive*` wildcards. Deny `ArchiveEnvironment`, `UpdateEnvironment`, `CreateEnvironment`, and `ProcessEnvironmentWork` as well if you need to prevent any environment mutation. `ProcessEnvironmentWork` authorizes a [self-hosted sandbox](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/managed-agents/self-hosted-sandboxes) worker to poll for, acknowledge, heartbeat, stop, and post results on environment work items. Grant it only to principals that run self-hosted environment workers. The `AnthropicSelfHostedEnvironmentAccess` managed policy includes this action.

# Vaults

Action Routes authorized
CreateVault POST /v1/vaults
GetVault GET /v1/vaults/{id} GET /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials GET /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id}
ListVaults GET /v1/vaults
UpdateVault POST /v1/vaults/{id} POST /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials POST /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id} POST /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id}/archive DELETE /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id}
ArchiveVault POST /v1/vaults/{id}/archive
DeleteVault DELETE /v1/vaults/{id}
Creating, updating, archiving, or deleting an individual vault credential maps to `UpdateVault`. Reading a credential maps to `GetVault`. Vault credential secrets are not exposed: secret fields are write-only and are never returned by `GetVault` (see [Authenticate with vaults](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/managed-agents/vaults)). A policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Delete*` still allows credential deletion, and a policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Create*` still allows credential creation. Deny `UpdateVault`, `CreateVault`, and `ArchiveVault` as well if you need to prevent any vault mutation.

# Memory stores

Action Routes authorized
CreateMemoryStore POST /v1/memory_stores
GetMemoryStore GET /v1/memory_stores/{id} GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories/{id} GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memory_versions GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memory_versions/{id}
ListMemoryStores GET /v1/memory_stores
UpdateMemoryStore POST /v1/memory_stores/{id} POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories/{id} DELETE /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories/{id} POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memory_versions/{id}/redact
ArchiveMemoryStore POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/archive
DeleteMemoryStore DELETE /v1/memory_stores/{id}
`GetMemoryStore` authorizes reading store metadata, all memories, and memory version history. The `AnthropicReadOnlyAccess`, `AnthropicInferenceAccess`, and `AnthropicLimitedAccess` policies' `Get*` wildcards include this action. Creating, updating, or deleting an individual memory and redacting a memory version both map to `UpdateMemoryStore`, not `CreateMemoryStore` or `DeleteMemoryStore`. A policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Delete*` still allows individual-memory deletion and memory-version redaction, and a policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Create*` still allows individual-memory creation. Deny `UpdateMemoryStore`, `CreateMemoryStore`, and `ArchiveMemoryStore` as well if you need to prevent any memory-store mutation.

# Webhooks

Action Routes authorized
CreateWebhook POST /v1/webhooks
GetWebhook GET /v1/webhooks/{id}
ListWebhooks GET /v1/webhooks
UpdateWebhook POST /v1/webhooks/{id}
DeleteWebhook DELETE /v1/webhooks/{id}
RotateWebhookSecret POST /v1/webhooks/{id}/regenerate_signing_secret
Webhook signing secrets are write-only. `GetWebhook` returns webhook metadata only; it does not return the signing secret. `RotateWebhookSecret` is not matched by `aws-external-anthropic:Create*`, `Update*`, or `Delete*` wildcards. A policy that denies those patterns still allows secret rotation. Deny `RotateWebhookSecret`, `UpdateWebhook`, `CreateWebhook`, and `DeleteWebhook` if you need to prevent any webhook mutation.

# User profiles

Action Routes authorized
CreateUserProfile POST /v1/user_profiles
GetUserProfile GET /v1/user_profiles/{id}
ListUserProfiles GET /v1/user_profiles
UpdateUserProfile POST /v1/user_profiles/{id}
IAM action matching is case-insensitive. The wildcard `aws-external-anthropic:*File` matches `CreateFile`, `GetFile`, and `DeleteFile`, but does not match `ListFiles` (which ends in "files", not "file"). It also over-matches `CreateUserProfile`, `GetUserProfile`, and `UpdateUserProfile` because "Profile" ends in "file". If you intend to grant or deny only Files API actions, enumerate them explicitly (`CreateFile`, `GetFile`, `ListFiles`, `DeleteFile`) rather than using a `*File` suffix pattern.

# Workspaces

Action Routes authorized
CreateWorkspace POST /v1/organizations/workspaces
GetWorkspace GET /v1/organizations/workspaces/{id}
ListWorkspaces GET /v1/organizations/workspaces
UpdateWorkspace POST /v1/organizations/workspaces/{id}
ArchiveWorkspace POST /v1/organizations/workspaces/{id}/archive
Workspaces support only archive, not hard delete. A policy that denies `aws-external-anthropic:Delete*` does not block `ArchiveWorkspace`. Deny `ArchiveWorkspace`, `UpdateWorkspace`, and `CreateWorkspace` if you need to prevent any workspace mutation.

# Encryption keys

Action Routes authorized
RegisterKey POST /v1/organizations/external_keys
GetKey GET /v1/organizations/external_keys/{id}
ListKeys GET /v1/organizations/external_keys
UpdateKey POST /v1/organizations/external_keys/{id}
DisableKey DELETE /v1/organizations/external_keys/{id}
These actions manage your organization's [customer-managed encryption key (CMEK)](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/cmek-aws-kms#claude-platform-on-aws) registrations, the record of which AWS KMS key ARNs are registered. They do not create, change, or disable the keys in AWS KMS. `DisableKey` removes a registration and is rejected while any workspace still uses the key. `RegisterKey` and `DisableKey` are not matched by `Create*`, `Update*`, or `Delete*` wildcards; deny `RegisterKey`, `UpdateKey`, and `DisableKey` if you need to prevent any change to key registrations. In these routes, `{id}` is the URL-encoded KMS key ARN. Attaching a registered key to a workspace is a workspace operation, authorized by `CreateWorkspace` or `UpdateWorkspace`; the principal that attaches a key also needs `kms:DescribeKey`, `kms:Encrypt`, and `kms:Decrypt` on that key (see the [prerequisites](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/cmek-aws-kms#claude-platform-on-aws)). External key actions are account-scoped: specifying a workspace ARN on them has no effect; use `Resource: "*"`.

# Compliance

Action Routes authorized
ListComplianceActivities GET /v1/compliance/activities
`ListComplianceActivities` authorizes reading the [Compliance API](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/compliance-api) [Activity Feed](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/compliance-activity-feed), the organization-wide audit log that includes access transparency events. The route returns an error until the Compliance API is [enabled for your organization](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/compliance-api-access); enablement is on request through your Anthropic account team. The `AnthropicReadOnlyAccess`, `AnthropicInferenceAccess`, and `AnthropicLimitedAccess` policies' `List*` wildcards include this action. `ListComplianceActivities` is account-scoped, like `ListWorkspaces`. Specifying a workspace ARN on this action has no effect; use `Resource: "*"`.

# Authentication

Action Routes authorized
CallWithBearerToken (none)

CallWithBearerToken is an authentication-layer permission that authorizes a principal to authenticate through an API key (bearer token) rather than AWS SigV4. It does not map to a route. Grant it alongside the route-mapped actions you want the API key holder to perform.

# Console access

Action Routes authorized
AssumeConsole (none)

AssumeConsole authorizes a principal to open the Claude Console for a Claude Platform on AWS workspace through the AWS Console federation flow. It does not map to a route. Grant it to principals who should be able to click Open Claude Console on the Claude Platform on AWS service page in the AWS Console. The Claude Console role (Admin or Developer) is assigned separately by your Anthropic account representative; it is not derived from the principal's IAM permissions. See Using the Claude Console for the sign-in flow and role descriptions.

# Route-to-action mapping

The following table lists every route on Claude Platform on AWS and the IAM action required to call it. Each IAM action also authorizes requests that use the anthropic-beta header; beta variants of a route do not require a separate IAM action. CloudTrail classifies each action as either a Data event (high-volume, data-plane operations) or a Management event (control-plane operations). Vault and webhook actions are classified as Management events because they hold secrets (vault credentials and webhook signing secrets) and benefit from default-on audit logging. Workspace, external key, and compliance actions are also classified as Management events because they are organization-scoped control-plane operations. All other actions, including inference, batch, model, file, skill, user profile, and the remaining Claude Managed Agents actions, are classified as Data events.

Method Route IAM action CloudTrail event type
POST /v1/messages CreateInference Data
POST /v1/messages/count_tokens CountTokens Data
POST /v1/messages/batches CreateBatchInference Data
GET /v1/messages/batches ListBatchInferences Data
GET /v1/messages/batches/{id} GetBatchInference Data
GET /v1/messages/batches/{id}/results GetBatchInference Data
POST /v1/messages/batches/{id}/cancel CancelBatchInference Data
DELETE /v1/messages/batches/{id} DeleteBatchInference Data
GET /v1/models ListModels Data
GET /v1/models/{id} GetModel Data
POST /v1/files CreateFile Data
GET /v1/files ListFiles Data
GET /v1/files/{id} GetFile Data
GET /v1/files/{id}/content GetFile Data
DELETE /v1/files/{id} DeleteFile Data
POST /v1/skills CreateSkill Data
GET /v1/skills ListSkills Data
GET /v1/skills/{id} GetSkill Data
DELETE /v1/skills/{id} DeleteSkill Data
POST /v1/skills/{id}/versions UpdateSkill Data
GET /v1/skills/{id}/versions GetSkill Data
GET /v1/skills/{id}/versions/{version} GetSkill Data
GET /v1/skills/{id}/versions/{version}/content GetSkill Data
DELETE /v1/skills/{id}/versions/{version} UpdateSkill Data
POST /v1/user_profiles CreateUserProfile Data
GET /v1/user_profiles ListUserProfiles Data
GET /v1/user_profiles/{id} GetUserProfile Data
POST /v1/user_profiles/{id} UpdateUserProfile Data
POST /v1/organizations/workspaces CreateWorkspace Management
GET /v1/organizations/workspaces ListWorkspaces Management
GET /v1/organizations/workspaces/{id} GetWorkspace Management
POST /v1/organizations/workspaces/{id} UpdateWorkspace Management
POST /v1/organizations/workspaces/{id}/archive ArchiveWorkspace Management
POST /v1/organizations/external_keys RegisterKey Management
GET /v1/organizations/external_keys ListKeys Management
GET /v1/organizations/external_keys/{id} GetKey Management
POST /v1/organizations/external_keys/{id} UpdateKey Management
DELETE /v1/organizations/external_keys/{id} DisableKey Management
GET /v1/compliance/activities ListComplianceActivities Management
POST /v1/agents CreateAgent Data
GET /v1/agents ListAgents Data
GET /v1/agents/{id} GetAgent Data
POST /v1/agents/{id} UpdateAgent Data
POST /v1/agents/{id}/archive ArchiveAgent Data
GET /v1/agents/{id}/versions GetAgent Data
POST /v1/sessions CreateSession Data
GET /v1/sessions ListSessions Data
GET /v1/sessions/{id} GetSession Data
POST /v1/sessions/{id} UpdateSession Data
POST /v1/sessions/{id}/archive ArchiveSession Data
DELETE /v1/sessions/{id} DeleteSession Data
GET /v1/sessions/{id}/events GetSession Data
POST /v1/sessions/{id}/events UpdateSession Data
GET /v1/sessions/{id}/events/stream GetSession Data
GET /v1/sessions/{id}/resources GetSession Data
GET /v1/sessions/{id}/resources/{id} GetSession Data
POST /v1/sessions/{id}/resources UpdateSession Data
POST /v1/sessions/{id}/resources/{id} UpdateSession Data
DELETE /v1/sessions/{id}/resources/{id} UpdateSession Data
POST /v1/environments CreateEnvironment Data
GET /v1/environments ListEnvironments Data
GET /v1/environments/{id} GetEnvironment Data
POST /v1/environments/{id} UpdateEnvironment Data
POST /v1/environments/{id}/archive ArchiveEnvironment Data
DELETE /v1/environments/{id} DeleteEnvironment Data
GET /v1/environments/{id}/work GetEnvironment Data
GET /v1/environments/{id}/work/poll ProcessEnvironmentWork Data
GET /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id} GetEnvironment Data
GET /v1/environments/{id}/work/stats GetEnvironment Data
POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id} ProcessEnvironmentWork Data
POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id}/ack ProcessEnvironmentWork Data
POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id}/heartbeat ProcessEnvironmentWork Data
POST /v1/environments/{id}/work/{work_id}/stop ProcessEnvironmentWork Data
POST /v1/vaults CreateVault Management
GET /v1/vaults ListVaults Management
GET /v1/vaults/{id} GetVault Management
POST /v1/vaults/{id} UpdateVault Management
POST /v1/vaults/{id}/archive ArchiveVault Management
DELETE /v1/vaults/{id} DeleteVault Management
GET /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials GetVault Management
POST /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials UpdateVault Management
GET /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id} GetVault Management
POST /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id} UpdateVault Management
POST /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id}/archive UpdateVault Management
DELETE /v1/vaults/{id}/credentials/{id} UpdateVault Management
POST /v1/memory_stores CreateMemoryStore Data
GET /v1/memory_stores ListMemoryStores Data
GET /v1/memory_stores/{id} GetMemoryStore Data
POST /v1/memory_stores/{id} UpdateMemoryStore Data
POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/archive ArchiveMemoryStore Data
DELETE /v1/memory_stores/{id} DeleteMemoryStore Data
POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories UpdateMemoryStore Data
GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories GetMemoryStore Data
GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories/{id} GetMemoryStore Data
POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories/{id} UpdateMemoryStore Data
DELETE /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memories/{id} UpdateMemoryStore Data
GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memory_versions GetMemoryStore Data
GET /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memory_versions/{id} GetMemoryStore Data
POST /v1/memory_stores/{id}/memory_versions/{id}/redact UpdateMemoryStore Data
GET /v1/webhooks ListWebhooks Management
GET /v1/webhooks/{id} GetWebhook Management
POST /v1/webhooks CreateWebhook Management
POST /v1/webhooks/{id} UpdateWebhook Management
DELETE /v1/webhooks/{id} DeleteWebhook Management
POST /v1/webhooks/{id}/regenerate_signing_secret RotateWebhookSecret Management

Routes not in this table are not available on Claude Platform on AWS. The gateway denies any route not listed here by default.

Workspace and external key routes are the only Admin API routes available on Claude Platform on AWS. You can also create, update, or archive workspaces in the AWS Console or, with the Admin role, in the Claude Console. Encryption keys can also be registered and attached in the Claude Console.

# Managed policies

AWS provides five managed policies for Claude Platform on AWS. All managed policies apply to Resource: "*".

Policy Grants
AnthropicFullAccess aws-external-anthropic:*
AnthropicReadOnlyAccess Get*, List*, CallWithBearerToken
AnthropicInferenceAccess Get*, List*, CreateInference, CreateBatchInference, CancelBatchInference, DeleteBatchInference, CountTokens, CallWithBearerToken
AnthropicLimitedAccess All AnthropicInferenceAccess actions, plus all Claude Managed Agents actions (agents, sessions, environments, vaults, memory stores, webhooks, and self-hosted environment work)
AnthropicSelfHostedEnvironmentAccess GetEnvironment, ProcessEnvironmentWork, GetSession, UpdateSession, GetSkill, CallWithBearerToken

AnthropicInferenceAccess is the narrowest managed policy sufficient to run inference. It covers both synchronous and batch inference and, through the Get* and List* wildcards, grants read access to every API resource in the namespace, including Claude Managed Agents (CMA) resources (agents, sessions, environments, vaults, memory stores, and webhooks). This includes file content download through GetFile (see the Files note), skill content download through GetSkill (see the Skills note), and memory contents through GetMemoryStore. Vault credential secrets and webhook signing secrets are not exposed: those fields are write-only and are never returned by GetVault or GetWebhook (see Authenticate with vaults). AnthropicInferenceAccess does not grant file creation or deletion, skill management, user profile management, workspace mutation, encryption key management, or any Claude Managed Agents write action (create, update, archive, delete, process, or rotate). To exclude CMA reads, replace AnthropicInferenceAccess with a custom policy that enumerates only the specific non-CMA actions you need.

`AnthropicReadOnlyAccess`, `AnthropicInferenceAccess`, and `AnthropicLimitedAccess` all carry the `Get*` and `List*` wildcards, which grant read access to all content in the workspace: file bytes, skill content, batch results, session conversation history, and memory contents. The wildcards also grant `GetKey` and `ListKeys`, which read the organization's registered encryption key configurations (key ARNs and metadata, never key material). The `List*` wildcard also grants `ListComplianceActivities`, which reads the organization's compliance [Activity Feed](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/compliance-activity-feed) once the Compliance API is enabled for the organization (see [Compliance](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/claude-platform-on-aws-iam-actions#compliance)). Vault credential secrets and webhook signing secrets are not exposed; those fields are write-only and are never returned by `GetVault` or `GetWebhook`. If your principal should not read existing content, use a custom policy that enumerates only the actions you need.

AnthropicLimitedAccess includes all Claude Managed Agents actions in addition to inference actions.

AnthropicSelfHostedEnvironmentAccess is the narrowest managed policy sufficient to run a self-hosted sandbox worker. Attach it to the principal your environment worker authenticates as.

AssumeConsole is not included in AnthropicReadOnlyAccess, AnthropicInferenceAccess, AnthropicLimitedAccess, or AnthropicSelfHostedEnvironmentAccess. Principals who need Claude Console access require either AnthropicFullAccess or a custom policy that grants aws-external-anthropic:AssumeConsole. See Console access.

`CreateInference` and `CreateBatchInference` are separate actions. Denying one does not block the other. If you intend to prevent all model calls, deny both.

# Example policies

# Synchronous inference on a single workspace

Grants the minimal permissions for an IAM principal that runs inference against one production workspace:

json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "aws-external-anthropic:CreateInference",
        "aws-external-anthropic:CountTokens",
        "aws-external-anthropic:GetModel",
        "aws-external-anthropic:ListModels",
        "aws-external-anthropic:GetWorkspace"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:aws-external-anthropic:us-west-2:123456789012:workspace/wrkspc_01AbCdEf23GhIj"
    }
  ]
}
`ListWorkspaces` is account-scoped (see [Provisioning automation](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/claude-platform-on-aws-iam-actions#provisioning-automation)). If your service account needs to enumerate workspaces, add a separate `Allow` statement for `ListWorkspaces` with `Resource: "*"`.

This policy assumes AWS SigV4 authentication. If the principal authenticates with an API key, add a separate Allow statement for aws-external-anthropic:CallWithBearerToken with Resource: "*". CallWithBearerToken is a route-less action that does not bind to a workspace ARN. See Per-customer workspace isolation for the two-statement pattern.

# Per-customer workspace isolation

Restricts a role to a single workspace:

json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "aws-external-anthropic:*",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:aws-external-anthropic:us-west-2:123456789012:workspace/wrkspc_01AbCdEf23GhIj"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "aws-external-anthropic:CallWithBearerToken",
        "aws-external-anthropic:AssumeConsole"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
The `aws-external-anthropic:*` wildcard in the first statement includes account-scoped actions (`CreateWorkspace`, `ListWorkspaces`, `ListComplianceActivities`, and the external key actions) that the workspace ARN constraint silently filters out. This is consistent with the "isolation" intent (the role cannot create workspaces, enumerate workspaces, manage encryption key registrations, or read the compliance Activity Feed; it can still attach an already-registered key to its own workspace through `UpdateWorkspace`), but the policy contains permissions that have no effect. See [Provisioning automation](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/claude-platform-on-aws-iam-actions#provisioning-automation) for the account-scoped pattern.

CallWithBearerToken and AssumeConsole are route-less actions that do not bind to a workspace ARN. The second statement grants them on Resource: "*" so the role can authenticate with an API key and open the Claude Console. Omit this statement if the role uses SigV4 only and does not need Claude Console access.

# Feature lockdown for a ZDR-sensitive workspace

Blocks batch processing and file upload on a specific workspace while leaving synchronous inference available. Useful when a workspace handles Zero Data Retention (ZDR) data that must not persist server-side. Attach this policy alongside an Allow policy such as AnthropicInferenceAccess or the single-workspace example; on its own, a Deny-only policy grants no permissions:

json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": [
        "aws-external-anthropic:CreateBatchInference",
        "aws-external-anthropic:CreateFile"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:aws-external-anthropic:us-west-2:123456789012:workspace/wrkspc_01AbCdEf23GhIj"
    }
  ]
}
This deny blocks creation only. Other file and batch actions are not denied unless you list them as well. For a complete lockdown where the workspace must never hold files or batches, also deny `aws-external-anthropic:GetFile`, `aws-external-anthropic:ListFiles`, `aws-external-anthropic:DeleteFile`, `aws-external-anthropic:GetBatchInference`, `aws-external-anthropic:ListBatchInferences`, `aws-external-anthropic:CancelBatchInference`, and `aws-external-anthropic:DeleteBatchInference`.

# Provisioning automation

Besides the Admin API, you can create, update, or archive workspaces in the AWS Console or, with the Admin role, in the Claude Console.

Grants a CI/CD role the actions needed to create and manage workspaces, without any inference permissions:

json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "aws-external-anthropic:CreateWorkspace",
        "aws-external-anthropic:GetWorkspace",
        "aws-external-anthropic:ListWorkspaces",
        "aws-external-anthropic:UpdateWorkspace",
        "aws-external-anthropic:ArchiveWorkspace"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

CreateWorkspace and ListWorkspaces are account-scoped operations. Specifying a workspace ARN on these actions has no effect; use Resource: "*".

# See also

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