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identity_http_test.go 14.9 KB 405 lines go

1package api_test23import (4	"bufio"5	"context"6	"net/http"7	"strings"8	"testing"9	"time"1011	"clustr.spboucher.ai/mcc/internal/events"12)1314func TestHTTPSetupLoginCookiesAndCSRF(t *testing.T) {15	h := newHarness(t)16	guest := h.browser()17	if r := guest.do("GET", "/me", nil); r.Status != 401 || r.code() != "unauthenticated" {18		t.Fatalf("anonymous /me: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)19	}20	if r := guest.do("GET", "/me", nil); r.Header.Get("X-Correlation-Id") == "" || r.Header.Get("X-Content-Type-Options") != "nosniff" {21		t.Fatal("missing correlation id or security headers")22	}2324	root := h.owner()25	var me struct {26		User        struct{ Handle, Role string }27		Permissions []string28		CsrfToken   string `json:"csrf_token"`29	}30	root.must("GET", "/me", nil, 200).json(t, &me)31	if me.User.Handle != "root" || me.User.Role != "owner" || len(me.Permissions) < 20 || me.CsrfToken != root.csrf {32		t.Fatalf("unexpected /me: %+v", me)33	}3435	// Cookie attributes.36	r := root.login()37	if r.Status != 200 {38		t.Fatalf("login: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)39	}40	var sawSession bool41	for _, ck := range r.Header.Values("Set-Cookie") {42		if strings.HasPrefix(ck, "mcc_session=") {43			sawSession = true44			for _, attr := range []string{"HttpOnly", "SameSite=Strict", "Path=/"} {45				if !strings.Contains(ck, attr) {46					t.Errorf("session cookie lacks %s: %s", attr, ck)47				}48			}49			if strings.Contains(ck, "Max-Age") || strings.Contains(ck, "Expires") {50				t.Errorf("session cookie must not persist: %s", ck)51			}52		}53	}54	if !sawSession {55		t.Fatal("no session cookie set")56	}57	if strings.Contains(string(r.Raw), "access_token") || strings.Contains(string(r.Raw), "refresh_token") {58		t.Fatal("web sign-in must not return bearer tokens")59	}6061	// CSRF: a cookie alone is not enough to change state.62	body := map[string]any{"display_name": "Root Renamed"}63	if r := root.do("PATCH", "/me", body, "X-MCC-CSRF", ""); r.Status != 403 || r.code() != "csrf_failed" {64		t.Fatalf("missing CSRF header: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)65	}66	if r := root.do("PATCH", "/me", body, "X-MCC-CSRF", "forged"); r.code() != "csrf_failed" {67		t.Fatalf("forged CSRF header: %s", r.Raw)68	}69	if r := root.do("PATCH", "/me", body, "Origin", "https://evil.example"); r.code() != "csrf_failed" {70		t.Fatalf("cross-origin request with a valid token: %s", r.Raw)71	}72	if r := root.do("PATCH", "/me", body, "Origin", ""); r.code() != "csrf_failed" {73		t.Fatalf("cookie request without Origin: %s", r.Raw)74	}75	other := h.member(root, "viewer", "vera", false)76	if r := root.do("PATCH", "/me", body, "X-MCC-CSRF", other.csrf); r.code() != "csrf_failed" {77		t.Fatalf("another session's CSRF token accepted: %s", r.Raw)78	}79	if h.count(`select count(*) from users where display_name='Root Renamed'`) != 0 {80		t.Fatal("a refused request changed state")81	}82	root.must("PATCH", "/me", body, 200)8384	// Cross-origin sign-in attempts from a browser are refused too.85	evil := h.browser()86	evil.Origin = "https://evil.example"87	if r := evil.do("POST", "/auth/webauthn/authentication/begin", nil); r.code() != "csrf_failed" {88		t.Fatalf("cross-origin begin: %s", r.Raw)89	}9091	// Logout kills the session server-side.92	root.must("POST", "/auth/logout", nil, 204)93	if r := root.do("GET", "/me", nil); r.Status != 401 {94		t.Fatalf("after logout: %d", r.Status)95	}96}9798func TestHTTPAuthorizationAndStepUp(t *testing.T) {99	h := newHarness(t)100	root := h.owner()101	viewer := h.member(root, "viewer", "vera", false)102	operator := h.member(root, "operator", "oscar", true)103104	// Insufficient role: refused by the server and audited.105	inv := map[string]any{"role": "viewer", "handle": "x1", "display_name": "X"}106	for _, c := range []*client{viewer, operator} {107		if r := c.do("POST", "/invitations", inv); r.Status != 403 || r.code() != "forbidden" {108			t.Fatalf("invitation by non-admin: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)109		}110		if r := c.do("GET", "/invitations", nil); r.Status != 403 {111			t.Fatalf("list invitations by non-admin: %d", r.Status)112		}113	}114	if n := h.count(`select count(*) from audit_log where action='authz.denied'`); n != 4 {115		t.Fatalf("%d denials audited, want 4", n)116	}117118	// Step-up: required for sensitive operations once the last ceremony is too old.119	h.expireStepUp("root")120	if r := root.do("POST", "/invitations", inv); r.Status != 403 || r.code() != "step_up_required" {121		t.Fatalf("stale step-up: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)122	}123	root.must("GET", "/invitations", nil, 200) // reading does not need it124	root.stepUp()125	var created struct {126		Token      string `json:"token"`127		SetupURL   string `json:"setup_url"`128		Invitation struct{ ID string }129	}130	root.must("POST", "/invitations", inv, 201).json(t, &created)131	if !strings.HasPrefix(created.SetupURL, h.URL+"/setup#") || !strings.HasSuffix(created.SetupURL, created.Token) {132		t.Fatalf("setup url must carry the token in the fragment: %s", created.SetupURL)133	}134	// The token is never listed, logged in audit params, or stored in clear.135	if r := root.must("GET", "/invitations", nil, 200); strings.Contains(string(r.Raw), created.Token) {136		t.Fatal("invitation list leaks the token")137	}138	if h.count(`select count(*) from audit_log where params::text like '%'||$1||'%' or detail like '%'||$1||'%'`, created.Token) != 0 {139		t.Fatal("audit log contains the token")140	}141142	// Admin cannot create an owner even with a fresh step-up.143	admin := h.member(root, "admin", "ada", false)144	if r := admin.do("POST", "/invitations", map[string]any{"role": "owner", "handle": "o2", "display_name": "O"}); r.Status != 403 {145		t.Fatalf("admin minting an owner: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)146	}147148	// Removing one's last passkey is refused; deleting needs step-up.149	var keys struct{ Items []struct{ ID string } }150	root.must("GET", "/me/passkeys", nil, 200).json(t, &keys)151	if r := root.do("DELETE", "/me/passkeys/"+keys.Items[0].ID, nil); r.Status != 409 || r.code() != "last_passkey" {152		t.Fatalf("delete last passkey: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)153	}154	h.expireStepUp("root")155	if r := root.do("DELETE", "/me/passkeys/"+keys.Items[0].ID, nil); r.code() != "step_up_required" {156		t.Fatalf("delete passkey without step-up: %s", r.Raw)157	}158}159160func TestHTTPInvitationAbuse(t *testing.T) {161	h := newHarness(t)162	root := h.owner()163	var created struct{ Token string }164	root.must("POST", "/invitations", map[string]any{"role": "viewer", "handle": "once", "display_name": "Once"}, 201).json(t, &created)165166	a, b := h.browser(), h.browser()167	a.must("POST", "/invitations/exchange", map[string]any{"token": created.Token}, 200)168	if r := b.do("POST", "/invitations/exchange", map[string]any{"token": created.Token}); r.Status != 410 || r.code() != "invitation_invalid" {169		t.Fatalf("second exchange: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)170	}171	// Without the setup cookie the transaction is unreachable.172	if r := b.do("GET", "/invitations/transaction", nil); r.Status != 410 {173		t.Fatalf("transaction without cookie: %d", r.Status)174	}175	if r := b.do("POST", "/auth/webauthn/registration/begin", map[string]any{}); r.Status != 401 {176		t.Fatalf("registration without session or transaction: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)177	}178	// Setup endpoints are protected against cross-site use as well.179	if r := a.do("POST", "/auth/webauthn/registration/begin", map[string]any{}, "Origin", "https://evil.example"); r.code() != "csrf_failed" {180		t.Fatalf("cross-origin setup: %s", r.Raw)181	}182	// Abandon: nothing can be registered afterwards.183	a.must("DELETE", "/invitations/transaction", nil, 204)184	if r := a.do("POST", "/auth/webauthn/registration/begin", map[string]any{}); r.Status == 200 {185		t.Fatal("abandoned transaction still usable")186	}187	if h.count(`select count(*) from users where handle='once'`) != 0 {188		t.Fatal("account created from an abandoned invitation")189	}190	// Revoked invitation.191	var c2 struct {192		Token      string193		Invitation struct{ ID string }194	}195	root.must("POST", "/invitations", map[string]any{"role": "viewer", "handle": "rev", "display_name": "Rev"}, 201).json(t, &c2)196	root.must("DELETE", "/invitations/"+c2.Invitation.ID, nil, 204)197	if r := h.browser().do("POST", "/invitations/exchange", map[string]any{"token": c2.Token}); r.Status != 410 {198		t.Fatalf("revoked invitation: %d", r.Status)199	}200}201202func TestHTTPNativeBearerRefreshAndDeviceRevocation(t *testing.T) {203	h := newHarness(t)204	root := h.owner()205	mac := h.member(root, "operator", "oscar", true)206	if mac.access == "" || mac.refresh == "" || mac.device == "" {207		t.Fatal("native client did not get tokens")208	}209	mac.must("GET", "/me", nil, 200)210	// Malformed Authorization headers are refused outright (no fallback to cookies).211	if r := mac.do("GET", "/me", nil, "Authorization", "Basic abc"); r.Status != 401 {212		t.Fatalf("basic auth accepted: %d", r.Status)213	}214215	// Rotation, then replay of the old refresh token revokes the session.216	old := mac.refresh217	var pair map[string]any218	mac.must("POST", "/auth/refresh", map[string]any{"refresh_token": old}, 200).json(t, &pair)219	mac.absorb(pair)220	mac.must("GET", "/me", nil, 200)221	if r := mac.do("POST", "/auth/refresh", map[string]any{"refresh_token": old}); r.Status != 401 || r.code() != "refresh_rejected" {222		t.Fatalf("refresh replay: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)223	}224	if r := mac.do("GET", "/me", nil); r.Status != 401 {225		t.Fatal("session survived a refresh-token replay")226	}227228	// Sign in again on the same device id, then revoke the device from the web session.229	if r := mac.login(); r.Status != 200 {230		t.Fatalf("native login: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)231	}232	deviceID := mac.device233	web := h.browser()234	web.auth = mac.auth235	if r := web.login(); r.Status != 200 {236		t.Fatalf("web login with the same passkey: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)237	}238	var devs struct {239		Items []struct {240			ID      string241			Kind    string242			Current bool243		}244	}245	web.must("GET", "/me/devices", nil, 200).json(t, &devs)246	if len(devs.Items) != 2 {247		t.Fatalf("want 2 devices (one native reused, one web), got %d", len(devs.Items))248	}249	web.must("DELETE", "/me/devices/"+deviceID, nil, 204)250	if r := mac.do("GET", "/me", nil); r.Status != 401 {251		t.Fatal("revoked device still authenticated")252	}253	if r := mac.do("POST", "/auth/refresh", map[string]any{"refresh_token": mac.refresh}); r.Status != 401 {254		t.Fatal("revoked device could refresh")255	}256	web.must("GET", "/me", nil, 200)257	// Another user's device or session id is indistinguishable from a missing one.258	var rootDevs struct{ Items []struct{ ID string } }259	root.must("GET", "/me/devices", nil, 200).json(t, &rootDevs)260	if r := web.do("DELETE", "/me/devices/"+rootDevs.Items[0].ID, nil); r.Status != 404 {261		t.Fatalf("revoking someone else's device: %d", r.Status)262	}263264	// Session expiry.265	h.Pool.Exec(context.Background(), `update sessions set idle_expires_at = now() - interval '1 second' where user_id=(select id from users where handle='oscar')`)266	if r := web.do("GET", "/me", nil); r.Status != 401 {267		t.Fatal("expired session accepted")268	}269}270271func TestHTTPEnvelopeFallbackAndRateLimit(t *testing.T) {272	h := newHarness(t)273	root := h.owner()274	if r := root.do("GET", "/definitely/not/a/route", nil); r.Status != 404 || r.code() != "not_found" {275		t.Fatalf("unknown route: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)276	}277	if r := root.do("POST", "/auth/webauthn/authentication/finish", map[string]any{"challenge_id": "not-a-uuid"}); r.Status != 400 || r.code() != "validation_failed" {278		t.Fatalf("malformed body: %d %s", r.Status, r.Raw)279	}280	big := strings.Repeat("x", 2<<20)281	if r := root.do("PATCH", "/me", map[string]any{"display_name": big}); r.Status < 400 {282		t.Fatalf("oversized body accepted: %d", r.Status)283	}284	// Apple association file.285	res, err := http.Get(h.URL + "/.well-known/apple-app-site-association")286	if err != nil || res.StatusCode != 200 || !strings.HasPrefix(res.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "application/json") {287		t.Fatalf("AASA: %v %v", err, res)288	}289	res.Body.Close()290291	// Unauthenticated ceremonies are rate-limited per IP.292	limited := false293	for i := 0; i < 60; i++ {294		r := h.browser().do("POST", "/auth/webauthn/authentication/begin", nil)295		if r.Status == 429 {296			if r.Header.Get("Retry-After") == "" || r.code() != "rate_limited" {297				t.Fatalf("429 without Retry-After: %s", r.Raw)298			}299			limited = true300			break301		}302	}303	if !limited {304		t.Fatal("public endpoint was never rate-limited")305	}306}307308func TestHTTPEventStream(t *testing.T) {309	h := newHarness(t)310	root := h.owner()311	viewer := h.member(root, "viewer", "vera", false)312	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Second)313	defer cancel()314315	open := func(c *client, lastID string) (*bufio.Scanner, func()) {316		req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", h.URL+"/api/v1/events", nil)317		if lastID != "" {318			req.Header.Set("Last-Event-ID", lastID)319		}320		streamer := &http.Client{Jar: c.http.Jar}321		res, err := streamer.Do(req)322		if err != nil {323			t.Fatal(err)324		}325		if res.StatusCode != 200 || !strings.HasPrefix(res.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "text/event-stream") {326			t.Fatalf("stream: %d %s", res.StatusCode, res.Header.Get("Content-Type"))327		}328		return bufio.NewScanner(res.Body), func() { res.Body.Close() }329	}330	// next returns the next (id, event) frame, skipping comments.331	next := func(sc *bufio.Scanner) (id, event, data string) {332		for sc.Scan() {333			line := sc.Text()334			switch {335			case strings.HasPrefix(line, "id: "):336				id = line[4:]337			case strings.HasPrefix(line, "event: "):338				event = line[7:]339			case strings.HasPrefix(line, "data: "):340				data = line[6:]341			case line == "" && event != "":342				return343			}344		}345		t.Fatalf("stream ended: %v", sc.Err())346		return347	}348349	if res, _ := http.Get(h.URL + "/api/v1/events"); res.StatusCode != 401 {350		t.Fatalf("anonymous stream: %d", res.StatusCode)351	}352353	rs, closeRoot := open(root, "")354	vs, closeViewer := open(viewer, "")355	defer closeViewer()356	if _, ev, _ := next(rs); ev != "hello" {357		t.Fatalf("first frame %q", ev)358	}359	next(vs)360361	pub := func(topic string, v any) {362		if err := events.Publish(ctx, h.Pool, topic, v); err != nil {363			t.Fatal(err)364		}365	}366	pub("audit.appended", map[string]int{"seq": 1}) // owner only367	pub("node.state", map[string]string{"node_id": "n1"})368	id1, ev, _ := next(rs)369	if ev != "audit.appended" {370		t.Fatalf("owner should receive audit events, got %q", ev)371	}372	id2, ev, data := next(rs)373	if ev != "node.state" || !strings.Contains(data, "n1") || id2 <= id1 {374		t.Fatalf("owner frame 2: %s %s %s", id2, ev, data)375	}376	if _, ev, _ := next(vs); ev != "node.state" {377		t.Fatalf("viewer must not see audit events; got %q first", ev)378	}379380	// Resume: events published while disconnected are delivered exactly once, in order.381	closeRoot()382	pub("node.state", map[string]string{"node_id": "n2"})383	pub("node.state", map[string]string{"node_id": "n3"})384	rs2, close2 := open(root, id2)385	defer close2()386	next(rs2) // hello387	if _, _, d := next(rs2); !strings.Contains(d, "n2") {388		t.Fatalf("resume lost an event: %s", d)389	}390	if _, _, d := next(rs2); !strings.Contains(d, "n3") {391		t.Fatalf("resume out of order: %s", d)392	}393394	// A position that was pruned yields an explicit resync.395	h.Pool.Exec(ctx, `update events_outbox set ts = now() - interval '2 hours'`)396	events.Prune(ctx, h.Pool)397	pub("node.state", map[string]string{"node_id": "n4"})398	rs3, close3 := open(root, id1)399	defer close3()400	next(rs3)401	if _, ev, _ := next(rs3); ev != "resync" {402		t.Fatalf("expected resync, got %q", ev)403	}404}405
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