NEXTERM — Security behaviour
Process model and entitlements
- NEXTERM is not App Sandboxed: it must spawn the user's login shell,
ssh,git,tmuxandclaudewith the user's real environment and PTYs. Hardened Runtime is enabled; the only entitlement iscom.apple.security.network.client(hook receiver on loopback, SSH is a child process). Consequence: distribution is Developer ID + notarization (not Mac App Store). Seedocs/RELEASE.md. - macOS privacy (TCC) prompts for Desktop/Documents/Downloads/removable volumes are attributed to NEXTERM when a child process touches them, exactly as with Terminal.app. NEXTERM never pre-grants anything.
- Child processes are launched from argument arrays (
LaunchSpec) — never from concatenated shell strings. The one remote-side command string (cd '<dir>' && exec tmux …over SSH) single-quotes every user value and strips control characters (SSHCommandBuilder.shellQuote, unit-tested).
Terminal output is untrusted
- SwiftTerm parses escape sequences; NEXTERM never interprets terminal text as application
commands. Session state shown in the UI (pid, tty, cwd, foreground program) comes from the kernel
(
tcgetpgrp, libproc) or from OSC 7/OSC 0 title updates, which only set display strings. - Claude status comes exclusively from Claude Code hook events — never from scraping the screen.
- Clickable links/paths go through SwiftTerm's
UntrustedTerminalLinkvalidation.
Clipboard and paste
- Multi-line pastes prompt for confirmation (Settings ▸ Behavior, on by default); bracketed paste is
honoured by SwiftTerm and control bytes in pasted text are filtered (xterm
disallowedPasteControls).
SSH
- Always
/usr/bin/sshwithStrictHostKeyChecking=ask: unknown hosts prompt in the terminal, changed keys are refused by OpenSSH. There is no code path that setsStrictHostKeyChecking=noorUserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null(tested inRemoteCoreTests). Verified live on 2026-11-01: an unknown key produced OpenSSH's fingerprint prompt, "no" was answered andknown_hostswas unchanged. - Host aliases are placed after
--so an alias can never be parsed as an option. - Authentication uses the user's SSH agent/keys; NEXTERM stores no passwords, passphrases or keys. Host metadata (labels, tags, groups, favourites, tmux session, remote dir) is stored in SQLite.
Claude Code hooks (opt-in)
- Off by default. When enabled, NEXTERM runs an HTTP receiver on
127.0.0.1:<ephemeral port>and writes~/Library/Application Support/NEXTERM/hooks/hooks-settings.json(mode 0600) containingtype: httphooks with a per-launch random bearer token. Claude sessions started by NEXTERM get--settings <that file>;~/.claude/settings.jsonis never modified. - The receiver authenticates with a constant-time token compare, accepts only
POST /hook, caps bodies at 2 MB and always returns an empty 200 — it cannot returnpermissionDecision,decision,updatedInputor any other directive, so it can never approve, deny or alter a tool call. - Turning the toggle off (or quitting) stops the receiver and deletes the settings file. Sessions already running keep the file path on their command line until restarted.
Git
- Read operations only, plus
git worktree addandgit worktree removeof a clean worktree (the API has no force parameter; dirty worktrees throwGitSafetyError). No merge, push, reset, clean, checkout or branch deletion is exposed. Dangerous UI actions ask for confirmation. GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0prevents credential prompts from hanging the app.
Process termination
- Closing a pane/tab/window or quitting with a foreground program running asks first
(
tcgetpgrpsays whether something other than the shell owns the PTY).
Logging and telemetry
- No telemetry, no network calls other than the user's own SSH/Git/Claude processes.
- Diagnostics use
os.Logger(subsystemai.spboucher.nexterm); terminal contents are never logged. SwiftTerm'ssetHostLogging(raw PTY capture) is not enabled anywhere. - The settings file can enable diagnostic logging; it only adds lifecycle messages.
Persistence
- SQLite at
~/Library/Application Support/NEXTERM/nexterm.sqlite(WAL). All statements use bound parameters (PersistenceCoreTests.parameterBindingIsSafe). Stored: layouts, window geometry, pane profiles (kind, cwd, label, env overrides set by the user), settings, host metadata. Not stored: terminal scrollback, credentials, hook tokens.
Deep links
nexterm://pane|ssh|claude|mission-controlonly act on already-configured hosts/panes and file-system paths that exist; nothing from a URL reaches a shell.
Known limitations
- The hook receiver trusts any local process holding the token (the file is 0600 and the token is per launch; a local attacker with the user's privileges could post fake events — these would only affect NEXTERM's status display, never Claude's permission flow).
--settingsmerges with the user's own hook settings; NEXTERM cannot see or control those.