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1# ORIX Astra — Security and privacy23This document states what the app does, what it defends against, and how each defence is tested. Items that could not be verified on a physical device are marked as such.45## 1. Data inventory67| Data | Where it lives | Leaves the device? |8|---|---|---|9| Conversations, messages, branches, prompts, presets, agent profiles and runs, usage ledger, diagnostics, memories | SQLite database in the app's Application Support directory, file protection `completeUntilFirstUserAuthentication` | Only through an export the person starts |10| Attachments (images, PDFs, text) | Files named by SHA-256 beside the database | Sent to a cloud provider only when attached to a message for a cloud model, after a one-time confirmation per provider |11| Imported documents and their full-text index | Same database | Retrieved passages are sent to a cloud provider only if the agent's or chat's model is a cloud model |12| Provider API keys, custom-endpoint keys | iOS Keychain, `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`, not synchronisable | Sent only to their own provider, in a header |13| Model weights | Application Support/Models, excluded from backup | Never |14| Analytics, telemetry, crash reports | **None collected** | — |1516There is no ORIX account, no ORIX backend in the request path, and no third-party SDK. The app's privacy manifest declares no tracking and no collected data types.1718## 2. Where requests go1920| Feature | Destination | When |21|---|---|---|22| Cloud chat, arena, agents on a cloud model | The selected provider (`api.openai.com`, `api.anthropic.com`, `generativelanguage.googleapis.com`, `api.x.ai`, `openrouter.ai`) or the person's own endpoint | When the person sends a message to that model |23| Model lists and key checks | Same hosts | When a key is saved or the list is refreshed |24| Model catalogue and weights | `www.orixlab.dev`, with `huggingface.co` as fallback and for licences that are not mirrored | When the person opens Models or starts a download |25| Agent `web_fetch` | The host in the approved request | Only after a per-host approval |26| On-device chat (MLX, Apple Intelligence) | Nowhere | — |2728OpenRouter forwards requests to an upstream provider of its choosing; the app shows which one served each answer and offers the "providers that do not retain prompts" routing option.2930## 3. Threat model and mitigations3132| # | Threat | Mitigation | Test |33|---|---|---|---|34| T1 | A key leaks into a log, an error message, a diagnostic, an export or a screenshot | Keys are read from the Keychain at request time by a closure and never stored in observable state; the key field is cleared the moment it is submitted and only a masked form (`prefix••••last4`) is ever shown; `Redactor` scrubs known key shapes, bearer tokens, credential headers and `key=`/`token=` parameters from every provider message before it becomes an `AstraError`; diagnostics record status, request id and timings only | `errorMessagesNeverCarryASecret`, `redactorRemovesKnownKeyShapes` (7 key shapes × 7 contexts), provider key-leak test across errors, URLs, bodies and diagnostics for all six adapters, export test asserting no key field |35| T2 | A key is sent to the wrong host | One adapter per provider with a fixed base URL; Gemini's key goes in the `x-goog-api-key` header, never in the URL; custom endpoints use their own Keychain account | Request-encoding tests per adapter |36| T3 | A development key ships in the app | The shipped app contains no key. Automated runs may inject keys through the process environment in **DEBUG builds only**; they are held in an in-memory store and never reach the Keychain or disk | Secret scan (`Scripts/secret-scan.sh`) over the repository and the built app |37| T4 | Insecure endpoint | Plain HTTP is refused by default; when explicitly allowed for one endpoint it is still limited to loopback, link-local, private and CGNAT ranges and `.local` hosts, matching App Transport Security's local-networking exception; credentials in the URL are refused | `EndpointPolicyTests` |38| T5 | Header injection through custom endpoint headers | Header names are validated, credential-bearing names are refused, values with control characters are refused (checked on Unicode scalars: `\r\n` is one `Character` in Swift, a bug the tests caught) | `profileRefusesCredentialHeaders` |39| T6 | Malformed or hostile provider stream | Incremental SSE parser with an 8 MB line cap; `StreamValidator` rejects out-of-order events; invalid tool-argument JSON becomes an empty object with the raw text preserved; exactly one terminal event is guaranteed | `ValidatorTests`, `OrchestratorTests`, per-adapter mid-stream error fixtures |40| T7 | Model output that tries to run code or load remote content | Model output is rendered as Markdown by a native parser; raw HTML is shown as literal text and never interpreted; remote images are never fetched (the link is offered instead); only `http`, `https` and `mailto` links can be opened, anything else is inert | Markdown model tests |41| T8 | Prompt injection through documents, web pages or tool results | Tool results reach the model inside a delimited envelope with a fixed "this is data, not instructions" preamble, with marker spoofing stripped; permissions, allowlists and budgets are enforced in code so no model output can widen them; a heuristic scanner flags suspicious content and the flag is shown in the timeline and the approval sheet | Agent injection scenarios |42| T9 | Tool misuse by an agent | Tools outside the profile's allowlist never execute; arguments are validated against the tool's JSON Schema before execution; writes, external requests and destructive actions always need an explicit approval; a denied call returns an error to the model and is recorded; steps, tool calls, tokens, cost and wall-clock are bounded; repeated and alternating calls are detected and stop the run | Registry, approvals matrix, budget and cycle tests |43| T10 | Data exfiltration through `web_fetch` | HTTPS only, public hosts only (loopback, private, link-local and CGNAT refused), every redirect re-validated, URLs whose query embeds chunks of conversation text are flagged and always prompt even on a pre-approved host | SSRF and exfiltration tests |44| T11 | Path traversal and oversized or hostile files | Attachment bytes are stored under their SHA-256, never under a supplied name; imported files are capped at 20 MB, images are decoded at target size through ImageIO and re-encoded (which also drops location metadata), extracted text is capped; model downloads restrict paths to the model directory, refuse `..` and absolute paths, and refuse bodies larger than the declared size | Persistence traversal tests, download coordinator tests |45| T12 | Tampered or corrupted model weights | Every file is verified by SHA-256 against the catalogue; the bundled catalogue pins the hashes of the models the app ships with, and an online card for a known model is rejected if its hashes differ | Catalogue and download tests |46| T13 | Decompression bombs | The app never decompresses archives: models are downloaded as plain files, attachments are not unpacked | By construction |47| T14 | Low disk, low memory, thermal throttling, interrupted downloads | Disk preflight with a safety margin; conservative memory verdicts; one loaded model; unload on memory pressure; refusal to start a generation at critical thermal state; resumable range downloads that survive relaunch | Governor and download tests (injected readings); **device behaviour unverified** |48| T15 | Someone picks up the unlocked phone | Optional app lock with device-owner authentication (Face ID / Touch ID with passcode fallback); the lock view covers content when the app leaves the foreground; if the device has no passcode the lock is turned off and the person is told why | **Unverified on device** |49| T16 | Quota exhaustion and runaway cost | Arena shows an upper-bound estimate before a multi-model run and supports a budget; agents have token and cost limits; costs are labelled as estimates with the date of the prices | Cost tests |5051## 4. Reasoning traces5253The app shows only what a provider legitimately returns as a reasoning **summary**, or a local model's own visible thinking block. It never attempts to reconstruct hidden reasoning and never displays opaque reasoning state.5455## 5. Clipboard5657The app writes to the clipboard only on an explicit Copy action and never writes a key to it. Pasting a key reads the clipboard once, on the person's tap.5859## 6. What agents cannot do6061No shell, no process spawning, no arbitrary code execution, no access to other apps' data, no device-wide automation, no file access outside the items the person grants for a run, no file write except through the system exporter after approval. `calculator` and `data_transform` are the supported limited evaluators.6263## 7. Transport security6465All provider traffic is HTTPS with the system's certificate validation; the app does not disable or weaken it and uses ephemeral sessions without cookies or URL caches. `NSAllowsLocalNetworking` is the only App Transport Security exception, for user-configured servers on the local network.6667## 8. Export compliance6869The app uses only HTTPS and Apple's system cryptography (Keychain, CryptoKit SHA-256): `ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption` is `false`.7071## 9. Reporting7273Security reports: `admin@spboucher.ai`.74
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