Environment audit — 2026-11-21
Everything below was observed with metadata-only commands on the development Mac. No secret value was read into a terminal, a log or this repository.
Repository
- No project existed. A new repository was created next to the other ORIX applications of the owner
(
…/apple/ORIXAutomation), following their conventions: XcodeGenproject.yml(the.xcodeprojis generated, not committed), Swift packages underPackages/, release scripts underScripts/, file headers,dist/+build/ignored. - A parent folder carries an unrelated
CLAUDE.md(another product). It is ignored, apart from the shared header convention. - Git: local repository, branch
main, no remote yet. Publishing to a remote is a decision left to the owner.
Toolchain
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| macOS | 27.0 (build 26A5425a), Apple Silicon (arm64) |
| Xcode | 27.2 (27B52), macOS SDK 27.2 |
| Swift | 6.4.2, language mode 6, strict concurrency |
| Tools present | xcodegen, create-dmg, python3 (Homebrew), node, /usr/bin/sandbox-exec, JavaScriptCore jsc helper |
| Deployment target chosen | macOS 15.0 (same as the sibling apps); built and tested on 27.0 only |
Signing and notarization (metadata only)
security find-identity -v -p codesigning: one Developer ID Application identity (team3YM54G49SN) and two Apple Development identities. Hashes are not recorded here.xcrun notarytool history --keychain-profile MacLustr-Notarize: the existing keychain profile answers and lists accepted submissions from earlier today for sibling apps. It is reused as is; no credential was created, replaced, printed or exported.- Sibling release scripts (
sign.sh,notarize.sh,package.sh) were read and their approach is reused: Xcode signs the Release build with the Developer ID identity and Hardened Runtime,notarytool submit --wait, staple,spctl.
Distribution assessment
| Channel | Verdict |
|---|---|
| Direct distribution (Developer ID + notarization) | Chosen. Required for Apple Events to arbitrary apps, Accessibility control, child processes, Seatbelt confinement of scripts and a user LaunchAgent. |
| Mac App Store | Not targeted. The App Sandbox forbids most of what the product does (unrestricted Apple Events, Accessibility control of other apps, spawning arbitrary tools, reading user-chosen folders from a background agent without bookmarks per file). No claim of App Store compliance is made. |
The app is therefore not sandboxed. It runs with the Hardened Runtime and one entitlement,
com.apple.security.automation.apple-events (needed to send Apple Events under the Hardened Runtime). Its own
permission model (policy engine, grants, Seatbelt confinement of subprocesses) is what bounds the agent; macOS TCC
bounds the app.
macOS privacy permissions (TCC)
None can be granted programmatically, and the app never tries. Each is requested through the standard system flow
when a feature first needs it, and its absence is reported as BLOCKED_PERMISSION:
| Permission | Used by | How it is obtained |
|---|---|---|
| Automation (Apple Events), per target app | applescript.*, jxa.* |
System prompt on first event to each app |
| Accessibility | accessibility.*, Watch & Learn |
User enables the app in System Settings |
| Screen Recording | screen.capture, window titles |
System prompt, then System Settings |
| Notifications | approvals, run summaries | System prompt |
| Files and Folders / Full Disk Access | reading protected folders | System prompt per folder; Full Disk Access is never required |
Status during development: the test processes (swift test under the terminal) and the app have whatever the
terminal/app was granted on this Mac; each test suite prints which permission it had and what it skipped.
Development provider credentials (SP Chat)
- Located through the owner's deployment tooling: the SP Chat deployment is a Node service on a cluster node, with
provider keys injected as process environment variables from a deployment manifest. Variable names observed:
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY,OPENAI_API_KEY,OPENROUTER_API_KEY(plus others not used here). Values were only ever displayed as lengths. - The operator keeps a copy of that environment in a secrets file outside any repository on this Mac.
- Strategy:
Scripts/test/with-dev-keys.shis a broker: it reads the three values from that file and places them in the environment of one child process (ORIX_DEV_*_API_KEY). Nothing is copied into this repository, a.envfile, the Keychain, the app bundle, a fixture or a log.--checkreports presence by length only (all three present). - The only code that reads those variables is
DevEnvironmentCredentials, compiled under#if DEBUGand absent from Release builds. The shipped app is BYOK: keys typed by the user, stored in the login Keychain. - Authorization and cost: the product owner's brief designates these keys as the development test configuration.
Live tests are smoke tests on the cheapest models with hard token caps; the whole live suite is budgeted well under
US$0.05 per run. Results are recorded in
docs/release/live-provider-smoke.md.
Constraints noted
- The system language is French: scripts force
LC_ALL=Cwhen parsing tool output; UI tests pass-AppleLanguages "(en)"for English screenshots. - Other sessions may use the screen: GUI automation tests are gated on real permission status and never prompt.