ORIX Secure — Network Lab and link analysis
Sources: package ORIXNetworkLab, package ORIXURLRisk, App/Sources/Features/Network/NetworkController.swift,
App/Sources/Features/URLAnalysis/LinkAnalyzerView.swift, App/Sources/Platform/QRReading.swift,
ShareExtension/Sources/ShareViewController.swift.
1. Network diagnostics
flowchart TD
subgraph Passive["Local state — contacts no remote endpoint"]
M["ConnectivityMonitor<br/>NWPathMonitor"] --> SNAP["ConnectivitySnapshot"]
IF["InterfaceInspector.addresses()<br/>getifaddrs"] --> ADDR["[InterfaceAddress]"]
PX["InterfaceInspector.proxyConfiguration()<br/>CFNetworkCopySystemProxySettings"] --> PROXY["ProxyConfiguration"]
ADDR --> VPN["vpnIndicator — heuristic"]
PROXY --> VPN
WF["WiFiInspector.currentNetwork<br/>NEHotspotNetwork.fetchCurrent()"] --> WIFI["Reading of WiFiNetworkInfo"]
end
SNAP --> IN["NetworkAssessmentInput<br/>NetworkAssessment.collect"]
ADDR --> IN
PROXY --> IN
WIFI --> IN
IN --> NF["NetworkAssessment.findings — pure"]
NF --> SEC["AppModel.networkFindings<br/>contributed to the security assessment"]
subgraph Active["User-started probes — host typed by the user"]
H["host"] --> DNS["DNSProbe.resolve<br/>getaddrinfo, 5 s"]
H --> LAT["LatencyProbe.measure<br/>TCP 443, 5 samples"]
H --> TLS["TLSInspector.inspect<br/>one handshake, no data sent"]
TLS --> X509["X509Certificate + HostnameMatcher"]
X509 --> TF["TLSAssessment.findings"]
H -->|"separate button"| HTTPS["HTTPSProbe.head<br/>HEAD, at most 5 redirects"]
end
BON["LocalNetworkBrowser.browse<br/>NWBrowser, 6 s"] --> SUM["BonjourBrowseSummary"]
NF --> REP["NetworkAssessment.report<br/>ReportDocument kind .network"]
DNS --> REP
LAT --> REP
TF --> REP
SUM --> REP
NetworkController.runProbes(on:) starts DNS, latency and TLS concurrently for the host shown on screen;
the HTTPS probe and the Bonjour scan each have their own button.
1.1 Connectivity monitor
ConnectivityMonitor wraps NWPathMonitor: snapshots() (an AsyncStream), current(timeout:) (2 s
default) and a bounded in-memory change log (logCapacity 200, oldest dropped). A ConnectivitySnapshot
holds status, interfaceKinds, isExpensive, isConstrained, supportsIPv4/IPv6/DNS,
unsatisfiedReason, availableInterfaces. Monitoring runs while the app is active: AppModel.init calls
network.startMonitoring() at launch (the dashboard shows the connection) and stopMonitoring() has no
caller. The change log is not persisted.
1.2 Interfaces, proxy, VPN indicator
InterfaceInspector.addresses()lists this device's own IPv4/IPv6 addresses withgetifaddrs, each classified byAddressScope(loopback, private, CGNAT, link-local, unique local, global, multicast…).proxyConfiguration()interpretsCFNetworkCopySystemProxySettings: HTTP/HTTPS/SOCKS endpoints, PAC URL, auto-discovery, exceptions and the interface names under__SCOPED__.isProxyConfiguredis true for an explicit proxy or a PAC script; auto-discovery alone does not count.vpnIndicator(addresses:proxy:)is a heuristic over names with the prefixesutun,ipsec,ppp,tap,tun: (a) such an interface that is up and holds a routable address, and/or (b) such a name in the scoped proxy settings. Up tunnel interfaces holding only link-local addresses are reported separately assystemOnlyTunnelInterfacesand do not trigger the indicator.VPNIndicator.confidenceis always.heuristic; the source states it can be wrong in both directions (iOS systemutuninterfaces, iCloud Private Relay, device management, content filters).
Findings of NetworkAssessment.findings: network.connectivity, network.lowDataMode, network.expensive,
network.ipv6, network.addresses, network.proxy (attention/moderate when a proxy is
configured), network.vpn (attention with severity low, heuristic, when indicated; verified heuristic
otherwise), plus wifi.security when the path may be on Wi-Fi. The public address is not determined.
NWPath.supportsDNS is shown as reported but is not turned into a finding: it was observed to be false in the
iOS Simulator while names resolved, so the DNS probe is the only source of a DNS conclusion.
1.3 DNS
DNSProbe.resolve(_:timeout:) calls getaddrinfo on a dedicated thread with a 5 s default timeout; a lookup
that times out is abandoned, not interrupted. Failures are classified (DNSFailure.Kind, including not found,
timeout, no network). resolve(hosts:maxConcurrent:) runs at most 4 lookups at a time. Not visible to an app
and stated as such: which resolver answered, whether the answer was cached, DNSSEC.
1.4 TCP latency
LatencyProbe.measure(host:port:samples:timeout:interval:) — defaults port 443, 5 samples (clamped 1…50),
3 s per attempt, 200 ms pause — opens sequential NWConnections with NWParameters.tcp, sends nothing and
cancels each once ready. A sample's duration is the TCP handshake time from the connection's establishment
report when available, else wall-clock time. LatencyStatistics: minimum, average, median, maximum, jitter
(population standard deviation), loss count. This is not ICMP echo.
1.5 TLS inspector
TLSInspector.inspect(_:mode:alpn:allowLegacyProtocols:timeout:now:) performs one handshake over
NWConnection (defaults: mode: .reportOnly, ALPN h2 and http/1.1, legacy protocols offered so that an
obsolete server can be reported, 10 s). In the sec_protocol_options_set_verify_block it evaluates the chain
with SecTrustEvaluateWithError, copies at most 16 certificates as DER, and — in reportOnly mode — lets the
handshake finish so the negotiated version, cipher suite and ALPN can be read from
sec_protocol_metadata. No application data is sent in either mode; the connection is closed when the
handshake ends.
In-house parsing (no OS certificate-field API):
DER.swift— definite lengths only, at most 4 length bytes,maxDepth24,maxElements50 000,maxInputSize1 MiB, every access bounds-checked.X509Certificate(der:)— subject, issuer, validity, public key (algorithm, bits, curve), signature algorithm, subject alternative names, basic constraints, key usages, SHA-256 fingerprint;verifySelfSignature()for self-signed leaves.HostnameMatcher— RFC 6125 / 9525: exact DNS SAN match; a wildcard only as the whole left-most label, standing for exactly one label; no wildcard under a TLD or a public-suffix-like two-label name (short built-in list, a heuristic); IP addresses against IP SANs only; no common-name fallback.
TLSAssessment.findings (constants expiryWarningDays 14, publicLeafMaximumValidityDays 398):
| Finding id | attention condition |
Severity |
|---|---|---|
tls.handshake |
Handshake did not complete | low without chain or verdict, else moderate |
tls.trust |
SecTrustEvaluateWithError false |
high |
tls.validity |
Expired / not yet valid; expires within 14 days | high; low |
tls.hostname |
SANs do not cover the host | high |
tls.selfSigned / tls.issuer |
Self-signed leaf / issuer not trusted by the device | moderate |
tls.protocol |
TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 or DTLS 1.0 negotiated | moderate |
tls.signature |
MD2, MD5 or SHA-1 signature | high |
tls.key |
RSA under 2048 bits, EC under 224 bits | high |
tls.validityPeriod |
Leaf valid for more than 398 days | low |
Not checked: revocation (independently of iOS), Certificate Transparency, the origin of the trusted root.
1.6 HTTPS probe
HTTPSProbe.head(_:timeout:) sends HEAD with an ephemeral URLSession (no cookie storage, no cache, no
credential storage, 10 s), refuses automatic redirects through its delegate and requests each hop explicitly,
at most maximumRedirects (5). Findings: https.request, https.upgrade (attention/moderate when the
site stays on http), https.hsts (attention/low without an effective Strict-Transport-Security),
https.redirects. The app calls it only from "Check HTTPS Policy", with https://HOST/.
1.7 Bonjour browser
LocalNetworkBrowser.browse(serviceTypes:duration:) runs one NWBrowser per service type for a bounded
duration (clamped 1–30 s; the app uses 6 s) and streams .found / .lost / .finished. The 14
defaultServiceTypes are exactly the entries of NSBonjourServices in Info.plist. Error
kDNSServiceErr_PolicyDenied (−65570) maps to .permissionRequired. Discovered devices are not contacted;
the result is a list of advertised services, not a device inventory.
1.8 Wi-Fi inspector
WiFiInspector.currentNetwork(locationAuthorization:isOnWiFi:) calls NEHotspotNetwork.fetchCurrent() and
returns SSID (first 64 characters), BSSID, WiFiSecurity (open, wep, personal, enterprise,
unknown) and a signal strength only when in (0, 1]. WiFiInspector.requirements restates Apple's
conditions: the Access Wi-Fi Information entitlement, plus precise Location authorization, or a network the
app configured with NEHotspotConfiguration, or an active VPN or NEDNSSettingsManager configuration of the
app. ORIX Secure uses only the Location route. When iOS returns nothing, the unavailability kind tells why:
permissionRequired (not authorized, or approximate accuracy only), entitlementRequired (precise location
authorized but no network), simulator. wifi.security is attention/moderate for open networks,
attention/high for WEP, verified for personal/enterprise, userConfirmationRequired when the type is
not reported. iOS does not distinguish WPA2 from WPA3.
1.9 Requirements per probe
| Probe | Info.plist key | Entitlement | Runtime prompt |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectivity, interfaces, proxy, VPN indicator | none | none | none |
| DNS, TCP latency, TLS, HTTPS | none | none | none |
| Bonjour browser | NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription, NSBonjourServices |
none | Local network, at the first browse |
| Wi-Fi inspector | NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription |
com.apple.developer.networking.wifi-info |
Location, from the "Allow to Read Wi-Fi Security" button |
1.10 Never done
- No ICMP echo, no raw sockets, no port scan: the latency probe contacts one port of one host.
- No interception or proxying of traffic; no certificate is installed; no trust setting is modified.
- No VPN, no DNS configuration, no content filter.
NetworkExtensionis imported only forNEHotspotNetwork.fetchCurrent(); the project contains no NetworkExtension provider target and noNEVPNManager,NEHotspotConfigurationorNEDNSSettingsManageruse. - No throughput test, no "what is my IP" service, no reputation lookup, no probe of a host the user did not enter.
2. URL analysis
flowchart TD
I["Input: typed, pasted, orixsecure:// URL,<br/>share extension, QR payload"] --> EX["extractURLs(from:) when the text has whitespace<br/>NSDataDetector + token pass"]
EX --> A["URLRiskAnalyzer.analyze(_:)"]
A --> L{"≤ 100 000 scalars<br/>and not empty?"}
L -->|no| INV["url.invalid, weight 10"]
L -->|yes| CH["checkCharacters<br/>invisible / bidi, full-width"]
CH --> P["URLParser.parse<br/>after removing invisible characters"]
P -->|failure| INV
P -->|"hierarchical with host"| H["checkScheme → checkHost (IP, IDN, brands, keywords)<br/>→ checkUserinfo → checkPort → checkEncoding<br/>→ checkRedirects → checkPath"]
P -->|"opaque scheme"| O["checkOpaqueScheme"]
H --> S["signals: [URLSignal], one per kind"]
O --> S
INV --> S
S --> SC["URLRiskScoring.score = min(100, Σ weights)"]
SC --> LV["URLRiskScoring.level(forScore:)"]
LV --> R["URLAnalysis<br/>decomposition, signals, score, level,<br/>methodology, notInspected"]
R --> RD["reportDocument() — kind .urlAnalysis"]
The analysis is offline and textual: the link is never opened, fetched or resolved, and no redirect is
followed. The same URLRiskAnalyzer runs in the app and in the share extension, which makes no network
request and stores nothing.
2.1 Scoring
| Score | URLRiskLevel |
|---|---|
| 0 | noSignals ("No signals found") |
| 1 … 29 | low |
30 … 59 (elevatedThreshold = 30) |
elevated |
≥ 60 (highThreshold = 60), capped at maximumScore = 100 |
high |
Each signal kind appears at most once; if a check fires twice the higher weight is kept and the evidence
merged. A weight of 0 is an informational signal (state: .verified, severity none); otherwise the finding
is attention with severity low (weight < 20), moderate (< 45) or high (≥ 45). Parsed facts are
measured / parsedData; pattern judgments are heuristic. URLRiskScoring.methodology states that the
weights are editorial judgments, not measured probabilities. There is no level meaning "safe".
2.2 Signal kinds (URLSignalKind) and weights
| Group | Kinds (raw value → weight) |
|---|---|
| Input and scheme | url.invalid 10 · url.scheme.missing 0 · url.scheme.unencrypted 10 · url.scheme.non-web 45 (javascript, vbscript), 40 (data, blob), 20 (file), 5 (call/message schemes), 10 (other app schemes), 5 (other hierarchical non-web) |
| Characters and scripts | url.characters.invisible 45 · url.characters.full-width 30 · url.idn 5 · url.idn.invalid-punycode 30 · url.script.mixed 45 · url.script.confusable 30, or 10 under a native-script suffix |
| Brand resemblance | url.brand.confusable 70 · url.brand.typosquat 40 (distance 1) or 30 · url.brand.embedded 30, 35 or 50 · url.brand.other-suffix 15 · url.brand.path 10 |
| Host shape | url.host.ip 30 (5 for local addresses) · url.host.ip-obfuscated 40 · url.host.single-label 0 · url.host.subdomain-depth 15 (depth ≥ 4) · url.host.long 10 (> 60 bytes) · url.host.hyphens-digits 10 · url.host.keywords 5 or 10 · url.shortener 10 · url.tld 0 |
| Authority and encoding | url.userinfo 25, or 45 when the user part looks like a host · url.port 10 (0 for local hosts) · url.encoding.host 35 · url.encoding.double 10 or 15 · url.encoding.path 10 · url.encoding.script 35 · url.encoding.null 35 |
| Redirection and path | url.redirect.parameter 20 · url.redirect.path 15 · url.path.download-extension 5 to 30 (25 for mobileconfig, at least 30 with a double extension) · url.length 0 (> 200 scalars) |
Supporting data is embedded, with its limits listed in URLAnalysis.standardNotInspected: a Public Suffix
List subset, BrandList.brands, a confusables table (mainly Cyrillic and Greek) and word lists.
2.3 QR payload classifier
QRPayloadClassifier.classify(_:) (also QRPayload(decoding:analyzer:)) sorts a decoded payload into
QRPayload.Kind: url, wifi, contact, email, phone, sms, location, calendarEvent, text,
empty. A url payload gets a full URLAnalysis; links found inside contact cards, calendar events and
free text are analysed as embeddedURLAnalyses. A WIFI: payload is parsed into WiFiConfiguration
(open, wep, wpa, enterprise, unknown) with findings qr.wifi.open and qr.wifi.wep
(attention/moderate) and qr.wifi.unknown (attention/low). The payload is analysed and displayed;
it is never opened and no network is joined.
Decoding happens in the app: QRImageReader (Vision VNDetectBarcodesRequest, QR / Aztec / Data Matrix, on
a PhotosPicker image, no photo permission) and QRScannerView (VisionKit DataScannerViewController).
LinkAnalyzerView.openScanner() calls AVCaptureDevice.requestAccess(for: .video) when the status is
.notDetermined, then presents the scanner sheet.
3. Verification status
ORIXNetworkLabTestshas logic, findings and X.509 suites that run offline, andLiveTeststhat contact real hosts;ORIXURLRiskTestsruns corpora of links, Punycode vectors and QR payloads. They were not re-run while writing this document.- Wi-Fi:
WiFiInspectorreturns.unavailable(.simulator)in the Simulator, soNEHotspotNetwork.fetchCurrent(), the entitlement and the precise-location requirement have never been exercised on a device. - Bonjour and the local-network prompt, cellular / expensive / constrained paths, real VPN and proxy configurations, and the camera QR scanner were run in the Simulator or compiled only.
- The camera request (
openScanner()), the scanner sheet and its "Camera not available" fallback whenDataScannerViewController.isAvailableis false have not been exercised on a physical device.