# iOS capability matrix
What a third-party App Store app can and cannot do on iOS and iPadOS, and what ORIX Secure does with each capability.
Every feature of the app traces back to a row of this document. A capability that is not in a "supported" class is not implemented, and the app says so on screen instead of imitating it.
- Environment audited: Xcode 27.2 (27B52), Swift 6.4.2, iOS SDK 27.2, iOS Simulator runtime 26.5 (23F77), macOS 27.0. No physical iPhone or iPad was connected during development.
- Sources: the iOS 27.2 SDK headers on the development Mac, and Apple's published pages read on 2026‑11‑21 (listed at the end). Statements about Apple policy quote those pages.
- Deployment target: iOS / iPadOS 18.0. Only the iOS 26.5 Simulator was exercised; nothing was run on iOS 18–25.
# Classification
| Class |
Meaning |
How ORIX Secure treats it |
| A — Public API |
A documented API returns the value with no permission. |
Implemented. The finding cites the API as its source. |
| B — Public API + user authorization |
A documented API returns the value after the user grants a permission. |
Implemented. The permission is requested when the feature is used, never at launch. |
| C — Special entitlement |
Requires an entitlement or capability on the App ID. |
Implemented only where the entitlement is a normal, self-service capability (Access Wi‑Fi Information). Managed entitlements are not requested. |
| D — User-assisted |
iOS shows the setting to the user but not to apps. |
Implemented as a checklist: the app says where the setting is and records the answer as reported by the user, never as verified. |
| E — Unsupported |
No public API; private API, a jailbreak or an exploit would be required. |
Not implemented. Listed in the app as "cannot be assessed". |
# 1. Device and system
| Capability |
Class |
API / path |
In ORIX Secure |
| Hardware model identifier |
A |
uname(3) machine |
Device, reports |
| OS name and version |
A |
ProcessInfo.operatingSystemVersion, UIDevice.systemName |
Device, audit evidence |
| Whether the OS is the latest release |
D |
Settings › General › Software Update |
Checklist item sec.updates.current. The app also compares the installed major version with the SDK it was built with (a dated, real reference) and reports a finding only when the device is behind. |
| Screen size, scale, native resolution, refresh rate |
A |
UIScreen |
Device |
| Processor core counts |
A |
ProcessInfo.processorCount, .activeProcessorCount |
Device, performance finding |
| Installed RAM |
A |
ProcessInfo.physicalMemory |
Device |
| Memory used by the app itself |
A |
task_info(TASK_VM_INFO) phys_footprint |
Device, Battery & Performance |
| Memory the app may still allocate |
A |
os_proc_available_memory() |
Device (labelled "not the device's free memory") |
| Memory used by other apps, free system memory |
E |
— |
Listed as unavailable |
| System-wide CPU load, per-app CPU of other apps |
E |
— |
Listed as unavailable |
| Thermal state (4 levels) |
A |
ProcessInfo.thermalState |
Device, advice. Never shown as a temperature. |
| CPU / battery temperature in degrees |
E |
— |
Listed as unavailable |
| Low Power Mode |
A |
ProcessInfo.isLowPowerModeEnabled |
Device, advice |
| Battery level (5 % steps), charging state |
A |
UIDevice.batteryLevel, .batteryState |
Battery & Performance |
| Battery cycle count, maximum capacity, health |
E (D for the user) |
Settings › Battery › Battery Health |
Listed as unavailable, with the Settings path |
| Energy use of other apps |
E (D) |
Settings › Battery |
User-assisted check |
| Time of last restart |
A |
sysctl kern.boottime |
Device; "restart suggested after 30 days" finding |
| Hardware fault / repair history |
E (D) |
Settings › General › About › Parts & Service History |
Listed as unavailable |
| Kernel state, system processes, unrestricted logs |
E |
— |
Listed as unavailable |
# 2. Authentication and integrity
| Capability |
Class |
API / path |
In ORIX Secure |
| A device passcode is set |
A |
LAContext.canEvaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthentication) (LAError.passcodeNotSet) |
Audit finding auth.passcode |
| Passcode length or strength |
E (D) |
Settings › Face ID & Passcode |
Checklist sec.passcode.strength |
| Biometric sensor type, enrolment, lock-out |
A |
LAContext.biometryType, .canEvaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics) |
Audit finding auth.biometry |
| Unlocking the app with Face ID / Touch ID / passcode |
B (Face ID usage string) |
LAContext.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthentication) |
Optional App Lock |
| Secure Enclave present |
A |
CryptoKit.SecureEnclave.isAvailable |
Audit finding |
| App Attest supported |
A |
DCAppAttestService.isSupported |
Audit finding (reported only; the app has no server, so no attestation is performed) |
| Debugger attached to this process |
A |
sysctl(KERN_PROC_PID) P_TRACED |
Audit finding |
| Signs of jailbreak / instrumentation |
A (heuristic) |
FileManager.fileExists on known paths, write test outside the container, _dyld_get_image_name, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES |
Audit finding app.integrity, confidence heuristic: absence of known signs is stated as exactly that |
| Proof that the system is unmodified |
E |
— |
Stated as impossible |
| Data-protection class of the app's own files |
A |
FileManager.attributesOfItem .protectionKey |
Audit finding |
| Screen being recorded / mirrored |
A |
UITraitCollection.sceneCaptureState |
Audit finding |
| Stolen Device Protection, Find My, Lockdown Mode, Advanced Data Protection, Erase Data |
E (D) |
Settings |
Checklist items |
| Apple Account: two-factor, trusted numbers, devices, recovery |
E (D) |
Settings › [name] |
Checklist items |
| Installed configuration / MDM profiles, VPN configurations, trusted root certificates |
E (D) |
Settings › General › VPN & Device Management; About › Certificate Trust Settings |
Checklist items |
# 3. Other apps and system data
| Capability |
Class |
Notes |
| Scan other apps' files or the system for malware |
E |
The sandbox isolates every app container. App Review Guideline 2.3.1(a) names "iOS-based virus and malware scanners" as an example of promoting a service an app "does not actually offer". ORIX Secure makes no such claim. |
| List installed apps |
E |
canOpenURL only tests schemes declared in advance; it is not used. |
| Read other apps' permission states |
E (D) |
Settings › Privacy & Security. Checklist items; App Privacy Report is recommended. |
| Read Safari history, cookies, other apps' caches |
E |
Not implemented. |
| Delete other apps' caches, "System Data", free RAM |
E |
Not implemented. The app states that such features cannot exist. |
| Force-quit other apps, change power management |
E |
Not implemented. |
| Open a specific Settings page |
E |
Only UIApplication.openSettingsURLString is documented: it opens the app's own Settings page. No private prefs: / App-Prefs: URL is used; other pages are given as text paths. |
# 4. Storage and files
| Capability |
Class |
API |
In ORIX Secure |
| Volume capacity and available space |
A (required-reason API: disk space) |
URLResourceKey.volumeTotalCapacityKey, .volumeAvailableCapacityKey, .volumeAvailableCapacityForImportantUsageKey, …ForOpportunisticUsageKey |
Storage overview, capacity finding |
| Storage used by each app or category |
E (D) |
Settings › General › iPhone Storage |
Listed as unavailable |
| Size of the app's own files |
A |
FileManager enumeration, totalFileAllocatedSizeKey |
"ORIX Secure's own files", verified cleanup |
| Read a file or folder the user picks |
B (user's explicit selection) |
fileImporter / document picker, security-scoped URLs |
File Scanner, File Cleanup |
| Delete files in a folder the user picked |
B |
FileManager.removeItem on security-scoped URLs |
File Cleanup, after confirmation |
| Receive a file from another app |
B |
CFBundleDocumentTypes (public.data, viewer) |
"Open in ORIX Secure" → File Scanner |
| Arbitrary access to Files, iCloud Drive, other providers |
E |
— |
Not implemented |
# 5. Photos
| Capability |
Class |
API |
In ORIX Secure |
| Read the photo library (full or limited) |
B |
PHPhotoLibrary.requestAuthorization(for: .readWrite) |
Photo Cleanup. Limited access is supported and labelled. |
| Asset metadata (type, dates, dimensions, duration, screenshot, burst, favourite, edited) |
B |
PHAsset |
Categories |
| Small previews for fingerprinting |
B |
PHImageManager.requestImage (network access disabled) |
Similar-photo detection |
| Exact size and content hash of a local original |
B |
PHAssetResourceManager.requestData (streamed, network disabled); AVURLAsset file size for videos |
Measured sizes, exact duplicates |
| Size of an asset without reading it |
E |
PHAssetResource has no public size property. The widely used value(forKey: "fileSize") is key-value access to an undocumented property and is not used. |
Unmeasured sizes are shown as "not measured" |
| Size of originals stored only in iCloud |
E without downloading |
— |
Reported as not measured; nothing is downloaded |
| Delete assets |
B + system confirmation |
PHAssetChangeRequest.deleteAssets |
Only items the user selected; iOS shows its own confirmation; the result is verified by re-fetching |
| Empty "Recently Deleted" |
E |
— |
The app explains that space is reclaimed after 30 days or when the user empties the album |
# 6. Network
| Capability |
Class |
API |
In ORIX Secure |
| Path status, interface types, expensive / constrained, IPv4 / IPv6 / DNS support |
A |
NWPathMonitor |
Network Lab, change log while the app is active |
| The device's own interface addresses |
A |
getifaddrs |
Network Lab |
| Proxy configuration |
A |
CFNetworkCopySystemProxySettings |
Finding when a proxy is configured |
| VPN active |
A (heuristic) |
tunnel interfaces from getifaddrs, __SCOPED__ proxy keys |
"VPN indicator" finding, confidence heuristic |
| DNS resolution of a chosen host |
A |
getaddrinfo |
Probe |
| Which resolver answered (system, encrypted-DNS profile, VPN) |
E |
— |
Stated as not inspected |
| TCP connection time to a chosen host |
A |
NWConnection |
Probe (labelled "not an ICMP ping") |
| ICMP ping, raw sockets, packet capture |
E for this app |
— |
Not implemented |
| TLS version, cipher suite, certificate chain, system trust result of a chosen host |
A |
NWConnection + sec_protocol_options_set_verify_block, SecTrustEvaluateWithError; X.509 parsed by the app's own DER parser |
Certificate inspection |
| HTTP redirect and HSTS policy of a chosen host |
A (ATS applies) |
URLSession, ephemeral, HEAD |
Optional probe, asked for separately |
| Services announced on the local network |
B (Local Network permission) |
NWBrowser for the 14 service types declared in NSBonjourServices |
Local network scan |
| Full inventory of devices on the network, router configuration |
E |
— |
Stated as not inspected |
| Current Wi‑Fi name, BSSID, security type (open / WEP / personal / enterprise) |
B + C |
NEHotspotNetwork.fetchCurrent; needs the Access Wi‑Fi Information entitlement and one of Apple's criteria — here precise Location authorization |
Wi‑Fi security finding. The app requests Location only for this and never reads a position. |
| WPA2 vs WPA3, cipher, router firmware |
E |
— |
Stated as not inspected |
| Traffic of other apps, content filtering, DNS proxy, packet tunnel |
C (managed NetworkExtension entitlements; a VPN must be offered knowingly) |
— |
Not requested and not implemented. No VPN, no interception. Guideline 5.4 also restricts VPN apps to developers enrolled as an organization. |
| Reputation lookup of a URL or file hash |
— (would need an external service) |
— |
Not implemented: no external security API, nothing leaves the device |
# 7. Links, QR codes and files
| Capability |
Class |
API |
In ORIX Secure |
| Parse and analyse a URL offline |
A |
Foundation; in-house Punycode, confusables, public-suffix subset |
Link Analyser |
| Receive a URL from another app |
B |
Share extension (com.apple.share-services), URL scheme orixsecure://analyze?url= |
"Analyse Link" in the share sheet |
| Read a QR code from a chosen photo |
B (picker; no library permission) |
PhotosPicker, VNDetectBarcodesRequest |
Link Analyser |
| Scan a QR code with the camera |
B (Camera) |
DataScannerViewController |
Link Analyser |
| Fetch the page behind a link, follow redirects |
A, deliberately not used |
— |
The app never opens an analysed link |
| Identify a file's real type, hash it, read archive and PDF structure |
A / B (file chosen by the user) |
FileHandle, CryptoKit, PDFKit, in-house parsers |
File Scanner |
| Detect malware in a file |
E without a signature or reputation service |
— |
Not claimed; findings are structural |
# 8. Privacy manifest and required-reason APIs
Declared in App/Resources/PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy: no tracking, no tracking domains, no collected data types.
| Category |
Reason(s) |
Why |
| Disk space |
85F4.1, E174.1 |
Capacity is displayed to the user; the app's findings change with low space |
| File timestamp |
DDA9.1, 3B52.1, C617.1 |
Dates of user-picked files are displayed; metadata of user-picked files and of the app's own files is read |
| User defaults |
CA92.1 |
The app's own settings |
| System boot time |
35F9.1 |
Probe durations are measured with DispatchTime (elapsed time within the app) |
sysctl kern.boottime, used to show the last restart, is not in Apple's list of boot-time required-reason APIs (the list names systemUptime and mach_absolute_time()); the value is displayed on the device and never leaves it.
# 9. Permissions requested
| Permission |
Requested when |
Feature without it |
| Photos (read/write, full or limited) |
The user taps "Choose Photo Access" in Photo Cleanup |
Photo Cleanup is unavailable; everything else works |
| Camera |
The user opens the camera QR scanner |
QR codes can still be read from a photo |
| Location (when in use, precise) |
The user taps "Allow to Read Wi‑Fi Security" |
Wi‑Fi name and security type are shown as unavailable |
| Local Network |
The user starts a local network scan (system prompt) |
The scan reports "permission required" |
| Face ID |
The user turns on App Lock |
App Lock stays off |
Nothing is requested at launch. The app never requests tracking, contacts, microphone, Bluetooth, notifications, motion or health data.
# 10. Verified vs. not verified in this build
- Run on the iOS 26.5 Simulator: every class‑A reading that the Simulator provides, the checklist, link and file analysis, live DNS / latency / TLS probes, the photo pipeline including the system permission prompt and the system delete confirmation, file cleanup, reports and exports.
- Compiled but never run on hardware: battery readings, Secure Enclave, App Attest, data-protection class, jailbreak-path checks, camera QR scanning, Wi‑Fi security type, the Local Network prompt, App Lock with real biometrics.
# Sources
Read on 2026‑11‑21 through Safari: