"key","authors","year","title","outlet","volume_pages","doi_url","mechanism","approach","key_finding","overlap_with_wp19","gaps","confidence","verified_via"
"albrecht2007opportunistic","Albrecht, James and Anderson, Axel and Smith, Eric and Vroman, Susan","2007","Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market","International Economic Review","48(2): 641-664","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x","Buyers and sellers switch from relaxed to desperate flow values at a Poisson rate; matching is opportunistic and price depends on the pair's urgency states.","theory","Expected price falls with time on market and the conditional price variance is hump-shaped; urgent sellers accept lower prices and sell faster.","Closest antecedent for 'urgency lowers the reservation price and generates dispersion'; WP19 instead treats urgency as a continuous permanent holding cost, adds free entry and a financing stage, and derives index-selection bias.","No liquidity-shock comparative statics on matching efficiency, no mortgage/cash distinction, no formal selection correction for price indices.","high","crossref+doi"
"albrecht2016directed","Albrecht, James and Gautier, Pieter A. and Vroman, Susan","2016","Directed search in the housing market","Review of Economic Dynamics","19: 218-231","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002","Sellers post asking prices with limited commitment; buyers direct search; asking price signals seller reservation type and houses sell above, at or below ask.","theory","Directed-search equilibrium with heterogeneous seller reservation values is constrained efficient; asking prices separate seller types.","Provides the posted-price benchmark against which WP19's Nash bargaining is checked for robustness; both feature private seller reservation types.","Two seller types only; no continuous urgency distribution, no financing contingency, no transaction-hazard or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi"
"anenberg2016information","Anenberg, Elliot","2016","Information Frictions And Housing Market Dynamics","International Economic Review","57(4): 1449-1479","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12204","Sellers learn about demand for their house through Bayesian updating while listed; information frictions shape list-price dynamics.","structural","Seller uncertainty about current demand explains list-price reductions and generates microfounded momentum in aggregate prices.","Alternative explanation of declining prices with time on market (learning) against which WP19's urgency/selection explanation must be distinguished.","No permanent urgency heterogeneity, no financing stage, no selection-corrected indices.","high","crossref+doi"
"anenberg2020endogenous","Anenberg, Elliot and Bayer, Patrick","2020","Endogenous Sources Of Volatility In Housing Markets: The Joint Buyer–Seller Problem","International Economic Review","61(3): 1195-1228","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12454","Cost of holding two homes varies endogenously over the cycle; moving owners' joint buy-sell problem amplifies volume and price volatility.","structural","Internal movement is highly procyclical; frictions from the joint buyer-seller problem substantially amplify cyclical price volatility.","Their time-varying cost of holding two homes is an endogenous version of WP19's carrying cost c; WP19 treats c as a permanent type and studies its cross-sectional implications.","No cash/mortgage distinction; no stationary dispersion or index-selection results.","high","crossref+doi"
"arnold1999search","Arnold, Michael A.","1999","Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices","Real Estate Economics","27(3): 453-481","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00780","Asking price affects the arrival rate of inspecting buyers; reservation and asking prices solved jointly in a search-bargaining model.","theory","Existence of a subgame-perfect asking/reservation strategy; discount rates and buyer outside options move both prices.","Provides the comparative statics of the reservation price with respect to the seller's discount rate, the closest analogue to WP19's urgency gradient.","Partial equilibrium; no tightness feedback, dispersion across sellers or financing.","high","crossref+doi"
"arnott1989housing","Arnott, Richard","1989","Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","2(1): 5-30","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00161714","Idiosyncratic tastes in a thin market generate equilibrium vacancies in rental housing.","theory","Vacancies are an equilibrium outcome of search with idiosyncratic match quality; thinness raises vacancies and affects rents.","Early formalisation of idiosyncratic match value x ~ G, central to WP19's acceptance rule.","Rental market, no urgency, financing or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi"
"bagnoli2005logconcave","Bagnoli, Mark and Bergstrom, Ted","2005","Log-concave probability and its applications","Economic Theory","26(2): 445-469","https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4","Log-concavity of densities implies monotone hazard rates and preserved properties under integration and truncation.","theory","Catalogue of log-concave distributions and of their implications for hazard and mean-residual-life functions.","Technical basis for WP19's proposition that the sale hazard is increasing in the effective arrival rate under log-concave G.","Pure probability tool.","high","crossref+doi"
"bian2018bargaining","Bian, Xun and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2018","Bargaining, Mortgage Financing, and Housing Prices","Journal of Real Estate Research","40(3): 419-452","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506","Financing embedded in a bilateral bargaining model: mortgage terms create gains from trade beyond valuations.","theory","With financing, trade can occur even if buyer valuation is below seller reservation; omitting financing misstates the gain from trade and price.","Only formal bargaining theory with financing found; WP19 instead models financing as a contingency affecting timing and success, not surplus.","No search, no tightness, no cash discount from selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"bond2007marketing","Bond, Shaun A. and Hwang, Soosung and Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Theory and Empirical Estimates from the UK Commercial Real Estate Market","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","34(4): 447-461","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1","Marketing period risk adds a second moment to real estate returns in portfolio choice.","theory","UK commercial real estate: marketing-period risk materially raises ex ante risk and reduces optimal allocations.","Supports treating time to sale as a priced risk, as in WP19; WP19 endogenises its distribution.","No equilibrium or seller heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi"
"burdett1983equilibrium","Burdett, Kenneth and Judd, Kenneth L.","1983","Equilibrium Price Dispersion","Econometrica","51(4): 955-969","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912045","Noisy search (consumers observe one or several prices) sustains equilibrium price dispersion for a homogeneous good.","theory","Price dispersion is an equilibrium outcome of search frictions even with identical sellers and buyers.","Benchmark for WP19's dispersion result, which instead derives dispersion from seller heterogeneity in urgency under bargaining.","Posted prices by sellers with no holding-cost heterogeneity; no dynamics or hazard.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)"
"caplin2011trading","Caplin, Andrew and Leahy, John","2011","Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 283-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x","Liquidity modelled through a trading-friction process linking prices, sales and inventory.","theory","Model generates large price changes and positive price-sales correlation but counterfactual negative autocorrelation; informational frictions help.","Shares the goal of a joint characterisation of prices, sales and inventory; WP19 provides a micro-founded stationary version with seller heterogeneity.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi"
"carrillo2012empirical","Carrillo, Paul E.","2012","An Empirical Stationary Equilibrium Search Model Of The Housing Market","International Economic Review","53(1): 203-234","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x","Stationary equilibrium with two-sided search, heterogeneous motivation to trade, posting and bargaining, and endogenous matching via advertising.","structural","Estimated model fits MLS data; more listing information and lower commissions change prices and time on market.","Shares heterogeneous seller motivation and a stationary equilibrium with posting plus bargaining; WP19 is analytical, adds financing and derives propositions and index bias.","No explicit liquidity-discount definition, no mortgage/cash contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi"
"cheng2010illiquidity","Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2010","Illiquidity, transaction cost, and optimal holding period for real estate: Theory and application","Journal of Housing Economics","19(2): 109-118","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002","Illiquidity and transaction costs determine an optimal holding period for real estate.","theory","Optimal holding period increases with transaction costs and marketing-period uncertainty.","Relates holding cost and illiquidity to timing decisions; WP19 treats the holding cost as the seller's urgency type.","Partial equilibrium; no market feedback.","high","crossref+doi"
"diamond1982aggregate","Diamond, Peter A.","1982","Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","90(5): 881-894","https://doi.org/10.1086/261099","Trading externalities in a search economy produce multiple equilibria and inefficiently low activity.","theory","Thick-market externalities can sustain low-activity equilibria; aggregate demand management can be welfare-improving.","Origin of the matching externalities WP19 invokes when matching efficiency falls; WP19 keeps a unique stationary equilibrium under stated conditions.","No housing, prices by bargaining absent, no heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi"
"diaz2013house","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén","2013","House Prices, Sales, And Time On The Market: A Search-Theoretic Framework","International Economic Review","54(3): 837-872","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12019","Random matching with Nash bargaining and endogenous entry; aggregate demand/supply shocks propagate through vacancies, sales and time on market.","theory","Search frictions reproduce positive price-sales and negative price-TOM comovement; trading delays amplify price volatility and propagate shocks.","WP19 shares the matching-function, bargaining and free-entry architecture; it adds urgency heterogeneity, financing contingency and a selection-corrected index, and studies non-fundamental shocks.","Representative seller; no cross-sectional price dispersion from urgency; shocks are to fundamentals rather than to matching efficiency or buyer qualification.","high","crossref+doi"
"diaz2024housing","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén and Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo","2024","Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search","The Economic Journal","134(657): 220-270","https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead054","Competitive search with credit constraints: wealthier, risk-averse buyers pay more to transact faster; block recursivity via intermediaries.","theory","Credit availability raises long-run prices and debt more than a Walrasian model, especially with inelastic supply.","Links buyers' financial position to transaction speed and price, the mirror image of WP19's cash discount on the seller side.","No seller urgency distribution, no pending-approval stage, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi"
"duffie2005over","Duffie, Darrell and Garleanu, Nicolae and Pedersen, Lasse Heje","2005","Over-the-Counter Markets","Econometrica","73(6): 1815-1847","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x","Search and bargaining in OTC asset markets; prices depend on search intensity and bargaining power through outside options.","theory","Bid-ask spreads and liquidity premia are decreasing in search intensity and depend on bargaining power; marketmakers' role derived.","Finance analogue of WP19's endogenous liquidity discount: price departs from the frictionless value because of search and bargaining.","Homogeneous asset units, no housing-specific match value or financing stage.","high","crossref+doi"
"eerola2018borrowing","Eerola, Essi and Määttänen, Niku","2018","Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity","Review of Economic Dynamics","27: 184-204","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003","Matching plus credit frictions with risk-averse households; tighter borrowing constraints change who can buy and bargain.","theory","Moderate tightening of borrowing constraints substantially increases time on market and idiosyncratic price dispersion.","Very close to WP19's qualification channel: credit tightening raises TOM and dispersion; WP19 adds explicit seller urgency types and a pending-approval stage with cash buyers.","No cash discount, no decomposition of dispersion into urgency vs buyer wealth, no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi"
"fisher2003controlling","Fisher, Jeffrey and Gatzlaff, Dean and Geltner, David and Haurin, Donald","2003","Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices","Real Estate Economics","31(2): 269-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00066","Constant-liquidity value concept: transaction indices embed time-varying ease of sale; procyclical volume.","empirical","Constant-liquidity indices lead transaction and appraisal indices and show greater amplitude.","Closest antecedent to WP19's dynamic selection bias proposition; WP19 derives the sign of the bias from heterogeneous hazard elasticities (both/theory-informed econometrics).","No structural model of seller heterogeneity; residential application and financing absent.","high","crossref+doi"
"gabrovski2019beveridge","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2019","The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market","Journal of Economic Theory","181: 361-381","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003","Free entry of both buyers and sellers in a housing search model generates an upward-sloping Beveridge curve.","theory","Baseline housing search models imply a downward-sloping Beveridge curve; two-sided entry restores the positive vacancy-buyer correlation in data.","WP19 uses free entry of buyers only (listing inflow exogenous); this paper warns that seller entry can reverse tightness comparative statics.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or index selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"gabrovski2021search","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2021","Search and credit frictions in the housing market","European Economic Review","134: 103699","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699","Interaction of search and credit frictions: credit conditions shift buyer entry and liquidity, with multiple equilibria.","theory","Credit shocks affect mortgage debt and liquidity more than prices; combined frictions produce multiple equilibria.","Closest to WP19's financing extension: both route credit into buyer arrival/qualification; WP19 models an explicit pending-approval stage and the cash discount.","No cash-versus-mortgage buyers, no seller urgency distribution, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi"
"gabrovski2025note","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2025","A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions","Macroeconomic Dynamics","29","https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100525100692","Congestion and participation externalities with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers; equilibrium inefficient even under Hosios condition.","theory","With two-sided entry the Hosios-Mortensen-Pissarides condition no longer delivers efficiency in the housing market; externalities quantified for the US.","Direct benchmark for WP19's welfare/Hosios proposition; WP19 has one-sided (buyer) entry, so the standard Hosios logic applies but urgency heterogeneity adds a composition wedge.","No seller heterogeneity in holding cost and no financing stage in the welfare analysis.","high","crossref+doi"
"garriga2020mortgage","Garriga, Carlos and Hedlund, Aaron","2020","Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession","American Economic Review","110(6): 1603-1634","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170772","Endogenously illiquid housing from search frictions plus long-term defaultable mortgages transmit the bust to consumption.","structural","Deterioration in house prices and liquidity, transmitted via balance sheets, explains aggregate and cross-sectional patterns of the Great Recession.","Establishes that housing liquidity is a distinct state variable in macro-housing models; WP19 provides the microfoundation of the liquidity discount they embed.","No cash discount, no urgency dispersion or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi"
"genesove2012search","Genesove, David and Han, Lu","2012","Search and matching in the housing market","Journal of Urban Economics","72(1): 31-45","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002","Search intensity and matching in a housing market with buyers and sellers; tests of increasing returns in matching and strategic search behaviour.","empirical","Evidence on the matching technology and on buyer search behaviour consistent with search-theoretic predictions (both/empirical with theory motivation).","Informs WP19's assumption of a CRS matching function and the interpretation of theta; WP19 does not estimate the matching function.","Does not model seller urgency, financing or price discounts.","high","crossref+doi"
"glower1998selling","Glower, Michel and Haurin, Donald R. and Hendershott, Patric H.","1998","Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation","Real Estate Economics","26(4): 719-740","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00763","Seller motivation (planned moving date) shifts reservation price and selling time.","empirical","Motivated sellers sell faster and at lower prices; motivation affects sale price but not list-price markup; models should allow heterogeneous sellers.","Empirical motivation for WP19's heterogeneous carrying cost; WP19 supplies the theory they call for (also relevant to Part B).","No formal equilibrium model, no index-selection or financing analysis.","high","crossref+doi"
"guren2018house","Guren, Adam M.","2018","House Price Momentum and Strategic Complementarity","Journal of Political Economy","126(3): 1172-1218","https://doi.org/10.1086/697207","Concave demand in relative list price generates strategic complementarity among sellers, amplifying momentum.","structural","Sellers adjust prices gradually toward the average; concave demand amplifies price momentum two- to threefold.","Both link the sale hazard to the seller's price; WP19 derives the hazard from match-value acceptance under log-concavity rather than estimated demand curvature.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; momentum rather than stationary dispersion and selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"guren2020foreclosures","Guren, Adam M and McQuade, Timothy J","2020","How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?","The Review of Economic Studies","87(3): 1331-1364","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa001","Foreclosures freeze the non-foreclosure market: choosier buyers, ruined credit and lender losses create price-default spirals.","structural","Foreclosure amplification accounts for a large share of the non-distressed price decline; principal reduction is more effective than payment reduction.","Distressed sellers are an extreme urgency type; WP19 generalises urgency to a continuum and derives the composition effect on observed prices.","No explicit cash/mortgage stage; selection in observed indices not the focus.","high","crossref+doi"
"han2015microstructure","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2015","The Microstructure of Housing Markets","Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics","vol. 5: 813-886","https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2","Survey of search (one-sided, random, directed), bargaining and auctions, and brokerage in housing markets.","survey","Organises the microstructure literature and identifies open questions on matching, bargaining and intermediaries.","WP19's positioning follows this taxonomy (random matching plus Nash bargaining with posted-price robustness).","Identifies but does not resolve the interaction of seller heterogeneity, financing and observed price indices.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)"
"han2024cash","Han, Lu and Hong, Seung-Hyun","2024","Cash is king? Understanding financing risk in housing markets","Review of Finance","28(6): 2083-2118","https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae025","Financing risk: a mortgage contingency may fail, returning the house to the market; cash offers avoid this risk.","empirical","Cash offers close 29% faster and carry a 2-3.9% discount; closing risk alone is insufficient, the risk of failing to resell is key (both/empirical with calibrated model).","WP19's pending-approval stage with success probability phi and relisting is the formal version of their mechanism; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness feedback.","No analytical propositions on dispersion or index selection; no urgency heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi"
"head2012housing","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw","2012","Housing Liquidity, Mobility, and the Labour Market","The Review of Economic Studies","79(4): 1559-1589","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds004","Homeowners' acceptance of out-of-town jobs depends on how fast they can sell; housing liquidity links labour and housing search.","theory","Housing illiquidity lowers mobility of owners relative to renters; the aggregate unemployment effect is small except in high-unemployment states.","Introduces 'liquidity as time to sell' as a state variable for owners, which WP19 adopts, but WP19 does not model labour markets.","No seller urgency distribution or financing; liquidity measured by selling speed only, not by a price discount.","high","crossref+doi"
"head2014search","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw and Sun, Hongfei","2014","Search, Liquidity, and the Dynamics of House Prices and Construction","American Economic Review","104(4): 1172-1210","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1172","City-level search with construction and buyer entry; variation in time to sell induces serially correlated price growth.","theory","Search plus endogenous construction and entry explains momentum in house prices and the joint dynamics of sales, prices and population after income shocks.","Free entry of buyers and the role of time to sell in prices are shared; WP19 is a local stationary model focused on microstructure rather than dynamics with construction.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; the liquidity concept is aggregate time to sell rather than a decomposed discount.","high","crossref+doi"
"head2023default","Head, Allen and Sun, Hongfei and Zhou, Chenggang","2023","Indebted sellers, liquidity and mortgage standards","European Economic Review","151: 104321","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104321","Indebted sellers set higher asking prices and take longer to sell; asking prices and time-to-sell determine liquidity and default risk.","structural","Higher LTV sellers ask more and sell slower; policies reducing default can loosen lending standards and lower welfare.","Debt-driven heterogeneity in reservation prices is the mirror of WP19's holding-cost heterogeneity: debt lowers urgency to accept, carrying cost raises it.","No cash/mortgage buyer contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi"
"hedlund2016cyclical","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing, debt, and foreclosures","Quantitative Economics","7(1): 289-328","https://doi.org/10.3982/qe483","Liquidity spirals from search frictions and endogenous credit constraints; longer selling times raise foreclosure risk and tighten credit.","structural","Search-based housing illiquidity with equilibrium default matches cyclical housing and mortgage dynamics; full-recourse reform reduces foreclosures.","Dynamic macro analogue of WP19's liquidity shock propagation; WP19 is stationary and analytical with explicit hazard and discount decompositions.","No urgency heterogeneity among sellers beyond debt; no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi"
"hedlund2016illiquidity","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","Illiquidity and its discontents: Trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market","Journal of Monetary Economics","83: 1-13","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005","Search frictions make housing illiquid; trading delays interact with mortgage default to produce foreclosures.","theory","Trading delays raise foreclosure risk and endogenously tighten credit; illiquidity amplifies downturns.","Shares endogenous illiquidity from search and its credit feedback; WP19 isolates the microstructure and adds a pending-financing stage and urgency.","No cash/mortgage buyer distinction, no price dispersion, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"horowitz1992role","Horowitz, Joel L.","1992","The role of the list price in housing markets: Theory and an econometric model","Journal of Applied Econometrics","7(2): 115-129","https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.3950070202","List price is a ceiling distinct from the reservation price; sellers optimally hold list prices even when unsold for long periods.","theory","Sale prices fall below but not above list; structural model predicts sale and reservation prices and explains sticky list prices.","Reservation price as the operative state variable, as in WP19; WP19 derives it from carrying cost and tightness.","No urgency heterogeneity or equilibrium feedback.","high","crossref+doi"
"hosios1990efficiency","Hosios, Arthur J.","1990","On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","57(2): 279-298","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297382","Efficiency of search equilibria requires bargaining shares to equal matching elasticities.","theory","Hosios condition: Nash bargaining power equal to the elasticity of matching w.r.t. the agent's side internalises congestion externalities.","WP19's welfare proposition uses the Hosios condition and shows how urgency heterogeneity creates a composition wedge.","Homogeneous agents; no financing stage or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)"
"krainer2001theory","Krainer, John","2001","A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets","Journal of Urban Economics","49(1): 32-53","https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.2000.2180","Buyers draw idiosyncratic match values; sellers set reservation prices anticipating future aggregate states; liquidity (time on market) varies with expected housing-service values.","theory","Sellers rationally hold out in downturns when expected future states improve, so time on market rises while prices adjust sluggishly: endogenous liquidity co-moves with prices.","WP19 uses the same idiosyncratic match-value draw and reservation logic and the definition of liquidity through expected selling time; WP19 differs by holding fundamentals fixed and shocking matching efficiency/qualification instead.","Homogeneous sellers; the liquidity shock is itself a shock to future dividends, so it cannot separate a pure liquidity shock from a fundamental shock, which is WP19's central question.","high","crossref+doi"
"krainer2002equilibrium","Krainer, John and LeRoy, Stephen F.","2002","Equilibrium valuation of illiquid assets","Economic Theory","19(2): 223-242","https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004214","Illiquid asset valued by an owner who can only sell when a stochastic buyer arrives; equilibrium price reflects expected search delay and the owner-specific dividend.","theory","Equilibrium valuation of an illiquid asset: the price discount relative to a liquid benchmark depends on arrival intensity and the cross-section of dividends.","Provides the cleanest frictionless-benchmark comparison that WP19 formalises as D=(p*-p)/p*; WP19 endogenises the arrival rate through tightness and makes the discount depend on seller urgency.","Exogenous arrival intensity, no tightness, no bargaining-vs-selection decomposition and no implications for observed hazard distributions.","high","crossref+doi"
"lagos2009liquidity","Lagos, Ricardo and Rocheteau, Guillaume","2009","Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions","Econometrica","77(2): 403-426","https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7250","Unrestricted asset holdings in an OTC search model; trading frictions shape asset demands, volume, spreads and delays.","theory","Investors offset frictions by adjusting positions; frictions affect liquidity measures and asset prices through this margin.","Clarifies what a liquidity premium means in search markets; WP19's indivisible housing unit removes the holdings margin and emphasises seller urgency instead.","Divisible assets; no housing.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)"
"leung2017flipping","Leung, Charles Ka Yui and Tse, Chung-Yi","2017","Flipping in the housing market","Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control","76: 232-263","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2017.01.003","Arbitrage middlemen (flippers) enter a housing search model; multiple equilibria in turnover, vacancy and prices.","theory","Flipping arises in sluggish and tight markets; it is socially useful in illiquid markets and wasteful in liquid ones.","Flippers act as liquidity providers to urgent sellers, a role WP19 attributes to cash buyers; both find liquidity provision changes prices and turnover.","No explicit seller urgency distribution or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi"
"lin2007illiquidity","Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Illiquidity and Pricing Biases in the Real Estate Market","Real Estate Economics","35(3): 291-330","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00191.x","Uncertain marketing period and time to sale bias transaction-based return and risk estimates that assume immediate execution.","theory","Estimated returns are biased upward and risks downward when marketing-period uncertainty is ignored; biases can be large.","Shares the view that transaction-price measures understate illiquidity; WP19 derives the bias from equilibrium selection on seller urgency.","No equilibrium pricing or hazards; no urgency heterogeneity; no financing.","high","crossref+doi"
"lin2008real","Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2008","Real Estate Returns and Risk with Heterogeneous Investors","Real Estate Economics","36(4): 753-776","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00229.x","Sellers with different degrees of financial distress face different TOM risk and return distributions.","theory","Return and risk are investor-specific; ignoring TOM uncertainty and financial circumstances understates risk.","Explicitly ties seller financial distress to marketing-period risk and realised prices, close to WP19's urgency gradient but without equilibrium.","No equilibrium tightness, no bargaining, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"lippman1976economics","Lippman, Steven A. and McCall, John J.","1976","The Economics Of Job Search: A Survey","Economic Inquiry","14(2): 155-189","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x","Sequential search with reservation values; comparative statics of the reservation value in offer distribution and search costs.","survey","Reservation-value characterisation of optimal stopping; higher search costs lower the reservation value.","WP19's result that the reservation price decreases in holding cost c is a direct application of this classical comparative static.","Partial equilibrium; no two-sided market.","high","crossref+doi"
"maury2014search","Maury, Tristan-Pierre and Tripier, Fabien","2014","Search strategies on the housing market and their implications on price dispersion","Journal of Housing Economics","26: 55-80","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2014.09.001","Buyers' choice of search strategy generates equilibrium price dispersion in a housing market.","theory","Heterogeneous search strategies produce price dispersion for identical houses; dispersion responds to search costs.","Dispersion from buyer-side heterogeneity complements WP19's dispersion from seller urgency.","No seller urgency, financing or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"merlo2015home","Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François and Rust, John","2015","The Home Selling Problem: Theory And Evidence","International Economic Review","56(2): 457-484","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12111","Single seller's optimal stopping with list-price menu costs and stochastic offer arrivals.","structural","Tiny menu costs rationalise sticky list prices; the model fits list-price and sale dynamics for English properties.","Partial-equilibrium seller problem that WP19 embeds in a market equilibrium; both treat the sale as optimal stopping with offer arrivals.","No equilibrium feedback on arrival rates, no urgency cross-section or selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi"
"moen1997competitive","Moen, Espen R.","1997","Competitive Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","105(2): 385-411","https://doi.org/10.1086/262077","Competitive (directed) search: posted terms direct searchers; equilibrium is constrained efficient.","theory","Competitive search equilibrium decentralises the Hosios condition; submarkets price time to trade.","WP19's posted-price robustness check uses this benchmark.","No seller urgency continuum with private information in the housing sense; no financing.","high","crossref+doi"
"moen2021buying","Moen, Espen R and Nenov, Plamen T and Sniekers, Florian","2021","Buying First or Selling First in Housing Markets","Journal of the European Economic Association","19(1): 38-81","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz069","Moving owners choose to buy first or sell first; strategic complementarity in that choice generates multiple steady states.","theory","Buy-first incentives congest the buyer side and raise the buyer-seller ratio, producing multiplicity and large fluctuations consistent with housing cycles.","Both make tightness endogenous through participation decisions; WP19 keeps a single seller population and studies urgency within it.","No urgency distribution, financing contingency or price-index selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"mortensen1994job","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1994","Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","61(3): 397-415","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297896","Matching function with free entry of vacancies and Nash wage bargaining; endogenous job destruction.","theory","Canonical DMP equilibrium: tightness pinned by free entry; surplus split by Nash bargaining; comparative statics of shocks on flows.","WP19's free-entry condition for buyers and Nash split are direct transplants; sellers play the role of vacancies.","Labour market; no heterogeneous holding costs of the posting side or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi"
"mortensen1999new","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1999","Chapter 39 New developments in models of search in the labor market","Handbook of Labor Economics","vol. 3B: 2567-2627","https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30025-0","Survey of search and matching models in labour markets including endogenous destruction and efficiency.","survey","Summarises the DMP class and its comparative statics.","Reference for WP19's standard results that are not new.","Labour framing.","high","crossref+doi"
"nash1950bargaining","Nash, John F.","1950","The Bargaining Problem","Econometrica","18(2): 155-162","https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266","Axiomatic bargaining solution maximising the product of surpluses.","theory","The Nash solution is the unique split satisfying the stated axioms.","WP19's baseline price-setting rule.","No frictions or dynamics.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)"
"ngai2014hot","Ngai, L. Rachel and Tenreyro, Silvana","2014","Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market","American Economic Review","104(12): 3991-4026","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3991","Thick-market externality in match quality: more participants raise expected match quality, raising willingness to pay and transaction rates.","theory","Small deterministic seasonal drivers are amplified into large seasonal swings in prices and volumes through thick-market effects.","Both models let matching efficiency affect prices and volume with unchanged housing-service values; WP19 shocks efficiency A directly and studies seller urgency rather than seasonality.","Homogeneous sellers; no financing stage; no selection bias in indices.","high","crossref+doi"
"ngai2020decision","Ngai, L Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D","2020","The Decision to Move House and Aggregate Housing-Market Dynamics","Journal of the European Economic Association","18(5): 2487-2531","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa001","Moving is an investment in match quality; the decision to list (inflows) rather than selling speed drives transactions.","theory","Transactions are driven mainly by listings; a model with endogenous moving explains the 1995-2003 boom and has welfare implications through mismatch.","Shares search-and-matching with idiosyncratic match quality; WP19 keeps listing inflow exogenous and focuses on hazards and prices conditional on listing.","No urgency heterogeneity, no financing, no observed-index selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"ngai2024ins","Ngai, L. Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D.","2024","The Ins And Outs Of Selling Houses: Understanding Housing-Market Volatility","International Economic Review","65(3): 1415-1440","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12693","Inflows (new listings) and outflows (sales) jointly determine housing-market volatility; correlations with inventory depend on shock source and persistence.","theory","Both listing inflows and sales outflows matter quantitatively; signs of inventory correlations are time-varying and depend on the nature of shocks.","WP19's exogenous withdrawal rate delta and matching-efficiency shocks are the stationary analogue of their outflow margins; WP19 adds urgency and financing.","No seller heterogeneity in holding costs, no cash/mortgage distinction, no composition correction of price indices.","high","crossref+doi"
"novymarx2009hot","Novy-Marx, Robert","2009","Hot and Cold Markets","Real Estate Economics","37(1): 1-22","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x","Feedback between buyer-seller ratio and bargaining positions amplifies demand shocks: sellers sell faster, inventory falls, tightness rises further.","theory","Equilibrium tightness, expected time to sale and prices are highly sensitive to fundamentals because of endogenous stock feedback.","WP19 shares the tightness-feedback mechanism through free entry; it isolates shocks to matching efficiency and qualification and adds urgency heterogeneity.","Homogeneous agents; no decomposition of the price response into bargaining and composition; no financing.","high","crossref+doi"
"ortalomagne2006housing","Ortalo-Magné, François and Rady, Sven","2006","Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints","Review of Economic Studies","73(2): 459-485","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.383_1.x","Life-cycle credit constraints and the property ladder transmit income shocks into price overshooting and volume dynamics.","theory","Credit-constrained young buyers make prices overreact to income shocks; prices and transactions comove without search frictions.","Provides the frictionless-with-credit benchmark; WP19 isolates the search channel holding credit constant except through qualification.","No search, no time on market, no dispersion.","high","crossref+doi"
"petrongolo2001looking","Petrongolo, Barbara and Pissarides, Christopher A","2001","Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function","Journal of Economic Literature","39(2): 390-431","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.390","Survey of the aggregate matching function: microfoundations, CRS Cobb-Douglas estimates, aggregation issues.","survey","CRS Cobb-Douglas matching function fits many markets; microfoundations remain debated.","Justifies WP19's CRS matching assumption and the interpretation of A as matching efficiency.","Labour market focus.","high","crossref+doi"
"piazzesi2009momentum","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin","2009","Momentum Traders in the Housing Market: Survey Evidence and a Search Model","American Economic Review","99(2): 406-411","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.406","Survey-based heterogeneity in beliefs; a search model where a small share of momentum traders can move prices because trading is frictional.","theory","In a search market a minority of optimistic traders raises transaction prices substantially because they are overrepresented among marginal buyers.","Illustrates how composition of transacting agents, not fundamentals, moves transaction prices; WP19 formalises an analogous composition effect for sellers after a liquidity shock.","Belief heterogeneity on the buyer side only; no seller urgency, hazards or selection correction.","high","crossref+doi"
"piazzesi2020segmented","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin and Stroebel, Johannes","2020","Segmented Housing Search","American Economic Review","110(3): 720-759","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141772","Heterogeneous clienteles search across overlapping market segments; broad searchers flow toward high-inventory segments.","structural","Within-city inventory and search activity covary positively because broad searchers spread localized shocks across segments.","WP19 is a single-segment local market; segmentation is a natural extension and the paper's treatment of inventory and search intensity informs theta.","No seller urgency distribution, financing contingency or liquidity-discount decomposition.","high","crossref+doi"
"pissarides2000equilibrium","Pissarides, Christopher A.","2000","Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd edition","MIT Press (book)","Cambridge, MA","https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html","Textbook treatment of matching, free entry, Nash bargaining, efficiency and endogenous destruction.","theory","Standard reference for equilibrium search with matching functions and the Hosios efficiency condition.","Source of WP19's modelling conventions (CRS matching, tightness, Bellman equations in continuous time).","Labour framing; no asset-price discount or transaction-index implications.","medium","publisher page https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html"
"reher2024mortgage","Reher, Michael and Valkanov, Rossen","2024","The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle","The Journal of Finance","79(5): 3149-3201","https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13373","Mortgage transaction frictions make sellers demand a premium from mortgaged buyers; representative-seller model yields a small premium.","empirical","Mortgaged buyers pay about 11% more than cash buyers; a rational model implies 3%; heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half the gap.","WP19's cash discount = bargaining term + selection term speaks directly to their puzzle by adding seller urgency heterogeneity (both/empirical with model).","No equilibrium tightness feedback or hazard-based selection decomposition.","high","crossref+doi"
"rocheteau2011liquidity","Rocheteau, Guillaume and Weill, Pierre-Olivier","2011","Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 261-282","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00435.x","Review of frictional asset markets in finance and monetary theory with a simple search model.","survey","Unifies the literature on liquidity in search markets, including housing and credit market dynamics.","Places WP19 in the search-based liquidity literature.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi"
"rogerson2005search","Rogerson, Richard and Shimer, Robert and Wright, Randall","2005","Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey","Journal of Economic Literature","43(4): 959-988","https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362014","Survey of search-theoretic models: reservation strategies, matching, bargaining, directed search, wage dispersion.","survey","Unifies partial and equilibrium search; explains coexistence of unmatched agents on both sides and dispersion.","Reference for WP19's reservation-value and dispersion results that are standard.","Labour framing; no financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi"
"rubinstein1982perfect","Rubinstein, Ariel","1982","Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model","Econometrica","50(1): 97-109","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531","Alternating-offers bargaining; impatience determines the unique perfect-equilibrium split.","theory","Unique subgame-perfect division; the more patient party obtains more; limit approximates Nash bargaining.","Justifies WP19's Nash split with bargaining weight beta and links seller urgency (impatience) to lower bargained prices.","No market equilibrium or search.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)"
"sagi2021asset","Sagi, Jacob S","2021","Asset-Level Risk and Return in Real Estate Investments","The Review of Financial Studies","34(8): 3647-3694","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa122","Search-based asset pricing with transaction risk explains why idiosyncratic real estate returns do not scale with holding period.","structural","Equilibrium search model fits commercial real estate transactions; transaction risk is crucial for price dynamics.","Shares search-generated idiosyncratic price dispersion; WP19 focuses on residential sellers' urgency and financing.","No seller urgency types or cash/mortgage contingency.","high","crossref+doi"
"salant1991sale","Salant, Stephen W.","1991","For sale by owner: When to use a broker and how to price the house","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","4(2): 157-173","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00173122","Finite-horizon seller with a deadline chooses between selling by owner and using a broker and sets a declining price path.","theory","A seller facing a moving deadline optimally lowers price over time and may switch to a broker; urgency is a deadline.","Early treatment of seller urgency (deadline) and declining reservation prices; WP19 models urgency as a flow cost in stationary equilibrium.","No market equilibrium, no dispersion or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)"
"shimer2005cyclical","Shimer, Robert","2005","The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies","American Economic Review","95(1): 25-49","https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828572","Standard matching model cannot generate observed volatility of tightness from productivity shocks.","theory","Vacancy-unemployment ratio is far more volatile than productivity; the textbook model lacks amplification.","Benchmark for elasticities of tightness to shocks used in WP19's numerical calibration discussion.","Labour market.","high","crossref+doi"
"stein1995prices","Stein, Jeremy C.","1995","Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A Model with Down-Payment Effects","The Quarterly Journal of Economics","110(2): 379-406","https://doi.org/10.2307/2118444","Down-payment constraints make repeat buyers' demand depend on equity; price declines reduce volume and amplify themselves.","theory","Price-volume comovement and amplification arise from down-payment constraints without search frictions.","Alternative, non-search channel for volume-price comovement; WP19 shares the role of financing in sellers' ability to transact but routes it through buyer qualification.","No search frictions, hazards or price dispersion.","high","crossref+doi"
"taylor1999time","Taylor, Curtis R.","1999","Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality","Review of Economic Studies","66(3): 555-578","https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00098","Time on the market signals unobserved quality when inspections are informative, creating stigma for stale listings.","theory","Long TOM lowers buyers' beliefs and reduces subsequent sale probability and price.","Competing explanation of declining hazard with duration; WP19 obtains duration dependence from urgency composition instead.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing.","high","crossref+doi"
"wheaton1990vacancy","Wheaton, William C.","1990","Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model","Journal of Political Economy","98(6): 1270-1292","https://doi.org/10.1086/261734","Owner-occupiers mismatched with their house search while holding two units; vacancy and matching rate pin down reservation prices and equilibrium price via Nash bargaining.","theory","First housing matching model: higher vacancy lowers prices; price depends on expected time to sell and the cost of carrying two units.","WP19 keeps the stationary matching structure and carrying cost of unsold housing, but makes carrying cost heterogeneous across sellers and derives the hazard and discount jointly with free entry of buyers.","No seller heterogeneity in urgency, no financing contingency, no selection correction for transaction indices; liquidity is vacancy-driven rather than a defined discount relative to a frictionless price.","high","crossref+doi"
"williams1995pricing","Williams, Joseph T.","1995","Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search","Review of Financial Studies","8(1): 55-90","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/8.1.55","Owners of heterogeneous real assets search costly for buyers; the asset price is an optimal-stopping value under Poisson arrivals and dispersed offers.","theory","Equilibrium prices of real assets embed a search discount; time to sale and prices respond to arrival rates and the dispersion of buyer offers.","Shares the Poisson-arrival/optimal-stopping core and the idea of a price below the frictionless value; WP19 adds two-sided tightness, free entry, urgency heterogeneity and a financing stage.","Partial-equilibrium arrival rate; no matching function or tightness feedback, no composition effects in observed transaction prices.","high","crossref+doi"
"wright2021directed","Wright, Randall and Kircher, Philipp and Julien, Benoît and Guerrieri, Veronica","2021","Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour","Journal of Economic Literature","59(1): 90-148","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191505","Survey of directed and competitive search: efficiency, private information, sorting with heterogeneity.","survey","Directed search prices goods plus time to obtain them; equilibria are often efficient; technical results collected.","Guides WP19's posted-price robustness section and the efficiency comparison.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi"
"yavas1992simple","Yavaş, Abdullah","1992","A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets","Real Estate Economics","20(4): 533-548","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00595","Buyers and sellers choose search intensities; price by Nash bargaining; brokers change incentives to search.","theory","Brokers reduce own search; price rises by less than the commission; the split depends on bargaining powers (half under Nash).","Nash bargaining over the match surplus with endogenous search intensity is a direct antecedent of WP19's bargaining block.","No seller urgency distribution, financing, liquidity shock or index selection.","high","crossref+doi"
"yavas1995strategic","Yavas, Abdullah and Yang, Shiawee","1995","The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence","Real Estate Economics","23(3): 347-368","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00668","Listing price trades off arrival rate (TOM) against bargained transaction price.","theory","Theory and evidence that higher list prices lengthen TOM and raise sale price; optimal list price balances the two.","WP19's reservation-price/hazard trade-off is the bargaining analogue of the list-price/TOM trade-off here.","Homogeneous seller urgency; no financing; no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi"