\section{Introduction} \label{sec:introduction} Trading desks, retail brokers and market-making firms have begun to connect large language models (LLMs) to order entry. The models are few, the prompts are similar, and the information they see is the same public tape. If a meaningful share of order flow comes to be generated by a handful of foundation models answering near-identical questions about near-identical screens, the classical concern about correlated trading---that it impairs the aggregation of dispersed information and amplifies shocks---acquires a new and concrete source. Regulators have said as much \citep{fsb2024, danielsson2025}; the empirical record on what actually happens when LLM agents populate a market is thin, because the counterfactual market without them cannot be observed. This paper builds the counterfactual. We construct a transparent, replayable exchange economy in which the share of traders controlled by a language model is an experimental treatment, and we ask six questions: whether a rising share improves or impairs informational efficiency; whether a shared model generates correlated orders and liquidity spirals even when prompts and private signals differ; how LLM agents interact with fundamentalists, trend followers, noise traders, arbitrageurs, market makers and leveraged traders; whether memory, communication and adaptive feedback improve decisions while synchronizing them; what the causal role of agent identity, information, latency and budget is; and which safeguards mitigate instability at what cost. The answers are causal statements about the simulator, identified by randomization, and we are explicit that they are not statements about institutions. Three design choices separate this from existing LLM market simulations \citep{lopezlira2025trade, yang2025twinmarket, saxena2026, henning2025}. First, the economy keeps four prices apart: the latent fundamental value defined by an exogenous dividend process whose next innovation is drawn but not yet announced; the public value implied by announced dividends and public news; the transaction price; and the quote midpoint. Price discovery is measured as the convergence of the mid to the latent value, not to a known target, and information has value because the latent innovation is revealed only through noisy news, private signals and the next dividend. Second, the LLM treatment is randomized: a seed fixes the dividend path, the news, the endowments, the latencies and the policy assignment of every trader slot, and the treatment replaces a stratified subset of slots by LLM agents that inherit the information set of the slot they replace. Matched pairs differ only in who decides. Third, the mechanisms are derived before they are tested. A stylized model of traders whose signal errors share a model-specific component delivers closed-form comparative statics for price informativeness, order-flow correlation, synchrony, the effective number of models, feedback amplification and the leverage spiral; the experimental design maps each primitive to a simulator parameter and pre-registers the sign of every prediction, the primary outcomes, the thresholds that define bubbles and crashes and the estimators. The experiments use OpenAI's \code{gpt-5.4-nano} as the shared model (with \code{gpt-5.4-mini} in a two-model and an equal-budget arm), 100-trader markets of 600 ticks, and seven matched seeds per live cell: six shares from 0 to 100\,\% of slots, three diversity and cognition arms, a leverage interaction with a matched classical comparator, two safeguards, two fairness arms, and a frozen-decision-library replay at 1,000 traders. A classical design of sixteen cells and thirty seeds validates the stylized facts and the mechanisms without any language model. The analysis is paired at the run level with Holm adjustment within hypothesis families; with seven seeds, effects below roughly 1.2 standard deviations are not detectable and are reported as such. The results separate cleanly into what the theory got right and what it got wrong. It got coordination right: LLM agents deciding at the same tick are on the same side nine times out of ten, a communication channel makes them more alike, and prompt or model diversity makes them less so. It got prices wrong: raising the LLM share from 0 to 95\,\% of slots tightens the quoted spread from 18.6 to 6.1 basis points, raises depth from 141 to 956 lots, cuts price impact by 60\,\% and leaves the deviation of price from latent value unchanged at about half a percent; no bubble, crash or halt occurs in any of 112 live runs; and in the presence of leveraged trend followers the LLM agents halve the pricing error and remove the bubble episodes that leverage creates in the classical economy. The cost appears in dynamics rather than levels: latent information is absorbed more slowly as the share rises, the five-tick variance ratio climbs from 1.1 to 2.1 and the first-order autocorrelation of returns from 0.02 to 0.32, so that the price reaches its value in a smooth, predictable drift that trend followers exploit. The mechanism that unifies these facts is not correlated error but patient liquidity provision: a small reasoning model given the public present value and asked every twenty ticks what to do mostly rests a limit order near that value and waits. A market populated by such agents is deep, calm, and slow to learn what it does not already know. Section~\ref{sec:literature} positions the paper. Section~\ref{sec:model} describes the economy, Section~\ref{sec:theory} the stylized model and its propositions, Section~\ref{sec:identification} the experimental design and pre-analysis plan, Section~\ref{sec:implementation} the software and its validation. Section~\ref{sec:results} reports the classical and live experiments, Section~\ref{sec:mechanisms} reads them against the theory, Section~\ref{sec:robustness} probes thresholds, caching, dose, mechanism and scale, Section~\ref{sec:limitations} states what the design cannot say, and Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} concludes. Appendices give the proofs, the prompts, the algorithms, every hyperparameter and the replication package.