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    "claim": "Reputation motivation creates a certification effect that can prevent IPO market breakdowns",
    "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",
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    "claim": "Reputation motivation lowers welfare when good firms are abundant or profitable",
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    "claim": "The VC's equilibrium profits can exceed those of a purely profit-maximizing VC",
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    "claim": "VC reputation motivation stems from fixed fees on attracted capital, and picking good firms is central to VC skill",
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