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   "estimand": "How a fund's mid-year distance from its benchmark affects second-half risk-shifting (relative tracking-error volatility), and whether this differs for managers with versus without performance-based contracts",
   "strategy": "Median quantile regressions of the risk adjustment ratio on Distance and excess return. Contract types are hand-collected from SAI filings. Treated funds (performance contracts) are matched to control funds (no performance contracts) on observables. A placebo test randomly reassigns benchmarks.",
   "key_assumptions": [
    "After matching on observables, contract type is uncorrelated with unobservables",
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    "selection into contract type on observables",
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   "convention_notes": "Table notes define dependent variables (risk adjustment ratio as a second-half versus first-half tracking-error volatility ratio) and give the quantile-regression specification. Pooled OLS and median quantile regressions are reported side by side. A bootstrap placebo table summarizes 500 benchmark randomizations.",
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    "claim": "An asymmetric bonus contract is valued like an exchange option whose vega peaks when the portfolio's return is close to the benchmark's",
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    "claim": "Funds performing closer to the benchmark at mid-year increase relative risk more in the second half",
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    "claim": "Risk-shifting is concentrated among funds with a clear compensation benchmark and is absent without performance pay",
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    "claim": "Matched treated-control comparison supports a causal effect of contracts on risk-shifting",
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    "claim": "Manager ownership reduces risk-shifting, active share increases it, and tenure mitigates it; Distance remains important",
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   {
    "claim": "Random benchmark assignment does not reproduce the effect",
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    "claim": "The contract-based incentive dominates flow-performance tournament incentives",
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    "evidence_ref": "Section III.G"
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  "structural_summary": "The paper opens with an agency-and-contracting motivation, then sketches an option-based theory of the manager's bonus that predicts a hypothesis, priced in the appendix. After describing the data, one long empirical section moves through baseline quantile regressions, hand-collected contract heterogeneity, a matched-sample causal analysis, cross-sectional moderators, a placebo, a horse race against flow incentives, and robustness checks. A brief conclusion bounds the interpretation.",
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