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  "identification": {
   "estimand": "How an investor's IPO allocation, measured as normalized rationing, relates to the revenues that investor generates for the bookrunner and to proxies for its information production during bookbuilding.",
   "strategy": "Allocation regressions on revenue quartile rankings and bid/behavior proxies. The regressions are run pooled and bank by bank, then with investor fixed effects and investor-bank fixed effects to absorb unobserved characteristics and relationships. Expected profitability of bids is also tested.",
   "key_assumptions": [
    "After investor and investor-bank fixed effects, no time-varying unobserved information production remains that is correlated with revenue rankings.",
    "The observable proxies (bid type, meeting attendance, bidding frequency) adequately capture information revelation."
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   "threats_addressed": [
    "Unobserved investor expertise or efficiency in producing information",
    "Closer investor-bank relationships that lead to more information revelation",
    "Allocation differences reflecting expected profitability rather than allocation levels alone"
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   "convention_notes": "Table notes define the dependent variable (normalized rationing, i.e., percentage allotted divided by percentage bid) and the regressors (bid-size quartiles, price-sensitive vs money bids, revenue quartiles). Descriptive tables are split into panels. The expected-profitability model is referenced to an Internet Appendix table.",
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    "welfare implications ambiguous",
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  "claim_evidence": [
   {
    "claim": "Price-sensitive bids receive slightly higher allocations, with considerable variation across banks.",
    "evidence_type": "table",
    "evidence_ref": "Tables VI, VII"
   },
   {
    "claim": "Top revenue-quartile investors receive allocations about 60% higher relative to bid than non-clients.",
    "evidence_type": "table",
    "evidence_ref": "Table VI"
   },
   {
    "claim": "The revenue-allocation link persists with investor and investor-bank fixed effects.",
    "evidence_type": "table",
    "evidence_ref": "Table VIII"
   },
   {
    "claim": "The revenue-allocation relationship is concentrated in hot IPOs.",
    "evidence_type": "table",
    "evidence_ref": "Table IX"
   },
   {
    "claim": "High-revenue investors obtain higher expected profits from their bids.",
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    "evidence_ref": "Table X"
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   {
    "claim": "Prior studies lacked allocation books and could only show indirect quid pro quo links.",
    "evidence_type": "prior_literature",
    "evidence_ref": "Reuter (2006); Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett (2011)"
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  "structural_summary": "The paper motivates the question with past IPO scandals and a regulator's market study that supplied unique data. The introduction frames two non-exclusive hypotheses, information revelation and quid pro quo, and previews how unobservables are handled. It then lists findings in an ordered sequence and positions itself against indirect prior evidence. Section I describes the institutional setting and data. Section II reports pooled and bank-level allocation regressions. Section III challenges the quid pro quo interpretation with fixed effects and expected-profitability tests and discusses welfare. The conclusion restates the findings with caveats about generalizability.",
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   "regulatory data",
   "proprietary allocation books",
   "competing hypotheses",
   "fixed effects",
   "welfare ambiguity",
   "European IPOs"
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  "confidence": 0.8,
  "notes": "The data come from an FCA market study. Significance conventions are not visible in the excerpts. The Internet Appendix is referenced for the expected-price model."
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