{"text": "{\"genre\":\"empirical\",\"subfield\":\"household_finance\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"primary_method\":\"regression_discontinuity\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"Effect of an information-free credit rating downgrade on consumers' subsequent borrowing, borrower actions and market exit, plus the share of the post-default credit decline attributable to the credit-reporting downgrade itself.\",\"strategy\":\"Regression discontinuity around Peru's 'rule of twenty' rating-alignment regulation. The running variable is an exchange-rate-adjusted debt share, so currency movements push a bank's share across the 20% threshold. Complete-default outcomes are then decomposed by interacting default with the expected exogenous classification change.\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"Currency movements are exogenous to individual consumers\",\"No manipulation of the running variable around the 20% threshold\",\"Borrowers just above and just below the threshold are comparable\",\"Threshold crossing affects outcomes only through the rating alignment\"],\"threats_addressed\":[\"Endogeneity of current-month balance changes (handled by using lagged, exchange-rate-adjusted balances)\",\"Covariate balance around the threshold\",\"Density manipulation (McCrary test)\",\"Placebo sample of borrowers with homogeneous loan ratings who should be unaffected\"],\"causal_language_strength\":4,\"uses_causal_claim\":true},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":3},\"contribution\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"tension_or_puzzle\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"identification_defense\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":7,\"move\":\"roadmap\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":4,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_evidence\",\"new_identification\"],\"roadmap_present\":true,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"inside_introduction\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"data\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"empirical_design\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"conclusion\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":true,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"stars_and_tstats\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":true},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"within_results\",\"types\":[\"placebo\",\"alternative_specification\",\"falsification\"]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"Notes give the observation level (client-bank-month), the sample definition, and the equation estimated. Later tables point back to the baseline specification of Table IV. Stars mark significance levels. Outcomes are measured at 12-, 24- and 36-month horizons. Some variables are stated in soles.\",\"units_stated_in_notes\":true,\"standard_errors_description\":\"unclear\"},\"figures\":{\"uncertainty_shown\":\"unclear\"},\"conclusion\":{\"bounded_claims\":true,\"policy_implications\":true,\"open_questions\":false,\"restates_contribution\":true},\"hedging\":{\"level\":\"moderate\",\"typical_devices\":[\"suggest\",\"may\",\"appears to\",\"potentially\",\"in our sample\"]},\"claim_evidence\":[{\"claim\":\"Complete default is associated with medium-term reductions in borrowing in a random sample of the full data set\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table III\"},{\"claim\":\"Exchange-rate-adjusted share predicts actual crossing of the 20% threshold\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table IV, Figure 1\"},{\"claim\":\"Borrowers just above and below the threshold look similar on observables, with no density manipulation\",\"evidence_type\":\"figure\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table V, Figures 2-3\"},{\"claim\":\"Crossing the threshold produces a moderate-duration rating downgrade only for borrowers with heterogeneous ratings\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table VI, Figure 4\"},{\"claim\":\"Shocked borrowers see lower loan balances, less new financing and fewer new relationships for three years\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table VII, Figure 5\"},{\"claim\":\"Shocked borrowers pay down judicial-collection loans and zero out credit cards\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table VIII, Figure 6\"},{\"claim\":\"Shocked borrowers are more likely to exit the consumer loan market at two- and three-year horizons\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table IX, Figure 7\"},{\"claim\":\"The reporting downgrade accounts for 25-65% of the post-default credit decline\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Tables X-XI\"}],\"structural_summary\":\"Opens from the macro debate on weak post-2008 recovery and household borrowing constraints, then asks why negative credit events have lasting effects. Establishes a descriptive default–credit association first. It then uses a regulatory threshold combined with currency-driven variation as an RD to isolate information-free downgrades. The design is validated through first stage, covariate balance, density and placebo checks. Effects are traced on financing, borrower actions and broader outcomes, and the paper ends with a decomposition of the post-default decline. Policy implications about macro-contingent credit-history forgiveness close both the introduction and the conclusion.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"regression discontinuity\",\"regulatory threshold\",\"credit reporting\",\"consumer credit\",\"Peru\",\"exchange rate variation\",\"decomposition\",\"policy implication\"],\"confidence\":0.85,\"notes\":\"Standard-error type is not visible in the excerpts. Robustness checks are embedded in results subsections rather than a separate section. An Internet Appendix exists, but its content is not visible.\"}", "json": {"genre": "empirical", "subfield": "household_finance", "subfield_secondary": "financial_intermediation_banking", "primary_method": "regression_discontinuity", "identification": {"estimand": "Effect of an information-free credit rating downgrade on consumers' subsequent borrowing, borrower actions and market exit, plus the share of the post-default credit decline attributable to the credit-reporting downgrade itself.", "strategy": "Regression discontinuity around Peru's 'rule of twenty' rating-alignment regulation. The running variable is an exchange-rate-adjusted debt share, so currency movements push a bank's share across the 20% threshold. Complete-default outcomes are then decomposed by interacting default with the expected exogenous classification change.", "key_assumptions": ["Currency movements are exogenous to individual consumers", "No manipulation of the running variable around the 20% threshold", "Borrowers just above and just below the threshold are comparable", "Threshold crossing affects outcomes only through the rating alignment"], "threats_addressed": ["Endogeneity of current-month balance changes (handled by using lagged, exchange-rate-adjusted balances)", "Covariate balance around the threshold", "Density manipulation (McCrary test)", "Placebo sample of borrowers with homogeneous loan ratings who should be unaffected"], "causal_language_strength": 4, "uses_causal_claim": true}, "abstract_moves": {"question": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 0}, "gap": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}, "method": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 1}, "results": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 1}, "magnitude": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 3}, "contribution": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}}, "introduction": {"moves": [{"paragraph_index": 0, "move": "motivation"}, {"paragraph_index": 0, "move": "tension_or_puzzle"}, {"paragraph_index": 1, "move": "preview_of_approach"}, {"paragraph_index": 1, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 2, "move": "identification_defense"}, {"paragraph_index": 3, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 4, "move": "related_literature_positioning"}, {"paragraph_index": 4, "move": "contribution_statement"}, {"paragraph_index": 5, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 5, "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "related_literature_positioning"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "policy_or_broader_implication"}, {"paragraph_index": 7, "move": "roadmap"}], "contribution_paragraph_index": 4, "contribution_types": ["new_evidence", "new_identification"], "roadmap_present": true, "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"}, "section_roles": [{"idx": 0, "role": "introduction"}, {"idx": 1, "role": "data"}, {"idx": 2, "role": "empirical_design"}, {"idx": 3, "role": "results"}, {"idx": 4, "role": "conclusion"}], "results_presentation": {"economic_significance_discussed": true, "statistical_significance_language": "stars_and_tstats", "magnitude_statements_in_intro": true}, "robustness": {"location": "within_results", "types": ["placebo", "alternative_specification", "falsification"]}, "tables": {"convention_notes": "Notes give the observation level (client-bank-month), the sample definition, and the equation estimated. 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