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   "estimand": "Determinants of post-IPO VC financing, plus investor and firm returns associated with these financings; the value of having pre-IPO backing from VCs prone to post-IPO funding",
   "strategy": "Competing-hypothesis tests. Firm-level linear probability models compare four financing types. VC×firm-level choice regressions follow. Returns are measured as buy-and-hold abnormal returns to investors, announcement CARs and long-run returns. Calendar-time long-short portfolios and delisting logits are sorted on the pre-IPO VC's propensity to fund after the IPO.",
   "key_assumptions": [
    "Proxies for information asymmetry and VC agency costs capture the intended constructs",
    "A VC's historical propensity to fund post-IPO serves as a proxy for a firm's access to post-IPO VC financing",
    "Comparing with non-VC PIPEs isolates the VC comparative advantage"
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    "Alternative agency explanation tested against the information asymmetry explanation",
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   "convention_notes": "Table notes open by defining the sample, cross-referencing Table I. They then describe the model (linear probability, logit, calendar-time portfolio regressions, CARs against size-decile benchmarks) and the panel structure.",
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    "claim": "About 15% of VC-backed IPO firms obtain additional VC funding within five years of the IPO",
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   },
   {
    "claim": "Only post-IPO VC financings are linked to both high firm information asymmetry and a VC informational advantage",
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    "claim": "VCs with prior investment or board seats are more likely to fund post-IPO; agency proxies show no association",
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   {
    "claim": "VCs earn roughly 31 percentage points of abnormal return over 12 months, unlike non-VC PIPE investors",
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    "claim": "Market reactions around post-IPO VC investments are positive",
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    "claim": "A long-short portfolio sorted on the pre-IPO VC's post-IPO funding propensity earns positive returns, and such firms delist less",
    "evidence_type": "table",
    "evidence_ref": "Tables VIII, IX"
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  "structural_summary": "The paper opens by challenging conventional wisdom with a descriptive fact: VCs frequently fund firms after their IPO. It frames two competing explanations, information asymmetry versus agency. Data and descriptives come first. Successive results sections then test the hypotheses through determinants of financing type, VC-level choice, returns to VC investors, market reactions and long-run returns, and a portfolio and delisting analysis based on pre-IPO VC propensity. The conclusion restates the finding favoring information asymmetry and draws a practical implication for private firms choosing VCs.",
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  "notes": "No explicit robustness section appears in the excerpts; an Internet Appendix is mentioned but its contents are not shown. The excerpts conflict on sample start year (1985 vs 1995)."
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