{"text": "{\"genre\":\"empirical\",\"subfield\":\"market_microstructure\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"information intermediaries / sell-side analysts\",\"primary_method\":\"natural_experiment_event_study\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"Effect of industry-level drops in the number of analysts on the forecast accuracy, bias, effort and informativeness of the remaining analysts covering that industry, incremental to firm-level coverage effects\",\"strategy\":\"Uses analyst drops caused by brokerage house mergers and closures as plausibly exogenous shocks to industry-level analyst coverage, estimated with industry panel regressions; complemented by firm-level OLS and difference-in-differences regressions extending Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), and by analyses of all coverage changes\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"Analyst drops from brokerage mergers and closures are unrelated to the industry's underlying information environment\",\"Industry-level competition is the channel through which coverage changes affect other analysts\"],\"threats_addressed\":[\"endogeneity of analyst coverage changes\",\"external validity limits of drop-only tests (addressed by examining all changes, including increases)\",\"confounding of industry-level effects with firm-level coverage effects\"],\"causal_language_strength\":3,\"uses_causal_claim\":true},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":3}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"literature_gap\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":6,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_evidence\"],\"roadmap_present\":false,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"inside_introduction\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"data\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"robustness\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"conclusion\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":7,\"role\":\"appendix\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":true,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"unclear\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":true},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"mixed\",\"types\":[\"alternative_specification\",\"alternative_measure\",\"subsample\",\"other\"]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"Panel-regression tables in which notes define the dependent variables (e.g., absolute and signed forecast error as proxies for accuracy and bias), the treatment variable (analyst drops from mergers and closures) and interaction indicators. 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It previews descriptive evidence on how analyst scope varies over time and its economic correlates, then sketches a competition and spillover mechanism. It previews results from merger- and closure-induced analyst drops on forecast quality, effort, convergence and price informativeness, and closes with firm- versus industry-level comparisons and contribution claims. In the body, Section I gives descriptive time-series evidence. Section II presents the quasi-experimental results with mechanism tests. Section III extends to all coverage changes and firm-level DID. The conclusion restates the findings and draws implications for the literature and regulation.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"sell-side analysts\",\"industry competition\",\"spillover effects\",\"brokerage mergers\",\"quasi-natural experiment\",\"forecast accuracy\",\"information dissemination\"],\"confidence\":0.8,\"notes\":\"Section I is labeled 'other' in the source but functions as data and descriptive analysis. The source says Section II's first paragraph refers to changes 'documented in Section II'; this appears to be a numbering mismatch. The excerpts do not state how standard errors are computed. The internet appendix is mentioned.\"}", "json": {"genre": "empirical", "subfield": "market_microstructure", "subfield_secondary": "information intermediaries / sell-side analysts", "primary_method": "natural_experiment_event_study", "identification": {"estimand": "Effect of industry-level drops in the number of analysts on the forecast accuracy, bias, effort and informativeness of the remaining analysts covering that industry, incremental to firm-level coverage effects", "strategy": "Uses analyst drops caused by brokerage house mergers and closures as plausibly exogenous shocks to industry-level analyst coverage, estimated with industry panel regressions; complemented by firm-level OLS and difference-in-differences regressions extending Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), and by analyses of all coverage changes", "key_assumptions": ["Analyst drops from brokerage mergers and closures are unrelated to the industry's underlying information environment", "Industry-level competition is the channel through which coverage changes affect other analysts"], "threats_addressed": ["endogeneity of analyst coverage changes", "external validity limits of drop-only tests (addressed by examining all changes, including increases)", "confounding of industry-level effects with firm-level coverage effects"], "causal_language_strength": 3, "uses_causal_claim": true}, "abstract_moves": {"question": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 0}, "gap": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}, "method": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}, "results": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 1}, "magnitude": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}, "contribution": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 3}}, "introduction": {"moves": [{"paragraph_index": 0, "move": "motivation"}, {"paragraph_index": 0, "move": "related_literature_positioning"}, {"paragraph_index": 1, "move": "literature_gap"}, {"paragraph_index": 1, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 2, "move": "preview_of_approach"}, {"paragraph_index": 2, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 3, "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"}, {"paragraph_index": 4, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 5, "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"}, {"paragraph_index": 5, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "preview_of_approach"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "contribution_statement"}], "contribution_paragraph_index": 6, "contribution_types": ["new_evidence"], "roadmap_present": false, "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"}, "section_roles": [{"idx": 0, "role": "introduction"}, {"idx": 1, "role": "data"}, {"idx": 2, "role": "results"}, {"idx": 3, "role": "robustness"}, {"idx": 4, "role": "conclusion"}, {"idx": 5, "role": "appendix"}, {"idx": 6, "role": "appendix"}, {"idx": 7, "role": "appendix"}], "results_presentation": {"economic_significance_discussed": true, "statistical_significance_language": "unclear", "magnitude_statements_in_intro": true}, "robustness": {"location": "mixed", "types": ["alternative_specification", "alternative_measure", "subsample", "other"]}, "tables": {"convention_notes": "Panel-regression tables in which notes define the dependent variables (e.g., absolute and signed forecast error as proxies for accuracy and bias), the treatment variable (analyst drops from mergers and closures) and interaction indicators. 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