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1// Analyse de l'en-tête Authentication-Results (RFC 8601) → verdicts SPF / DKIM / DMARC.2import { relatedDomains } from "./address"34export type AuthVerdict = "pass" | "fail" | "softfail" | "neutral" | "none" | "temperror" | "permerror" | "policy"5export interface AuthMethodResult {6 method: string7 result: AuthVerdict | string8 reason?: string9 props: Record<string, string>10}11export interface AuthResults {12 authserv: string13 results: AuthMethodResult[]14}15export interface AuthSummary {16 spf?: AuthVerdict17 dkim?: AuthVerdict18 dmarc?: AuthVerdict19 /** domaine signataire DKIM qui a réussi, s'il y en a un */20 dkimDomain?: string21 /** true si aucun résultat exploitable (courrier interne, ou serveur qui n'a rien vérifié) */22 empty: boolean23 /** niveau global pour l'interface */24 level: "ok" | "warn" | "danger" | "unknown"25}2627const VERDICTS = new Set(["pass", "fail", "softfail", "neutral", "none", "temperror", "permerror", "policy"])2829/** Retire les commentaires entre parenthèses (imbriqués) hors chaînes entre guillemets, et déplie les lignes. */30function stripComments(v: string): string {31 let out = ""32 let depth = 033 let quoted = false34 for (let i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {35 const c = v[i]36 if (quoted) {37 out += c38 if (c === "\\" && i + 1 < v.length) out += v[++i]39 else if (c === '"') quoted = false40 } else if (depth > 0) {41 if (c === "\\") i++42 else if (c === "(") depth++43 else if (c === ")") depth--44 } else if (c === "(") depth++45 else if (c === '"') {46 quoted = true47 out += c48 } else out += c49 }50 return out.replace(/\r?\n[ \t]+/g, " ")51}5253function splitTop(v: string, sep: string): string[] {54 const out: string[] = []55 let cur = ""56 let quoted = false57 for (let i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {58 const c = v[i]59 if (quoted) {60 cur += c61 if (c === "\\" && i + 1 < v.length) cur += v[++i]62 else if (c === '"') quoted = false63 } else if (c === '"') {64 quoted = true65 cur += c66 } else if (c === sep) {67 out.push(cur)68 cur = ""69 } else cur += c70 }71 out.push(cur)72 return out73}7475export function parseAuthenticationResults(value: string): AuthResults | null {76 const parts = splitTop(stripComments(value), ";").map((s) => s.trim())77 if (!parts.length || !parts[0]) return null78 const authserv = parts[0].split(/\s+/)[0]79 const results: AuthMethodResult[] = []80 for (const p of parts.slice(1)) {81 if (!p || /^none$/i.test(p)) continue82 const tokens = p.match(/[^\s=]+\s*=\s*(?:"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"|[^\s]+)/g) ?? []83 if (!tokens.length) continue84 const kv = tokens.map((t) => {85 const i = t.indexOf("=")86 return [t.slice(0, i).trim().toLowerCase(), t.slice(i + 1).trim().replace(/^"(.*)"$/s, "$1")] as const87 })88 const [method, result] = kv[0]89 const props: Record<string, string> = {}90 let reason: string | undefined91 for (const [k, val] of kv.slice(1)) {92 if (k === "reason") reason = val93 else props[k] = val94 }95 results.push({ method: method.split("/")[0], result: result.toLowerCase(), reason, props })96 }97 return { authserv, results }98}99100function verdict(r: string | undefined): AuthVerdict | undefined {101 return r && VERDICTS.has(r) ? (r as AuthVerdict) : undefined102}103104/**105 * Résume les résultats du serveur de réception. Seul le PREMIER en-tête (le plus haut, ajouté par notre serveur) est de confiance :106 * un expéditeur peut joindre ses propres en-têtes Authentication-Results mensongers plus bas.107 * `trustedAuthserv`, s'il est fourni, exige que l'identifiant du serveur corresponde.108 */109export function summarizeAuth(headerValues: string[], fromDomain?: string, trustedAuthserv?: string): AuthSummary {110 const first = headerValues.length ? parseAuthenticationResults(headerValues[0]) : null111 if (!first || (trustedAuthserv && first.authserv.toLowerCase() !== trustedAuthserv.toLowerCase()) || !first.results.length)112 return { empty: true, level: "unknown" }113 const of = (m: string) => first.results.filter((r) => r.method === m)114 const spf = verdict(of("spf")[0]?.result)115 const dkims = of("dkim")116 const dkimPass = dkims.find((r) => r.result === "pass" && (!fromDomain || !r.props["header.d"] || relatedDomains(r.props["header.d"], fromDomain))) ?? dkims.find((r) => r.result === "pass")117 const dkim = dkimPass ? "pass" : verdict(dkims[0]?.result)118 const dmarc = verdict(of("dmarc")[0]?.result)119 const all = [spf, dkim, dmarc].filter(Boolean) as AuthVerdict[]120 let level: AuthSummary["level"] = "unknown"121 if (all.length) {122 const bad = (v?: AuthVerdict) => v === "fail" || v === "permerror" || v === "policy"123 if (bad(dmarc) || (dmarc === undefined && bad(spf) && dkim !== "pass") || (bad(dkim) && spf !== "pass" && dmarc !== "pass")) level = "danger"124 else if (dmarc === "pass" || (spf === "pass" && dkim === "pass")) level = "ok"125 else level = "warn"126 }127 return { spf, dkim, dmarc, dkimDomain: dkimPass?.props["header.d"], empty: all.length === 0, level }128}129130/**131 * L'adresse From est-elle authentifiée ? Vrai seulement si DMARC a réussi, ou si une signature DKIM valide provient d'un132 * domaine aligné sur celui de l'expéditeur. C'est la condition pour appliquer une préférence « expéditeur de confiance » :133 * sans elle, n'importe qui pourrait usurper l'adresse et faire charger des images distantes (pistage) à sa place.134 */135export function senderAuthenticated(headerValues: string[], fromDomain: string | undefined, trustedAuthserv?: string): boolean {136 if (!fromDomain) return false137 const first = headerValues.length ? parseAuthenticationResults(headerValues[0]) : null138 if (!first || (trustedAuthserv && first.authserv.toLowerCase() !== trustedAuthserv.toLowerCase())) return false139 for (const r of first.results) {140 if (r.method === "dmarc" && r.result === "pass") {141 // header.from, s'il est donné, doit désigner le domaine de l'expéditeur affiché142 const d = r.props["header.from"]143 if (!d || relatedDomains(d, fromDomain)) return true144 }145 if (r.method === "dkim" && r.result === "pass" && r.props["header.d"] && relatedDomains(r.props["header.d"], fromDomain)) return true146 }147 return false148}149