# Security review — 2026-11-18, before public exposure
Scope: the whole repository at the deployed commit. Method: manual review of every server route and of the client
engine, then tests that reproduce each attack. Performed by the author of the code (Claude); this is not an
independent audit and does not replace one. Passing tests show that specific attacks fail; they do not prove the
system secure.
# Findings
| # |
Severity |
Finding |
Resolution |
| 1 |
High |
Clients extended a group to any account the server listed as a member. A malicious server could add a real, enrolled account to a private conversation and that account would receive the keys |
Fixed: reconciliation only adds devices of accounts already holding a leaf in the authenticated MLS tree. Test: “an account the server adds to the member list on its own is never given the group keys” |
| 2 |
High |
A welcome message could replace a working group state on a device (an enrolled attacker cooperating with the server could substitute a group for an existing conversation and speak inside it) |
Fixed: welcomes are accepted only when the device holds no state; the MLS group id must equal the conversation id; a direct conversation's tree may contain only its two accounts |
| 3 |
Medium |
Attachment descriptors from other members were used without validation (malformed values could break rendering; file names could contain path separators) |
Fixed: strict validation and sanitisation in the engine (cleanFiles) |
| 4 |
Medium |
Messages updated in place (edits, reactions) were not re-rendered: a person could keep seeing stale content |
Fixed (revision counter) |
| 5 |
Low |
Unbounded key-package uploads and self-synced blobs per device |
Fixed: caps (120 packages, 200 blobs of 256 KB) |
| 6 |
Low |
Outbox order depended on random identifiers within the same millisecond |
Fixed: monotonic counter; ordering tested |
| 7 |
Info |
Sessions were created without the manually built browser contexts having media permissions (test harness only) |
Test harness corrected |
# Verified controls
| Control |
Evidence |
| No account without invitation or one-time bootstrap; tokens single use, expirable, revocable |
integration tests 1–3 |
| Passkey verification, unknown credential refused, challenge single use, session revocation |
test 4 |
| CSRF (SameSite=Strict cookie + Origin check + custom header), WebSocket origin and session checks, security headers, CSP without inline script |
test 5; production headers checked |
| Server stores no plaintext (database rows and blob files searched for a marker) |
tests 7, 17 |
| Sender authentication, author-only edit/delete |
test 8 |
| Removal and revocation cut access, cryptographically and at the API |
tests 10, 12, 19 |
| Forged device certificate refused by server and by clients |
tests 6, 13, 14 |
| Identity change raises a warning and is not trusted before acceptance |
test 16 |
| Attachment tampering, chunk swapping, cross-conversation access, quota |
test 17 |
| Rate limiting |
test 20 |
| Dependencies |
pnpm audit --prod: no known vulnerabilities (2026-11-18) |
| Load |
16 accounts, 480 group messages, 7 200 decryptions in 1.2 s, identical order on every device |
| Production |
health, headers, WebSocket refusal without session (401), TURN relay end to end, wrong TURN credential refused |
# Open items (not fixed)
- Independent audit of
ts-mls and of this integration: not done.
- Real Face ID / Touch ID and real iPhone/iPad/Mac Safari: not tested (virtual authenticator in Chromium only).
WebKit-specific behaviour (IndexedDB eviction after 7 days without use in Safari tabs, media recorder formats) is
unverified. Installing the site to the Home Screen avoids the eviction policy.
- Group calls with three or more real participants: not tested.
- The Caddy access log on the gateway records request paths; no secret is ever placed in a path.
- TURN uses UDP/TCP 3478 without TLS (media is already encrypted; a
turns: listener on 443 is not possible while
UDP 443 is redirected to WireGuard). Networks that only allow 443 will not connect calls.
- Backups stay on the hosting node. An off-node copy is not configured.
- No protection of administrative actions by a fresh passkey check (step-up); an unlocked administrator session can
invite and disable accounts.