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SECURITY-REVIEW.md 4.3 KB

# Security review — 2026-11-18, before public exposure

Scope: the whole repository at the deployed commit. Method: manual review of every server route and of the client engine, then tests that reproduce each attack. Performed by the author of the code (Claude); this is not an independent audit and does not replace one. Passing tests show that specific attacks fail; they do not prove the system secure.

# Findings

# Severity Finding Resolution
1 High Clients extended a group to any account the server listed as a member. A malicious server could add a real, enrolled account to a private conversation and that account would receive the keys Fixed: reconciliation only adds devices of accounts already holding a leaf in the authenticated MLS tree. Test: “an account the server adds to the member list on its own is never given the group keys”
2 High A welcome message could replace a working group state on a device (an enrolled attacker cooperating with the server could substitute a group for an existing conversation and speak inside it) Fixed: welcomes are accepted only when the device holds no state; the MLS group id must equal the conversation id; a direct conversation's tree may contain only its two accounts
3 Medium Attachment descriptors from other members were used without validation (malformed values could break rendering; file names could contain path separators) Fixed: strict validation and sanitisation in the engine (cleanFiles)
4 Medium Messages updated in place (edits, reactions) were not re-rendered: a person could keep seeing stale content Fixed (revision counter)
5 Low Unbounded key-package uploads and self-synced blobs per device Fixed: caps (120 packages, 200 blobs of 256 KB)
6 Low Outbox order depended on random identifiers within the same millisecond Fixed: monotonic counter; ordering tested
7 Info Sessions were created without the manually built browser contexts having media permissions (test harness only) Test harness corrected

# Verified controls

Control Evidence
No account without invitation or one-time bootstrap; tokens single use, expirable, revocable integration tests 1–3
Passkey verification, unknown credential refused, challenge single use, session revocation test 4
CSRF (SameSite=Strict cookie + Origin check + custom header), WebSocket origin and session checks, security headers, CSP without inline script test 5; production headers checked
Server stores no plaintext (database rows and blob files searched for a marker) tests 7, 17
Sender authentication, author-only edit/delete test 8
Removal and revocation cut access, cryptographically and at the API tests 10, 12, 19
Forged device certificate refused by server and by clients tests 6, 13, 14
Identity change raises a warning and is not trusted before acceptance test 16
Attachment tampering, chunk swapping, cross-conversation access, quota test 17
Rate limiting test 20
Dependencies pnpm audit --prod: no known vulnerabilities (2026-11-18)
Load 16 accounts, 480 group messages, 7 200 decryptions in 1.2 s, identical order on every device
Production health, headers, WebSocket refusal without session (401), TURN relay end to end, wrong TURN credential refused

# Open items (not fixed)

  1. Independent audit of ts-mls and of this integration: not done.
  2. Real Face ID / Touch ID and real iPhone/iPad/Mac Safari: not tested (virtual authenticator in Chromium only). WebKit-specific behaviour (IndexedDB eviction after 7 days without use in Safari tabs, media recorder formats) is unverified. Installing the site to the Home Screen avoids the eviction policy.
  3. Group calls with three or more real participants: not tested.
  4. The Caddy access log on the gateway records request paths; no secret is ever placed in a path.
  5. TURN uses UDP/TCP 3478 without TLS (media is already encrypted; a turns: listener on 443 is not possible while UDP 443 is redirected to WireGuard). Networks that only allow 443 will not connect calls.
  6. Backups stay on the hosting node. An off-node copy is not configured.
  7. No protection of administrative actions by a fresh passkey check (step-up); an unlocked administrator session can invite and disable accounts.
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