| Network attacker (Wi-Fi, ISP) |
See that a device talks to message.spboucher.ai and to the TURN relay; see traffic volume and timing |
Read or alter anything: TLS to the gateway, WireGuard gateway→node, MLS inside, DTLS-SRTP for calls |
| Honest-but-curious server administrator / database or backup thief |
Read accounts, usernames, public keys, membership of every conversation, timestamps, sizes, delivery acknowledgements, typing and presence events, IP addresses in session and audit records |
Read message text, reactions, read receipts, group names, file content, file names, thumbnails, call media. No decryption key is stored server-side |
| Malicious server (actively lying) |
Withhold, delay or drop messages; refuse service; remove an account from the member list (clients then remove it: denial of service); list a false member (ignored for key distribution: clients only extend the group to accounts already inside it); advertise a false device (refused: no certificate from the pinned identity key); advertise a new identity key for an account (warning, not used until accepted) |
Add a reader to an existing conversation without a visible key-change warning that a person accepts; forge a message from a member; replace a working group state on a device (welcomes are accepted only by devices holding no state); substitute keys during device approval without changing the code the person compares |
| Malicious server delivering altered web code |
Everything. A web application is served by the server at each visit; altered JavaScript could exfiltrate keys. CSP and same-origin scripts limit third parties, not the origin itself |
— This is the main residual risk of any web-delivered E2EE application. Native apps with signed binaries remove it |
| TURN relay operator |
See which IP addresses exchange media and how much |
Decrypt media (DTLS-SRTP end to end; fingerprints exchanged inside MLS) |
| Member of a conversation |
Read what is sent while a member; keep copies; send malformed content (validated before display) |
Impersonate another member (signatures per device); edit or delete someone else's message; read messages sent after removal |
| Removed member / revoked device |
Keep what it already decrypted |
Decrypt anything sent after the commit that removed it; fetch ciphertext (membership check) |
| Someone with an invitation link |
Create one account per remaining use |
Reuse a spent, expired or revoked link; join conversations (must be added by a member) |
| Thief of an unlocked device |
Read local history; send as the owner until the device is revoked |
Use the passkey without Face ID/Touch ID/device code; extract the IndexedDB wrapping key as raw bytes (non-extractable) — though code running in that browser profile can use it |
| Thief of the recovery key alone |
Nothing without also signing in with a passkey of the account |
— |
| Thief of a passkey alone (synced keychain compromise) |
Sign in, see the conversation list, request a device link |
Read any message: needs approval from a trusted device (code comparison) or the recovery key |