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1contribution,rank,closest_paper_key,what_is_already_established,what_would_remain_new,verdict,proposed_reformulation2"(i) Endogenous ownership-entry wealth threshold jointly shaped by bequests, collateral and price feedback",1,ortalomagne2006housing,Life-cycle property-ladder model with a down-payment constraint; young households' ability to finance the down payment drives prices; capital gains on starter homes relax incumbents' constraints; overshooting after income shocks (analytical).,Bequests/inter vivos transfers as a source of threshold heterogeneity among equal-income households; explicit rental sector; nominal debt; supply-elasticity dependence of the threshold; stationary distribution of tenure.,incremental,"State (i) as a characterisation proposition: existence and monotonicity of the entry threshold in bequest, LTV, price level and rent-price ratio in a two-/three-period version with an explicit rental market, then show numerically how price feedback shifts it; cite Ortalo-Magné-Rady as the analytical ancestor."3(i),2,kaplan2020housing,"Quantitative life-cycle GE with rental market, long-term mortgages, tenure choice; credit conditions move ownership/leverage but not prices because the rental sector and long-term mortgages absorb demand.",Inheritance heterogeneity as the source of entry differences; analytical threshold; price feedback conditional on segmentation and supply elasticity.,incremental,Make the owner/rental segmentation parameter explicit and report the threshold and price response across it; do not claim a generic price feedback.4(i),3,favilukis2017macroeconomic,"OLG GE with collateral constraints, aggregate risk and heterogeneous bequest motives generating a realistic wealth distribution; credit liberalisation raises prices via a lower housing risk premium.",Tenure margin and renters; threshold characterisation; nominal mortgages.,incremental,"Position WP18 as adding the tenure/entry margin and nominal debt to the FLVN architecture, in a deterministic-aggregate setting that permits analytical results."5(i),4,greenwald2025do,Credit moves prices only to the extent owner and rental stocks are segmented; estimated segmentation elasticity; credit explains 32-53% of the 2000s boom.,Application of the segmentation logic to inheritance-driven demand and to the entry threshold.,incremental,"Parameterise segmentation as in Greenwald-Guren and show the threshold result under no, partial and full segmentation."6(i),5,stein1995prices,Down-payment effects create multiple equilibria and price-volume comovement (static).,"Dynamic, intergenerational version with bequests and rental sector.",incremental,Use Stein as the source of the multiplicity conjecture; do not assert multiplicity until proved in WP18 setting.7(ii) Conditions for persistent ownership/wealth gaps and path dependence,1,daysal2023intergenerational,"Empirical (Denmark): about 25% of early-childhood parental housing-wealth gains pass through to children's housing wealth, 27% to total wealth; modest ownership effects; earnings/education explain 20-30%.","A theoretical derivation of the conditions (LTV, bequest motive, supply elasticity, return on housing vs renters' assets) under which the gap among equal-income dynasties persists in the stationary distribution.",new (theory) / established (empirics),"Frame (ii) as a theoretical persistence result that rationalises Daysal et al. and Charles-Hurst, with explicit half-life or stationary-mass statements; avoid claiming that transfers are the dominant channel (Fagereng et al.)."8(ii),2,charles2002transition,Empirical (US): parental wealth/transfers explain much of the Black-White ownership gap at equal income.,Model-based conditions for persistence.,new (theory) / established (empirics),Same as above.9(ii),3,benhabib2011distribution,Analytical: Pareto tails from capital-income risk and bequests in OLG; estate taxes reduce inequality.,Persistence of a tenure-based two-class structure rather than a tail; housing-specific leveraged returns.,incremental,Use BBZ techniques (stationary distribution of a Markov wealth process with bequests) but target the tenure bimodality rather than tail thickness.10(ii),4,nekoei2023how,Empirical (Sweden): inheritances equalise on receipt but disequalise within a decade because wealthy heirs earn higher returns.,Leveraged housing return as the mechanism by which an inheritance buys a higher return; the ownership threshold as the discontinuity in returns.,new (mechanism),Make the return discontinuity at the ownership threshold the formal link to Nekoei-Seim and test it in simulation.11(ii),5,gabaix2016dynamics,Random-growth models converge too slowly; persistent heterogeneity needed for fast inequality changes.,Speed of convergence of the ownership gap.,incremental,Report half-lives of the gap under each parameterisation and compare with the Gabaix et al. benchmark.12(iii) Conditional inflation redistribution through fixed nominal mortgages in GE,1,garriga2017mortgages,"GE with long-term nominal mortgages: monetary policy transmits via new-mortgage pricing and the real burden of existing debt; persistent inflation benefits FRM borrowers over time, hurts ARM borrowers immediately; effects stronger under ARM.",Renters and an ownership-entry margin; inheritance; five-year renewable FRM (Canada) vs 30-year FRM; effect on next-generation tenure; endogenous rents.,"incremental (direct revaluation) / new (entry margin, Canadian term)","Restate (iii) as: conditions on contract term, debt share revalued, rent indexation and supply elasticity under which a surprise inflation (a) transfers from lenders to indebted owners and (b) raises or lowers the entry threshold for renters; report the five-year renewable contract as the Canadian case."13(iii),2,doepke2006inflation,Accounting of nominal positions: surprise inflation transfers from rich old bondholders and foreigners to young middle-class FRM borrowers and the government.,"GE response of prices, rents, real rates and lender wealth; tenure dynamics.",established (direct effect),Cite as the partial-equilibrium benchmark that WP18 tests for survival in GE.14(iii),3,meh2010aggregate,"OLG GE (Canada-calibrated nominal positions): 1% price-level surprise redistributes more under inflation targeting than price-level targeting; young, poor and government gain; rebating the windfall lowers GDP.","Housing market, tenure, mortgages as the nominal liability, intergenerational persistence.",incremental,Position WP18 as the housing-tenure extension of Meh-Rios-Rull-Terajima for Canada.15(iii),4,auclert2019monetary,"Sufficient statistics (URE, Fisher, earnings heterogeneity) for the redistribution channel of monetary policy.",Long-run tenure and wealth-distribution consequences; entry threshold.,incremental,Express the WP18 inflation proposition in Auclert's sufficient-statistic form for comparability.16(iii),5,pallotti2024who,"2021-2023 euro-area accounting: nominal net positions drive heterogeneity; rigid rents hedge renters; retirees lose up to 14%, half of 25-44-year-olds gain.",GE and tenure-entry effects; rent indexation as a modelled parameter.,established (direct effect),Include a rent-indexation switch in the model; cite Pallotti et al. for the hedge result.17(iv) Supply elasticity and mortgage-contract effects on intergenerational mobility,1,kiyotaki2011winners,"Life-cycle GE with land: large land share makes prices react strongly to productivity/interest shocks, redistributing from young net buyers to old net sellers; financing constraints have limited price effects.","Bequests, nominal mortgages, mobility across generations (renter's child becoming owner), contract type.",incremental,"State (iv) as comparative statics of a mobility measure (P(child owns | parent rents), rank-rank slope) in supply elasticity and contract term; acknowledge KMN as the source of the land-share result."18(iv),2,grossmann2021distributional,Dynamic GE with land as fixed factor: surging rents redistribute from renters to landowners and raise wealth inequality.,"Ownership entry, inheritance, contract type, mobility.",incremental,Same framing; note that representative owner/renter types in Grossmann et al. preclude mobility analysis.19(iv),3,chambers2009accounting,OLG GE with tenure and contract choice: mortgage innovation explains 56-70% of the 1994-2005 ownership rise; FRM introduction explains at least half of the post-1940 rise.,Interaction of contract with supply elasticity and with inheritance; mobility.,incremental,Treat contract-to-ownership as established; the new object is the contract x supply-elasticity interaction on mobility.20(iv),4,gyourko2013superstar,Inelastic supply with rising high-income demand yields persistent price divergence and sorting of the rich.,Intergenerational mobility within a tenure model.,incremental,Use as motivation for persistent divergence under inelastic supply.21(iv),5,favilukis2023affordable,"Spatial GE with owners, renters, construction and endogenous wealth inequality; affordability policies have insurance value but distort supply.",Inheritance and mobility; nominal debt.,incremental,Borrow the construction/rental architecture; keep the policy section comparative rather than optimal.22