1# WP19 baseline parameterisation — ILLUSTRATIVE, not calibrated to data.2# Time unit = year. Values and prices in units of the mean buyer valuation of the quality segment (q = 1).3name: baseline4seed: 202610205preferences:6 r: 0.04 # discount rate (per year)7sellers:8 s: 1.0 # listing inflow (normalisation; per year)9 delta: 0.5 # exogenous withdrawal hazard (per year): ~10-20 % of listings withdrawn at baseline hazards10 w0: 0.8 # seller's own-use (withdrawal) value, units of q: gains from trade ~20 % + match component11 c_min: 0.02 # carrying cost of the most patient seller (2 % of value per year: maintenance, taxes)12 c_max: 0.30 # carrying cost of the most urgent seller (30 %/yr: double housing, bridge loan, relocation, distress)13 n_types: 9 # discrete approximation of F (Gauss-Jacobi-like midpoints of a Beta distribution)14 beta_a: 2.0 # Beta(a,b) shape of F on [c_min, c_max]15 beta_b: 4.0 # -> right-skewed: most sellers patient, a minority urgent16buyers:17 k: 0.02 # sunk entry cost (2 % of value: inspections, search set-up, agent engagement)18 kappa_b: 0.05 # flow search cost while active (5 %/yr: temporary housing, time, uncertainty)19 phi: 0.85 # qualification probability per meeting (baseline screen)20matching:21 A: 4.5 # matching efficiency: meetings per year per side at theta = 122 alpha: 0.5 # elasticity of meetings w.r.t. buyers23bargaining:24 beta: 0.5 # seller's Nash share25match_values:26 dist: truncnorm # log-concave density => IFR (Proposition 2 conditions hold)27 mu: 1.028 sigma: 0.1029 lo: 0.7030 hi: 1.3031financing_extension: # Experiment 4 only32 pi: 0.30 # share of cash buyers at entry33 nu: 12.0 # financing resolution rate (per year): ~1 month34 phi: 0.85 # approval probability35numerics:36 theta_bounds: [0.02, 60.0]37 root_xtol: 1.0e-1238 grid_check_points: 6039dynamics: # Experiment 940 T: 8.0 # horizon (years)41 dt: 0.02 # time step (years), ~1 week42 damping: 0.343 tol: 1.0e-744 max_iter: 40045