1key,authors,year,title,outlet,volume_pages,doi_url,mechanism,approach,key_finding,overlap_with_wp19,gaps,confidence,verified_via2zuehlke1987duration,"Zuehlke, Thomas W.",1987,Duration Dependence in the Housing Market,Review of Economics and Statistics,"69(4), 701-704",https://doi.org/10.2307/1935966,Sale hazard as a function of elapsed marketing time; vacancy as proxy for seller carrying cost/urgency,"empirical; Weibull hazard on MLS listings (New Orleans, Tallahassee)",Early parametric duration evidence; vacant houses display stronger (positive) duration dependence than occupied ones [magnitudes not abstract-verified],WP19 derives observed duration dependence from unobserved urgency heterogeneity; Zuehlke's vacancy split is a direct empirical analogue of carrying-cost heterogeneity,No control for unobserved heterogeneity vs true duration dependence; no price outcome; small samples,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_zuehlke1987duration.crossref.json)3haurin1988duration,"Haurin, Donald",1988,The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing,Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal),"16(4), 396-410",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00463,"Optimal stopping: atypical houses face higher offer variance, so sellers wait longer",empirical; failure-time model on resale houses,"Marketing time rises with house atypicality (offer dispersion), confirming reservation-price search behaviour by sellers",WP19's idiosyncratic match-value dispersion plays the role of Haurin's offer variance; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness,Seller heterogeneity in holding costs ignored; no equilibrium tightness,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin1988duration.crossref.json)4glower1998motivation,"Glower, Michel and Haurin, Donald R. and Hendershott, Patric H.",1998,Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation,Real Estate Economics,"26(4), 719-740",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00763,Heterogeneous seller motivation (planned move date) lowers reservation price and shortens marketing time,"empirical; seller survey linked to MLS outcomes (Columbus, Ohio)",Sellers with a planned move date sell faster; shorter planned horizon implies shorter actual TOM; motivation lowers sale price but not list-price markup,Closest empirical counterpart to WP19's carrying-cost heterogeneity: urgency raises hazard and lowers price; WP19 formalises and adds market-level feedback,Small survey; motivation self-reported; no general-equilibrium or selection-into-sales analysis,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_glower1998motivation.crossref.json)5springer1996motivation,"Springer, Thomas M.",1996,"Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time",Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"13(3), 237-254",https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00217393,Motivated/relocated/foreclosed/vacant sellers accept lower prices; list price is the main selling instrument,"empirical; hedonic price and marketing-time equations (Arlington, Texas 1991-1993)","Eager/motivated, relocated, vacant and foreclosure sellers sell at lower prices; only foreclosures sell faster; lower list price speeds sale at the cost of price",Supports WP19's prediction that urgency lowers transaction price; mixed evidence on hazard is a caution for the hazard-urgency prediction,Motivation flags from listing remarks; endogeneity of TOM and price not fully addressed,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_springer1996motivation.crossref.json)6anglin2003tradeoff,"Anglin, Paul M. and Rutherford, Ronald and Springer, Thomas M.",2003,The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"26(1), 95-111",https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021526332732,Higher list price (degree of overpricing) lengthens expected TOM; buyers infer information from price,"empirical; hazard model of TOM with withdrawn listings (Arlington, Texas)","Higher list-price premium raises expected TOM, more strongly where list prices have low predicted variance; withdrawn homes have higher, more variable list prices",Price-TOM tradeoff is WP19's core comparative static; withdrawal selection matches WP19's listing-withdrawal margin,Reduced-form; no structural mapping to reservation prices or urgency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2003tradeoff.crossref.json)7haurin2010listprices,"Haurin, Donald R. and Haurin, Jessica L. and Nadauld, Taylor and Sanders, Anthony",2010,"List Prices, Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets",Real Estate Economics,"38(4), 659-685",https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00279.x,List price trades off slower offer arrival against higher maximal offer; set jointly with reservation price,"theory + empirical; numerical comparative statics and Columbus, Ohio data",Greater dispersion of buyer offers raises list-to-expected-sale ratio; atypical dwellings have higher list markups and longer TOM,WP19's posted-price robustness case; dispersion of match values driving markups and TOM,No seller urgency heterogeneity; no financing contingency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin2010listprices.crossref.json)8genesove1997equity,"Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher J.",1997,Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market,American Economic Review,"87(3), 255-269",https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v87y1997i3p255-69.html,"Down-payment constraint raises high-LTV sellers' reservation prices: higher asking price, longer TOM, higher price if sold","empirical; Boston condominiums, early 1990s; list price, TOM hazard and sale price regressions","Owners with high loan-to-value ratios set higher asking prices, have longer expected time on market and obtain higher prices conditional on sale",Opposite sign to urgency: equity constraints raise effective reservation values; WP19 should allow carrying-cost distribution to include 'patient/locked' sellers,Owner-occupants only; cannot separate liquidity constraints from loss aversion (addressed in 2001 paper),high,"IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_genesove1997equity.evidence.txt)"9genesove2001lossaversion,"Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher",2001,Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market,Quarterly Journal of Economics,"116(4), 1233-1260",https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265561,"Sellers facing nominal losses set higher asking prices, sell at higher prices and with much lower hazard","empirical; Boston condominiums 1990s; asking price, sale price and hazard regressions","Sellers facing a prospective nominal loss set asking prices roughly 25-35% of the loss higher, achieve higher prices and sell much less often per period; effect about twice as large for owner-occupants as investors",Behavioural source of reservation-price heterogeneity and price-volume comovement; WP19 is rational but can nest reference-dependent carrying costs,No equilibrium feedback; identification relies on purchase-price proxy for reference point,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_genesove2001lossaversion.crossref.json)10levitt2008agents,"Levitt, Steven D. and Syverson, Chad",2008,Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions,Review of Economics and Statistics,"90(4), 599-611",https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.90.4.599,Agent incentives push clients to accept early low offers; agents' own homes wait longer for better offers,"empirical; MLS data, agent-owned vs client-owned homes with controls",Agent-owned homes sell for about 3.7% more and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer; distortion larger when information asymmetry is greater,"Quantifies the price gain from a longer optimal stopping horizon, i.e. the slope of the TOM-price tradeoff at the margin",Agency friction rather than seller carrying cost; no tightness variation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_levitt2008agents.crossref.json)11hendel2009fsbo,"Hendel, Igal and Nevo, Aviv and Ortalo-Magné, François",2009,The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com,American Economic Review,"99(5), 1878-1898",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1878,Platform choice sorts patient sellers to FSBO; buyer arrival rate differs across platforms,"empirical; Madison, Wisconsin FSBO vs MLS sales, prices, TOM, sale probability","FSBO pre-commission prices are no lower, but FSBO has longer time to sell and lower probability of sale; patient sellers select into FSBO","Endogenous sorting by seller patience is exactly WP19's heterogeneous-urgency selection mechanism, here across platforms",Single market; network size effects not identified,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hendel2009fsbo.crossref.json)12knight2002listing,"Knight, John R.",2002,"Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects of Listing Price Changes",Real Estate Economics,"30(2), 213-237",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00038,List-price revisions under demand uncertainty; initial overpricing is costly in time and money,empirical; probit for list-price changes plus price/TOM equations,Homes with high initial markups and vacant homes most likely to cut list price; large percentage list-price changes imply longer TOM and lower final prices,Supports WP19's reservation-price updating and vacancy (carrying cost) channel; stale-listing penalty,Missing revision data in most datasets; no equilibrium interpretation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_knight2002listing.crossref.json)13merlo2004bargaining,"Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François",2004,Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England,Journal of Urban Economics,"56(2), 192-216",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004,"Full listing histories: list-price changes, offers, visits; strategic buyer-seller interaction",empirical; novel English transaction-history dataset; stylized facts,"Documents timing and terms of agreement from listing to sale, every list-price change and offer; argues existing theories fit poorly and proposes a strategic framework",Micro facts on offers and revisions that WP19's bargaining-with-outside-option structure must match,Descriptive; no structural estimation of urgency or arrival rates,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_merlo2004bargaining.crossref.json)14carrillo2013heat,"Carrillo, Paul E.",2013,To Sell or Not to Sell: Measuring the Heat of the Housing Market,Real Estate Economics,"41(2), 310-346",https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12003,"Seller bargaining power index from structural home-seller search model combining list price, sale price and TOM",structural; Washington DC transactions; mapping from hedonic/TOM reduced forms to structural parameters,Index of seller bargaining power tracks up- and downturns in appreciation and popular perceptions of market 'heat',"Shows WP19's objects (bargaining power, sale probability) are identifiable from listings data; WP19 adds urgency heterogeneity and financing",Homogeneous sellers; partial equilibrium,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2013heat.crossref.json)15carrillo2015tightness,"Carrillo, Paul E. and de Wit, Eric R. and Larson, William",2015,Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands,Real Estate Economics,"43(3), 609-651",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12082,"Market tightness (sale probabilities, seller bargaining power) leads price appreciation","empirical; listings data, Netherlands and US regions; time-series forecasting",Current sale probabilities and bargaining-power index significantly reduce appreciation forecast errors and predict turning points,"Supports WP19's claim that liquidity (hazard, tightness) moves before and separately from transaction prices",Reduced-form forecasting; no decomposition into selection vs bargaining,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2015tightness.crossref.json)16anenberg2016information,"Anenberg, Elliot",2016,Information Frictions and Housing Market Dynamics,International Economic Review,"57(4), 1449-1479",https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12204,Seller uncertainty about demand with Bayesian learning generates list-price cuts and aggregate momentum,structural; dynamic micro-search model estimated on listings and transactions,Sellers lack full information about current demand; estimated learning model produces a significant microfounded momentum in short-run price appreciation,Alternative (information) source of TOM-price patterns; WP19 keeps full information and isolates urgency and liquidity,Abstracts from financing and seller carrying-cost heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2016information.crossref.json)17genesove2012search,"Genesove, David and Han, Lu",2012,Search and matching in the housing market,Journal of Urban Economics,"72(1), 31-45",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002,Random matching with CRS: buyer and seller TOM respond to demand through buyer-seller ratio,empirical; NAR buyer/seller surveys across years and markets,"Buyer TOM, homes visited and especially seller TOM fall as demand rises; elasticity of seller contact hazard with respect to buyer-seller ratio estimated at 0.84 under CRS",Direct calibration target for WP19's matching elasticity and tightness response; stronger response to demand growth than levels,Survey-based TOM; no prices or urgency heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_genesove2012search.crossref.json)18han2016askingprice,"Han, Lu and Strange, William C.",2016,What is the role of the asking price for a house?,Journal of Urban Economics,"93, 115-130",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.008,Asking price directs buyer search without being a ceiling or commitment,theory + empirical; survey data on buyer search and sale-at-list incidence,"Mass of sales exactly at asking price; asking price steers buyer visits, more so for atypical houses and in weak-demand markets",Informs WP19's posted-price robustness: list price as a directing device rather than a ceiling,No welfare or urgency analysis,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2016askingprice.crossref.json)19han2014biddingwars,"Han, Lu and Strange, William C.",2014,Bidding Wars for Houses,Real Estate Economics,"42(1), 1-32",https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12015,Above-list sales as a measure of tightness; list price not a ceiling in hot markets,empirical; time-series and cross-section of sales above list price,"Bidding wars rose from a stable 3-4% of transactions to over 30% in some markets by 2005, fell in the bust but remained about twice historical levels",Regime where WP19's buyer-side competition dominates; tightness changes bargaining split,Descriptive; mechanism not structurally identified,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2014biddingwars.crossref.json)20jud1996brokerage,"Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G. and Winkler, Daniel T.",1996,Time on the Market: The Impact of Residential Brokerage,Journal of Real Estate Research,"12(3), 447-458",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1996.12090852,"Duration model of TOM with brokerage, pricing strategy and duration dependence",empirical; duration model on MLS data,Positive duration dependence (sale probability rises with TOM); pricing-related strategies strongly affect TOM; agent/firm characteristics insignificant,Positive duration dependence contrasts with WP19's heterogeneity-induced negative dependence; useful discipline on the mixing distribution,No correction for unobserved heterogeneity; no price outcome,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1996brokerage.crossref.json)21huang2001withdrawal,"Huang, Ju-Chin and Palmquist, Raymond B.",2001,"Environmental Conditions, Reservation Prices, and Time on the Market for Housing",Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"22(2-3), 203-219",https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007891430162,Joint estimation of seller reservation price and marketing duration; reservation price declines with elapsed time,empirical; structural duration/reservation-price estimator applied to highway noise,Noise lowers reservation and predicted sale prices but not TOM significantly; longer TOM is associated with lower reservation prices (sellers revise down),Provides an estimator of the reservation price WP19 models; downward revision consistent with learning or rising carrying cost,Withdrawals treated as censoring; no urgency heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_huang2001withdrawal.crossref.json)22campbell2011forced,"Campbell, John Y. and Giglio, Stefano and Pathak, Parag",2011,Forced Sales and House Prices,American Economic Review,"101(5), 2108-2131",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.2108,"Forced sales (foreclosure, death, bankruptcy) sell at discounts; nearby foreclosures depress prices",empirical; all Massachusetts transactions over 20 years; hedonic with forced-sale indicators and spatial spillovers,Foreclosure discount averages about 27% of house value; a foreclosure within 0.05 miles lowers a house's price by about 1%; death and bankruptcy sales also discounted,Canonical magnitude for WP19's urgency-driven discount; WP19 explains why discount exceeds pure selection via bargaining under high carrying cost,Cannot fully separate quality deterioration from liquidity discount; no TOM,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_campbell2011forced.crossref.json)23mayer1998auctions,"Mayer, Christopher J.",1998,Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions,Real Estate Economics,"26(1), 41-66",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00737,Auction trades immediate sale against expected waiting in a search market; discount larger in downturns,"empirical; repeat-sales comparison of auction vs negotiated sales, Los Angeles and Dallas",Auction discounts 0-9% in the 1980s Los Angeles boom vs 9-21% in Dallas after the oil bust; consistent with discount rising when expected TOM is long,"Cleanest early estimate of the price of immediacy and its dependence on market liquidity, central to WP19's state-dependent discount",Auctioned properties may differ in unobservables despite repeat-sales control,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mayer1998auctions.crossref.json)24harding2009contagion,"Harding, John P. and Rosenblatt, Eric and Yao, Vincent W.",2009,The contagion effect of foreclosed properties,Journal of Urban Economics,"66(3), 164-178",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2009.07.003,"Nearby foreclosures lower sale prices via visual externality/neglect, growing through the distress process",empirical; repeat-sales with local trend and distance rings,"Peak contagion discount roughly 1% per nearby foreclosed property, decaying quickly with distance, growing from distress onset to foreclosure sale then levelling off",Externality channel distinct from WP19's competition/selection channel; WP19 abstracts from neighbourhood spillovers,Cannot cleanly separate supply competition from disamenity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2009contagion.crossref.json)25anenberg2014foreclosures,"Anenberg, Elliot and Kung, Edward",2014,Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures,American Economic Review,"104(8), 2527-2551",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2527,"REO listings depress nearby prices through competition (supply) and, in dense low-price areas, disamenity",empirical; weekly listings data; timing of seller response to new REO listings,"Sellers respond in the exact week an REO is listed; competition effects matter everywhere, disamenity only in high-density low-price neighbourhoods",Competition from urgent (REO) sellers lowering prices of non-urgent sellers is a market-level implication WP19 can generate through tightness,Local partial-equilibrium; no hazard estimates,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2014foreclosures.crossref.json)26mian2015foreclosures,"Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir and Trebbi, Francesco",2015,"Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy",Journal of Finance,"70(6), 2587-2634",https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12310,Judicial-foreclosure laws as instrument: forced sales cause price declines and real effects,"empirical; state-border discontinuity, IV, 2007-2013","Nonjudicial states were twice as likely to foreclose in 2007-2009; foreclosures caused large declines in house prices, residential investment and consumer demand","Macro-level evidence that an increase in the mass of urgent sellers moves prices without a fundamentals change, as in WP19's liquidity-shock proposition",Aggregate; no micro TOM or discount decomposition,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mian2015foreclosures.crossref.json)27penningtoncross2006reo,"Pennington-Cross, Anthony",2006,The Value of Foreclosed Property,Journal of Real Estate Research,"28(2), 193-214",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2006.12091177,"REO properties appreciate less than their metro area; gap depends on loan traits, legal regime, market conditions and marketing time",empirical; loan-level REO sales vs metro appreciation,"Foreclosed properties appreciate below the area average; the gap varies with legal restrictions, housing-market conditions and marketing time",State-dependence of the forced-sale discount matches WP19's prediction that the liquidity discount widens in slow markets,Magnitudes depend on specification; condition of property unobserved,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_penningtoncross2006reo.crossref.json)28clauretie2009foreclosure,"Clauretie, Terrence M. and Daneshvary, Nasser",2009,Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time,Real Estate Economics,"37(1), 43-67",https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00234.x,Foreclosure discount overstated when property condition and endogenous TOM are ignored,empirical; spatial hedonic with endogenous marketing time (Las Vegas),"Previous >20% foreclosure discounts are about one-third too high once condition, TOM-price relationship and spatial dependence are controlled","Highlights WP19's identification point: part of the observed discount is quality/selection, part is a genuine liquidity (urgency) discount",Single market; condition proxies imperfect,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clauretie2009foreclosure.crossref.json)29andersen2017firesales,"Andersen, Steffen and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner",2017,Fire Sales and House Prices: Evidence from Estate Sales Due to Sudden Death,Management Science,"63(1), 201-212",https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2292,Exogenous forced sales (sudden death) isolate supply-side urgency from demand shocks,empirical; Danish registry natural experiment,"Forced estate sales carry fire-sale discounts that increase with urgency, poor market conditions and seller financial constraints; fire sales occur without demand shocks",Closest causal evidence for WP19's urgency-discount interaction with market liquidity; demand held fixed,Danish institutional setting; discount magnitudes not reported in abstract,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andersen2017firesales.crossref.json)30reher2024mortgagecash,"Reher, Michael and Valkanov, Rossen",2024,The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle,Journal of Finance,"79(5), 3149-3201",https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13373,"Sellers accept lower cash offers to avoid mortgage transaction frictions (delay, failure risk)",empirical + dynamic model + survey experiment; multiple US datasets 1980-2017,Mortgaged buyers pay an 11% premium over all-cash buyers; representative-seller model implies 3%; heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half the gap; belief distortions in high-risk states,WP19's financing-contingency block generates an endogenous cash discount; Reher-Valkanov's 'puzzle' is the gap WP19's urgency heterogeneity should narrow,Residual puzzle attributed to beliefs; bargaining-vs-selection split not fully decomposed,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_reher2024mortgagecash.crossref.json)31han2024cashisking,"Han, Lu and Hong, Seung-Hyun",2024,Cash is king? Understanding financing risk in housing markets,Review of Finance,"28(6), 2083-2118",https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae025,Mortgage contingency creates closing risk and risk of re-listing failure; cash discount compensates sellers,empirical + calibrated search model; Los Angeles transactions,"Cash offers close 29% faster and carry a 2-3.9% price discount; discount smaller in booms and larger markets; closing risk alone insufficient, re-listing failure risk needed",Nearly identical mechanism to WP19's financing contingency and relisting; WP19 adds heterogeneous urgency and general-equilibrium tightness,Single metro; interaction with seller carrying costs not modelled,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2024cashisking.crossref.json)32asabere1992cash,"Asabere, Paul K. and Huffman, Forrest E. and Mehdian, Seyed",1992,The Price Effects of Cash versus Mortgage Transactions,Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal),"20(1), 141-154",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00576,All-cash transactions trade at a discount relative to typically financed sales,empirical; hedonic on comparable row homes,All-cash transactions associated with roughly a 13% price discount relative to market-typical financing,"Earliest cash-discount magnitude; WP19 predicts a smaller equilibrium discount unless urgency is high, so the 13% invites a selection interpretation","Small, dated sample; buyer/seller selection uncontrolled",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_asabere1992cash.crossref.json)33jauregui2019fundingprice,"Jauregui, Andres and Tidwell, Alan and Sah, Vivek",2019,Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating and Allocating House Transaction Funding Price Differentials,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"58(3), 366-407",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-018-9661-4,"Price differentials across cash, conventional, FHA and VA funding reflect selection plus a financing premium","empirical; sample-selection and spatial corrections, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition","Selection and spatial bias detected; conventional sales have stronger characteristics than cash sales, FHA/VA weaker; unexplained component interpreted as a financing premium",Decomposition of observed cash differential into composition vs premium parallels WP19's selection-vs-bargaining decomposition,Magnitudes not in abstract; no time-to-close data,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jauregui2019fundingprice.crossref.json)34aroul2023cashdiscount,"Aroul, Ramya R. and Hansz, J. Andrew",2023,The impact of cash financing on housing prices: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from a volatile United States market cycle,Journal of Property Research,"40(1), 25-52",https://doi.org/10.1080/09599916.2022.2119878,Mortgage-contingency pricing effect measured as a cash discount that varies with market distress and property traits,theory + empirical; 12-year US cycle around 2008,"Cash discounts are larger in distressed markets, at lower price levels and for smaller/poorer-condition improvements; no single rule of thumb",State-dependence of the cash discount is a WP19 prediction (discount widens as qualification risk and seller urgency rise),No magnitudes in abstract; selection of cash buyers into distressed properties,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_aroul2023cashdiscount.crossref.json)35lin2025contingencies,"Lin, Zhenguo and Seiler, Michael J. and Siebert, Ralph B. and Winkler, Daniel T.",2025,"Selling price, time on the market, and contractual contingencies",Journal of Housing Economics,"68, 102062",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102062,Contingency clauses lengthen TOM and reduce closing certainty; buyers compensate with price,"empirical; Miami-Dade transactions (CESifo WP 9947 version: Gordon, Seiler, Siebert, Winkler 2022)","Contingency clauses relate to market conditions, TOM, list premiums and distressed sales; price premia range from -3.7% to +2.2% (-3.3% to +2.4% conditioning on TOM)","Direct evidence on WP19's contingency margin: contingent offers trade price for closing risk, sign depending on clause and market state",Clause types pooled in abstract; identification of contingency choice is endogenous,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_lin2025contingencies.crossref.json)36anenberg2019creditavailability,"Anenberg, Elliot and Hizmo, Aurel and Kung, Edward and Molloy, Raven",2019,Measuring mortgage credit availability: A frontier estimation approach,Journal of Applied Econometrics,"34(6), 865-882",https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2720,Loan frontier measures maximum obtainable mortgage; shifts in frontier proxy buyer qualification,empirical; stochastic frontier on originations 2001-2014,Credit expanded for all borrowers in the boom and contracted most for low-score borrowers; frontier variation across metros shows borrowing constraints mattered for the cycle,Provides an empirical counterpart to WP19's qualification probability phi and its cross-market variation,Frontier is an upper bound; approval delays and failures not measured,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2019creditavailability.crossref.json)37bhutta2021insurance,"Bhutta, Neil and Ringo, Daniel",2021,The effect of interest rates on home buying: Evidence from a shock to mortgage insurance premiums,Journal of Monetary Economics,"118, 195-211",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.10.001,Binding DTI thresholds make buyer qualification sensitive to small rate changes (extensive margin),empirical; regression discontinuity around FHA premium cut,"A surprise 50bp effective rate cut raised home buying among FHA-reliant households by 14% immediately, via DTI qualification thresholds","Quantifies how qualification (phi) responds to financing conditions, the input to WP19's buyer-arrival shock",Effect on prices and TOM not the focus,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bhutta2021insurance.crossref.json)38fuster2019technology,"Fuster, Andreas and Plosser, Matthew and Schnabl, Philipp and Vickery, James",2019,The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending,Review of Financial Studies,"32(5), 1854-1899",https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz018,Technology shortens mortgage processing time without raising defaults,empirical; loan-level application and origination data 2010-2016,FinTech lenders grew from 2% to 8% of lending and process applications about 20% faster with no higher defaults; more elastic supply to demand shocks,Approval delay is a structural parameter in WP19's financing contingency; this gives its empirical scale and variability,Refinance-heavy; purchase-closing failures not studied,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fuster2019technology.crossref.json)39defusco2020leverage,"DeFusco, Anthony A. and Johnson, Stephanie and Mondragon, John",2020,Regulating Household Leverage,Review of Economic Studies,"87(2), 914-958",https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz040,Leverage regulation removes marginal borrowers (quantity) more than it raises price,empirical; discontinuity in Ability-to-Repay rule,Rates on affected loans rose 10-15bp but 15% of the affected market was eliminated and leverage reduced for another 20%; lenders exited the regulated segment,"Credit tightening as a qualification shock reducing effective buyer arrival, a key WP19 counterfactual",Housing-market price/TOM consequences not traced,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_defusco2020leverage.crossref.json)40allen2019searchfrictions,"Allen, Jason and Clark, Robert and Houde, Jean-François",2019,Search Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated-Price Markets,Journal of Political Economy,"127(4), 1550-1598",https://doi.org/10.1086/701684,Search and negotiation frictions in the Canadian mortgage market generate dispersion and market power,structural; Canadian insured-mortgage contract data; search-and-bargaining model,"Frictions cost about $12/month/consumer (50% search costs, 28% price discrimination, 22% inefficient matching); large banks' margins about 70% higher",Only verified Canadian structural evidence on housing-finance search frictions; shows the financing side itself is a negotiated search market,"Mortgage pricing, not house transactions or TOM",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_allen2019searchfrictions.crossref.json)41buchak2026ibuyers,"Buchak, Greg and Matvos, Gregor and Piskorski, Tomasz and Seru, Amit",2026,Why Is Intermediating Houses So Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers,Journal of Political Economy,"forthcoming (NBER WP 28252, 2020, rev. 2025)",https://doi.org/10.1086/742710,Dealers supply immediacy; speed trades off against valuation accuracy and adverse selection,empirical + structural search model with adverse selection; iBuyer transactions,"iBuyers sell quickly and earn about a 5% spread; they intermediate only in liquid, easy-to-value markets; low underlying liquidity exacerbates adverse selection",Market price of immediacy (spread) is a benchmark for WP19's liquidity discount; adverse selection is a channel WP19 abstracts from,"Recent, narrow set of markets",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_buchak2026ibuyers.crossref.json)42gatzlaff1997selection,"Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.",1997,Sample Selection Bias and Repeat-Sales Index Estimates,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"14(1-2), 33-50",https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007763816289,Homes that sell are a nonrandom sample; repeat-sales index bias correlated with economic conditions,"empirical; censored-sample correction of repeat-sales index, Dade County FL","Index built from homes selling more than once is biased, and the bias is strongly correlated with changes in economic conditions",Empirical basis for WP19's proposition that transaction indices mix liquidity-driven selection with value changes,Selection equation relies on observables; no link to seller urgency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1997selection.crossref.json)43gatzlaff1998selection,"Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.",1998,Sample Selection and Biases in Local House Value Indices,Journal of Urban Economics,"43(2), 199-222",https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1997.2045,Selection into sale biases hedonic local value indices; bias varies with market state,empirical; selection-corrected hedonic indices [abstract not retrievable],Extends selection correction to local hedonic indices; selection bias varies systematically with local economic conditions [details unconfirmed],Same identification problem as WP19's index-selection proposition at the local-market level,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1998selection.crossref.json)44hwang2004selectivity,"Hwang, Min and Quigley, John M.",2004,"Selectivity, Quality Adjustment and Mean Reversion in the Measurement of House Values",Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"28(2-3), 161-178",https://doi.org/10.1023/b:real.0000011152.40485.12,"Joint model of sale selection, quality change and mean reversion in individual house prices",empirical; all sales in Sweden's largest metro 1982-1999 vs repeat-sales,Repeat-sales method yields systematically biased estimates of the value of the housing stock once selectivity and quality change are modelled,Supports WP19's distinction between index movements and fundamental value when sale selection is endogenous,Selection not linked to seller motives or liquidity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hwang2004selectivity.crossref.json)45goetzmann2006reservation,"Goetzmann, William and Peng, Liang",2006,Estimating House Price Indexes in the Presence of Seller Reservation Prices,Review of Economics and Statistics,"88(1), 100-112",https://doi.org/10.1162/003465306775565783,Reservation-price-to-value ratio drives both volume and selection bias in transaction indices,theory + econometric correction; simulations and Los Angeles repeat sales,Falling volume biases index returns upward and rising volume biases them downward; reserve-conditional unbiased index differs substantially from standard repeat-sales,"Formalises exactly WP19's selection proposition: with heterogeneous reservation prices, observed prices are a truncated sample tied to volume",Reservation prices exogenous; no search/bargaining microfoundation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_goetzmann2006reservation.crossref.json)46jud1994selection,"Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G.",1994,Sample Selection Bias in Estimating Housing Sales Prices,Journal of Real Estate Research,"9(3), 289-298",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1994.12090753,Appreciation estimates from sold homes suffer Heckman-type selection,empirical; Heckman two-step on sold vs all houses,Housing sample-selection problem is statistically significant for appreciation estimates,Early confirmation of the selection problem WP19 models,Direction and magnitude of bias not reported in abstract,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1994selection.crossref.json)47case1989efficiency,"Case, Karl E. and Shiller, Robert J.",1989,The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes,American Economic Review,"79(1), 125-137",https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v79y1989i1p125-37.html,Repeat-sales indices reveal positive serial correlation inconsistent with efficiency,"empirical; weighted repeat-sales on 39,210 homes in four cities 1970-1986",Market does not appear efficient: annual price changes are followed by same-direction changes; individual house price changes largely unforecastable,Momentum benchmark; WP19 argues part of index persistence can arise from slow-moving liquidity and sale selection,No volume or liquidity in the test,high,"IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_case1989efficiency.evidence.txt)"48bailey1963repeatsales,"Bailey, Martin J. and Muth, Richard F. and Nourse, Hugh O.",1963,A Regression Method for Real Estate Price Index Construction,Journal of the American Statistical Association,"58(304), 933-942",https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10480679,Repeat-sales regression as a constant-quality price index,econometric method,Introduces the repeat-sales regression index later generalised by Case-Shiller,Baseline index whose selection properties WP19 characterises,Assumes sales are random draws from the stock,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bailey1963repeatsales.crossref.json)49clapp1992assessed,"Clapp, John M. and Giaccotto, Carmelo",1992,Estimating Price Indices for Residential Property: A Comparison of Repeat Sales and Assessed Value Methods,Journal of the American Statistical Association,"87(418), 300-306",https://doi.org/10.2307/2290260,"Assessed-value method uses the full stock, mitigating repeat-sales selection",econometric method + empirical comparison,"Assessed-value index avoids the small, possibly unrepresentative repeat-sales sample and compares favourably",Alternative index design that WP19 can use as a less selection-prone benchmark,Assessment quality varies across jurisdictions,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clapp1992assessed.crossref.json)50harding2003bargainingpower,"Harding, John P. and Rosenthal, Stuart S. and Sirmans, C. F.",2003,Estimating Bargaining Power in the Market for Existing Homes,Review of Economics and Statistics,"85(1), 178-188",https://doi.org/10.1162/003465303762687794,Buyer and seller characteristics shift bargaining power within hedonic prices,empirical; American Housing Survey with both parties' traits,"Wealth, gender and demographics affect bargaining power; bargaining variation tied to school-age children explains seasonal anomalies in quality-adjusted indices",Empirical identification of the Nash bargaining weight WP19 treats as a parameter; shows it varies across parties and seasons,Cross-section; no urgency or TOM,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingpower.crossref.json)51harding2003bargainingeffects,"Harding, John P. and Knight, John R. and Sirmans, C. F.",2003,Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market,Real Estate Economics,"31(4), 601-622",https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1080-8620.2003.00078.x,"Vacancy weakens seller bargaining power, shifting the hedonic constant and attribute prices",empirical; hedonic with vacant-at-sale indicator across markets,Vacant (weak-bargaining) sellers receive lower prices; bargaining alters attribute shadow prices without a consistent cross-market pattern,Vacancy = high carrying cost in WP19; confirms urgency lowers negotiated price,Vacancy may also proxy quality/condition,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingeffects.crossref.json)52kurlat2015asymmetries,"Kurlat, Pablo and Stroebel, Johannes",2015,Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets,Review of Financial Studies,"28(8), 2429-2461",https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv028,Better-informed sellers (about neighbourhood) sell ahead of price declines,empirical; seller-pool composition and subsequent price changes,"When the seller pool shifts toward better-informed and high-supply-elasticity sellers, prices subsequently fall; stronger for neighbourhood-exposed houses",Adverse-selection explanation of volume-price dynamics that WP19 rules out by assumption; useful for the novelty audit,Information not directly observed,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_kurlat2015asymmetries.crossref.json)53garmaise2004asymmetries,"Garmaise, Mark J. and Moskowitz, Tobias J.",2004,Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real Estate Markets,Review of Financial Studies,"17(2), 405-437",https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg037,Asymmetric information measured by assessment quality shapes who trades and how,empirical; US commercial real estate,"Strong evidence information considerations matter: buyers favour nearby properties and long income histories, avoid informed brokers; financing-choice evidence weak",Information asymmetry is a competing friction; WP19 isolates search/urgency with symmetric information,"Commercial, not residential",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_garmaise2004asymmetries.crossref.json)54piazzesi2020segmented,"Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin and Stroebel, Johannes",2020,Segmented Housing Search,American Economic Review,"110(3), 720-759",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141772,Heterogeneous buyer search ranges across segments link inventory and search activity,"quantitative search model + Trulia search data, San Francisco Bay Area",Search activity and inventory covary negatively across cities but positively across segments within cities; broad searchers spread local shocks across segments,WP19's single-segment matching abstracts from segment spillovers that dampen local liquidity shocks,Prices not the focus; no seller urgency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_piazzesi2020segmented.crossref.json)55cheng2013liquidityrisk,"Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun",2013,Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets,Financial Review,"48(4), 671-696",https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12020,Uncertain marketing period adds liquidity risk to ex ante returns of private assets,analytical + empirical calibration on commercial real estate,"Liquidity risk is too large to ignore, especially in down markets",Return-based framing of the liquidity premium that WP19 derives at the transaction level,Assumes exogenous TOM distribution,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_cheng2013liquidityrisk.crossref.json)56fisher2003liquidity,"Fisher, Jeffrey and Gatzlaff, Dean and Geltner, David and Haurin, Donald",2003,Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices,Real Estate Economics,"31(2), 269-303",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00066,Constant-liquidity value separates price movements from procyclical ease of selling,econometric index model with selection; NCREIF data,Constant-liquidity values lead transaction- and appraisal-based indices and show greater volatility and cycle amplitude,Operationalises WP19's distinction between a liquidity-adjusted price and the observed transaction index,Commercial; buyer/seller reservation distributions parametric,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fisher2003liquidity.crossref.json)57fisher2007tbi,"Fisher, Jeff and Geltner, David and Pollakowski, Henry",2007,A Quarterly Transactions-based Index of Institutional Real Estate Investment Performance and Movements in Supply and Demand,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"34(1), 5-33",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9001-6,Transaction-based index with separate supply-side and demand-side (constant-liquidity) indices,"econometric index construction; NCREIF, assessed-value hedonic","Produces variable-liquidity, demand-side (constant-liquidity) and supply-side quarterly indices from transaction prices, avoiding appraisal smoothing","Shows how buyer- and seller-side reservation movements can be separately tracked, as WP19's model implies",Institutional commercial assets,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fisher2007tbi.crossref.json)58clayton2008liquidity,"Clayton, Jim and MacKinnon, Greg and Peng, Liang",2008,Time Variation of Liquidity in the Private Real Estate Market: An Empirical Investigation,Journal of Real Estate Research,"30(2), 125-160",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2008.12091217,"Time-varying liquidity from noisy signals, option value of waiting, or sentiment",empirical; tests of competing explanations on private real estate,Results broadly consistent with rational updating and support the opportunity-cost-of-waiting (option value) explanation of liquidity variation,Supports WP19's waiting-option microfoundation for countercyclical illiquidity,Commercial; aggregate liquidity measures,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2008liquidity.crossref.json)59clayton2010pricevolume,"Clayton, Jim and Miller, Norman and Peng, Liang",2010,Price-volume Correlation in the Housing Market: Causality and Co-movements,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"40(1), 14-40",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-008-9128-0,Prices and volume jointly endogenous; asymmetric causality and common shocks,"empirical; panel VAR/Granger tests, 114 US MSAs 1990-2002",Price declines reduce volume but increases do not; volume Granger-causes prices only in inelastic-supply markets; correlation mostly co-movement from common shocks,"WP19's liquidity shock generates common movement of price and volume without a fundamental shock, consistent with co-movement dominance",Reduced-form; no TOM,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2010pricevolume.crossref.json)60berkovec1996turnover,"Berkovec, James A. and Goodman, John L.",1996,Turnover as a Measure of Demand for Existing Homes,Real Estate Economics,"24(4), 421-440",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00698,Search model: demand shocks move turnover before prices,theory + empirical; aggregate turnover and demand indicators,Positive correlation between changes in turnover and housing demand; at high frequency turnover is a better demand indicator than price,"Same ordering as WP19's dynamics: hazard/volume respond first, prices adjust through bargaining and selection",No seller heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_berkovec1996turnover.crossref.json)61hort2000turnover,"Hort, Katinka",2000,Prices and turnover in the market for owner-occupied homes,Regional Science and Urban Economics,"30(1), 99-119",https://doi.org/10.1016/s0166-0462(99)00028-9,Price-turnover comovement in a search framework with sluggish reservation prices,empirical; Swedish regional data [abstract not retrievable],Documents positive price-turnover relationship in Sweden with turnover responding ahead of prices [details unconfirmed],Non-US evidence on the volume-price fact WP19 targets,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hort2000turnover.crossref.json)62andrew2003transactions,"Andrew, Mark and Meen, Geoffrey",2003,"House Price Appreciation, Transactions and Structural Change in the British Housing Market: A Macroeconomic Perspective",Real Estate Economics,"31(1), 99-116",https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1080-8620.2003.00059.x,Aggregate price-transactions relationship with structural break,empirical; British aggregate time series,"Strong price-transactions relationship in Britain that changed in the 1990s, with transactions becoming much lower","Reminds that the volume-price mapping is regime-dependent, as WP19's tightness feedback implies",Macro; no micro liquidity measures,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andrew2003transactions.crossref.json)63leamer2007businesscycle,"Leamer, Edward E.",2007,Housing IS the Business Cycle,"NBER Working Paper 13428 (also Proceedings, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 149-233)",NBER WP 13428,https://doi.org/10.3386/w13428,Housing volumes (residential investment) lead recessions; volume adjusts before prices,descriptive macro; postwar US cycles,Residential investment is the best early warning of recession; eight postwar recessions were preceded by housing/durables problems,Macro motivation for a volume-first liquidity channel; WP19 provides the microstructure,No formal liquidity model,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_leamer2007businesscycle.crossref.json)64dachis2012transfertax,"Dachis, Ben and Duranton, Gilles and Turner, Matthew A.",2012,The effects of land transfer taxes on real estate markets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto,Journal of Economic Geography,"12(2), 327-354",https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbr007,"Transaction tax raises trading cost, reduces volume and lowers prices",empirical; Toronto land transfer tax natural experiment 2008,A 1.1% transfer tax reduced sales by about 15% and lowered prices by roughly the tax; welfare loss about $1 per $8 raised,"Only verified Canadian evidence on how a transaction cost shifts volume and prices, useful for WP19's transaction-cost calibration",No TOM or seller heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_dachis2012transfertax.crossref.json)65carrillo2012potatoes,"Carrillo, Paul E. and Pope, Jaren C.",2012,Are homes hot or cold potatoes? The distribution of marketing time in the housing market,Regional Science and Urban Economics,"42(1-2), 189-197",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.08.010,Shape of the marketing-time distribution: quick 'hot' sales vs long 'cold' spells,empirical; MLS listings [abstract not retrievable],Characterises the empirical distribution of marketing time and its heterogeneity across homes and market states [details unconfirmed],WP19 derives the TOM distribution as a mixture over urgency types; this paper is the natural empirical target,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2012potatoes.crossref.json)66benefield2015measurement,"Benefield, Justin D. and Hardin, William G.",2015,Does Time-on-Market Measurement Matter?,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"50(1), 52-73",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9450-z,TOM definitions and relisting treatment change estimated TOM relationships,"empirical; five TOM measures in one MLS, relisting in another",Choice of TOM definition and treatment of relisted properties substantially change model results and significance; much TOM literature needs re-evaluation,Relisting/withdrawal is WP19's withdrawal margin; measurement of observed hazards must account for it,No structural interpretation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_benefield2015measurement.crossref.json)67anglin2006liquidity,"Anglin, Paul M.",2006,Value and liquidity under changing market conditions,Journal of Housing Economics,"15(4), 293-304",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2006.10.003,"Joint response of price and liquidity (TOM, sale probability) to changing market conditions",empirical [abstract not retrievable],Studies how value and liquidity of listed homes co-move as market conditions change [details unconfirmed],Same price-liquidity duality as WP19's discount-hazard pair,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2006liquidity.crossref.json)68