1"key","authors","year","title","outlet","volume_pages","doi_url","mechanism","approach","key_finding","overlap_with_wp19","gaps","confidence","verified_via","part"2"albrecht2007opportunistic","Albrecht, James and Anderson, Axel and Smith, Eric and Vroman, Susan","2007","Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market","International Economic Review","48(2): 641-664","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x","Buyers and sellers switch from relaxed to desperate flow values at a Poisson rate; matching is opportunistic and price depends on the pair's urgency states.","theory","Expected price falls with time on market and the conditional price variance is hump-shaped; urgent sellers accept lower prices and sell faster.","Closest antecedent for 'urgency lowers the reservation price and generates dispersion'; WP19 instead treats urgency as a continuous permanent holding cost, adds free entry and a financing stage, and derives index-selection bias.","No liquidity-shock comparative statics on matching efficiency, no mortgage/cash distinction, no formal selection correction for price indices.","high","crossref+doi","A"3"albrecht2016directed","Albrecht, James and Gautier, Pieter A. and Vroman, Susan","2016","Directed search in the housing market","Review of Economic Dynamics","19: 218-231","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002","Sellers post asking prices with limited commitment; buyers direct search; asking price signals seller reservation type and houses sell above, at or below ask.","theory","Directed-search equilibrium with heterogeneous seller reservation values is constrained efficient; asking prices separate seller types.","Provides the posted-price benchmark against which WP19's Nash bargaining is checked for robustness; both feature private seller reservation types.","Two seller types only; no continuous urgency distribution, no financing contingency, no transaction-hazard or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A"4"anenberg2016information","Anenberg, Elliot","2016","Information Frictions And Housing Market Dynamics","International Economic Review","57(4): 1449-1479","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12204","Sellers learn about demand for their house through Bayesian updating while listed; information frictions shape list-price dynamics.","structural","Seller uncertainty about current demand explains list-price reductions and generates microfounded momentum in aggregate prices.","Alternative explanation of declining prices with time on market (learning) against which WP19's urgency/selection explanation must be distinguished. | B: Alternative (information) source of TOM-price patterns; WP19 keeps full information and isolates urgency and liquidity","No permanent urgency heterogeneity, no financing stage, no selection-corrected indices.","high","crossref+doi","A+B"5"anenberg2020endogenous","Anenberg, Elliot and Bayer, Patrick","2020","Endogenous Sources Of Volatility In Housing Markets: The Joint Buyer–Seller Problem","International Economic Review","61(3): 1195-1228","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12454","Cost of holding two homes varies endogenously over the cycle; moving owners' joint buy-sell problem amplifies volume and price volatility.","structural","Internal movement is highly procyclical; frictions from the joint buyer-seller problem substantially amplify cyclical price volatility.","Their time-varying cost of holding two homes is an endogenous version of WP19's carrying cost c; WP19 treats c as a permanent type and studies its cross-sectional implications.","No cash/mortgage distinction; no stationary dispersion or index-selection results.","high","crossref+doi","A"6"arnold1999search","Arnold, Michael A.","1999","Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices","Real Estate Economics","27(3): 453-481","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00780","Asking price affects the arrival rate of inspecting buyers; reservation and asking prices solved jointly in a search-bargaining model.","theory","Existence of a subgame-perfect asking/reservation strategy; discount rates and buyer outside options move both prices.","Provides the comparative statics of the reservation price with respect to the seller's discount rate, the closest analogue to WP19's urgency gradient.","Partial equilibrium; no tightness feedback, dispersion across sellers or financing.","high","crossref+doi","A"7"arnott1989housing","Arnott, Richard","1989","Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","2(1): 5-30","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00161714","Idiosyncratic tastes in a thin market generate equilibrium vacancies in rental housing.","theory","Vacancies are an equilibrium outcome of search with idiosyncratic match quality; thinness raises vacancies and affects rents.","Early formalisation of idiosyncratic match value x ~ G, central to WP19's acceptance rule.","Rental market, no urgency, financing or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi","A"8"bagnoli2005logconcave","Bagnoli, Mark and Bergstrom, Ted","2005","Log-concave probability and its applications","Economic Theory","26(2): 445-469","https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4","Log-concavity of densities implies monotone hazard rates and preserved properties under integration and truncation.","theory","Catalogue of log-concave distributions and of their implications for hazard and mean-residual-life functions.","Technical basis for WP19's proposition that the sale hazard is increasing in the effective arrival rate under log-concave G.","Pure probability tool.","high","crossref+doi","A"9"bian2018bargaining","Bian, Xun and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2018","Bargaining, Mortgage Financing, and Housing Prices","Journal of Real Estate Research","40(3): 419-452","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506","Financing embedded in a bilateral bargaining model: mortgage terms create gains from trade beyond valuations.","theory","With financing, trade can occur even if buyer valuation is below seller reservation; omitting financing misstates the gain from trade and price.","Only formal bargaining theory with financing found; WP19 instead models financing as a contingency affecting timing and success, not surplus.","No search, no tightness, no cash discount from selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"10"bond2007marketing","Bond, Shaun A. and Hwang, Soosung and Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Theory and Empirical Estimates from the UK Commercial Real Estate Market","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","34(4): 447-461","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1","Marketing period risk adds a second moment to real estate returns in portfolio choice.","theory","UK commercial real estate: marketing-period risk materially raises ex ante risk and reduces optimal allocations.","Supports treating time to sale as a priced risk, as in WP19; WP19 endogenises its distribution.","No equilibrium or seller heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi","A"11"burdett1983equilibrium","Burdett, Kenneth and Judd, Kenneth L.","1983","Equilibrium Price Dispersion","Econometrica","51(4): 955-969","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912045","Noisy search (consumers observe one or several prices) sustains equilibrium price dispersion for a homogeneous good.","theory","Price dispersion is an equilibrium outcome of search frictions even with identical sellers and buyers.","Benchmark for WP19's dispersion result, which instead derives dispersion from seller heterogeneity in urgency under bargaining.","Posted prices by sellers with no holding-cost heterogeneity; no dynamics or hazard.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A"12"caplin2011trading","Caplin, Andrew and Leahy, John","2011","Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 283-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x","Liquidity modelled through a trading-friction process linking prices, sales and inventory.","theory","Model generates large price changes and positive price-sales correlation but counterfactual negative autocorrelation; informational frictions help.","Shares the goal of a joint characterisation of prices, sales and inventory; WP19 provides a micro-founded stationary version with seller heterogeneity.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi","A"13"carrillo2012empirical","Carrillo, Paul E.","2012","An Empirical Stationary Equilibrium Search Model Of The Housing Market","International Economic Review","53(1): 203-234","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x","Stationary equilibrium with two-sided search, heterogeneous motivation to trade, posting and bargaining, and endogenous matching via advertising.","structural","Estimated model fits MLS data; more listing information and lower commissions change prices and time on market.","Shares heterogeneous seller motivation and a stationary equilibrium with posting plus bargaining; WP19 is analytical, adds financing and derives propositions and index bias.","No explicit liquidity-discount definition, no mortgage/cash contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi","A"14"cheng2010illiquidity","Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2010","Illiquidity, transaction cost, and optimal holding period for real estate: Theory and application","Journal of Housing Economics","19(2): 109-118","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002","Illiquidity and transaction costs determine an optimal holding period for real estate.","theory","Optimal holding period increases with transaction costs and marketing-period uncertainty.","Relates holding cost and illiquidity to timing decisions; WP19 treats the holding cost as the seller's urgency type.","Partial equilibrium; no market feedback.","high","crossref+doi","A"15"diamond1982aggregate","Diamond, Peter A.","1982","Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","90(5): 881-894","https://doi.org/10.1086/261099","Trading externalities in a search economy produce multiple equilibria and inefficiently low activity.","theory","Thick-market externalities can sustain low-activity equilibria; aggregate demand management can be welfare-improving.","Origin of the matching externalities WP19 invokes when matching efficiency falls; WP19 keeps a unique stationary equilibrium under stated conditions.","No housing, prices by bargaining absent, no heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi","A"16"diaz2013house","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén","2013","House Prices, Sales, And Time On The Market: A Search-Theoretic Framework","International Economic Review","54(3): 837-872","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12019","Random matching with Nash bargaining and endogenous entry; aggregate demand/supply shocks propagate through vacancies, sales and time on market.","theory","Search frictions reproduce positive price-sales and negative price-TOM comovement; trading delays amplify price volatility and propagate shocks.","WP19 shares the matching-function, bargaining and free-entry architecture; it adds urgency heterogeneity, financing contingency and a selection-corrected index, and studies non-fundamental shocks.","Representative seller; no cross-sectional price dispersion from urgency; shocks are to fundamentals rather than to matching efficiency or buyer qualification.","high","crossref+doi","A"17"diaz2024housing","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén and Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo","2024","Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search","The Economic Journal","134(657): 220-270","https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead054","Competitive search with credit constraints: wealthier, risk-averse buyers pay more to transact faster; block recursivity via intermediaries.","theory","Credit availability raises long-run prices and debt more than a Walrasian model, especially with inelastic supply.","Links buyers' financial position to transaction speed and price, the mirror image of WP19's cash discount on the seller side.","No seller urgency distribution, no pending-approval stage, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi","A"18"duffie2005over","Duffie, Darrell and Garleanu, Nicolae and Pedersen, Lasse Heje","2005","Over-the-Counter Markets","Econometrica","73(6): 1815-1847","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x","Search and bargaining in OTC asset markets; prices depend on search intensity and bargaining power through outside options.","theory","Bid-ask spreads and liquidity premia are decreasing in search intensity and depend on bargaining power; marketmakers' role derived.","Finance analogue of WP19's endogenous liquidity discount: price departs from the frictionless value because of search and bargaining.","Homogeneous asset units, no housing-specific match value or financing stage.","high","crossref+doi","A"19"eerola2018borrowing","Eerola, Essi and Määttänen, Niku","2018","Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity","Review of Economic Dynamics","27: 184-204","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003","Matching plus credit frictions with risk-averse households; tighter borrowing constraints change who can buy and bargain.","theory","Moderate tightening of borrowing constraints substantially increases time on market and idiosyncratic price dispersion.","Very close to WP19's qualification channel: credit tightening raises TOM and dispersion; WP19 adds explicit seller urgency types and a pending-approval stage with cash buyers.","No cash discount, no decomposition of dispersion into urgency vs buyer wealth, no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi","A"20"fisher2003controlling","Fisher, Jeffrey and Gatzlaff, Dean and Geltner, David and Haurin, Donald","2003","Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices","Real Estate Economics","31(2): 269-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00066","Constant-liquidity value concept: transaction indices embed time-varying ease of sale; procyclical volume.","empirical","Constant-liquidity indices lead transaction and appraisal indices and show greater amplitude.","Closest antecedent to WP19's dynamic selection bias proposition; WP19 derives the sign of the bias from heterogeneous hazard elasticities (both/theory-informed econometrics). | B: Operationalises WP19's distinction between a liquidity-adjusted price and the observed transaction index","No structural model of seller heterogeneity; residential application and financing absent.","high","crossref+doi","A+B"21"gabrovski2019beveridge","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2019","The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market","Journal of Economic Theory","181: 361-381","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003","Free entry of both buyers and sellers in a housing search model generates an upward-sloping Beveridge curve.","theory","Baseline housing search models imply a downward-sloping Beveridge curve; two-sided entry restores the positive vacancy-buyer correlation in data.","WP19 uses free entry of buyers only (listing inflow exogenous); this paper warns that seller entry can reverse tightness comparative statics.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"22"gabrovski2021search","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2021","Search and credit frictions in the housing market","European Economic Review","134: 103699","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699","Interaction of search and credit frictions: credit conditions shift buyer entry and liquidity, with multiple equilibria.","theory","Credit shocks affect mortgage debt and liquidity more than prices; combined frictions produce multiple equilibria.","Closest to WP19's financing extension: both route credit into buyer arrival/qualification; WP19 models an explicit pending-approval stage and the cash discount.","No cash-versus-mortgage buyers, no seller urgency distribution, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi","A"23"gabrovski2025note","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2025","A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions","Macroeconomic Dynamics","29","https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100525100692","Congestion and participation externalities with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers; equilibrium inefficient even under Hosios condition.","theory","With two-sided entry the Hosios-Mortensen-Pissarides condition no longer delivers efficiency in the housing market; externalities quantified for the US.","Direct benchmark for WP19's welfare/Hosios proposition; WP19 has one-sided (buyer) entry, so the standard Hosios logic applies but urgency heterogeneity adds a composition wedge.","No seller heterogeneity in holding cost and no financing stage in the welfare analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A"24"garriga2020mortgage","Garriga, Carlos and Hedlund, Aaron","2020","Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession","American Economic Review","110(6): 1603-1634","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170772","Endogenously illiquid housing from search frictions plus long-term defaultable mortgages transmit the bust to consumption.","structural","Deterioration in house prices and liquidity, transmitted via balance sheets, explains aggregate and cross-sectional patterns of the Great Recession.","Establishes that housing liquidity is a distinct state variable in macro-housing models; WP19 provides the microfoundation of the liquidity discount they embed.","No cash discount, no urgency dispersion or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A"25"genesove2012search","Genesove, David and Han, Lu","2012","Search and matching in the housing market","Journal of Urban Economics","72(1): 31-45","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002","Search intensity and matching in a housing market with buyers and sellers; tests of increasing returns in matching and strategic search behaviour.","empirical","Evidence on the matching technology and on buyer search behaviour consistent with search-theoretic predictions (both/empirical with theory motivation).","Informs WP19's assumption of a CRS matching function and the interpretation of theta; WP19 does not estimate the matching function. | B: Direct calibration target for WP19's matching elasticity and tightness response; stronger response to demand growth than levels","Does not model seller urgency, financing or price discounts.","high","crossref+doi","A+B"26"glower1998motivation","Glower, Michel and Haurin, Donald R. and Hendershott, Patric H.","1998","Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation","Real Estate Economics","26(4): 719-740","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00763","Seller motivation (planned moving date) shifts reservation price and selling time.","empirical","Motivated sellers sell faster and at lower prices; motivation affects sale price but not list-price markup; models should allow heterogeneous sellers.","Empirical motivation for WP19's heterogeneous carrying cost; WP19 supplies the theory they call for (also relevant to Part B). | B: Closest empirical counterpart to WP19's carrying-cost heterogeneity: urgency raises hazard and lowers price; WP19 formalises and adds market-level feedback","No formal equilibrium model, no index-selection or financing analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A+B"27"guren2018house","Guren, Adam M.","2018","House Price Momentum and Strategic Complementarity","Journal of Political Economy","126(3): 1172-1218","https://doi.org/10.1086/697207","Concave demand in relative list price generates strategic complementarity among sellers, amplifying momentum.","structural","Sellers adjust prices gradually toward the average; concave demand amplifies price momentum two- to threefold.","Both link the sale hazard to the seller's price; WP19 derives the hazard from match-value acceptance under log-concavity rather than estimated demand curvature.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; momentum rather than stationary dispersion and selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"28"guren2020foreclosures","Guren, Adam M and McQuade, Timothy J","2020","How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?","The Review of Economic Studies","87(3): 1331-1364","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa001","Foreclosures freeze the non-foreclosure market: choosier buyers, ruined credit and lender losses create price-default spirals.","structural","Foreclosure amplification accounts for a large share of the non-distressed price decline; principal reduction is more effective than payment reduction.","Distressed sellers are an extreme urgency type; WP19 generalises urgency to a continuum and derives the composition effect on observed prices.","No explicit cash/mortgage stage; selection in observed indices not the focus.","high","crossref+doi","A"29"han2015microstructure","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2015","The Microstructure of Housing Markets","Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics","vol. 5: 813-886","https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2","Survey of search (one-sided, random, directed), bargaining and auctions, and brokerage in housing markets.","survey","Organises the microstructure literature and identifies open questions on matching, bargaining and intermediaries.","WP19's positioning follows this taxonomy (random matching plus Nash bargaining with posted-price robustness).","Identifies but does not resolve the interaction of seller heterogeneity, financing and observed price indices.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)","A"30"han2024cash","Han, Lu and Hong, Seung-Hyun","2024","Cash is king? Understanding financing risk in housing markets","Review of Finance","28(6): 2083-2118","https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae025","Financing risk: a mortgage contingency may fail, returning the house to the market; cash offers avoid this risk.","empirical","Cash offers close 29% faster and carry a 2-3.9% discount; closing risk alone is insufficient, the risk of failing to resell is key (both/empirical with calibrated model).","WP19's pending-approval stage with success probability phi and relisting is the formal version of their mechanism; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness feedback. | B: Nearly identical mechanism to WP19's financing contingency and relisting; WP19 adds heterogeneous urgency and general-equilibrium tightness","No analytical propositions on dispersion or index selection; no urgency heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi","A+B"31"head2012housing","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw","2012","Housing Liquidity, Mobility, and the Labour Market","The Review of Economic Studies","79(4): 1559-1589","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds004","Homeowners' acceptance of out-of-town jobs depends on how fast they can sell; housing liquidity links labour and housing search.","theory","Housing illiquidity lowers mobility of owners relative to renters; the aggregate unemployment effect is small except in high-unemployment states.","Introduces 'liquidity as time to sell' as a state variable for owners, which WP19 adopts, but WP19 does not model labour markets.","No seller urgency distribution or financing; liquidity measured by selling speed only, not by a price discount.","high","crossref+doi","A"32"head2014search","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw and Sun, Hongfei","2014","Search, Liquidity, and the Dynamics of House Prices and Construction","American Economic Review","104(4): 1172-1210","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1172","City-level search with construction and buyer entry; variation in time to sell induces serially correlated price growth.","theory","Search plus endogenous construction and entry explains momentum in house prices and the joint dynamics of sales, prices and population after income shocks.","Free entry of buyers and the role of time to sell in prices are shared; WP19 is a local stationary model focused on microstructure rather than dynamics with construction.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; the liquidity concept is aggregate time to sell rather than a decomposed discount.","high","crossref+doi","A"33"head2023default","Head, Allen and Sun, Hongfei and Zhou, Chenggang","2023","Indebted sellers, liquidity and mortgage standards","European Economic Review","151: 104321","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104321","Indebted sellers set higher asking prices and take longer to sell; asking prices and time-to-sell determine liquidity and default risk.","structural","Higher LTV sellers ask more and sell slower; policies reducing default can loosen lending standards and lower welfare.","Debt-driven heterogeneity in reservation prices is the mirror of WP19's holding-cost heterogeneity: debt lowers urgency to accept, carrying cost raises it.","No cash/mortgage buyer contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi","A"34"hedlund2016cyclical","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing, debt, and foreclosures","Quantitative Economics","7(1): 289-328","https://doi.org/10.3982/qe483","Liquidity spirals from search frictions and endogenous credit constraints; longer selling times raise foreclosure risk and tighten credit.","structural","Search-based housing illiquidity with equilibrium default matches cyclical housing and mortgage dynamics; full-recourse reform reduces foreclosures.","Dynamic macro analogue of WP19's liquidity shock propagation; WP19 is stationary and analytical with explicit hazard and discount decompositions.","No urgency heterogeneity among sellers beyond debt; no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi","A"35"hedlund2016illiquidity","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","Illiquidity and its discontents: Trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market","Journal of Monetary Economics","83: 1-13","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005","Search frictions make housing illiquid; trading delays interact with mortgage default to produce foreclosures.","theory","Trading delays raise foreclosure risk and endogenously tighten credit; illiquidity amplifies downturns.","Shares endogenous illiquidity from search and its credit feedback; WP19 isolates the microstructure and adds a pending-financing stage and urgency.","No cash/mortgage buyer distinction, no price dispersion, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"36"horowitz1992role","Horowitz, Joel L.","1992","The role of the list price in housing markets: Theory and an econometric model","Journal of Applied Econometrics","7(2): 115-129","https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.3950070202","List price is a ceiling distinct from the reservation price; sellers optimally hold list prices even when unsold for long periods.","theory","Sale prices fall below but not above list; structural model predicts sale and reservation prices and explains sticky list prices.","Reservation price as the operative state variable, as in WP19; WP19 derives it from carrying cost and tightness.","No urgency heterogeneity or equilibrium feedback.","high","crossref+doi","A"37"hosios1990efficiency","Hosios, Arthur J.","1990","On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","57(2): 279-298","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297382","Efficiency of search equilibria requires bargaining shares to equal matching elasticities.","theory","Hosios condition: Nash bargaining power equal to the elasticity of matching w.r.t. the agent's side internalises congestion externalities.","WP19's welfare proposition uses the Hosios condition and shows how urgency heterogeneity creates a composition wedge.","Homogeneous agents; no financing stage or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A"38"krainer2001theory","Krainer, John","2001","A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets","Journal of Urban Economics","49(1): 32-53","https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.2000.2180","Buyers draw idiosyncratic match values; sellers set reservation prices anticipating future aggregate states; liquidity (time on market) varies with expected housing-service values.","theory","Sellers rationally hold out in downturns when expected future states improve, so time on market rises while prices adjust sluggishly: endogenous liquidity co-moves with prices.","WP19 uses the same idiosyncratic match-value draw and reservation logic and the definition of liquidity through expected selling time; WP19 differs by holding fundamentals fixed and shocking matching efficiency/qualification instead.","Homogeneous sellers; the liquidity shock is itself a shock to future dividends, so it cannot separate a pure liquidity shock from a fundamental shock, which is WP19's central question.","high","crossref+doi","A"39"krainer2002equilibrium","Krainer, John and LeRoy, Stephen F.","2002","Equilibrium valuation of illiquid assets","Economic Theory","19(2): 223-242","https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004214","Illiquid asset valued by an owner who can only sell when a stochastic buyer arrives; equilibrium price reflects expected search delay and the owner-specific dividend.","theory","Equilibrium valuation of an illiquid asset: the price discount relative to a liquid benchmark depends on arrival intensity and the cross-section of dividends.","Provides the cleanest frictionless-benchmark comparison that WP19 formalises as D=(p*-p)/p*; WP19 endogenises the arrival rate through tightness and makes the discount depend on seller urgency.","Exogenous arrival intensity, no tightness, no bargaining-vs-selection decomposition and no implications for observed hazard distributions.","high","crossref+doi","A"40"lagos2009liquidity","Lagos, Ricardo and Rocheteau, Guillaume","2009","Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions","Econometrica","77(2): 403-426","https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7250","Unrestricted asset holdings in an OTC search model; trading frictions shape asset demands, volume, spreads and delays.","theory","Investors offset frictions by adjusting positions; frictions affect liquidity measures and asset prices through this margin.","Clarifies what a liquidity premium means in search markets; WP19's indivisible housing unit removes the holdings margin and emphasises seller urgency instead.","Divisible assets; no housing.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)","A"41"leung2017flipping","Leung, Charles Ka Yui and Tse, Chung-Yi","2017","Flipping in the housing market","Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control","76: 232-263","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2017.01.003","Arbitrage middlemen (flippers) enter a housing search model; multiple equilibria in turnover, vacancy and prices.","theory","Flipping arises in sluggish and tight markets; it is socially useful in illiquid markets and wasteful in liquid ones.","Flippers act as liquidity providers to urgent sellers, a role WP19 attributes to cash buyers; both find liquidity provision changes prices and turnover.","No explicit seller urgency distribution or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A"42"lin2007illiquidity","Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Illiquidity and Pricing Biases in the Real Estate Market","Real Estate Economics","35(3): 291-330","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00191.x","Uncertain marketing period and time to sale bias transaction-based return and risk estimates that assume immediate execution.","theory","Estimated returns are biased upward and risks downward when marketing-period uncertainty is ignored; biases can be large.","Shares the view that transaction-price measures understate illiquidity; WP19 derives the bias from equilibrium selection on seller urgency.","No equilibrium pricing or hazards; no urgency heterogeneity; no financing.","high","crossref+doi","A"43"lin2008real","Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2008","Real Estate Returns and Risk with Heterogeneous Investors","Real Estate Economics","36(4): 753-776","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00229.x","Sellers with different degrees of financial distress face different TOM risk and return distributions.","theory","Return and risk are investor-specific; ignoring TOM uncertainty and financial circumstances understates risk.","Explicitly ties seller financial distress to marketing-period risk and realised prices, close to WP19's urgency gradient but without equilibrium.","No equilibrium tightness, no bargaining, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"44"lippman1976economics","Lippman, Steven A. and McCall, John J.","1976","The Economics Of Job Search: A Survey","Economic Inquiry","14(2): 155-189","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x","Sequential search with reservation values; comparative statics of the reservation value in offer distribution and search costs.","survey","Reservation-value characterisation of optimal stopping; higher search costs lower the reservation value.","WP19's result that the reservation price decreases in holding cost c is a direct application of this classical comparative static.","Partial equilibrium; no two-sided market.","high","crossref+doi","A"45"maury2014search","Maury, Tristan-Pierre and Tripier, Fabien","2014","Search strategies on the housing market and their implications on price dispersion","Journal of Housing Economics","26: 55-80","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2014.09.001","Buyers' choice of search strategy generates equilibrium price dispersion in a housing market.","theory","Heterogeneous search strategies produce price dispersion for identical houses; dispersion responds to search costs.","Dispersion from buyer-side heterogeneity complements WP19's dispersion from seller urgency.","No seller urgency, financing or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"46"merlo2015home","Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François and Rust, John","2015","The Home Selling Problem: Theory And Evidence","International Economic Review","56(2): 457-484","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12111","Single seller's optimal stopping with list-price menu costs and stochastic offer arrivals.","structural","Tiny menu costs rationalise sticky list prices; the model fits list-price and sale dynamics for English properties.","Partial-equilibrium seller problem that WP19 embeds in a market equilibrium; both treat the sale as optimal stopping with offer arrivals.","No equilibrium feedback on arrival rates, no urgency cross-section or selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A"47"moen1997competitive","Moen, Espen R.","1997","Competitive Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","105(2): 385-411","https://doi.org/10.1086/262077","Competitive (directed) search: posted terms direct searchers; equilibrium is constrained efficient.","theory","Competitive search equilibrium decentralises the Hosios condition; submarkets price time to trade.","WP19's posted-price robustness check uses this benchmark.","No seller urgency continuum with private information in the housing sense; no financing.","high","crossref+doi","A"48"moen2021buying","Moen, Espen R and Nenov, Plamen T and Sniekers, Florian","2021","Buying First or Selling First in Housing Markets","Journal of the European Economic Association","19(1): 38-81","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz069","Moving owners choose to buy first or sell first; strategic complementarity in that choice generates multiple steady states.","theory","Buy-first incentives congest the buyer side and raise the buyer-seller ratio, producing multiplicity and large fluctuations consistent with housing cycles.","Both make tightness endogenous through participation decisions; WP19 keeps a single seller population and studies urgency within it.","No urgency distribution, financing contingency or price-index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"49"mortensen1994job","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1994","Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","61(3): 397-415","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297896","Matching function with free entry of vacancies and Nash wage bargaining; endogenous job destruction.","theory","Canonical DMP equilibrium: tightness pinned by free entry; surplus split by Nash bargaining; comparative statics of shocks on flows.","WP19's free-entry condition for buyers and Nash split are direct transplants; sellers play the role of vacancies.","Labour market; no heterogeneous holding costs of the posting side or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A"50"mortensen1999new","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1999","Chapter 39 New developments in models of search in the labor market","Handbook of Labor Economics","vol. 3B: 2567-2627","https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30025-0","Survey of search and matching models in labour markets including endogenous destruction and efficiency.","survey","Summarises the DMP class and its comparative statics.","Reference for WP19's standard results that are not new.","Labour framing.","high","crossref+doi","A"51"nash1950bargaining","Nash, John F.","1950","The Bargaining Problem","Econometrica","18(2): 155-162","https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266","Axiomatic bargaining solution maximising the product of surpluses.","theory","The Nash solution is the unique split satisfying the stated axioms.","WP19's baseline price-setting rule.","No frictions or dynamics.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A"52"ngai2014hot","Ngai, L. Rachel and Tenreyro, Silvana","2014","Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market","American Economic Review","104(12): 3991-4026","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3991","Thick-market externality in match quality: more participants raise expected match quality, raising willingness to pay and transaction rates.","theory","Small deterministic seasonal drivers are amplified into large seasonal swings in prices and volumes through thick-market effects.","Both models let matching efficiency affect prices and volume with unchanged housing-service values; WP19 shocks efficiency A directly and studies seller urgency rather than seasonality.","Homogeneous sellers; no financing stage; no selection bias in indices.","high","crossref+doi","A"53"ngai2020decision","Ngai, L Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D","2020","The Decision to Move House and Aggregate Housing-Market Dynamics","Journal of the European Economic Association","18(5): 2487-2531","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa001","Moving is an investment in match quality; the decision to list (inflows) rather than selling speed drives transactions.","theory","Transactions are driven mainly by listings; a model with endogenous moving explains the 1995-2003 boom and has welfare implications through mismatch.","Shares search-and-matching with idiosyncratic match quality; WP19 keeps listing inflow exogenous and focuses on hazards and prices conditional on listing.","No urgency heterogeneity, no financing, no observed-index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"54"ngai2024ins","Ngai, L. Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D.","2024","The Ins And Outs Of Selling Houses: Understanding Housing-Market Volatility","International Economic Review","65(3): 1415-1440","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12693","Inflows (new listings) and outflows (sales) jointly determine housing-market volatility; correlations with inventory depend on shock source and persistence.","theory","Both listing inflows and sales outflows matter quantitatively; signs of inventory correlations are time-varying and depend on the nature of shocks.","WP19's exogenous withdrawal rate delta and matching-efficiency shocks are the stationary analogue of their outflow margins; WP19 adds urgency and financing.","No seller heterogeneity in holding costs, no cash/mortgage distinction, no composition correction of price indices.","high","crossref+doi","A"55"novymarx2009hot","Novy-Marx, Robert","2009","Hot and Cold Markets","Real Estate Economics","37(1): 1-22","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x","Feedback between buyer-seller ratio and bargaining positions amplifies demand shocks: sellers sell faster, inventory falls, tightness rises further.","theory","Equilibrium tightness, expected time to sale and prices are highly sensitive to fundamentals because of endogenous stock feedback.","WP19 shares the tightness-feedback mechanism through free entry; it isolates shocks to matching efficiency and qualification and adds urgency heterogeneity.","Homogeneous agents; no decomposition of the price response into bargaining and composition; no financing.","high","crossref+doi","A"56"ortalomagne2006housing","Ortalo-Magné, François and Rady, Sven","2006","Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints","Review of Economic Studies","73(2): 459-485","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.383_1.x","Life-cycle credit constraints and the property ladder transmit income shocks into price overshooting and volume dynamics.","theory","Credit-constrained young buyers make prices overreact to income shocks; prices and transactions comove without search frictions.","Provides the frictionless-with-credit benchmark; WP19 isolates the search channel holding credit constant except through qualification.","No search, no time on market, no dispersion.","high","crossref+doi","A"57"petrongolo2001looking","Petrongolo, Barbara and Pissarides, Christopher A","2001","Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function","Journal of Economic Literature","39(2): 390-431","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.390","Survey of the aggregate matching function: microfoundations, CRS Cobb-Douglas estimates, aggregation issues.","survey","CRS Cobb-Douglas matching function fits many markets; microfoundations remain debated.","Justifies WP19's CRS matching assumption and the interpretation of A as matching efficiency.","Labour market focus.","high","crossref+doi","A"58"piazzesi2009momentum","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin","2009","Momentum Traders in the Housing Market: Survey Evidence and a Search Model","American Economic Review","99(2): 406-411","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.406","Survey-based heterogeneity in beliefs; a search model where a small share of momentum traders can move prices because trading is frictional.","theory","In a search market a minority of optimistic traders raises transaction prices substantially because they are overrepresented among marginal buyers.","Illustrates how composition of transacting agents, not fundamentals, moves transaction prices; WP19 formalises an analogous composition effect for sellers after a liquidity shock.","Belief heterogeneity on the buyer side only; no seller urgency, hazards or selection correction.","high","crossref+doi","A"59"piazzesi2020segmented","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin and Stroebel, Johannes","2020","Segmented Housing Search","American Economic Review","110(3): 720-759","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141772","Heterogeneous clienteles search across overlapping market segments; broad searchers flow toward high-inventory segments.","structural","Within-city inventory and search activity covary positively because broad searchers spread localized shocks across segments.","WP19 is a single-segment local market; segmentation is a natural extension and the paper's treatment of inventory and search intensity informs theta. | B: WP19's single-segment matching abstracts from segment spillovers that dampen local liquidity shocks","No seller urgency distribution, financing contingency or liquidity-discount decomposition.","high","crossref+doi","A+B"60"pissarides2000equilibrium","Pissarides, Christopher A.","2000","Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd edition","MIT Press (book)","Cambridge, MA","https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html","Textbook treatment of matching, free entry, Nash bargaining, efficiency and endogenous destruction.","theory","Standard reference for equilibrium search with matching functions and the Hosios efficiency condition.","Source of WP19's modelling conventions (CRS matching, tightness, Bellman equations in continuous time).","Labour framing; no asset-price discount or transaction-index implications.","medium","publisher page https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html","A"61"reher2024mortgage","Reher, Michael and Valkanov, Rossen","2024","The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle","The Journal of Finance","79(5): 3149-3201","https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13373","Mortgage transaction frictions make sellers demand a premium from mortgaged buyers; representative-seller model yields a small premium.","empirical","Mortgaged buyers pay about 11% more than cash buyers; a rational model implies 3%; heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half the gap.","WP19's cash discount = bargaining term + selection term speaks directly to their puzzle by adding seller urgency heterogeneity (both/empirical with model). | B: WP19's financing-contingency block generates an endogenous cash discount; Reher-Valkanov's 'puzzle' is the gap WP19's urgency heterogeneity should narrow","No equilibrium tightness feedback or hazard-based selection decomposition.","high","crossref+doi","A+B"62"rocheteau2011liquidity","Rocheteau, Guillaume and Weill, Pierre-Olivier","2011","Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 261-282","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00435.x","Review of frictional asset markets in finance and monetary theory with a simple search model.","survey","Unifies the literature on liquidity in search markets, including housing and credit market dynamics.","Places WP19 in the search-based liquidity literature.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi","A"63"rogerson2005search","Rogerson, Richard and Shimer, Robert and Wright, Randall","2005","Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey","Journal of Economic Literature","43(4): 959-988","https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362014","Survey of search-theoretic models: reservation strategies, matching, bargaining, directed search, wage dispersion.","survey","Unifies partial and equilibrium search; explains coexistence of unmatched agents on both sides and dispersion.","Reference for WP19's reservation-value and dispersion results that are standard.","Labour framing; no financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A"64"rubinstein1982perfect","Rubinstein, Ariel","1982","Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model","Econometrica","50(1): 97-109","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531","Alternating-offers bargaining; impatience determines the unique perfect-equilibrium split.","theory","Unique subgame-perfect division; the more patient party obtains more; limit approximates Nash bargaining.","Justifies WP19's Nash split with bargaining weight beta and links seller urgency (impatience) to lower bargained prices.","No market equilibrium or search.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A"65"sagi2021asset","Sagi, Jacob S","2021","Asset-Level Risk and Return in Real Estate Investments","The Review of Financial Studies","34(8): 3647-3694","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa122","Search-based asset pricing with transaction risk explains why idiosyncratic real estate returns do not scale with holding period.","structural","Equilibrium search model fits commercial real estate transactions; transaction risk is crucial for price dynamics.","Shares search-generated idiosyncratic price dispersion; WP19 focuses on residential sellers' urgency and financing.","No seller urgency types or cash/mortgage contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A"66"salant1991sale","Salant, Stephen W.","1991","For sale by owner: When to use a broker and how to price the house","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","4(2): 157-173","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00173122","Finite-horizon seller with a deadline chooses between selling by owner and using a broker and sets a declining price path.","theory","A seller facing a moving deadline optimally lowers price over time and may switch to a broker; urgency is a deadline.","Early treatment of seller urgency (deadline) and declining reservation prices; WP19 models urgency as a flow cost in stationary equilibrium.","No market equilibrium, no dispersion or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A"67"shimer2005cyclical","Shimer, Robert","2005","The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies","American Economic Review","95(1): 25-49","https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828572","Standard matching model cannot generate observed volatility of tightness from productivity shocks.","theory","Vacancy-unemployment ratio is far more volatile than productivity; the textbook model lacks amplification.","Benchmark for elasticities of tightness to shocks used in WP19's numerical calibration discussion.","Labour market.","high","crossref+doi","A"68"stein1995prices","Stein, Jeremy C.","1995","Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A Model with Down-Payment Effects","The Quarterly Journal of Economics","110(2): 379-406","https://doi.org/10.2307/2118444","Down-payment constraints make repeat buyers' demand depend on equity; price declines reduce volume and amplify themselves.","theory","Price-volume comovement and amplification arise from down-payment constraints without search frictions.","Alternative, non-search channel for volume-price comovement; WP19 shares the role of financing in sellers' ability to transact but routes it through buyer qualification.","No search frictions, hazards or price dispersion.","high","crossref+doi","A"69"taylor1999time","Taylor, Curtis R.","1999","Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality","Review of Economic Studies","66(3): 555-578","https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00098","Time on the market signals unobserved quality when inspections are informative, creating stigma for stale listings.","theory","Long TOM lowers buyers' beliefs and reduces subsequent sale probability and price.","Competing explanation of declining hazard with duration; WP19 obtains duration dependence from urgency composition instead.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing.","high","crossref+doi","A"70"wheaton1990vacancy","Wheaton, William C.","1990","Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model","Journal of Political Economy","98(6): 1270-1292","https://doi.org/10.1086/261734","Owner-occupiers mismatched with their house search while holding two units; vacancy and matching rate pin down reservation prices and equilibrium price via Nash bargaining.","theory","First housing matching model: higher vacancy lowers prices; price depends on expected time to sell and the cost of carrying two units.","WP19 keeps the stationary matching structure and carrying cost of unsold housing, but makes carrying cost heterogeneous across sellers and derives the hazard and discount jointly with free entry of buyers.","No seller heterogeneity in urgency, no financing contingency, no selection correction for transaction indices; liquidity is vacancy-driven rather than a defined discount relative to a frictionless price.","high","crossref+doi","A"71"williams1995pricing","Williams, Joseph T.","1995","Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search","Review of Financial Studies","8(1): 55-90","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/8.1.55","Owners of heterogeneous real assets search costly for buyers; the asset price is an optimal-stopping value under Poisson arrivals and dispersed offers.","theory","Equilibrium prices of real assets embed a search discount; time to sale and prices respond to arrival rates and the dispersion of buyer offers.","Shares the Poisson-arrival/optimal-stopping core and the idea of a price below the frictionless value; WP19 adds two-sided tightness, free entry, urgency heterogeneity and a financing stage.","Partial-equilibrium arrival rate; no matching function or tightness feedback, no composition effects in observed transaction prices.","high","crossref+doi","A"72"wright2021directed","Wright, Randall and Kircher, Philipp and Julien, Benoît and Guerrieri, Veronica","2021","Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour","Journal of Economic Literature","59(1): 90-148","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191505","Survey of directed and competitive search: efficiency, private information, sorting with heterogeneity.","survey","Directed search prices goods plus time to obtain them; equilibria are often efficient; technical results collected.","Guides WP19's posted-price robustness section and the efficiency comparison.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi","A"73"yavas1992simple","Yavaş, Abdullah","1992","A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets","Real Estate Economics","20(4): 533-548","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00595","Buyers and sellers choose search intensities; price by Nash bargaining; brokers change incentives to search.","theory","Brokers reduce own search; price rises by less than the commission; the split depends on bargaining powers (half under Nash).","Nash bargaining over the match surplus with endogenous search intensity is a direct antecedent of WP19's bargaining block.","No seller urgency distribution, financing, liquidity shock or index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"74"yavas1995strategic","Yavas, Abdullah and Yang, Shiawee","1995","The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence","Real Estate Economics","23(3): 347-368","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00668","Listing price trades off arrival rate (TOM) against bargained transaction price.","theory","Theory and evidence that higher list prices lengthen TOM and raise sale price; optimal list price balances the two.","WP19's reservation-price/hazard trade-off is the bargaining analogue of the list-price/TOM trade-off here.","Homogeneous seller urgency; no financing; no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A"75"zuehlke1987duration","Zuehlke, Thomas W.","1987","Duration Dependence in the Housing Market","Review of Economics and Statistics","69(4), 701-704","https://doi.org/10.2307/1935966","Sale hazard as a function of elapsed marketing time; vacancy as proxy for seller carrying cost/urgency","empirical; Weibull hazard on MLS listings (New Orleans, Tallahassee)","Early parametric duration evidence; vacant houses display stronger (positive) duration dependence than occupied ones [magnitudes not abstract-verified]","WP19 derives observed duration dependence from unobserved urgency heterogeneity; Zuehlke's vacancy split is a direct empirical analogue of carrying-cost heterogeneity","No control for unobserved heterogeneity vs true duration dependence; no price outcome; small samples","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_zuehlke1987duration.crossref.json)","B"76"haurin1988duration","Haurin, Donald","1988","The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing","Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal)","16(4), 396-410","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00463","Optimal stopping: atypical houses face higher offer variance, so sellers wait longer","empirical; failure-time model on resale houses","Marketing time rises with house atypicality (offer dispersion), confirming reservation-price search behaviour by sellers","WP19's idiosyncratic match-value dispersion plays the role of Haurin's offer variance; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness","Seller heterogeneity in holding costs ignored; no equilibrium tightness","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin1988duration.crossref.json)","B"77"springer1996motivation","Springer, Thomas M.","1996","Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","13(3), 237-254","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00217393","Motivated/relocated/foreclosed/vacant sellers accept lower prices; list price is the main selling instrument","empirical; hedonic price and marketing-time equations (Arlington, Texas 1991-1993)","Eager/motivated, relocated, vacant and foreclosure sellers sell at lower prices; only foreclosures sell faster; lower list price speeds sale at the cost of price","Supports WP19's prediction that urgency lowers transaction price; mixed evidence on hazard is a caution for the hazard-urgency prediction","Motivation flags from listing remarks; endogeneity of TOM and price not fully addressed","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_springer1996motivation.crossref.json)","B"78"anglin2003tradeoff","Anglin, Paul M. and Rutherford, Ronald and Springer, Thomas M.","2003","The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","26(1), 95-111","https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021526332732","Higher list price (degree of overpricing) lengthens expected TOM; buyers infer information from price","empirical; hazard model of TOM with withdrawn listings (Arlington, Texas)","Higher list-price premium raises expected TOM, more strongly where list prices have low predicted variance; withdrawn homes have higher, more variable list prices","Price-TOM tradeoff is WP19's core comparative static; withdrawal selection matches WP19's listing-withdrawal margin","Reduced-form; no structural mapping to reservation prices or urgency","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2003tradeoff.crossref.json)","B"79"haurin2010listprices","Haurin, Donald R. and Haurin, Jessica L. and Nadauld, Taylor and Sanders, Anthony","2010","List Prices, Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets","Real Estate Economics","38(4), 659-685","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00279.x","List price trades off slower offer arrival against higher maximal offer; set jointly with reservation price","theory + empirical; numerical comparative statics and Columbus, Ohio data","Greater dispersion of buyer offers raises list-to-expected-sale ratio; atypical dwellings have higher list markups and longer TOM","WP19's posted-price robustness case; dispersion of match values driving markups and TOM","No seller urgency heterogeneity; no financing contingency","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin2010listprices.crossref.json)","B"80"genesove1997equity","Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher J.","1997","Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market","American Economic Review","87(3), 255-269","https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v87y1997i3p255-69.html","Down-payment constraint raises high-LTV sellers' reservation prices: higher asking price, longer TOM, higher price if sold","empirical; Boston condominiums, early 1990s; list price, TOM hazard and sale price regressions","Owners with high loan-to-value ratios set higher asking prices, have longer expected time on market and obtain higher prices conditional on sale","Opposite sign to urgency: equity constraints raise effective reservation values; WP19 should allow carrying-cost distribution to include 'patient/locked' sellers","Owner-occupants only; cannot separate liquidity constraints from loss aversion (addressed in 2001 paper)","high","IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_genesove1997equity.evidence.txt)","B"81"genesove2001lossaversion","Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher","2001","Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market","Quarterly Journal of Economics","116(4), 1233-1260","https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265561","Sellers facing nominal losses set higher asking prices, sell at higher prices and with much lower hazard","empirical; Boston condominiums 1990s; asking price, sale price and hazard regressions","Sellers facing a prospective nominal loss set asking prices roughly 25-35% of the loss higher, achieve higher prices and sell much less often per period; effect about twice as large for owner-occupants as investors","Behavioural source of reservation-price heterogeneity and price-volume comovement; WP19 is rational but can nest reference-dependent carrying costs","No equilibrium feedback; identification relies on purchase-price proxy for reference point","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_genesove2001lossaversion.crossref.json)","B"82"levitt2008agents","Levitt, Steven D. and Syverson, Chad","2008","Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions","Review of Economics and Statistics","90(4), 599-611","https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.90.4.599","Agent incentives push clients to accept early low offers; agents' own homes wait longer for better offers","empirical; MLS data, agent-owned vs client-owned homes with controls","Agent-owned homes sell for about 3.7% more and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer; distortion larger when information asymmetry is greater","Quantifies the price gain from a longer optimal stopping horizon, i.e. the slope of the TOM-price tradeoff at the margin","Agency friction rather than seller carrying cost; no tightness variation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_levitt2008agents.crossref.json)","B"83"hendel2009fsbo","Hendel, Igal and Nevo, Aviv and Ortalo-Magné, François","2009","The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com","American Economic Review","99(5), 1878-1898","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1878","Platform choice sorts patient sellers to FSBO; buyer arrival rate differs across platforms","empirical; Madison, Wisconsin FSBO vs MLS sales, prices, TOM, sale probability","FSBO pre-commission prices are no lower, but FSBO has longer time to sell and lower probability of sale; patient sellers select into FSBO","Endogenous sorting by seller patience is exactly WP19's heterogeneous-urgency selection mechanism, here across platforms","Single market; network size effects not identified","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hendel2009fsbo.crossref.json)","B"84"knight2002listing","Knight, John R.","2002","Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects of Listing Price Changes","Real Estate Economics","30(2), 213-237","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00038","List-price revisions under demand uncertainty; initial overpricing is costly in time and money","empirical; probit for list-price changes plus price/TOM equations","Homes with high initial markups and vacant homes most likely to cut list price; large percentage list-price changes imply longer TOM and lower final prices","Supports WP19's reservation-price updating and vacancy (carrying cost) channel; stale-listing penalty","Missing revision data in most datasets; no equilibrium interpretation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_knight2002listing.crossref.json)","B"85"merlo2004bargaining","Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François","2004","Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England","Journal of Urban Economics","56(2), 192-216","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004","Full listing histories: list-price changes, offers, visits; strategic buyer-seller interaction","empirical; novel English transaction-history dataset; stylized facts","Documents timing and terms of agreement from listing to sale, every list-price change and offer; argues existing theories fit poorly and proposes a strategic framework","Micro facts on offers and revisions that WP19's bargaining-with-outside-option structure must match","Descriptive; no structural estimation of urgency or arrival rates","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_merlo2004bargaining.crossref.json)","B"86"carrillo2013heat","Carrillo, Paul E.","2013","To Sell or Not to Sell: Measuring the Heat of the Housing Market","Real Estate Economics","41(2), 310-346","https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12003","Seller bargaining power index from structural home-seller search model combining list price, sale price and TOM","structural; Washington DC transactions; mapping from hedonic/TOM reduced forms to structural parameters","Index of seller bargaining power tracks up- and downturns in appreciation and popular perceptions of market 'heat'","Shows WP19's objects (bargaining power, sale probability) are identifiable from listings data; WP19 adds urgency heterogeneity and financing","Homogeneous sellers; partial equilibrium","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2013heat.crossref.json)","B"87"carrillo2015tightness","Carrillo, Paul E. and de Wit, Eric R. and Larson, William","2015","Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands","Real Estate Economics","43(3), 609-651","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12082","Market tightness (sale probabilities, seller bargaining power) leads price appreciation","empirical; listings data, Netherlands and US regions; time-series forecasting","Current sale probabilities and bargaining-power index significantly reduce appreciation forecast errors and predict turning points","Supports WP19's claim that liquidity (hazard, tightness) moves before and separately from transaction prices","Reduced-form forecasting; no decomposition into selection vs bargaining","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2015tightness.crossref.json)","B"88"han2016askingprice","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2016","What is the role of the asking price for a house?","Journal of Urban Economics","93, 115-130","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.008","Asking price directs buyer search without being a ceiling or commitment","theory + empirical; survey data on buyer search and sale-at-list incidence","Mass of sales exactly at asking price; asking price steers buyer visits, more so for atypical houses and in weak-demand markets","Informs WP19's posted-price robustness: list price as a directing device rather than a ceiling","No welfare or urgency analysis","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2016askingprice.crossref.json)","B"89"han2014biddingwars","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2014","Bidding Wars for Houses","Real Estate Economics","42(1), 1-32","https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12015","Above-list sales as a measure of tightness; list price not a ceiling in hot markets","empirical; time-series and cross-section of sales above list price","Bidding wars rose from a stable 3-4% of transactions to over 30% in some markets by 2005, fell in the bust but remained about twice historical levels","Regime where WP19's buyer-side competition dominates; tightness changes bargaining split","Descriptive; mechanism not structurally identified","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2014biddingwars.crossref.json)","B"90"jud1996brokerage","Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G. and Winkler, Daniel T.","1996","Time on the Market: The Impact of Residential Brokerage","Journal of Real Estate Research","12(3), 447-458","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1996.12090852","Duration model of TOM with brokerage, pricing strategy and duration dependence","empirical; duration model on MLS data","Positive duration dependence (sale probability rises with TOM); pricing-related strategies strongly affect TOM; agent/firm characteristics insignificant","Positive duration dependence contrasts with WP19's heterogeneity-induced negative dependence; useful discipline on the mixing distribution","No correction for unobserved heterogeneity; no price outcome","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1996brokerage.crossref.json)","B"91"huang2001withdrawal","Huang, Ju-Chin and Palmquist, Raymond B.","2001","Environmental Conditions, Reservation Prices, and Time on the Market for Housing","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","22(2-3), 203-219","https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007891430162","Joint estimation of seller reservation price and marketing duration; reservation price declines with elapsed time","empirical; structural duration/reservation-price estimator applied to highway noise","Noise lowers reservation and predicted sale prices but not TOM significantly; longer TOM is associated with lower reservation prices (sellers revise down)","Provides an estimator of the reservation price WP19 models; downward revision consistent with learning or rising carrying cost","Withdrawals treated as censoring; no urgency heterogeneity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_huang2001withdrawal.crossref.json)","B"92"campbell2011forced","Campbell, John Y. and Giglio, Stefano and Pathak, Parag","2011","Forced Sales and House Prices","American Economic Review","101(5), 2108-2131","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.2108","Forced sales (foreclosure, death, bankruptcy) sell at discounts; nearby foreclosures depress prices","empirical; all Massachusetts transactions over 20 years; hedonic with forced-sale indicators and spatial spillovers","Foreclosure discount averages about 27% of house value; a foreclosure within 0.05 miles lowers a house's price by about 1%; death and bankruptcy sales also discounted","Canonical magnitude for WP19's urgency-driven discount; WP19 explains why discount exceeds pure selection via bargaining under high carrying cost","Cannot fully separate quality deterioration from liquidity discount; no TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_campbell2011forced.crossref.json)","B"93"mayer1998auctions","Mayer, Christopher J.","1998","Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions","Real Estate Economics","26(1), 41-66","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00737","Auction trades immediate sale against expected waiting in a search market; discount larger in downturns","empirical; repeat-sales comparison of auction vs negotiated sales, Los Angeles and Dallas","Auction discounts 0-9% in the 1980s Los Angeles boom vs 9-21% in Dallas after the oil bust; consistent with discount rising when expected TOM is long","Cleanest early estimate of the price of immediacy and its dependence on market liquidity, central to WP19's state-dependent discount","Auctioned properties may differ in unobservables despite repeat-sales control","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mayer1998auctions.crossref.json)","B"94"harding2009contagion","Harding, John P. and Rosenblatt, Eric and Yao, Vincent W.","2009","The contagion effect of foreclosed properties","Journal of Urban Economics","66(3), 164-178","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2009.07.003","Nearby foreclosures lower sale prices via visual externality/neglect, growing through the distress process","empirical; repeat-sales with local trend and distance rings","Peak contagion discount roughly 1% per nearby foreclosed property, decaying quickly with distance, growing from distress onset to foreclosure sale then levelling off","Externality channel distinct from WP19's competition/selection channel; WP19 abstracts from neighbourhood spillovers","Cannot cleanly separate supply competition from disamenity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2009contagion.crossref.json)","B"95"anenberg2014foreclosures","Anenberg, Elliot and Kung, Edward","2014","Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures","American Economic Review","104(8), 2527-2551","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2527","REO listings depress nearby prices through competition (supply) and, in dense low-price areas, disamenity","empirical; weekly listings data; timing of seller response to new REO listings","Sellers respond in the exact week an REO is listed; competition effects matter everywhere, disamenity only in high-density low-price neighbourhoods","Competition from urgent (REO) sellers lowering prices of non-urgent sellers is a market-level implication WP19 can generate through tightness","Local partial-equilibrium; no hazard estimates","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2014foreclosures.crossref.json)","B"96"mian2015foreclosures","Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir and Trebbi, Francesco","2015","Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy","Journal of Finance","70(6), 2587-2634","https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12310","Judicial-foreclosure laws as instrument: forced sales cause price declines and real effects","empirical; state-border discontinuity, IV, 2007-2013","Nonjudicial states were twice as likely to foreclose in 2007-2009; foreclosures caused large declines in house prices, residential investment and consumer demand","Macro-level evidence that an increase in the mass of urgent sellers moves prices without a fundamentals change, as in WP19's liquidity-shock proposition","Aggregate; no micro TOM or discount decomposition","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mian2015foreclosures.crossref.json)","B"97"penningtoncross2006reo","Pennington-Cross, Anthony","2006","The Value of Foreclosed Property","Journal of Real Estate Research","28(2), 193-214","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2006.12091177","REO properties appreciate less than their metro area; gap depends on loan traits, legal regime, market conditions and marketing time","empirical; loan-level REO sales vs metro appreciation","Foreclosed properties appreciate below the area average; the gap varies with legal restrictions, housing-market conditions and marketing time","State-dependence of the forced-sale discount matches WP19's prediction that the liquidity discount widens in slow markets","Magnitudes depend on specification; condition of property unobserved","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_penningtoncross2006reo.crossref.json)","B"98"clauretie2009foreclosure","Clauretie, Terrence M. and Daneshvary, Nasser","2009","Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time","Real Estate Economics","37(1), 43-67","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00234.x","Foreclosure discount overstated when property condition and endogenous TOM are ignored","empirical; spatial hedonic with endogenous marketing time (Las Vegas)","Previous >20% foreclosure discounts are about one-third too high once condition, TOM-price relationship and spatial dependence are controlled","Highlights WP19's identification point: part of the observed discount is quality/selection, part is a genuine liquidity (urgency) discount","Single market; condition proxies imperfect","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clauretie2009foreclosure.crossref.json)","B"99"andersen2017firesales","Andersen, Steffen and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner","2017","Fire Sales and House Prices: Evidence from Estate Sales Due to Sudden Death","Management Science","63(1), 201-212","https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2292","Exogenous forced sales (sudden death) isolate supply-side urgency from demand shocks","empirical; Danish registry natural experiment","Forced estate sales carry fire-sale discounts that increase with urgency, poor market conditions and seller financial constraints; fire sales occur without demand shocks","Closest causal evidence for WP19's urgency-discount interaction with market liquidity; demand held fixed","Danish institutional setting; discount magnitudes not reported in abstract","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andersen2017firesales.crossref.json)","B"100"asabere1992cash","Asabere, Paul K. and Huffman, Forrest E. and Mehdian, Seyed","1992","The Price Effects of Cash versus Mortgage Transactions","Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal)","20(1), 141-154","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00576","All-cash transactions trade at a discount relative to typically financed sales","empirical; hedonic on comparable row homes","All-cash transactions associated with roughly a 13% price discount relative to market-typical financing","Earliest cash-discount magnitude; WP19 predicts a smaller equilibrium discount unless urgency is high, so the 13% invites a selection interpretation","Small, dated sample; buyer/seller selection uncontrolled","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_asabere1992cash.crossref.json)","B"101"jauregui2019fundingprice","Jauregui, Andres and Tidwell, Alan and Sah, Vivek","2019","Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating and Allocating House Transaction Funding Price Differentials","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","58(3), 366-407","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-018-9661-4","Price differentials across cash, conventional, FHA and VA funding reflect selection plus a financing premium","empirical; sample-selection and spatial corrections, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition","Selection and spatial bias detected; conventional sales have stronger characteristics than cash sales, FHA/VA weaker; unexplained component interpreted as a financing premium","Decomposition of observed cash differential into composition vs premium parallels WP19's selection-vs-bargaining decomposition","Magnitudes not in abstract; no time-to-close data","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jauregui2019fundingprice.crossref.json)","B"102"aroul2023cashdiscount","Aroul, Ramya R. and Hansz, J. Andrew","2023","The impact of cash financing on housing prices: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from a volatile United States market cycle","Journal of Property Research","40(1), 25-52","https://doi.org/10.1080/09599916.2022.2119878","Mortgage-contingency pricing effect measured as a cash discount that varies with market distress and property traits","theory + empirical; 12-year US cycle around 2008","Cash discounts are larger in distressed markets, at lower price levels and for smaller/poorer-condition improvements; no single rule of thumb","State-dependence of the cash discount is a WP19 prediction (discount widens as qualification risk and seller urgency rise)","No magnitudes in abstract; selection of cash buyers into distressed properties","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_aroul2023cashdiscount.crossref.json)","B"103"lin2025contingencies","Lin, Zhenguo and Seiler, Michael J. and Siebert, Ralph B. and Winkler, Daniel T.","2025","Selling price, time on the market, and contractual contingencies","Journal of Housing Economics","68, 102062","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102062","Contingency clauses lengthen TOM and reduce closing certainty; buyers compensate with price","empirical; Miami-Dade transactions (CESifo WP 9947 version: Gordon, Seiler, Siebert, Winkler 2022)","Contingency clauses relate to market conditions, TOM, list premiums and distressed sales; price premia range from -3.7% to +2.2% (-3.3% to +2.4% conditioning on TOM)","Direct evidence on WP19's contingency margin: contingent offers trade price for closing risk, sign depending on clause and market state","Clause types pooled in abstract; identification of contingency choice is endogenous","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_lin2025contingencies.crossref.json)","B"104"anenberg2019creditavailability","Anenberg, Elliot and Hizmo, Aurel and Kung, Edward and Molloy, Raven","2019","Measuring mortgage credit availability: A frontier estimation approach","Journal of Applied Econometrics","34(6), 865-882","https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2720","Loan frontier measures maximum obtainable mortgage; shifts in frontier proxy buyer qualification","empirical; stochastic frontier on originations 2001-2014","Credit expanded for all borrowers in the boom and contracted most for low-score borrowers; frontier variation across metros shows borrowing constraints mattered for the cycle","Provides an empirical counterpart to WP19's qualification probability phi and its cross-market variation","Frontier is an upper bound; approval delays and failures not measured","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2019creditavailability.crossref.json)","B"105"bhutta2021insurance","Bhutta, Neil and Ringo, Daniel","2021","The effect of interest rates on home buying: Evidence from a shock to mortgage insurance premiums","Journal of Monetary Economics","118, 195-211","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.10.001","Binding DTI thresholds make buyer qualification sensitive to small rate changes (extensive margin)","empirical; regression discontinuity around FHA premium cut","A surprise 50bp effective rate cut raised home buying among FHA-reliant households by 14% immediately, via DTI qualification thresholds","Quantifies how qualification (phi) responds to financing conditions, the input to WP19's buyer-arrival shock","Effect on prices and TOM not the focus","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bhutta2021insurance.crossref.json)","B"106"fuster2019technology","Fuster, Andreas and Plosser, Matthew and Schnabl, Philipp and Vickery, James","2019","The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending","Review of Financial Studies","32(5), 1854-1899","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz018","Technology shortens mortgage processing time without raising defaults","empirical; loan-level application and origination data 2010-2016","FinTech lenders grew from 2% to 8% of lending and process applications about 20% faster with no higher defaults; more elastic supply to demand shocks","Approval delay is a structural parameter in WP19's financing contingency; this gives its empirical scale and variability","Refinance-heavy; purchase-closing failures not studied","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fuster2019technology.crossref.json)","B"107"defusco2020leverage","DeFusco, Anthony A. and Johnson, Stephanie and Mondragon, John","2020","Regulating Household Leverage","Review of Economic Studies","87(2), 914-958","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz040","Leverage regulation removes marginal borrowers (quantity) more than it raises price","empirical; discontinuity in Ability-to-Repay rule","Rates on affected loans rose 10-15bp but 15% of the affected market was eliminated and leverage reduced for another 20%; lenders exited the regulated segment","Credit tightening as a qualification shock reducing effective buyer arrival, a key WP19 counterfactual","Housing-market price/TOM consequences not traced","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_defusco2020leverage.crossref.json)","B"108"allen2019searchfrictions","Allen, Jason and Clark, Robert and Houde, Jean-François","2019","Search Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated-Price Markets","Journal of Political Economy","127(4), 1550-1598","https://doi.org/10.1086/701684","Search and negotiation frictions in the Canadian mortgage market generate dispersion and market power","structural; Canadian insured-mortgage contract data; search-and-bargaining model","Frictions cost about $12/month/consumer (50% search costs, 28% price discrimination, 22% inefficient matching); large banks' margins about 70% higher","Only verified Canadian structural evidence on housing-finance search frictions; shows the financing side itself is a negotiated search market","Mortgage pricing, not house transactions or TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_allen2019searchfrictions.crossref.json)","B"109"buchak2026ibuyers","Buchak, Greg and Matvos, Gregor and Piskorski, Tomasz and Seru, Amit","2026","Why Is Intermediating Houses So Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers","Journal of Political Economy","forthcoming (NBER WP 28252, 2020, rev. 2025)","https://doi.org/10.1086/742710","Dealers supply immediacy; speed trades off against valuation accuracy and adverse selection","empirical + structural search model with adverse selection; iBuyer transactions","iBuyers sell quickly and earn about a 5% spread; they intermediate only in liquid, easy-to-value markets; low underlying liquidity exacerbates adverse selection","Market price of immediacy (spread) is a benchmark for WP19's liquidity discount; adverse selection is a channel WP19 abstracts from","Recent, narrow set of markets","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_buchak2026ibuyers.crossref.json)","B"110"gatzlaff1997selection","Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.","1997","Sample Selection Bias and Repeat-Sales Index Estimates","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","14(1-2), 33-50","https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007763816289","Homes that sell are a nonrandom sample; repeat-sales index bias correlated with economic conditions","empirical; censored-sample correction of repeat-sales index, Dade County FL","Index built from homes selling more than once is biased, and the bias is strongly correlated with changes in economic conditions","Empirical basis for WP19's proposition that transaction indices mix liquidity-driven selection with value changes","Selection equation relies on observables; no link to seller urgency","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1997selection.crossref.json)","B"111"gatzlaff1998selection","Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.","1998","Sample Selection and Biases in Local House Value Indices","Journal of Urban Economics","43(2), 199-222","https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1997.2045","Selection into sale biases hedonic local value indices; bias varies with market state","empirical; selection-corrected hedonic indices [abstract not retrievable]","Extends selection correction to local hedonic indices; selection bias varies systematically with local economic conditions [details unconfirmed]","Same identification problem as WP19's index-selection proposition at the local-market level","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1998selection.crossref.json)","B"112"hwang2004selectivity","Hwang, Min and Quigley, John M.","2004","Selectivity, Quality Adjustment and Mean Reversion in the Measurement of House Values","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","28(2-3), 161-178","https://doi.org/10.1023/b:real.0000011152.40485.12","Joint model of sale selection, quality change and mean reversion in individual house prices","empirical; all sales in Sweden's largest metro 1982-1999 vs repeat-sales","Repeat-sales method yields systematically biased estimates of the value of the housing stock once selectivity and quality change are modelled","Supports WP19's distinction between index movements and fundamental value when sale selection is endogenous","Selection not linked to seller motives or liquidity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hwang2004selectivity.crossref.json)","B"113"goetzmann2006reservation","Goetzmann, William and Peng, Liang","2006","Estimating House Price Indexes in the Presence of Seller Reservation Prices","Review of Economics and Statistics","88(1), 100-112","https://doi.org/10.1162/003465306775565783","Reservation-price-to-value ratio drives both volume and selection bias in transaction indices","theory + econometric correction; simulations and Los Angeles repeat sales","Falling volume biases index returns upward and rising volume biases them downward; reserve-conditional unbiased index differs substantially from standard repeat-sales","Formalises exactly WP19's selection proposition: with heterogeneous reservation prices, observed prices are a truncated sample tied to volume","Reservation prices exogenous; no search/bargaining microfoundation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_goetzmann2006reservation.crossref.json)","B"114"jud1994selection","Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G.","1994","Sample Selection Bias in Estimating Housing Sales Prices","Journal of Real Estate Research","9(3), 289-298","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1994.12090753","Appreciation estimates from sold homes suffer Heckman-type selection","empirical; Heckman two-step on sold vs all houses","Housing sample-selection problem is statistically significant for appreciation estimates","Early confirmation of the selection problem WP19 models","Direction and magnitude of bias not reported in abstract","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1994selection.crossref.json)","B"115"case1989efficiency","Case, Karl E. and Shiller, Robert J.","1989","The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes","American Economic Review","79(1), 125-137","https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v79y1989i1p125-37.html","Repeat-sales indices reveal positive serial correlation inconsistent with efficiency","empirical; weighted repeat-sales on 39,210 homes in four cities 1970-1986","Market does not appear efficient: annual price changes are followed by same-direction changes; individual house price changes largely unforecastable","Momentum benchmark; WP19 argues part of index persistence can arise from slow-moving liquidity and sale selection","No volume or liquidity in the test","high","IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_case1989efficiency.evidence.txt)","B"116"bailey1963repeatsales","Bailey, Martin J. and Muth, Richard F. and Nourse, Hugh O.","1963","A Regression Method for Real Estate Price Index Construction","Journal of the American Statistical Association","58(304), 933-942","https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10480679","Repeat-sales regression as a constant-quality price index","econometric method","Introduces the repeat-sales regression index later generalised by Case-Shiller","Baseline index whose selection properties WP19 characterises","Assumes sales are random draws from the stock","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bailey1963repeatsales.crossref.json)","B"117"clapp1992assessed","Clapp, John M. and Giaccotto, Carmelo","1992","Estimating Price Indices for Residential Property: A Comparison of Repeat Sales and Assessed Value Methods","Journal of the American Statistical Association","87(418), 300-306","https://doi.org/10.2307/2290260","Assessed-value method uses the full stock, mitigating repeat-sales selection","econometric method + empirical comparison","Assessed-value index avoids the small, possibly unrepresentative repeat-sales sample and compares favourably","Alternative index design that WP19 can use as a less selection-prone benchmark","Assessment quality varies across jurisdictions","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clapp1992assessed.crossref.json)","B"118"harding2003bargainingpower","Harding, John P. and Rosenthal, Stuart S. and Sirmans, C. F.","2003","Estimating Bargaining Power in the Market for Existing Homes","Review of Economics and Statistics","85(1), 178-188","https://doi.org/10.1162/003465303762687794","Buyer and seller characteristics shift bargaining power within hedonic prices","empirical; American Housing Survey with both parties' traits","Wealth, gender and demographics affect bargaining power; bargaining variation tied to school-age children explains seasonal anomalies in quality-adjusted indices","Empirical identification of the Nash bargaining weight WP19 treats as a parameter; shows it varies across parties and seasons","Cross-section; no urgency or TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingpower.crossref.json)","B"119"harding2003bargainingeffects","Harding, John P. and Knight, John R. and Sirmans, C. F.","2003","Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market","Real Estate Economics","31(4), 601-622","https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1080-8620.2003.00078.x","Vacancy weakens seller bargaining power, shifting the hedonic constant and attribute prices","empirical; hedonic with vacant-at-sale indicator across markets","Vacant (weak-bargaining) sellers receive lower prices; bargaining alters attribute shadow prices without a consistent cross-market pattern","Vacancy = high carrying cost in WP19; confirms urgency lowers negotiated price","Vacancy may also proxy quality/condition","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingeffects.crossref.json)","B"120"kurlat2015asymmetries","Kurlat, Pablo and Stroebel, Johannes","2015","Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets","Review of Financial Studies","28(8), 2429-2461","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv028","Better-informed sellers (about neighbourhood) sell ahead of price declines","empirical; seller-pool composition and subsequent price changes","When the seller pool shifts toward better-informed and high-supply-elasticity sellers, prices subsequently fall; stronger for neighbourhood-exposed houses","Adverse-selection explanation of volume-price dynamics that WP19 rules out by assumption; useful for the novelty audit","Information not directly observed","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_kurlat2015asymmetries.crossref.json)","B"121"garmaise2004asymmetries","Garmaise, Mark J. and Moskowitz, Tobias J.","2004","Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real Estate Markets","Review of Financial Studies","17(2), 405-437","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg037","Asymmetric information measured by assessment quality shapes who trades and how","empirical; US commercial real estate","Strong evidence information considerations matter: buyers favour nearby properties and long income histories, avoid informed brokers; financing-choice evidence weak","Information asymmetry is a competing friction; WP19 isolates search/urgency with symmetric information","Commercial, not residential","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_garmaise2004asymmetries.crossref.json)","B"122"cheng2013liquidityrisk","Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2013","Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets","Financial Review","48(4), 671-696","https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12020","Uncertain marketing period adds liquidity risk to ex ante returns of private assets","analytical + empirical calibration on commercial real estate","Liquidity risk is too large to ignore, especially in down markets","Return-based framing of the liquidity premium that WP19 derives at the transaction level","Assumes exogenous TOM distribution","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_cheng2013liquidityrisk.crossref.json)","B"123"fisher2007tbi","Fisher, Jeff and Geltner, David and Pollakowski, Henry","2007","A Quarterly Transactions-based Index of Institutional Real Estate Investment Performance and Movements in Supply and Demand","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","34(1), 5-33","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9001-6","Transaction-based index with separate supply-side and demand-side (constant-liquidity) indices","econometric index construction; NCREIF, assessed-value hedonic","Produces variable-liquidity, demand-side (constant-liquidity) and supply-side quarterly indices from transaction prices, avoiding appraisal smoothing","Shows how buyer- and seller-side reservation movements can be separately tracked, as WP19's model implies","Institutional commercial assets","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fisher2007tbi.crossref.json)","B"124"clayton2008liquidity","Clayton, Jim and MacKinnon, Greg and Peng, Liang","2008","Time Variation of Liquidity in the Private Real Estate Market: An Empirical Investigation","Journal of Real Estate Research","30(2), 125-160","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2008.12091217","Time-varying liquidity from noisy signals, option value of waiting, or sentiment","empirical; tests of competing explanations on private real estate","Results broadly consistent with rational updating and support the opportunity-cost-of-waiting (option value) explanation of liquidity variation","Supports WP19's waiting-option microfoundation for countercyclical illiquidity","Commercial; aggregate liquidity measures","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2008liquidity.crossref.json)","B"125"clayton2010pricevolume","Clayton, Jim and Miller, Norman and Peng, Liang","2010","Price-volume Correlation in the Housing Market: Causality and Co-movements","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","40(1), 14-40","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-008-9128-0","Prices and volume jointly endogenous; asymmetric causality and common shocks","empirical; panel VAR/Granger tests, 114 US MSAs 1990-2002","Price declines reduce volume but increases do not; volume Granger-causes prices only in inelastic-supply markets; correlation mostly co-movement from common shocks","WP19's liquidity shock generates common movement of price and volume without a fundamental shock, consistent with co-movement dominance","Reduced-form; no TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2010pricevolume.crossref.json)","B"126"berkovec1996turnover","Berkovec, James A. and Goodman, John L.","1996","Turnover as a Measure of Demand for Existing Homes","Real Estate Economics","24(4), 421-440","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00698","Search model: demand shocks move turnover before prices","theory + empirical; aggregate turnover and demand indicators","Positive correlation between changes in turnover and housing demand; at high frequency turnover is a better demand indicator than price","Same ordering as WP19's dynamics: hazard/volume respond first, prices adjust through bargaining and selection","No seller heterogeneity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_berkovec1996turnover.crossref.json)","B"127"hort2000turnover","Hort, Katinka","2000","Prices and turnover in the market for owner-occupied homes","Regional Science and Urban Economics","30(1), 99-119","https://doi.org/10.1016/s0166-0462(99)00028-9","Price-turnover comovement in a search framework with sluggish reservation prices","empirical; Swedish regional data [abstract not retrievable]","Documents positive price-turnover relationship in Sweden with turnover responding ahead of prices [details unconfirmed]","Non-US evidence on the volume-price fact WP19 targets","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hort2000turnover.crossref.json)","B"128"andrew2003transactions","Andrew, Mark and Meen, Geoffrey","2003","House Price Appreciation, Transactions and Structural Change in the British Housing Market: A Macroeconomic Perspective","Real Estate Economics","31(1), 99-116","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1080-8620.2003.00059.x","Aggregate price-transactions relationship with structural break","empirical; British aggregate time series","Strong price-transactions relationship in Britain that changed in the 1990s, with transactions becoming much lower","Reminds that the volume-price mapping is regime-dependent, as WP19's tightness feedback implies","Macro; no micro liquidity measures","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andrew2003transactions.crossref.json)","B"129"leamer2007businesscycle","Leamer, Edward E.","2007","Housing IS the Business Cycle","NBER Working Paper 13428 (also Proceedings, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 149-233)","NBER WP 13428","https://doi.org/10.3386/w13428","Housing volumes (residential investment) lead recessions; volume adjusts before prices","descriptive macro; postwar US cycles","Residential investment is the best early warning of recession; eight postwar recessions were preceded by housing/durables problems","Macro motivation for a volume-first liquidity channel; WP19 provides the microstructure","No formal liquidity model","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_leamer2007businesscycle.crossref.json)","B"130"dachis2012transfertax","Dachis, Ben and Duranton, Gilles and Turner, Matthew A.","2012","The effects of land transfer taxes on real estate markets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto","Journal of Economic Geography","12(2), 327-354","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbr007","Transaction tax raises trading cost, reduces volume and lowers prices","empirical; Toronto land transfer tax natural experiment 2008","A 1.1% transfer tax reduced sales by about 15% and lowered prices by roughly the tax; welfare loss about $1 per $8 raised","Only verified Canadian evidence on how a transaction cost shifts volume and prices, useful for WP19's transaction-cost calibration","No TOM or seller heterogeneity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_dachis2012transfertax.crossref.json)","B"131"carrillo2012potatoes","Carrillo, Paul E. and Pope, Jaren C.","2012","Are homes hot or cold potatoes? The distribution of marketing time in the housing market","Regional Science and Urban Economics","42(1-2), 189-197","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.08.010","Shape of the marketing-time distribution: quick 'hot' sales vs long 'cold' spells","empirical; MLS listings [abstract not retrievable]","Characterises the empirical distribution of marketing time and its heterogeneity across homes and market states [details unconfirmed]","WP19 derives the TOM distribution as a mixture over urgency types; this paper is the natural empirical target","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2012potatoes.crossref.json)","B"132"benefield2015measurement","Benefield, Justin D. and Hardin, William G.","2015","Does Time-on-Market Measurement Matter?","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","50(1), 52-73","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9450-z","TOM definitions and relisting treatment change estimated TOM relationships","empirical; five TOM measures in one MLS, relisting in another","Choice of TOM definition and treatment of relisted properties substantially change model results and significance; much TOM literature needs re-evaluation","Relisting/withdrawal is WP19's withdrawal margin; measurement of observed hazards must account for it","No structural interpretation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_benefield2015measurement.crossref.json)","B"133"anglin2006liquidity","Anglin, Paul M.","2006","Value and liquidity under changing market conditions","Journal of Housing Economics","15(4), 293-304","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2006.10.003","Joint response of price and liquidity (TOM, sale probability) to changing market conditions","empirical [abstract not retrievable]","Studies how value and liquidity of listed homes co-move as market conditions change [details unconfirmed]","Same price-liquidity duality as WP19's discount-hazard pair","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2006liquidity.crossref.json)","B"134