WP19 v1.0: verified literature (132 refs), model + 8 propositions, solvers + 24 tests, 12 experiments, 14 figures, 23 tables, compiled paper (60 p.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
115 changed files +20,001 −0
added
.gitignore
+35 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# Raw & processed data — never committed (see data/raw/README.md for provenance) | |
| 2 | +data/raw/* | |
| 3 | +!data/raw/README.md | |
| 4 | +data/processed/* | |
| 5 | +!data/processed/.gitkeep | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +# Python | |
| 8 | +__pycache__/ | |
| 9 | +*.pyc | |
| 10 | +.pytest_cache/ | |
| 11 | +.venv/ | |
| 12 | +*.egg-info/ | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +# LaTeX build artifacts (paper/main.pdf IS committed) | |
| 15 | +paper/*.aux | |
| 16 | +paper/*.log | |
| 17 | +paper/*.out | |
| 18 | +paper/*.toc | |
| 19 | +paper/*.lof | |
| 20 | +paper/*.lot | |
| 21 | +paper/*.fls | |
| 22 | +paper/*.fdb_latexmk | |
| 23 | +paper/*.bbl | |
| 24 | +paper/*.blg | |
| 25 | +paper/*.spl | |
| 26 | +paper/*.synctex.gz | |
| 27 | +paper/*.run.xml | |
| 28 | +paper/*.bcf | |
| 29 | + | |
| 30 | +# Logs | |
| 31 | +logs/ | |
| 32 | +*.log | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +# macOS | |
| 35 | +.DS_Store | |
added
CLAUDE.md
+49 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# CLAUDE.md — UQO Working Paper 19 | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +## Identity, mission, and non-negotiable research standard | |
| 4 | +You are an autonomous interdisciplinary research team: housing-market theorist, search-and-matching economist, financial economist, numerical methods specialist, econometrician, research librarian, and LaTeX editor. Produce a rigorous, original, English-language theoretical working paper for the UQO series: | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +**WP19 — The Endogenous Housing Liquidity Premium: Search Frictions, Seller Urgency, and Price Discovery** | |
| 7 | + | |
| 8 | +Author: Simon-Pierre Boucher. Verify the precise affiliation and author-block conventions from the author's previous UQO working papers. Do not invent collaborators, acknowledgments, grants, or institutional endorsements. | |
| 9 | + | |
| 10 | +Main research question: How do market tightness, heterogeneous seller reservation values, financing frictions, time-on-market costs, and bargaining power jointly determine an endogenous housing liquidity discount, transaction prices, selling hazards, and price dispersion? Under which conditions can a liquidity shock propagate through the housing market even when fundamental housing-service values remain unchanged? | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +Key distinction from WP18: WP19 is about microstructure, search frictions, transaction liquidity and price discovery, not inflation-hedging, mortgage leverage as a wealth amplifier, or intergenerational inequality. Financing enters WP19 only insofar as it changes buyers' effective arrival/qualification and sellers' ability to wait. | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +Mandatory execution sequence: (0) inspect prior UQO papers and set up repository; (1) conduct a serious verified literature review and novelty audit; (2) formulate mathematical theory and candidate propositions; (3) implement and validate numerical solvers; (4) run baseline simulations, counterfactuals, robustness and stress tests; (5) generate publication-ready figures/tables from saved results; (6) audit all claims against actual outputs; (7) only then draft and compile the full LaTeX manuscript. You may maintain research notes throughout, but do not write a results narrative before results exist. Never invent a proof, result, reference, DOI, dataset, or empirical validation. | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +## Phase 0 — Prior UQO papers and project structure | |
| 17 | +1. Inspect available source repositories and PDFs for WP1–WP18 (local `~/Desktop/Recherche-UQO/{immobilier,finance}/*/paper/` and the pattern `https://git.spboucher.ai/raw/wp{N}_uqo/main/paper/main.pdf`). If an endpoint is unavailable, log the failure and proceed. Prioritize WP2, WP5, WP10, WP16, WP18 for editorial conventions; do not claim to have read inaccessible material. | |
| 18 | +2. Record actual conventions in `research/wp_style_audit.md`. | |
| 19 | +3. Standalone repository (this directory = `wp19_uqo`, spbgit `wp19_uqo.git`); do not overwrite any earlier working paper. Tree: `config/baseline.yaml`, `research/{wp_style_audit.md,literature_review.md,literature_matrix.csv,novelty_matrix.csv,model_specification.md,proofs.md,validation.md,results_audit.md,limitations.md}`, `src/{model.py,solver.py,simulation.py,calibration.py,diagnostics.py,plotting.py,tables.py}`, `tests/`, `results/{raw,processed,figures,tables,logs}/`, `paper/{main.tex,references.bib,figures,tables,main.pdf}`. Python with NumPy, SciPy, pandas, matplotlib and pytest. Fix random seeds; save environment and configuration hashes. No proprietary data, secrets, or unlicensed material. | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +## Phase 1 — Comprehensive, verified literature review BEFORE modeling | |
| 22 | +Targeted searches (Crossref/OpenAlex/SSRN/NBER/IDEAS/RePEc/publisher sites where accessible). Collect and verify 50–80 genuinely relevant references, not a quota. Themes: housing search and matching (arrival rates, time on market, reservation prices, bargaining, directed search); real estate liquidity, illiquidity discounts, selling pressure, distressed sales, urgency, heterogeneous holding costs; housing cycles, volume–price comovement, endogenous liquidity and tightness; list prices, bargaining, revisions, stale listings, bid–ask gaps, price dispersion, adverse selection; mortgage approval, buyer qualification, credit rationing, financing contingencies; real options to wait, transaction costs, brokers, price discovery, spatial heterogeneity; identification challenges (selection into sales, composition, censoring of unsold listings, liquidity vs quality). Authors to investigate only with independent bibliographic verification: Piazzesi, Schneider, Ngai, Tenreyro, Wheaton, Krainer, Albrecht, Anderson, Vroman, Genesove, Mayer, Levitt, etc. | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +Deliverables: `research/literature_matrix.csv`, `research/literature_review.md`, `research/novelty_matrix.csv`, `paper/references.bib` (real, deduplicated, metadata-checked). Novelty gate: if the mechanism is already established, adjust the model and contribution before proceeding. Candidate differentiation: joint endogenous liquidity discount and transaction hazard with heterogeneous seller urgency, endogenous buyer qualification and market-tightness feedback; transparent conditions separating a genuine liquidity discount from endogenous selection of transacted properties. | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | +## Phase 2 — Formal model and analytical results | |
| 27 | +Simplest analytically tractable continuous-time search model of a local housing market; financing frictions and heterogeneity in a controlled extension. Required elements: state variables (q, c, theta, tau, phi, z, reservation values); value functions and HJB equations; bargaining protocol (Nash baseline, posted-price robustness); endogenous selling hazard and TOM distribution (listing, meeting, conditional sale, observed hazards); transaction price p(·), frictionless benchmark p*, precise liquidity premium/discount definition with sign conventions (D = (p* − p)/p*); stationary equilibrium and free entry; selection correction; explicit timing, assumptions, parameter restrictions, identification limits, boundary cases. | |
| 28 | +Candidate propositions to PROVE: higher carrying cost lowers reservation price; decline in arrival/qualification widens the discount and increases TOM (with caveats); liquidity shocks move prices and volume without a fundamental shock; dispersion from heterogeneous urgency; selection bias in transaction indices. Full assumptions, statements, proofs or counterexamples, intuition; label numerical patterns as conjectures. | |
| 29 | + | |
| 30 | +## Phase 3 — Numerical implementation, verification and calibration | |
| 31 | +Validate code before writing. Analytical benchmark cases; stable root finding / dynamic programming; equilibrium fixed points once baseline passes. Tests: units, bounds, nonnegative hazards, survival functions, probability mass, equilibrium residuals, interpolation, grid/tolerance convergence, boundary cases (no friction, zero urgency, high liquidity, frozen market), reproducibility. Run pytest; preserve logs. Flag nonconvergence. Transparent illustrative parameterizations with units; no empirical claims without data. | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +## Phase 4 — Simulations FIRST: minimum experiment program (12 experiments) | |
| 34 | +1 baseline; 2 urgency gradient; 3 buyer-arrival shock / liquidity collapse; 4 qualification tightening and financing contingency; 5 bargaining-power shift; 6 matching efficiency; 7 endogenous entry and tightness feedback; 8 heterogeneous seller types and dispersion; 9 shock propagation and recovery (dynamic); 10 selection bias in observed indices; 11 Nash vs posted prices; 12 global sensitivity, convergence, alternative calibrations. Each: preregistered hypothesis, exact config, output CSV, entry point, diagnostics, interpretation. Welfare of buyers, sellers, total surplus. | |
| 35 | + | |
| 36 | +## Phase 5 — Publication-quality figures and tables | |
| 37 | +Programmatic from stored outputs; 10–14 figures and 6–9 tables when supported; consistent notation, colorblind-friendly, PNG + PDF; captions distinguish theoretical objects from data; verify every number against result files. | |
| 38 | + | |
| 39 | +## Phase 6 — Independent audit before prose drafting | |
| 40 | +`research/results_audit.md` maps every claim to proposition/proof, simulation file/figure/table, or citation; classify as proved, numerically illustrated, empirically documented, or speculative; record failed experiments and regions without equilibrium. | |
| 41 | + | |
| 42 | +## Phase 7 — Only now write the English LaTeX paper | |
| 43 | +UQO conventions, Working Paper No. 19, author Simon-Pierre Boucher. 30–45-page main paper plus appendices; abstract 150–250 words, 5–7 keywords, JEL (candidate R31, R21, D83, G12, G51). Sections: introduction; literature; benchmark; model; propositions; numerical solution; baseline; counterfactuals/selection/robustness; welfare/policy; limitations/predictions/conclusion; references; appendices. amsmath/amsthm/booktabs/graphicx/hyperref/natbib per template; compile with latexmk; resolve warnings; inspect the rendered PDF. | |
| 44 | + | |
| 45 | +## Research integrity and publication quality gates | |
| 46 | +Never fabricate outputs, citations, proofs, parameters or significance. No empirical language for synthetic experiments. Separate new results from established comparative statics. Report failures. Introduction and abstract written last. No "publishable / first-of-its-kind" claims. Citations for all substantive literature claims. Self-contained, reproducible, defensible. | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +## Deliverables | |
| 49 | +Full repository, compiled `paper/main.pdf`, `paper/main.tex`, `paper/references.bib`, scripts, tests, configs, figures, tables, literature matrix/review, novelty audit, proofs, README with commands and output inventory, final report (contributions, proved propositions, strongest results with figure/table references, literature coverage, unresolved items, reproducibility status, file locations). | |
added
Makefile
+26 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ | ||
| 1 | +.PHONY: all test simulate diagnostics figures tables paper clean | |
| 2 | +PY ?= python3 | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +all: test simulate diagnostics tables figures paper | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +test: | |
| 7 | + $(PY) -m pytest -q | tee results/logs/pytest_full.log | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +simulate: | |
| 10 | + $(PY) -m src.simulation --exp all | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +diagnostics: | |
| 13 | + $(PY) -m src.diagnostics | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +tables: | |
| 16 | + $(PY) -m src.tables | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +figures: | |
| 19 | + $(PY) -m src.plotting | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +paper: | |
| 22 | + cd paper && latexmk | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +clean: | |
| 25 | + cd paper && latexmk -C | |
| 26 | + rm -rf .pytest_cache src/__pycache__ tests/__pycache__ | |
added
README.md
+157 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ | ||
| 1 | +<!-- Author: Simon-Pierre Boucher — simon-pierre.boucher@uqo.ca --> | |
| 2 | +# 🏠 The Endogenous Housing Liquidity Premium | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +**UQO Working Paper No. 19** — *Search Frictions, Seller Urgency, and Price Discovery* | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +[-b31b1b?logo=latex&logoColor=white)](paper/main.pdf) | |
| 7 | +[](requirements.txt) | |
| 8 | +[](data/raw/README.md) | |
| 9 | +[](Makefile) | |
| 10 | +[](https://uqo.ca) | |
| 11 | +[](mailto:simon-pierre.boucher@uqo.ca) | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +> **TL;DR** — A continuous-time search model of a local housing market with free entry of buyers, a continuous distribution of | |
| 14 | +> seller carrying costs (urgency), Nash bargaining, withdrawals, and a financing-contingency extension (cash vs mortgage buyers). | |
| 15 | +> Eight propositions (urgency discount, arrival rate with an exact Pareto counterexample, free entry, liquidity shocks without | |
| 16 | +> fundamentals, dispersion, sale selection in price indices with a distribution-dependent sign, the cash–mortgage gap in three | |
| 17 | +> terms, posted prices) and twelve pre-registered numerical experiments. Baseline: 2.2 months on market, 5.6 % urgency discount, | |
| 18 | +> 3.5 % price dispersion among identical houses; halving matching efficiency lowers prices 4.8 % and raises time on market to | |
| 19 | +> 3.4 months; the composition (selection) term of the observed index is ≤ 0.15 log-% against 2–10 % within-type effects. | |
| 20 | +> Theoretical paper: **no data are used**. | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +--- | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +## 📌 Status | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | +| Item | Value | | |
| 27 | +|---|---| | |
| 28 | +| Version | 1.0 (October 2026) | | |
| 29 | +| SSRN | not yet submitted | | |
| 30 | +| Journal | — | | |
| 31 | +| Code & data | fully reproducible from `config/baseline.yaml` (see Quick start); no data | | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +## 🎯 What this paper does | |
| 34 | + | |
| 35 | +The paper asks how market tightness, heterogeneous seller reservation values, financing frictions, time-on-market costs and | |
| 36 | +bargaining power jointly determine an endogenous housing liquidity discount, transaction prices, sale hazards and price | |
| 37 | +dispersion, and under which conditions a liquidity shock propagates when housing-service values are unchanged. | |
| 38 | + | |
| 39 | +Sellers of type $c$ (carrying cost) solve | |
| 40 | +``` | |
| 41 | +(r+δ) V(c) = −c + δ w0 + Λ_s β H(V(c)+U), H(v) = E[(w−v)^+], Λ_s = φ A θ^α | |
| 42 | +``` | |
| 43 | +with free entry of buyers ($U=k$), sale hazard $η(c)=Λ_s[1−G(V(c)+U)]$, Nash price $p=(1−β)V−βU+βw$, and stocks | |
| 44 | +$n(c)=s f(c)/(η(c)+δ)$. The urgency discount is $D(c)=1−\bar p(c)/\bar p(c_L)$; the Walrasian free-entry price $p^*$ solves $H(p^*)=rk$. | |
| 45 | + | |
| 46 | +## 🏆 Headline results | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +| Object | Value (baseline, model-generated) | | |
| 49 | +|---|---| | |
| 50 | +| Tightness θ*, contact rates Λ_s / Λ_b | 4.39 buyers per listing; 8.0 / 1.8 per year | | |
| 51 | +| Time on market of sales; buyer search | 2.2 months; 10.8 months | | |
| 52 | +| Urgency discount, most urgent / transaction-weighted | 5.6 % / 2.0 % | | |
| 53 | +| Price s.d. among identical houses; between-type share | 3.5 %; 13 % | | |
| 54 | +| Halving matching efficiency (GE vs PE) | price −4.8 % vs −4.3 %; TOM 3.4 vs 3.2 months; θ 3.73 | | |
| 55 | +| Entry amplification d ln Λ_s / d ln φ | 1.10 | | |
| 56 | +| Transition, permanent −20 % A | price −1.46 % on impact; sales −13 % → −1.4 %; inventory +13 % (half-life 1.9 months) | | |
| 57 | +| Index composition term (selection) | ≤ 0.15 log-%; dampens for truncated normal/Weibull, amplifies for exponential/Pareto | | |
| 58 | +| Cash–mortgage gap (extension) | 1.73 % = 0.49 (delay-bargaining) + 1.61 (outside option) − 0.37 (selection); 1.1 % patient → 3.0 % urgent | | |
| 59 | +| Welfare-maximising β (flow criterion) | 0.55 (Hosios 0.50); planner gain 0.30 % | | |
| 60 | + | |
| 61 | +## 🗂 Repository layout | |
| 62 | + | |
| 63 | +``` | |
| 64 | +endogenous-housing-liquidity-premium/ (spbgit: wp19_uqo.git) | |
| 65 | +├── CLAUDE.md # research brief and execution protocol | |
| 66 | +├── config/baseline.yaml # the only input: parameters with units and justifications | |
| 67 | +├── src/ | |
| 68 | +│ ├── model.py # distributions (truncnorm, exponential, Pareto, Weibull), type grid, Params | |
| 69 | +│ ├── solver.py # seller block, free-entry equilibrium, posted prices, financing extension, planner, transition | |
| 70 | +│ ├── simulation.py # the 12 pre-registered experiments → results/processed, results/raw (hypothesis + env + hash) | |
| 71 | +│ ├── diagnostics.py # Monte Carlo cross-check, residuals, bounds → results/logs/validation.json | |
| 72 | +│ ├── calibration.py # illustrative-parameterisation report (no data) | |
| 73 | +│ ├── plotting.py # 14 figures (PDF + PNG) → results/figures, paper/figures | |
| 74 | +│ ├── tables.py # 23 LaTeX fragments + numbers.tex macros → results/tables, paper/tables | |
| 75 | +│ └── literature.py # merges the verified literature parts, cross-checks Crossref JSON, writes references.bib | |
| 76 | +├── tests/ # 24 pytest tests (closed forms, propositions, boundary cases, equilibrium, convergence) | |
| 77 | +├── research/ # wp_style_audit, literature_matrix.csv (132 refs), literature_review, novelty_matrix, | |
| 78 | +│ # model_specification, proofs, validation, results_audit, limitations, progress, verification/ | |
| 79 | +├── results/{raw,processed,figures,tables,logs}/ | |
| 80 | +├── data/raw/README.md # no data | |
| 81 | +└── paper/ # main.tex + sections/ + appendix/ + tables/ + figures/ + references.bib → main.pdf | |
| 82 | +``` | |
| 83 | + | |
| 84 | +## 🚀 Quick start | |
| 85 | + | |
| 86 | +```bash | |
| 87 | +python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt | |
| 88 | +make test # pytest (24 tests, ~20 s) | |
| 89 | +make simulate # 12 experiments (~6 min on an Apple-silicon laptop) | |
| 90 | +make diagnostics # Monte Carlo validation (~3 min) | |
| 91 | +make tables # LaTeX fragments + numbers.tex | |
| 92 | +make figures # 14 figures | |
| 93 | +make paper # cd paper && latexmk → main.pdf | |
| 94 | +``` | |
| 95 | +`python -m src.simulation --exp 3,9` runs a subset. Every result file carries the configuration hash (`0a165f317815d76c`), | |
| 96 | +seed (20261020), software versions and the pre-registered hypothesis. | |
| 97 | + | |
| 98 | +## 🗃 Data | |
| 99 | + | |
| 100 | +None. The parameterisation is illustrative (Table 1 of the paper, `config/baseline.yaml`); see `data/raw/README.md`. | |
| 101 | + | |
| 102 | +## 🔬 Methodology | |
| 103 | + | |
| 104 | +1. Seller value by Brent's method on the strictly decreasing Φ(V) (`solver.seller_value`). | |
| 105 | +2. Free-entry tightness by sign scan + Brent, multiplicity reported (`solver.solve_equilibrium`). | |
| 106 | +3. Posted prices (`solve_equilibrium_posted`), financing extension as a 3-equation root (`solve_equilibrium_financing`), | |
| 107 | + planner's flow optimum (`planner_optimum`), transition by backward HJB / forward KFE / pointwise free entry (`transition`). | |
| 108 | +4. Experiments E1–E12 (`simulation.py`), Monte Carlo validation (`diagnostics.py`), figures and tables from stored CSVs only. | |
| 109 | + | |
| 110 | +## 🖼 Figures & tables inventory | |
| 111 | + | |
| 112 | +| Figure | Content | | |
| 113 | +|---|---| | |
| 114 | +| `fig01_equilibrium_matching` | free-entry residual and matching rates | | |
| 115 | +| `fig02_urgency_reservation_price`, `fig03_urgency_sale_hazard` | urgency gradients for five arrival rates | | |
| 116 | +| `fig04_liquidity_discount_vs_arrivals` | discount, price and Γ sign change | | |
| 117 | +| `fig05_financing_counterfactual` | cash–mortgage gap decomposition, φ_m and delay | | |
| 118 | +| `fig06_volume_vs_price`, `fig07_tom_survival`, `fig08_seller_type_price_distributions` | comovement, survival, mixture density | | |
| 119 | +| `fig09_observed_vs_latent_index` | index decomposition by G family and the h_G·M sign condition | | |
| 120 | +| `fig10_shock_impulse_responses` | transition paths | | |
| 121 | +| `fig11_welfare_friction_contours`, `fig12_sensitivity_tornado`, `fig13_numerical_convergence`, `fig14_posted_vs_nash` | welfare, sensitivity, convergence, protocols | | |
| 122 | + | |
| 123 | +Tables: `tab01_parameters`, `tab02_baseline_moments`, `tab02b_baseline_types`, `tab03_comparative_statics`, `tab04a–e` (financing), | |
| 124 | +`tab05`, `tab05b` (heterogeneity), `tab06`, `tab06b` (selection, dynamics), `tab07`, `tab07b–f` (robustness, convergence, entry, | |
| 125 | +uniqueness), `tab08`, `tab08b` (welfare, planner), `tab09_protocols`, `numbers.tex` (macros). | |
| 126 | + | |
| 127 | +## ⚠️ Limitations | |
| 128 | + | |
| 129 | +Theoretical, stationary, local; permanent nonnegative urgency; complete information; buyers never exit (financing extension | |
| 130 | +inadmissible for φ_m ≤ 0.6); flow welfare criterion; unanticipated shocks with instantaneous entry; no data. See | |
| 131 | +`research/limitations.md` and Section 10 of the paper. | |
| 132 | + | |
| 133 | +## 📖 Citation | |
| 134 | + | |
| 135 | +```bibtex | |
| 136 | +@techreport{boucher2026liquidity, | |
| 137 | + author = {Boucher, Simon-Pierre}, | |
| 138 | + title = {The Endogenous Housing Liquidity Premium: Search Frictions, Seller Urgency, and Price Discovery}, | |
| 139 | + institution = {Universit\'e du Qu\'ebec en Outaouais, D\'epartement des sciences administratives}, | |
| 140 | + type = {UQO Working Paper}, | |
| 141 | + number = {19}, | |
| 142 | + year = {2026}, | |
| 143 | + month = {October} | |
| 144 | +} | |
| 145 | +``` | |
| 146 | + | |
| 147 | +## 👤 Author & contact | |
| 148 | + | |
| 149 | +Simon-Pierre Boucher — simon-pierre.boucher@uqo.ca — Département des sciences administratives, Université du Québec en Outaouais. | |
| 150 | + | |
| 151 | +## 📝 Notes | |
| 152 | + | |
| 153 | +- Deviations from the series standard: theoretical paper (no Data section; a numerical-solution section instead); extended amsthm | |
| 154 | + environments; `src/*.py` + `Makefile` + `config/` instead of numbered `scripts/`; `research/` directory kept in git. | |
| 155 | +- The spbgit remote `wp19_uqo.git` could not be created on 2026-10-20 (gateway unreachable from the laptop); the repository is | |
| 156 | + local until pushed. | |
| 157 | +- Process record: `research/progress.md`; novelty audit: `research/novelty_matrix.csv`; claim audit: `research/results_audit.md`. | |
added
config/baseline.yaml
+44 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 baseline parameterisation — ILLUSTRATIVE, not calibrated to data. | |
| 2 | +# Time unit = year. Values and prices in units of the mean buyer valuation of the quality segment (q = 1). | |
| 3 | +name: baseline | |
| 4 | +seed: 20261020 | |
| 5 | +preferences: | |
| 6 | + r: 0.04 # discount rate (per year) | |
| 7 | +sellers: | |
| 8 | + s: 1.0 # listing inflow (normalisation; per year) | |
| 9 | + delta: 0.5 # exogenous withdrawal hazard (per year): ~10-20 % of listings withdrawn at baseline hazards | |
| 10 | + w0: 0.8 # seller's own-use (withdrawal) value, units of q: gains from trade ~20 % + match component | |
| 11 | + c_min: 0.02 # carrying cost of the most patient seller (2 % of value per year: maintenance, taxes) | |
| 12 | + c_max: 0.30 # carrying cost of the most urgent seller (30 %/yr: double housing, bridge loan, relocation, distress) | |
| 13 | + n_types: 9 # discrete approximation of F (Gauss-Jacobi-like midpoints of a Beta distribution) | |
| 14 | + beta_a: 2.0 # Beta(a,b) shape of F on [c_min, c_max] | |
| 15 | + beta_b: 4.0 # -> right-skewed: most sellers patient, a minority urgent | |
| 16 | +buyers: | |
| 17 | + k: 0.02 # sunk entry cost (2 % of value: inspections, search set-up, agent engagement) | |
| 18 | + kappa_b: 0.05 # flow search cost while active (5 %/yr: temporary housing, time, uncertainty) | |
| 19 | + phi: 0.85 # qualification probability per meeting (baseline screen) | |
| 20 | +matching: | |
| 21 | + A: 4.5 # matching efficiency: meetings per year per side at theta = 1 | |
| 22 | + alpha: 0.5 # elasticity of meetings w.r.t. buyers | |
| 23 | +bargaining: | |
| 24 | + beta: 0.5 # seller's Nash share | |
| 25 | +match_values: | |
| 26 | + dist: truncnorm # log-concave density => IFR (Proposition 2 conditions hold) | |
| 27 | + mu: 1.0 | |
| 28 | + sigma: 0.10 | |
| 29 | + lo: 0.70 | |
| 30 | + hi: 1.30 | |
| 31 | +financing_extension: # Experiment 4 only | |
| 32 | + pi: 0.30 # share of cash buyers at entry | |
| 33 | + nu: 12.0 # financing resolution rate (per year): ~1 month | |
| 34 | + phi: 0.85 # approval probability | |
| 35 | +numerics: | |
| 36 | + theta_bounds: [0.02, 60.0] | |
| 37 | + root_xtol: 1.0e-12 | |
| 38 | + grid_check_points: 60 | |
| 39 | +dynamics: # Experiment 9 | |
| 40 | + T: 8.0 # horizon (years) | |
| 41 | + dt: 0.02 # time step (years), ~1 week | |
| 42 | + damping: 0.3 | |
| 43 | + tol: 1.0e-7 | |
| 44 | + max_iter: 400 | |
added
data/processed/.gitkeep
+0 −0
added
data/raw/README.md
+7 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# Data | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +WP19 is a theoretical paper. **No empirical data are used**; every number in the paper is generated by the model | |
| 4 | +(`config/baseline.yaml` → `src/simulation.py` → `results/`). The parameterisation is illustrative and documented with units and | |
| 5 | +justifications in `config/baseline.yaml` and Table 1 of the paper. No Québec or Canadian transaction data were obtained; an optional | |
| 6 | +case study was considered and not pursued (no lawfully usable listing-level data with time on market were available to the author | |
| 7 | +at the time of writing, see `research/limitations.md`). | |
added
paper/.latexmkrc
+5 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ | ||
| 1 | +$pdf_mode = 1; | |
| 2 | +$pdflatex = 'pdflatex -interaction=nonstopmode -halt-on-error -synctex=1 %O %S'; | |
| 3 | +$bibtex_use = 2; | |
| 4 | +$clean_ext = 'synctex.gz run.xml bbl bcf fdb_latexmk fls log aux out toc lof lot blg'; | |
| 5 | +@default_files = ('main.tex'); | |
added
paper/Makefile
+11 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ | ||
| 1 | +.PHONY: all clean distclean | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +all: | |
| 4 | + latexmk | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +clean: | |
| 7 | + latexmk -c | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +distclean: | |
| 10 | + latexmk -C | |
| 11 | + rm -f *.synctex.gz *.run.xml *.bbl *.bcf | |
added
paper/appendix/appendix_computation.tex
+69 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Computation} | |
| 2 | +\label{app:computation} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +\paragraph{Discretisation of $F$.} The carrying-cost distribution Beta$(a,b)$ on $[c_L,c_H]$ is represented by $n$ types placed at the | |
| 5 | +conditional means of $n$ equal-probability bins, with the bins' masses as weights; the mean of the discretisation equals the Beta | |
| 6 | +mean exactly. Convergence in $n$ is reported in Table~\ref{tab:conv_types}: with 9 types the mean price differs from the 81-type | |
| 7 | +solution by \convTypesRelErr{} percent. | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +\paragraph{Stationary equilibrium.} For a given $\theta$, $\Lambda_s=\phi A\theta^\alpha$ and $U=k$; each $V(c_i)$ is the Brent root of $\Phi$ with | |
| 10 | +bracket $[(-c_i+\delta w_0)/(r+\delta),\,w_H-U]$ (widened by doubling when the support is unbounded), tolerance $10^{-12}$; hazards, stocks | |
| 11 | +and the free-entry residual follow in closed form. The residual is evaluated on 60 log-spaced points of $[0.02,60]$ and Brent's | |
| 12 | +method is applied to every sign change; the number of roots is stored with each result. In the baseline and in all 60 random draws | |
| 13 | +of Table~\ref{tab:uniqueness_draws} there is exactly one root (\uniqMultiple{} draws with several roots, \uniqNone{} without). | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +\paragraph{Financing extension.} With $x=(\ln\theta,U_c,\operatorname{logit}\tilde\pi)$ and $U_m=(k-\pi U_c)/(1-\pi)$, the residual vector | |
| 16 | +consists of the cash and mortgage buyer Bellman equations divided by $r$ and of the stock-consistency condition | |
| 17 | +$\tilde\pi=B_c/(B_c+B_m)$, where $B_c=\pi Q/\xi_c$, $B_m=(1-\pi)Q/(\phi_m\xi_m)$, $\xi_c=\lambda_b\int(1-G(v^*_c))dN$, $\xi_m=\lambda_b\int(1-G(v^*_m))dN$, | |
| 18 | +$n(c)=sf(c)/[\eta_c(c)+\phi_m\eta_m(c)+\delta]$ with $\eta_c=\lambda_s\tilde\pi(1-G(v^*_c))$ and $\eta_m=\lambda_s(1-\tilde\pi)(1-G(v^*_m))$, pending stock | |
| 19 | +$m(c)=\eta_m n/\nu$, and $Q=\int(\eta_c+\phi_m\eta_m)n$. The identity $\theta=(B_c+B_m)/S$ is implied by the flow accounting and is | |
| 20 | +reported as a diagnostic (it holds to $10^{-15}$). The system is solved by a hybrid Powell method with a Levenberg--Marquardt | |
| 21 | +fallback, from the baseline-screen equilibrium; all residuals are below $10^{-15}$ and three different starting points return the | |
| 22 | +same solution. The expected mean prices by financing type are $\bar p_c=V+\beta M(v^*_c)$ and $\bar p_m=V+\beta[E(w\mid w\ge v^*_m)-V-U_m]+\Delta_b$. | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +\paragraph{Posted prices.} $y(c)$ solves $(y-a)g(y)=1-G(y)$ by Brent's method, nested inside the Brent root for $V$; the buyer's | |
| 25 | +surplus per meeting with a type-$c$ seller is $H(y(c))$. | |
| 26 | + | |
| 27 | +\paragraph{Planner.} The flow surplus \eqref{eq:welfare} is maximised over $(\ln\theta,v^*(c_1),\dots,v^*(c_n))$ by Nelder--Mead | |
| 28 | +followed by Powell's method, started at the decentralised allocation; success flags and function evaluations are stored. | |
| 29 | + | |
| 30 | +\paragraph{Transition.} On a grid with step $\Delta t$ (0.02 years in the reported experiments, horizon 8 years), the seller value is | |
| 31 | +updated backward by $V_j=[V_{j+1}+\Delta t(-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_{s,j}\beta H(V_{j+1}+k))]/[1+(r+\delta)\Delta t]$ from the terminal steady state; | |
| 32 | +the stock is updated forward by $n_{j+1}=(n_j+\Delta t\,sf)/[1+\Delta t(\eta_j+\delta)]$ from the initial steady state; the free-entry | |
| 33 | +condition gives $\theta_j=\{(rk+\kappa_b)/[\phi_jA_j(1-\beta)\int H(V_j+k)dN_j]\}^{1/(\alpha-1)}$; the tightness path is updated with damping | |
| 34 | +0.3 until the maximum change is below $10^{-7}$ (27 to 46 iterations). Terminal stocks match the new steady state to $10^{-12}$; | |
| 35 | +convergence in $\Delta t$ is reported in Table~\ref{tab:conv_dt}. | |
| 36 | + | |
| 37 | +\paragraph{Monte Carlo validation.} Listings are simulated individually: a type is drawn from $f$, meetings arrive at rate $\Lambda_s$, | |
| 38 | +withdrawal at rate $\delta$, each meeting draws $w\sim G$ and the sale occurs at the first $w\ge v^*(c)$ at the Nash price. Three seeds and | |
| 39 | +$n\in\{2{,}000, 20{,}000, 100{,}000\}$ listings; the maximum absolute relative error between simulated and analytic moments at | |
| 40 | +$n=100{,}000$ is \mcMaxRelErr{} percent, and identical seeds reproduce identical samples. | |
| 41 | + | |
| 42 | +\paragraph{Reproducibility.} All experiments are run by \texttt{python -m src.simulation --exp all} from \texttt{config/baseline.yaml} | |
| 43 | +(SHA-256 hash of the configuration and the software versions are stored with each result), tables by \texttt{python -m src.tables}, | |
| 44 | +figures by \texttt{python -m src.plotting}, tests by \texttt{pytest}, and the manuscript by \texttt{latexmk}; every number in the text | |
| 45 | +is a macro generated from the result files. | |
| 46 | + | |
| 47 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 48 | +\centering | |
| 49 | +\caption{Convergence in the number of seller types (model-generated)} | |
| 50 | +\label{tab:conv_types} | |
| 51 | +\footnotesize | |
| 52 | +\input{tables/tab07c_convergence_types} | |
| 53 | +\end{table} | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 56 | +\centering | |
| 57 | +\caption{Convergence of the transition solver in the time step (permanent 20 percent fall in $A$, horizon 4 years)} | |
| 58 | +\label{tab:conv_dt} | |
| 59 | +\footnotesize | |
| 60 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab07d_convergence_dt}} | |
| 61 | +\end{table} | |
| 62 | + | |
| 63 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 64 | +\centering | |
| 65 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig13_numerical_convergence.pdf} | |
| 66 | +\caption{Numerical convergence (model-generated). Panel (a): relative deviation of equilibrium objects from the 81-type solution | |
| 67 | +as the number of seller types increases. Panel (b): relative deviation of transition objects from the finest time step.} | |
| 68 | +\label{fig:convergence} | |
| 69 | +\end{figure} | |
added
paper/appendix/appendix_extra.tex
+92 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Additional tables and experiment register} | |
| 2 | +\label{app:extra} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +\paragraph{Experiment register.} Each experiment was pre-registered with the following hypothesis before it was run; the outcome | |
| 5 | +column records whether the stored results support it. | |
| 6 | +\begin{enumerate}[label=E\arabic*.] | |
| 7 | +\item Baseline: unique equilibrium, durations of a few months, urgency discount of a few percent, positive between-type dispersion, | |
| 8 | +decreasing population hazard. Supported (Tables~\ref{tab:baseline}--\ref{tab:types}, Figures~\ref{fig:equilibrium}, \ref{fig:survival}). | |
| 9 | +\item Urgency gradient: monotone schedules, attenuation $|\bar p'|<|V'|$, steeper when arrivals fall. Supported (Figures~\ref{fig:urgency_price}--\ref{fig:urgency_hazard}). | |
| 10 | +\item Arrival collapse: lower prices and tightness, longer durations, more inventory, wider discount; GE exceeds PE; $\Gamma$ changes sign. Supported (Table~\ref{tab:compstat}, Figure~\ref{fig:discount}). | |
| 11 | +\item Financing: screen equivalent to $A$; mortgage deals need better matches; three-term gap; $\Delta_b$ rising in urgency. Supported except that mortgage deals need better matches only for urgent sellers (selection term negative for patient sellers), and the extension is inadmissible for $\phi_m\le0.6$ (Table~\ref{tab:financing}). | |
| 12 | +\item Bargaining power: hump-shaped welfare near the Hosios value; heterogeneity shifts the optimum. Supported for the hump; the optimum is at 0.55 for both economies, so the heterogeneity shift is not detectable (Table~\ref{tab:welfare}). | |
| 13 | +\item Matching versus approval: distinct signatures in the extension. Supported (Table~\ref{tab:match_vs_approval}). | |
| 14 | +\item Entry: monotone residual, amplification, entry costs. Supported (Tables~\ref{tab:entry}, \ref{tab:uniqueness_draws}). | |
| 15 | +\item Heterogeneity: dispersion rises with the spread of $F$ and when liquidity falls. Supported (Table~\ref{tab:heterogeneity}). | |
| 16 | +\item Dynamics: impact fall of the index, inventory build-up, slow volume; composition transitory; sign depends on $G$. Supported, with the qualification that prices adjust fully on impact (Table~\ref{tab:dynamics}). | |
| 17 | +\item Selection: small composition term, sign governed by $h_GM$. Supported (Table~\ref{tab:selection}). | |
| 18 | +\item Posted prices: pickier sellers, between-type dispersion only, gradient preserved. Supported (Table~\ref{tab:protocols}). | |
| 19 | +\item Sensitivity and convergence: signs robust, objects converge, Monte Carlo agrees. Supported (Tables~\ref{tab:sensitivity}--\ref{tab:distributions}, Appendix~\ref{app:computation}). | |
| 20 | +\end{enumerate} | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 23 | +\centering | |
| 24 | +\caption{Qualification screen $\phi$ in the baseline (model-generated, general equilibrium)} | |
| 25 | +\label{tab:screen} | |
| 26 | +\footnotesize | |
| 27 | +\input{tables/tab04a_qualification_screen} | |
| 28 | +\end{table} | |
| 29 | + | |
| 30 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 31 | +\centering | |
| 32 | +\caption{Financing extension: approval delay (model-generated)} | |
| 33 | +\label{tab:fin_delay} | |
| 34 | +\footnotesize | |
| 35 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab04c_financing_delay}} | |
| 36 | +\end{table} | |
| 37 | + | |
| 38 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 39 | +\centering | |
| 40 | +\caption{Financing extension: bargaining power and the delay-bargaining term (model-generated)} | |
| 41 | +\label{tab:fin_beta} | |
| 42 | +\footnotesize | |
| 43 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab04d_financing_bargaining}} | |
| 44 | +\end{table} | |
| 45 | + | |
| 46 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 47 | +\centering | |
| 48 | +\caption{Entry and search costs (model-generated, general equilibrium)} | |
| 49 | +\label{tab:entry} | |
| 50 | +\footnotesize | |
| 51 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab07e_entry_costs}} | |
| 52 | +\end{table} | |
| 53 | + | |
| 54 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 55 | +\centering | |
| 56 | +\caption{Uniqueness check: number of roots of the free-entry residual in 60 random parameter draws (model-generated)} | |
| 57 | +\label{tab:uniqueness_draws} | |
| 58 | +\footnotesize | |
| 59 | +\input{tables/tab07f_uniqueness} | |
| 60 | +\end{table} | |
| 61 | + | |
| 62 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 63 | +\centering | |
| 64 | +\caption{Dispersion decomposition as a function of the seller's bargaining share (model-generated)} | |
| 65 | +\label{tab:disp_beta} | |
| 66 | +\footnotesize | |
| 67 | +\input{tables/tab05b_dispersion_beta} | |
| 68 | +\end{table} | |
| 69 | + | |
| 70 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 71 | +\centering | |
| 72 | +\caption{Planner's steady-state flow optimum versus the decentralised equilibrium (model-generated)} | |
| 73 | +\label{tab:planner} | |
| 74 | +\footnotesize | |
| 75 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab08b_planner}} | |
| 76 | +\end{table} | |
| 77 | + | |
| 78 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 79 | +\centering | |
| 80 | +\caption{One-at-a-time sensitivity of baseline moments (model-generated)} | |
| 81 | +\label{tab:sensitivity} | |
| 82 | +\scriptsize | |
| 83 | +\input{tables/tab07_sensitivity} | |
| 84 | +\end{table} | |
| 85 | + | |
| 86 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 87 | +\centering | |
| 88 | +\caption{Alternative match-value distributions at the baseline parameters (model-generated)} | |
| 89 | +\label{tab:distributions} | |
| 90 | +\footnotesize | |
| 91 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab07b_distributions}} | |
| 92 | +\end{table} | |
added
paper/appendix/appendix_proofs.tex
+82 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Proofs} | |
| 2 | +\label{app:proofs} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +Throughout, $U$ is given, $h_G=g/(1-G)$ and $M=H/(1-G)$. Two facts are used repeatedly. (F1) $H'(v)=-(1-G(v))$ and | |
| 5 | +$M'(v)=-1+h_G(v)M(v)$, so $M'>-1$ wherever $g>0$; under IFR $M(v)=\int_v^{w_H}\exp(-\int_v^wh_G)\,dw\le\int_v^\infty e^{-h_G(v)(w-v)}dw | |
| 6 | +=1/h_G(v)$, hence $M'\le0$. (F2) $\frac{d}{dv}E[w\mid w\ge v]=1+M'(v)=h_G(v)M(v)>0$ wherever $g>0$; under IFR $gH=g(1-G)M\le(1-G)^2$. | |
| 7 | + | |
| 8 | +\paragraph{Lemma~\ref{lem:scale}.} | |
| 9 | +$H_q(qv)=\int(q\varepsilon-qv)^+dG_\varepsilon=qH_1(v)$ and $1-G_q(qv)=1-G_\varepsilon(v)$. Substituting $V_q=qV$, $U_q=qU$ into \eqref{eq:S} | |
| 10 | +and \eqref{eq:B} gives the $q=1$ equations multiplied by $q$; hazards, stocks and $\theta$ are unchanged; free entry reads | |
| 11 | +$qU=q\tilde k$; prices scale by \eqref{eq:price}. \qed | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +\paragraph{Lemma~\ref{lem:value}.} | |
| 14 | +$\Phi(V)=-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_s\beta H(V+U)-(r+\delta)V$ is continuous and strictly decreasing, $\Phi'=-\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)-(r+\delta)\le-(r+\delta)$; | |
| 15 | +$\Phi\to+\infty$ as $V\to-\infty$ because $H(v)=E[w]-v$ for $v\le w_L$, and $\Phi\to-\infty$ as $V\to+\infty$ because $H\ge0$. Hence a unique | |
| 16 | +root. $\Phi$ is $C^1$ in all arguments and $\Phi_V<0$, so the implicit function theorem applies with $\Phi_c=-1$, | |
| 17 | +$\Phi_{\Lambda_s}=\beta H(v^*)$ and $\Phi_U=-\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))$. \qed | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | +\paragraph{Lemma~\ref{lem:duration}.} | |
| 20 | +$\bar h(\tau)=\int\mu e^{-\mu\tau}dF/\int e^{-\mu\tau}dF=E_\tau[\mu]$ under the tilted measure $dF_\tau\propto e^{-\mu\tau}dF$, and | |
| 21 | +$\bar h'(\tau)=-\mathrm{Var}_\tau(\mu)<0$. \qed | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:urgency}.} | |
| 24 | +(i) is Lemma~\ref{lem:value}. (ii) $\eta'(c)=-\Lambda_sg(v^*)V'(c)\ge0$. (iii) Conditional on sale $p=V+\beta(w-v^*)$, so | |
| 25 | +$\bar p=V+\beta M(v^*)$ and $\bar p'=V'[1+\beta M'(v^*)]$ since $v^{*\prime}=V'$; by (F1) $1+\beta M'>1-\beta>0$, and under IFR $1+\beta M'\le1$. | |
| 26 | +$D(c)=1-\bar p(c)/\bar p(c_L)$ inherits monotonicity when $\bar p(c_L)>0$. (iv) The root of the decreasing $\Phi$ is at least $w_0$ iff | |
| 27 | +$\Phi(w_0)\ge0$, i.e. $-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_s\beta H(w_0+k)-(r+\delta)w_0\ge0$. \qed | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:arrival}.} | |
| 30 | +(i) Lemma~\ref{lem:value} and $\partial\bar p/\partial\Lambda_s=\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s[1+\beta M']$. (ii) | |
| 31 | +$\partial\eta/\partial\Lambda_s=(1-G)-\Lambda_sg\,\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s$; multiplying by the positive denominator of \eqref{eq:Vderiv}, the sign | |
| 32 | +is that of $(1-G)(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta[(1-G)^2-gH]$, positive under IFR by (F2). Pareto: $1-G=(w_L/v)^a$, $g=aw_L^av^{-a-1}$, | |
| 33 | +$M=v/(a-1)$, so $gH=\frac{a}{a-1}(w_L/v)^{2a}$ and $(1-G)^2-gH=-(1-G)^2/(a-1)$; the sign becomes that of $(r+\delta)-\beta\eta/(a-1)$. Since | |
| 34 | +$H(v^*)=(1-G(v^*))v^*/(a-1)$, equation \eqref{eq:S} reads $(r+\delta)V+c-\delta w_0=\beta\eta v^*/(a-1)$ with $v^*=V+U$, i.e. | |
| 35 | +$\beta\eta=(a-1)(r+\delta)+(a-1)[c-\delta w_0-(r+\delta)U]/v^*$, whence $\beta\eta>(a-1)(r+\delta)$ iff $c>\delta w_0+(r+\delta)U$. | |
| 36 | +(iii) $V(c_L)-V(c)=\int_{c_L}^c du/[(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(u)]$ by (i) of Proposition~\ref{prop:urgency}, and $\eta(u)$ is increasing in | |
| 37 | +$\Lambda_s$ by (ii). (iv) As $\Lambda_s\to0$, \eqref{eq:S} gives $V\to(-c+\delta w_0)/(r+\delta)$, which is $0$ for $c=0$, $w_0=0$; then $v^*\to k\le w_L$, | |
| 38 | +$M(k)=E[w]-k$ and $\bar p\to\beta(E[w]-k)$. As $\Lambda_s\to\infty$, $H(v^*)=[(r+\delta)V+c-\delta w_0]/(\Lambda_s\beta)\to0$ forces $v^*\to w_H$, so | |
| 39 | +$V\to w_H-k$ and $M\to0$. $p^*<w_H-k$ iff $H(p^*)=rk>H(w_H-k)$ since $H$ is decreasing. \qed | |
| 40 | + | |
| 41 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:entry}.} | |
| 42 | +(a) $\lambda_b=A\theta^{\alpha-1}$ is strictly decreasing; $V$ is increasing in $\theta$ through $\Lambda_s=\phi A\theta^\alpha$, so $H(V+k)$ is | |
| 43 | +nonincreasing; the product of a strictly decreasing positive function and a nonincreasing positive function is strictly decreasing. | |
| 44 | +As $\theta\to\infty$, $\lambda_b\to0$ and $R\to-\kappa_b-rk$; as $\theta\to0$, $\lambda_b\to\infty$ and $H(V+k)\to H(k+(\delta w_0-c)/(r+\delta))>0$. | |
| 45 | +$\partial R/\partial\phi=(1-\beta)\lambda_b[H-\phi(1-G)\partial V/\partial\phi]$ with $\partial V/\partial\phi=\lambda_s\beta H/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)]$, so | |
| 46 | +$\partial R/\partial\phi=(1-\beta)\lambda_bH(r+\delta)/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)]>0$ and $d\theta^*/d\phi=-R_\phi/R_\theta>0$; the same algebra applies to | |
| 47 | +$A$. Observational equivalence: $\Lambda_s=\phi A\theta^\alpha$ and $\Lambda_b=\phi A\theta^{\alpha-1}$. (b) $R$ is continuous in $\theta$ because | |
| 48 | +$V(c;\theta)$, $\eta$, $n$ and $N$ are, with the same limits, so the intermediate value theorem applies. \qed | |
| 49 | + | |
| 50 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:shock}.} | |
| 51 | +(i) Proposition~\ref{prop:arrival}(i), and Proposition~\ref{prop:entry}(a) for the fall in $\theta^*$. (ii) | |
| 52 | +Proposition~\ref{prop:arrival}(ii) with $n$ fixed in $Q=\int\eta n$. (iii) $n(c)=sf(c)/(\eta(c)+\delta)$ and $1/(\eta+\delta)$ rise. | |
| 53 | +(iv) $Q_{ss}=s\int\eta/(\eta+\delta)\,dF$ is strictly increasing in each $\eta$ iff $\delta>0$. \qed | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:dispersion}.} | |
| 56 | +Law of total variance with $p=(1-\beta)V(c)-\beta U+\beta w$ and $\mathrm{Var}(p\mid c)=\beta^2\mathrm{Var}(w\mid w\ge v^*(c))$. (i) | |
| 57 | +$\bar p$ is strictly monotone. (ii) $V$ is Lipschitz with constant $1/(r+\delta)$; for Lipschitz $f$ with constant $L$, | |
| 58 | +$\mathrm{Var}f(X)=\tfrac12E[(f(X)-f(X'))^2]\le L^2\mathrm{Var}X$; under IFR $|\bar p'|\le|V'|\le1/(r+\delta)$. (iii) Proposition~\ref{prop:arrival}(iii). \qed | |
| 59 | + | |
| 60 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:selection}.} | |
| 61 | +(i) $\omega=\eta n/Q$ with $n=sf/\eta$ and $Q=s$. (ii) $\omega^+\propto\eta^+n$ with $n$ fixed, so $d\ln\omega=d\ln\eta-d\ln Q=(\epsilon-E_\omega\epsilon)\,d\ln\Lambda_s$. | |
| 62 | +Then $dP=\int\bar p\,d\omega+\int\omega\,d\bar p$ and $\int\bar p\,d\omega=\mathrm{Cov}_\omega(\bar p,\epsilon)\,d\ln\Lambda_s$. Two functions that are both | |
| 63 | +decreasing in $c$ are comonotone and positively correlated under any $\omega$ (Chebyshev's sum inequality), strictly if both are | |
| 64 | +strictly monotone and $\omega$ is non-degenerate; two functions of opposite monotonicity are negatively correlated. The formula for | |
| 65 | +$\epsilon$: $\partial\ln\eta/\partial\ln\Lambda_s=1-h_G(v^*)\Lambda_s\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s=1-h_G\Lambda_s\beta H/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)]$ and | |
| 66 | +$\Lambda_sH=\eta M$. (iii) Exponential: $h_GM=1$. Pareto: $h_GM=a/(a-1)$. If $h_GM$ is nonincreasing in $v$, then as $c$ rises $v^*$ | |
| 67 | +falls, $h_GM$ rises and $\beta\eta/(r+\delta+\beta\eta)$ rises, so $\epsilon$ falls; if $h_GM$ is increasing the two factors move in opposite | |
| 68 | +directions and no general sign obtains. (iv) is (i). \qed | |
| 69 | + | |
| 70 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:financing}.} | |
| 71 | +Pending values are linear in $p$ with slopes $\pm\nu\phi_m/(r+\nu)$, so the Nash product is maximised where $P_s-V=\beta\Sigma_m$. | |
| 72 | +Writing $\Sigma_m=[\nu\phi_m(w-V-U_m)-c-\kappa_b-r(V+U_m)]/(r+\nu)$ and solving $P_s-V=\beta\Sigma_m$ for $p$ gives | |
| 73 | +$p_m=V+\beta(w-V-U_m)+\{(1-\beta)[c+rV]-\beta[\kappa_b+rU_m]\}/(\nu\phi_m)$; subtracting $p_c=V+\beta(w-V-U_c)$ yields \eqref{eq:gap}. (i) | |
| 74 | +$1+rV'=[\delta+\lambda_s\beta(\cdot)]/[(r+\delta)+\lambda_s\beta(\cdot)]\ge0$, where $(\cdot)$ is the positive acceptance mass of the two buyer types. | |
| 75 | +(ii) $\Sigma_m\ge0$ iff $w\ge v^*_m$; subtract $v^*_c=V+U_c$; $E[w\mid w\ge v]$ is strictly increasing by (F2). (iii) Direct. \qed | |
| 76 | + | |
| 77 | +\paragraph{Proposition~\ref{prop:posted}.} | |
| 78 | +(i) $\ln[(1-G(y))(y-a)]$ is strictly concave on $(a,w_H)$ because log-concave $g$ implies log-concave $1-G$, and the objective | |
| 79 | +vanishes at both ends; the first-order condition $-g(y)(y-a)+(1-G(y))=0$ gives the characterisation. (ii) By the envelope theorem | |
| 80 | +the maximised value has slope $-(1-G(y))$ in $V$, so $\Phi_P(V)=-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_s\max_y(\cdot)-(r+\delta)V$ is strictly decreasing with a | |
| 81 | +unique root, and the implicit function theorem gives $V'$. $\psi(y)=y-1/h_G(y)$ is strictly increasing under IFR, so | |
| 82 | +$y(c)=\psi^{-1}(U+V(c))$ is increasing in $V$ and decreasing in $c$. (iii) $1/h_G(y)>0$. \qed | |
added
paper/figures/fig01_equilibrium_matching.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig02_urgency_reservation_price.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig03_urgency_sale_hazard.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig04_liquidity_discount_vs_arrivals.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig05_financing_counterfactual.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig06_volume_vs_price.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig07_tom_survival.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig08_seller_type_price_distributions.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig09_observed_vs_latent_index.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig10_shock_impulse_responses.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig11_welfare_friction_contours.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig12_sensitivity_tornado.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig13_numerical_convergence.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/figures/fig14_posted_vs_nash.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/main.pdf
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
paper/main.tex
+163 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ | ||
| 1 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 2 | +% UQO Working Paper Template — Economics / Finance | |
| 3 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 4 | +\documentclass[12pt,letterpaper]{article} | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +% --- Encoding & Language --- | |
| 7 | +\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} | |
| 8 | +\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} | |
| 9 | +\usepackage[english]{babel} | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +% --- Page Layout --- | |
| 12 | +\usepackage[ | |
| 13 | + letterpaper, | |
| 14 | + top=1in, | |
| 15 | + bottom=1in, | |
| 16 | + left=1in, | |
| 17 | + right=1in | |
| 18 | +]{geometry} | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +% --- Typography --- | |
| 21 | +\usepackage{mathptmx} % Times-like font (text + math) | |
| 22 | +\usepackage{microtype} % Improved typographic refinements | |
| 23 | +\usepackage{setspace} | |
| 24 | +\onehalfspacing % 1.5 line spacing | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | +% --- Math --- | |
| 27 | +\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsthm} | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +% --- Theorem Environments (WP19) --- | |
| 30 | +\theoremstyle{plain} | |
| 31 | +\newtheorem{proposition}{Proposition} | |
| 32 | +\newtheorem{lemma}{Lemma} | |
| 33 | +\newtheorem{corollary}{Corollary} | |
| 34 | +\theoremstyle{definition} | |
| 35 | +\newtheorem{assumption}{Assumption} | |
| 36 | +\newtheorem{definition}{Definition} | |
| 37 | +\theoremstyle{remark} | |
| 38 | +\newtheorem{remark}{Remark} | |
| 39 | +\newtheorem{conjecture}{Conjecture} | |
| 40 | + | |
| 41 | +% --- Tables --- | |
| 42 | +\usepackage{booktabs} | |
| 43 | +\usepackage{tabularx} | |
| 44 | +\usepackage{multirow} | |
| 45 | +\usepackage{threeparttable} | |
| 46 | +\usepackage{siunitx} | |
| 47 | +\sisetup{ | |
| 48 | + input-symbols = {()}, | |
| 49 | + table-format = -1.3, | |
| 50 | + parse-numbers = false | |
| 51 | +} | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +% --- Figures --- | |
| 54 | +\usepackage{graphicx} | |
| 55 | +\usepackage{subcaption} | |
| 56 | +\usepackage{float} | |
| 57 | +\graphicspath{{figures/}} | |
| 58 | + | |
| 59 | +% --- Colors & Links --- | |
| 60 | +\usepackage[dvipsnames]{xcolor} | |
| 61 | +\usepackage[ | |
| 62 | + colorlinks = true, | |
| 63 | + linkcolor = NavyBlue, | |
| 64 | + citecolor = NavyBlue, | |
| 65 | + urlcolor = NavyBlue, | |
| 66 | + breaklinks = true | |
| 67 | +]{hyperref} | |
| 68 | +\hypersetup{pdftitle={The Endogenous Housing Liquidity Premium: Search Frictions, Seller Urgency, and Price Discovery}, | |
| 69 | + pdfauthor={Simon-Pierre Boucher}} | |
| 70 | + | |
| 71 | +% --- Bibliography --- | |
| 72 | +\usepackage[authoryear,round,semicolon]{natbib} | |
| 73 | +\bibliographystyle{aer} | |
| 74 | + | |
| 75 | +% --- Captions --- | |
| 76 | +\usepackage[ | |
| 77 | + font = small, | |
| 78 | + labelfont = bf, | |
| 79 | + labelsep = period, | |
| 80 | + justification = justified, | |
| 81 | + singlelinecheck = false | |
| 82 | +]{caption} | |
| 83 | + | |
| 84 | +% --- Headers & Footers --- | |
| 85 | +\usepackage{fancyhdr} | |
| 86 | +\pagestyle{fancy} | |
| 87 | +\fancyhf{} | |
| 88 | +\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt} | |
| 89 | +\fancyfoot[C]{\thepage} | |
| 90 | + | |
| 91 | +% --- Section Formatting --- | |
| 92 | +\usepackage{titlesec} | |
| 93 | +\titleformat{\section}{\large\bfseries}{\thesection.}{0.5em}{} | |
| 94 | +\titleformat{\subsection}{\normalsize\bfseries}{\thesubsection.}{0.5em}{} | |
| 95 | +\titleformat{\subsubsection}{\normalsize\itshape}{\thesubsubsection.}{0.5em}{} | |
| 96 | + | |
| 97 | +% --- Appendix Support --- | |
| 98 | +\usepackage[toc,page]{appendix} | |
| 99 | + | |
| 100 | +% --- Misc --- | |
| 101 | +\usepackage{enumitem} | |
| 102 | +\setlist{nosep,leftmargin=*} | |
| 103 | + | |
| 104 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 105 | +% METADATA — Edit these fields for each working paper | |
| 106 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 107 | +\newcommand{\WPnumber}{19} | |
| 108 | +\newcommand{\WPtitle}{The Endogenous Housing Liquidity Premium} | |
| 109 | +\newcommand{\WPsubtitle}{Search Frictions, Seller Urgency, and Price Discovery} | |
| 110 | +\newcommand{\WPdate}{October 2026} | |
| 111 | +\newcommand{\WPversion}{1.0} | |
| 112 | +\input{sections/abstract} | |
| 113 | +\newcommand{\WPkeywords}{housing liquidity, search and matching, seller urgency, time on market, price dispersion, sale selection, financing contingencies} | |
| 114 | +\newcommand{\WPjel}{R31, R21, D83, C63, G51} | |
| 115 | + | |
| 116 | +% --- Author --- | |
| 117 | +\newcommand{\WPauthor}{Simon-Pierre Boucher} | |
| 118 | +\newcommand{\WPaffiliation}{% | |
| 119 | + Département des sciences administratives\\ | |
| 120 | + Université du Québec en Outaouais% | |
| 121 | +} | |
| 122 | +\newcommand{\WPemail}{simon-pierre.boucher@uqo.ca} | |
| 123 | +\newcommand{\WPaddress}{% | |
| 124 | + Gatineau -- Pavillon Alexandre-Taché\\ | |
| 125 | + 283, boulevard Alexandre-Taché\\ | |
| 126 | + Gatineau, Québec, Canada J9A 1L8% | |
| 127 | +} | |
| 128 | + | |
| 129 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 130 | +% DOCUMENT | |
| 131 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 132 | +\begin{document} | |
| 133 | + | |
| 134 | +% --- Title Page --- | |
| 135 | +\input{sections/titlepage} | |
| 136 | + | |
| 137 | +% --- Numbers generated from results/ (src/tables.py) --- | |
| 138 | +\input{tables/numbers} | |
| 139 | + | |
| 140 | +% --- Main Body --- | |
| 141 | +\input{sections/introduction} | |
| 142 | +\input{sections/literature} | |
| 143 | +\input{sections/benchmark} | |
| 144 | +\input{sections/model} | |
| 145 | +\input{sections/propositions} | |
| 146 | +\input{sections/numerical} | |
| 147 | +\input{sections/baseline} | |
| 148 | +\input{sections/counterfactuals} | |
| 149 | +\input{sections/welfare} | |
| 150 | +\input{sections/conclusion} | |
| 151 | + | |
| 152 | +% --- References --- | |
| 153 | +\newpage | |
| 154 | +\bibliography{references} | |
| 155 | + | |
| 156 | +% --- Appendix --- | |
| 157 | +\begin{appendices} | |
| 158 | +\input{appendix/appendix_proofs} | |
| 159 | +\input{appendix/appendix_computation} | |
| 160 | +\input{appendix/appendix_extra} | |
| 161 | +\end{appendices} | |
| 162 | + | |
| 163 | +\end{document} | |
added
paper/references.bib
+1430 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,1430 @@ | ||
| 1 | +@article{albrecht2007opportunistic, | |
| 2 | + author = {Albrecht, James and Anderson, Axel and Smith, Eric and Vroman, Susan}, | |
| 3 | + title = {Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market}, | |
| 4 | + journal = {International Economic Review}, | |
| 5 | + year = {2007}, | |
| 6 | + volume = {48}, | |
| 7 | + number = {2}, | |
| 8 | + pages = {641--664}, | |
| 9 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x} | |
| 10 | +} | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +@article{albrecht2016directed, | |
| 13 | + author = {Albrecht, James and Gautier, Pieter A. and Vroman, Susan}, | |
| 14 | + title = {Directed search in the housing market}, | |
| 15 | + journal = {Review of Economic Dynamics}, | |
| 16 | + year = {2016}, | |
| 17 | + volume = {19}, | |
| 18 | + pages = {218--231}, | |
| 19 | + doi = {10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002} | |
| 20 | +} | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +@article{anenberg2016information, | |
| 23 | + author = {Anenberg, Elliot}, | |
| 24 | + title = {Information Frictions And Housing Market Dynamics}, | |
| 25 | + journal = {International Economic Review}, | |
| 26 | + year = {2016}, | |
| 27 | + volume = {57}, | |
| 28 | + number = {4}, | |
| 29 | + pages = {1449--1479}, | |
| 30 | + doi = {10.1111/iere.12204} | |
| 31 | +} | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +@article{anenberg2020endogenous, | |
| 34 | + author = {Anenberg, Elliot and Bayer, Patrick}, | |
| 35 | + title = {Endogenous Sources Of Volatility In Housing Markets: The Joint {Buyer–Seller} Problem}, | |
| 36 | + journal = {International Economic Review}, | |
| 37 | + year = {2020}, | |
| 38 | + volume = {61}, | |
| 39 | + number = {3}, | |
| 40 | + pages = {1195--1228}, | |
| 41 | + doi = {10.1111/iere.12454} | |
| 42 | +} | |
| 43 | + | |
| 44 | +@article{arnold1999search, | |
| 45 | + author = {Arnold, Michael A.}, | |
| 46 | + title = {Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices}, | |
| 47 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 48 | + year = {1999}, | |
| 49 | + volume = {27}, | |
| 50 | + number = {3}, | |
| 51 | + pages = {453--481}, | |
| 52 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00780} | |
| 53 | +} | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +@article{arnott1989housing, | |
| 56 | + author = {Arnott, Richard}, | |
| 57 | + title = {Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes}, | |
| 58 | + journal = {The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 59 | + year = {1989}, | |
| 60 | + volume = {2}, | |
| 61 | + number = {1}, | |
| 62 | + pages = {5--30}, | |
| 63 | + doi = {10.1007/bf00161714} | |
| 64 | +} | |
| 65 | + | |
| 66 | +@article{bagnoli2005logconcave, | |
| 67 | + author = {Bagnoli, Mark and Bergstrom, Ted}, | |
| 68 | + title = {Log-concave probability and its applications}, | |
| 69 | + journal = {Economic Theory}, | |
| 70 | + year = {2005}, | |
| 71 | + volume = {26}, | |
| 72 | + number = {2}, | |
| 73 | + pages = {445--469}, | |
| 74 | + doi = {10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4} | |
| 75 | +} | |
| 76 | + | |
| 77 | +@article{bian2018bargaining, | |
| 78 | + author = {Bian, Xun and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun}, | |
| 79 | + title = {Bargaining, Mortgage Financing, and Housing Prices}, | |
| 80 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | |
| 81 | + year = {2018}, | |
| 82 | + volume = {40}, | |
| 83 | + number = {3}, | |
| 84 | + pages = {419--452}, | |
| 85 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506} | |
| 86 | +} | |
| 87 | + | |
| 88 | +@article{bond2007marketing, | |
| 89 | + author = {Bond, Shaun A. and Hwang, Soosung and Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.}, | |
| 90 | + title = {Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Theory and Empirical Estimates from the {UK} Commercial Real Estate Market}, | |
| 91 | + journal = {The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 92 | + year = {2007}, | |
| 93 | + volume = {34}, | |
| 94 | + number = {4}, | |
| 95 | + pages = {447--461}, | |
| 96 | + doi = {10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1} | |
| 97 | +} | |
| 98 | + | |
| 99 | +@article{burdett1983equilibrium, | |
| 100 | + author = {Burdett, Kenneth and Judd, Kenneth L.}, | |
| 101 | + title = {Equilibrium Price Dispersion}, | |
| 102 | + journal = {Econometrica}, | |
| 103 | + year = {1983}, | |
| 104 | + volume = {51}, | |
| 105 | + number = {4}, | |
| 106 | + pages = {955--969}, | |
| 107 | + doi = {10.2307/1912045} | |
| 108 | +} | |
| 109 | + | |
| 110 | +@article{caplin2011trading, | |
| 111 | + author = {Caplin, Andrew and Leahy, John}, | |
| 112 | + title = {Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics}, | |
| 113 | + journal = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking}, | |
| 114 | + year = {2011}, | |
| 115 | + volume = {43}, | |
| 116 | + number = {s2}, | |
| 117 | + pages = {283--303}, | |
| 118 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x} | |
| 119 | +} | |
| 120 | + | |
| 121 | +@article{carrillo2012empirical, | |
| 122 | + author = {Carrillo, Paul E.}, | |
| 123 | + title = {An Empirical Stationary Equilibrium Search Model Of The Housing Market}, | |
| 124 | + journal = {International Economic Review}, | |
| 125 | + year = {2012}, | |
| 126 | + volume = {53}, | |
| 127 | + number = {1}, | |
| 128 | + pages = {203--234}, | |
| 129 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x} | |
| 130 | +} | |
| 131 | + | |
| 132 | +@article{cheng2010illiquidity, | |
| 133 | + author = {Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun}, | |
| 134 | + title = {Illiquidity, transaction cost, and optimal holding period for real estate: Theory and application}, | |
| 135 | + journal = {Journal of Housing Economics}, | |
| 136 | + year = {2010}, | |
| 137 | + volume = {19}, | |
| 138 | + number = {2}, | |
| 139 | + pages = {109--118}, | |
| 140 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002} | |
| 141 | +} | |
| 142 | + | |
| 143 | +@article{diamond1982aggregate, | |
| 144 | + author = {Diamond, Peter A.}, | |
| 145 | + title = {Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium}, | |
| 146 | + journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, | |
| 147 | + year = {1982}, | |
| 148 | + volume = {90}, | |
| 149 | + number = {5}, | |
| 150 | + pages = {881--894}, | |
| 151 | + doi = {10.1086/261099} | |
| 152 | +} | |
| 153 | + | |
| 154 | +@article{diaz2013house, | |
| 155 | + author = {Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén}, | |
| 156 | + title = {House Prices, Sales, And Time On The Market: A {Search-Theoretic} Framework}, | |
| 157 | + journal = {International Economic Review}, | |
| 158 | + year = {2013}, | |
| 159 | + volume = {54}, | |
| 160 | + number = {3}, | |
| 161 | + pages = {837--872}, | |
| 162 | + doi = {10.1111/iere.12019} | |
| 163 | +} | |
| 164 | + | |
| 165 | +@article{diaz2024housing, | |
| 166 | + author = {Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén and Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo}, | |
| 167 | + title = {Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search}, | |
| 168 | + journal = {The Economic Journal}, | |
| 169 | + year = {2024}, | |
| 170 | + volume = {134}, | |
| 171 | + number = {657}, | |
| 172 | + pages = {220--270}, | |
| 173 | + doi = {10.1093/ej/uead054} | |
| 174 | +} | |
| 175 | + | |
| 176 | +@article{duffie2005over, | |
| 177 | + author = {Duffie, Darrell and Garleanu, Nicolae and Pedersen, Lasse Heje}, | |
| 178 | + title = {{Over-the-Counter} Markets}, | |
| 179 | + journal = {Econometrica}, | |
| 180 | + year = {2005}, | |
| 181 | + volume = {73}, | |
| 182 | + number = {6}, | |
| 183 | + pages = {1815--1847}, | |
| 184 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x} | |
| 185 | +} | |
| 186 | + | |
| 187 | +@article{eerola2018borrowing, | |
| 188 | + author = {Eerola, Essi and Määttänen, Niku}, | |
| 189 | + title = {Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity}, | |
| 190 | + journal = {Review of Economic Dynamics}, | |
| 191 | + year = {2018}, | |
| 192 | + volume = {27}, | |
| 193 | + pages = {184--204}, | |
| 194 | + doi = {10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003} | |
| 195 | +} | |
| 196 | + | |
| 197 | +@article{fisher2003controlling, | |
| 198 | + author = {Fisher, Jeffrey and Gatzlaff, Dean and Geltner, David and Haurin, Donald}, | |
| 199 | + title = {Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices}, | |
| 200 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 201 | + year = {2003}, | |
| 202 | + volume = {31}, | |
| 203 | + number = {2}, | |
| 204 | + pages = {269--303}, | |
| 205 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00066} | |
| 206 | +} | |
| 207 | + | |
| 208 | +@article{gabrovski2019beveridge, | |
| 209 | + author = {Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor}, | |
| 210 | + title = {The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market}, | |
| 211 | + journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, | |
| 212 | + year = {2019}, | |
| 213 | + volume = {181}, | |
| 214 | + pages = {361--381}, | |
| 215 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003} | |
| 216 | +} | |
| 217 | + | |
| 218 | +@article{gabrovski2021search, | |
| 219 | + author = {Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor}, | |
| 220 | + title = {Search and credit frictions in the housing market}, | |
| 221 | + journal = {European Economic Review}, | |
| 222 | + year = {2021}, | |
| 223 | + volume = {134}, | |
| 224 | + pages = {103699}, | |
| 225 | + doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699} | |
| 226 | +} | |
| 227 | + | |
| 228 | +@article{gabrovski2025note, | |
| 229 | + author = {Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor}, | |
| 230 | + title = {A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions}, | |
| 231 | + journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, | |
| 232 | + year = {2025}, | |
| 233 | + volume = {29}, | |
| 234 | + doi = {10.1017/s1365100525100692} | |
| 235 | +} | |
| 236 | + | |
| 237 | +@article{garriga2020mortgage, | |
| 238 | + author = {Garriga, Carlos and Hedlund, Aaron}, | |
| 239 | + title = {Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession}, | |
| 240 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 241 | + year = {2020}, | |
| 242 | + volume = {110}, | |
| 243 | + number = {6}, | |
| 244 | + pages = {1603--1634}, | |
| 245 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.20170772} | |
| 246 | +} | |
| 247 | + | |
| 248 | +@article{genesove2012search, | |
| 249 | + author = {Genesove, David and Han, Lu}, | |
| 250 | + title = {Search and matching in the housing market}, | |
| 251 | + journal = {Journal of Urban Economics}, | |
| 252 | + year = {2012}, | |
| 253 | + volume = {72}, | |
| 254 | + number = {1}, | |
| 255 | + pages = {31--45}, | |
| 256 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002} | |
| 257 | +} | |
| 258 | + | |
| 259 | +@article{glower1998motivation, | |
| 260 | + author = {Glower, Michel and Haurin, Donald R. and Hendershott, Patric H.}, | |
| 261 | + title = {Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation}, | |
| 262 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 263 | + year = {1998}, | |
| 264 | + volume = {26}, | |
| 265 | + number = {4}, | |
| 266 | + pages = {719--740}, | |
| 267 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00763} | |
| 268 | +} | |
| 269 | + | |
| 270 | +@article{guren2018house, | |
| 271 | + author = {Guren, Adam M.}, | |
| 272 | + title = {House Price Momentum and Strategic Complementarity}, | |
| 273 | + journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, | |
| 274 | + year = {2018}, | |
| 275 | + volume = {126}, | |
| 276 | + number = {3}, | |
| 277 | + pages = {1172--1218}, | |
| 278 | + doi = {10.1086/697207} | |
| 279 | +} | |
| 280 | + | |
| 281 | +@article{guren2020foreclosures, | |
| 282 | + author = {Guren, Adam M and McQuade, Timothy J}, | |
| 283 | + title = {How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?}, | |
| 284 | + journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, | |
| 285 | + year = {2020}, | |
| 286 | + volume = {87}, | |
| 287 | + number = {3}, | |
| 288 | + pages = {1331--1364}, | |
| 289 | + doi = {10.1093/restud/rdaa001} | |
| 290 | +} | |
| 291 | + | |
| 292 | +@incollection{han2015microstructure, | |
| 293 | + author = {Han, Lu and Strange, William C.}, | |
| 294 | + title = {The Microstructure of Housing Markets}, | |
| 295 | + booktitle = {Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics}, | |
| 296 | + year = {2015}, | |
| 297 | + volume = {vol}, | |
| 298 | + pages = {. 5: 813--886}, | |
| 299 | + publisher = {Elsevier}, | |
| 300 | + doi = {10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2} | |
| 301 | +} | |
| 302 | + | |
| 303 | +@article{han2024cash, | |
| 304 | + author = {Han, Lu and Hong, Seung-Hyun}, | |
| 305 | + title = {Cash is king? Understanding financing risk in housing markets}, | |
| 306 | + journal = {Review of Finance}, | |
| 307 | + year = {2024}, | |
| 308 | + volume = {28}, | |
| 309 | + number = {6}, | |
| 310 | + pages = {2083--2118}, | |
| 311 | + doi = {10.1093/rof/rfae025} | |
| 312 | +} | |
| 313 | + | |
| 314 | +@article{head2012housing, | |
| 315 | + author = {Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw}, | |
| 316 | + title = {Housing Liquidity, Mobility, and the Labour Market}, | |
| 317 | + journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, | |
| 318 | + year = {2012}, | |
| 319 | + volume = {79}, | |
| 320 | + number = {4}, | |
| 321 | + pages = {1559--1589}, | |
| 322 | + doi = {10.1093/restud/rds004} | |
| 323 | +} | |
| 324 | + | |
| 325 | +@article{head2014search, | |
| 326 | + author = {Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw and Sun, Hongfei}, | |
| 327 | + title = {Search, Liquidity, and the Dynamics of House Prices and Construction}, | |
| 328 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 329 | + year = {2014}, | |
| 330 | + volume = {104}, | |
| 331 | + number = {4}, | |
| 332 | + pages = {1172--1210}, | |
| 333 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.104.4.1172} | |
| 334 | +} | |
| 335 | + | |
| 336 | +@article{head2023default, | |
| 337 | + author = {Head, Allen and Sun, Hongfei and Zhou, Chenggang}, | |
| 338 | + title = {Indebted sellers, liquidity and mortgage standards}, | |
| 339 | + journal = {European Economic Review}, | |
| 340 | + year = {2023}, | |
| 341 | + volume = {151}, | |
| 342 | + pages = {104321}, | |
| 343 | + doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104321} | |
| 344 | +} | |
| 345 | + | |
| 346 | +@article{hedlund2016cyclical, | |
| 347 | + author = {Hedlund, Aaron}, | |
| 348 | + title = {The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing, debt, and foreclosures}, | |
| 349 | + journal = {Quantitative Economics}, | |
| 350 | + year = {2016}, | |
| 351 | + volume = {7}, | |
| 352 | + number = {1}, | |
| 353 | + pages = {289--328}, | |
| 354 | + doi = {10.3982/qe483} | |
| 355 | +} | |
| 356 | + | |
| 357 | +@article{hedlund2016illiquidity, | |
| 358 | + author = {Hedlund, Aaron}, | |
| 359 | + title = {Illiquidity and its discontents: Trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market}, | |
| 360 | + journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, | |
| 361 | + year = {2016}, | |
| 362 | + volume = {83}, | |
| 363 | + pages = {1--13}, | |
| 364 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005} | |
| 365 | +} | |
| 366 | + | |
| 367 | +@article{horowitz1992role, | |
| 368 | + author = {Horowitz, Joel L.}, | |
| 369 | + title = {The role of the list price in housing markets: Theory and an econometric model}, | |
| 370 | + journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, | |
| 371 | + year = {1992}, | |
| 372 | + volume = {7}, | |
| 373 | + number = {2}, | |
| 374 | + pages = {115--129}, | |
| 375 | + doi = {10.1002/jae.3950070202} | |
| 376 | +} | |
| 377 | + | |
| 378 | +@article{hosios1990efficiency, | |
| 379 | + author = {Hosios, Arthur J.}, | |
| 380 | + title = {On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment}, | |
| 381 | + journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, | |
| 382 | + year = {1990}, | |
| 383 | + volume = {57}, | |
| 384 | + number = {2}, | |
| 385 | + pages = {279--298}, | |
| 386 | + doi = {10.2307/2297382} | |
| 387 | +} | |
| 388 | + | |
| 389 | +@article{krainer2001theory, | |
| 390 | + author = {Krainer, John}, | |
| 391 | + title = {A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets}, | |
| 392 | + journal = {Journal of Urban Economics}, | |
| 393 | + year = {2001}, | |
| 394 | + volume = {49}, | |
| 395 | + number = {1}, | |
| 396 | + pages = {32--53}, | |
| 397 | + doi = {10.1006/juec.2000.2180} | |
| 398 | +} | |
| 399 | + | |
| 400 | +@article{krainer2002equilibrium, | |
| 401 | + author = {Krainer, John and LeRoy, Stephen F.}, | |
| 402 | + title = {Equilibrium valuation of illiquid assets}, | |
| 403 | + journal = {Economic Theory}, | |
| 404 | + year = {2002}, | |
| 405 | + volume = {19}, | |
| 406 | + number = {2}, | |
| 407 | + pages = {223--242}, | |
| 408 | + doi = {10.1007/pl00004214} | |
| 409 | +} | |
| 410 | + | |
| 411 | +@article{lagos2009liquidity, | |
| 412 | + author = {Lagos, Ricardo and Rocheteau, Guillaume}, | |
| 413 | + title = {Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions}, | |
| 414 | + journal = {Econometrica}, | |
| 415 | + year = {2009}, | |
| 416 | + volume = {77}, | |
| 417 | + number = {2}, | |
| 418 | + pages = {403--426}, | |
| 419 | + doi = {10.3982/ecta7250} | |
| 420 | +} | |
| 421 | + | |
| 422 | +@article{leung2017flipping, | |
| 423 | + author = {Leung, Charles Ka Yui and Tse, Chung-Yi}, | |
| 424 | + title = {Flipping in the housing market}, | |
| 425 | + journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, | |
| 426 | + year = {2017}, | |
| 427 | + volume = {76}, | |
| 428 | + pages = {232--263}, | |
| 429 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jedc.2017.01.003} | |
| 430 | +} | |
| 431 | + | |
| 432 | +@article{lin2007illiquidity, | |
| 433 | + author = {Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.}, | |
| 434 | + title = {Illiquidity and Pricing Biases in the Real Estate Market}, | |
| 435 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 436 | + year = {2007}, | |
| 437 | + volume = {35}, | |
| 438 | + number = {3}, | |
| 439 | + pages = {291--330}, | |
| 440 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00191.x} | |
| 441 | +} | |
| 442 | + | |
| 443 | +@article{lin2008real, | |
| 444 | + author = {Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun}, | |
| 445 | + title = {Real Estate Returns and Risk with Heterogeneous Investors}, | |
| 446 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 447 | + year = {2008}, | |
| 448 | + volume = {36}, | |
| 449 | + number = {4}, | |
| 450 | + pages = {753--776}, | |
| 451 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00229.x} | |
| 452 | +} | |
| 453 | + | |
| 454 | +@article{lippman1976economics, | |
| 455 | + author = {Lippman, Steven A. and McCall, John J.}, | |
| 456 | + title = {The Economics Of Job Search: A Survey}, | |
| 457 | + journal = {Economic Inquiry}, | |
| 458 | + year = {1976}, | |
| 459 | + volume = {14}, | |
| 460 | + number = {2}, | |
| 461 | + pages = {155--189}, | |
| 462 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x} | |
| 463 | +} | |
| 464 | + | |
| 465 | +@article{maury2014search, | |
| 466 | + author = {Maury, Tristan-Pierre and Tripier, Fabien}, | |
| 467 | + title = {Search strategies on the housing market and their implications on price dispersion}, | |
| 468 | + journal = {Journal of Housing Economics}, | |
| 469 | + year = {2014}, | |
| 470 | + volume = {26}, | |
| 471 | + pages = {55--80}, | |
| 472 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jhe.2014.09.001} | |
| 473 | +} | |
| 474 | + | |
| 475 | +@article{merlo2015home, | |
| 476 | + author = {Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François and Rust, John}, | |
| 477 | + title = {The Home Selling Problem: Theory And Evidence}, | |
| 478 | + journal = {International Economic Review}, | |
| 479 | + year = {2015}, | |
| 480 | + volume = {56}, | |
| 481 | + number = {2}, | |
| 482 | + pages = {457--484}, | |
| 483 | + doi = {10.1111/iere.12111} | |
| 484 | +} | |
| 485 | + | |
| 486 | +@article{moen1997competitive, | |
| 487 | + author = {Moen, Espen R.}, | |
| 488 | + title = {Competitive Search Equilibrium}, | |
| 489 | + journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, | |
| 490 | + year = {1997}, | |
| 491 | + volume = {105}, | |
| 492 | + number = {2}, | |
| 493 | + pages = {385--411}, | |
| 494 | + doi = {10.1086/262077} | |
| 495 | +} | |
| 496 | + | |
| 497 | +@article{moen2021buying, | |
| 498 | + author = {Moen, Espen R and Nenov, Plamen T and Sniekers, Florian}, | |
| 499 | + title = {Buying First or Selling First in Housing Markets}, | |
| 500 | + journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, | |
| 501 | + year = {2021}, | |
| 502 | + volume = {19}, | |
| 503 | + number = {1}, | |
| 504 | + pages = {38--81}, | |
| 505 | + doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvz069} | |
| 506 | +} | |
| 507 | + | |
| 508 | +@article{mortensen1994job, | |
| 509 | + author = {Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.}, | |
| 510 | + title = {Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment}, | |
| 511 | + journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, | |
| 512 | + year = {1994}, | |
| 513 | + volume = {61}, | |
| 514 | + number = {3}, | |
| 515 | + pages = {397--415}, | |
| 516 | + doi = {10.2307/2297896} | |
| 517 | +} | |
| 518 | + | |
| 519 | +@incollection{mortensen1999new, | |
| 520 | + author = {Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.}, | |
| 521 | + title = {Chapter 39 New developments in models of search in the labor market}, | |
| 522 | + booktitle = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, | |
| 523 | + year = {1999}, | |
| 524 | + volume = {vol}, | |
| 525 | + pages = {. 3B: 2567--2627}, | |
| 526 | + publisher = {Elsevier}, | |
| 527 | + doi = {10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30025-0} | |
| 528 | +} | |
| 529 | + | |
| 530 | +@article{nash1950bargaining, | |
| 531 | + author = {Nash, John F.}, | |
| 532 | + title = {The Bargaining Problem}, | |
| 533 | + journal = {Econometrica}, | |
| 534 | + year = {1950}, | |
| 535 | + volume = {18}, | |
| 536 | + number = {2}, | |
| 537 | + pages = {155--162}, | |
| 538 | + doi = {10.2307/1907266} | |
| 539 | +} | |
| 540 | + | |
| 541 | +@article{ngai2014hot, | |
| 542 | + author = {Ngai, L. Rachel and Tenreyro, Silvana}, | |
| 543 | + title = {Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market}, | |
| 544 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 545 | + year = {2014}, | |
| 546 | + volume = {104}, | |
| 547 | + number = {12}, | |
| 548 | + pages = {3991--4026}, | |
| 549 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.104.12.3991} | |
| 550 | +} | |
| 551 | + | |
| 552 | +@article{ngai2020decision, | |
| 553 | + author = {Ngai, L Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D}, | |
| 554 | + title = {The Decision to Move House and Aggregate {Housing-Market} Dynamics}, | |
| 555 | + journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, | |
| 556 | + year = {2020}, | |
| 557 | + volume = {18}, | |
| 558 | + number = {5}, | |
| 559 | + pages = {2487--2531}, | |
| 560 | + doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvaa001} | |
| 561 | +} | |
| 562 | + | |
| 563 | +@article{ngai2024ins, | |
| 564 | + author = {Ngai, L. Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D.}, | |
| 565 | + title = {The Ins And Outs Of Selling Houses: Understanding {Housing-Market} Volatility}, | |
| 566 | + journal = {International Economic Review}, | |
| 567 | + year = {2024}, | |
| 568 | + volume = {65}, | |
| 569 | + number = {3}, | |
| 570 | + pages = {1415--1440}, | |
| 571 | + doi = {10.1111/iere.12693} | |
| 572 | +} | |
| 573 | + | |
| 574 | +@article{novymarx2009hot, | |
| 575 | + author = {Novy-Marx, Robert}, | |
| 576 | + title = {Hot and Cold Markets}, | |
| 577 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 578 | + year = {2009}, | |
| 579 | + volume = {37}, | |
| 580 | + number = {1}, | |
| 581 | + pages = {1--22}, | |
| 582 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x} | |
| 583 | +} | |
| 584 | + | |
| 585 | +@article{ortalomagne2006housing, | |
| 586 | + author = {Ortalo-Magné, François and Rady, Sven}, | |
| 587 | + title = {Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints}, | |
| 588 | + journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, | |
| 589 | + year = {2006}, | |
| 590 | + volume = {73}, | |
| 591 | + number = {2}, | |
| 592 | + pages = {459--485}, | |
| 593 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.383_1.x} | |
| 594 | +} | |
| 595 | + | |
| 596 | +@article{petrongolo2001looking, | |
| 597 | + author = {Petrongolo, Barbara and Pissarides, Christopher A}, | |
| 598 | + title = {Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function}, | |
| 599 | + journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, | |
| 600 | + year = {2001}, | |
| 601 | + volume = {39}, | |
| 602 | + number = {2}, | |
| 603 | + pages = {390--431}, | |
| 604 | + doi = {10.1257/jel.39.2.390} | |
| 605 | +} | |
| 606 | + | |
| 607 | +@article{piazzesi2009momentum, | |
| 608 | + author = {Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin}, | |
| 609 | + title = {Momentum Traders in the Housing Market: Survey Evidence and a Search Model}, | |
| 610 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 611 | + year = {2009}, | |
| 612 | + volume = {99}, | |
| 613 | + number = {2}, | |
| 614 | + pages = {406--411}, | |
| 615 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.99.2.406} | |
| 616 | +} | |
| 617 | + | |
| 618 | +@article{piazzesi2020segmented, | |
| 619 | + author = {Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin and Stroebel, Johannes}, | |
| 620 | + title = {Segmented Housing Search}, | |
| 621 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 622 | + year = {2020}, | |
| 623 | + volume = {110}, | |
| 624 | + number = {3}, | |
| 625 | + pages = {720--759}, | |
| 626 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.20141772} | |
| 627 | +} | |
| 628 | + | |
| 629 | +@book{pissarides2000equilibrium, | |
| 630 | + author = {Pissarides, Christopher A.}, | |
| 631 | + title = {Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd edition}, | |
| 632 | + publisher = {MIT Press (book)}, | |
| 633 | + year = {2000}, | |
| 634 | + url = {https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html} | |
| 635 | +} | |
| 636 | + | |
| 637 | +@article{reher2024mortgage, | |
| 638 | + author = {Reher, Michael and Valkanov, Rossen}, | |
| 639 | + title = {The {Mortgage-Cash} Premium Puzzle}, | |
| 640 | + journal = {The Journal of Finance}, | |
| 641 | + year = {2024}, | |
| 642 | + volume = {79}, | |
| 643 | + number = {5}, | |
| 644 | + pages = {3149--3201}, | |
| 645 | + doi = {10.1111/jofi.13373} | |
| 646 | +} | |
| 647 | + | |
| 648 | +@article{rocheteau2011liquidity, | |
| 649 | + author = {Rocheteau, Guillaume and Weill, Pierre-Olivier}, | |
| 650 | + title = {Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets}, | |
| 651 | + journal = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking}, | |
| 652 | + year = {2011}, | |
| 653 | + volume = {43}, | |
| 654 | + number = {s2}, | |
| 655 | + pages = {261--282}, | |
| 656 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00435.x} | |
| 657 | +} | |
| 658 | + | |
| 659 | +@article{rogerson2005search, | |
| 660 | + author = {Rogerson, Richard and Shimer, Robert and Wright, Randall}, | |
| 661 | + title = {{Search-Theoretic} Models of the Labor Market: A Survey}, | |
| 662 | + journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, | |
| 663 | + year = {2005}, | |
| 664 | + volume = {43}, | |
| 665 | + number = {4}, | |
| 666 | + pages = {959--988}, | |
| 667 | + doi = {10.1257/002205105775362014} | |
| 668 | +} | |
| 669 | + | |
| 670 | +@article{rubinstein1982perfect, | |
| 671 | + author = {Rubinstein, Ariel}, | |
| 672 | + title = {Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model}, | |
| 673 | + journal = {Econometrica}, | |
| 674 | + year = {1982}, | |
| 675 | + volume = {50}, | |
| 676 | + number = {1}, | |
| 677 | + pages = {97--109}, | |
| 678 | + doi = {10.2307/1912531} | |
| 679 | +} | |
| 680 | + | |
| 681 | +@article{sagi2021asset, | |
| 682 | + author = {Sagi, Jacob S}, | |
| 683 | + title = {{Asset-Level} Risk and Return in Real Estate Investments}, | |
| 684 | + journal = {The Review of Financial Studies}, | |
| 685 | + year = {2021}, | |
| 686 | + volume = {34}, | |
| 687 | + number = {8}, | |
| 688 | + pages = {3647--3694}, | |
| 689 | + doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhaa122} | |
| 690 | +} | |
| 691 | + | |
| 692 | +@article{salant1991sale, | |
| 693 | + author = {Salant, Stephen W.}, | |
| 694 | + title = {For sale by owner: When to use a broker and how to price the house}, | |
| 695 | + journal = {The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 696 | + year = {1991}, | |
| 697 | + volume = {4}, | |
| 698 | + number = {2}, | |
| 699 | + pages = {157--173}, | |
| 700 | + doi = {10.1007/bf00173122} | |
| 701 | +} | |
| 702 | + | |
| 703 | +@article{shimer2005cyclical, | |
| 704 | + author = {Shimer, Robert}, | |
| 705 | + title = {The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies}, | |
| 706 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 707 | + year = {2005}, | |
| 708 | + volume = {95}, | |
| 709 | + number = {1}, | |
| 710 | + pages = {25--49}, | |
| 711 | + doi = {10.1257/0002828053828572} | |
| 712 | +} | |
| 713 | + | |
| 714 | +@article{stein1995prices, | |
| 715 | + author = {Stein, Jeremy C.}, | |
| 716 | + title = {Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A Model with {Down-Payment} Effects}, | |
| 717 | + journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, | |
| 718 | + year = {1995}, | |
| 719 | + volume = {110}, | |
| 720 | + number = {2}, | |
| 721 | + pages = {379--406}, | |
| 722 | + doi = {10.2307/2118444} | |
| 723 | +} | |
| 724 | + | |
| 725 | +@article{taylor1999time, | |
| 726 | + author = {Taylor, Curtis R.}, | |
| 727 | + title = {{Time-on-the-Market} as a Sign of Quality}, | |
| 728 | + journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, | |
| 729 | + year = {1999}, | |
| 730 | + volume = {66}, | |
| 731 | + number = {3}, | |
| 732 | + pages = {555--578}, | |
| 733 | + doi = {10.1111/1467-937x.00098} | |
| 734 | +} | |
| 735 | + | |
| 736 | +@article{wheaton1990vacancy, | |
| 737 | + author = {Wheaton, William C.}, | |
| 738 | + title = {Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model}, | |
| 739 | + journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, | |
| 740 | + year = {1990}, | |
| 741 | + volume = {98}, | |
| 742 | + number = {6}, | |
| 743 | + pages = {1270--1292}, | |
| 744 | + doi = {10.1086/261734} | |
| 745 | +} | |
| 746 | + | |
| 747 | +@article{williams1995pricing, | |
| 748 | + author = {Williams, Joseph T.}, | |
| 749 | + title = {Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search}, | |
| 750 | + journal = {Review of Financial Studies}, | |
| 751 | + year = {1995}, | |
| 752 | + volume = {8}, | |
| 753 | + number = {1}, | |
| 754 | + pages = {55--90}, | |
| 755 | + doi = {10.1093/rfs/8.1.55} | |
| 756 | +} | |
| 757 | + | |
| 758 | +@article{wright2021directed, | |
| 759 | + author = {Wright, Randall and Kircher, Philipp and Julien, Benoît and Guerrieri, Veronica}, | |
| 760 | + title = {Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour}, | |
| 761 | + journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, | |
| 762 | + year = {2021}, | |
| 763 | + volume = {59}, | |
| 764 | + number = {1}, | |
| 765 | + pages = {90--148}, | |
| 766 | + doi = {10.1257/jel.20191505} | |
| 767 | +} | |
| 768 | + | |
| 769 | +@article{yavas1992simple, | |
| 770 | + author = {Yavaş, Abdullah}, | |
| 771 | + title = {A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets}, | |
| 772 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 773 | + year = {1992}, | |
| 774 | + volume = {20}, | |
| 775 | + number = {4}, | |
| 776 | + pages = {533--548}, | |
| 777 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00595} | |
| 778 | +} | |
| 779 | + | |
| 780 | +@article{yavas1995strategic, | |
| 781 | + author = {Yavas, Abdullah and Yang, Shiawee}, | |
| 782 | + title = {The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence}, | |
| 783 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 784 | + year = {1995}, | |
| 785 | + volume = {23}, | |
| 786 | + number = {3}, | |
| 787 | + pages = {347--368}, | |
| 788 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00668} | |
| 789 | +} | |
| 790 | + | |
| 791 | +@article{zuehlke1987duration, | |
| 792 | + author = {Zuehlke, Thomas W.}, | |
| 793 | + title = {Duration Dependence in the Housing Market}, | |
| 794 | + journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, | |
| 795 | + year = {1987}, | |
| 796 | + volume = {69}, | |
| 797 | + number = {4}, | |
| 798 | + pages = {701--704}, | |
| 799 | + doi = {10.2307/1935966} | |
| 800 | +} | |
| 801 | + | |
| 802 | +@article{haurin1988duration, | |
| 803 | + author = {Haurin, Donald}, | |
| 804 | + title = {The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing}, | |
| 805 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal)}, | |
| 806 | + year = {1988}, | |
| 807 | + volume = {16}, | |
| 808 | + number = {4}, | |
| 809 | + pages = {396--410}, | |
| 810 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00463} | |
| 811 | +} | |
| 812 | + | |
| 813 | +@article{springer1996motivation, | |
| 814 | + author = {Springer, Thomas M.}, | |
| 815 | + title = {Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time}, | |
| 816 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 817 | + year = {1996}, | |
| 818 | + volume = {13}, | |
| 819 | + number = {3}, | |
| 820 | + pages = {237--254}, | |
| 821 | + doi = {10.1007/bf00217393} | |
| 822 | +} | |
| 823 | + | |
| 824 | +@article{anglin2003tradeoff, | |
| 825 | + author = {Anglin, Paul M. and Rutherford, Ronald and Springer, Thomas M.}, | |
| 826 | + title = {The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and {Time-on-the-Market:} The Impact of Price Setting}, | |
| 827 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 828 | + year = {2003}, | |
| 829 | + volume = {26}, | |
| 830 | + number = {1}, | |
| 831 | + pages = {95--111}, | |
| 832 | + doi = {10.1023/a:1021526332732} | |
| 833 | +} | |
| 834 | + | |
| 835 | +@article{haurin2010listprices, | |
| 836 | + author = {Haurin, Donald R. and Haurin, Jessica L. and Nadauld, Taylor and Sanders, Anthony}, | |
| 837 | + title = {List Prices, Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to {U.S.} Housing Markets}, | |
| 838 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 839 | + year = {2010}, | |
| 840 | + volume = {38}, | |
| 841 | + number = {4}, | |
| 842 | + pages = {659--685}, | |
| 843 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00279.x} | |
| 844 | +} | |
| 845 | + | |
| 846 | +@article{genesove1997equity, | |
| 847 | + author = {Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher J.}, | |
| 848 | + title = {Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market}, | |
| 849 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 850 | + year = {1997}, | |
| 851 | + volume = {87}, | |
| 852 | + number = {3}, | |
| 853 | + pages = {255--269}, | |
| 854 | + url = {https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v87y1997i3p255-69.html} | |
| 855 | +} | |
| 856 | + | |
| 857 | +@article{genesove2001lossaversion, | |
| 858 | + author = {Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher}, | |
| 859 | + title = {Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market}, | |
| 860 | + journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, | |
| 861 | + year = {2001}, | |
| 862 | + volume = {116}, | |
| 863 | + number = {4}, | |
| 864 | + pages = {1233--1260}, | |
| 865 | + doi = {10.1162/003355301753265561} | |
| 866 | +} | |
| 867 | + | |
| 868 | +@article{levitt2008agents, | |
| 869 | + author = {Levitt, Steven D. and Syverson, Chad}, | |
| 870 | + title = {Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions}, | |
| 871 | + journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, | |
| 872 | + year = {2008}, | |
| 873 | + volume = {90}, | |
| 874 | + number = {4}, | |
| 875 | + pages = {599--611}, | |
| 876 | + doi = {10.1162/rest.90.4.599} | |
| 877 | +} | |
| 878 | + | |
| 879 | +@article{hendel2009fsbo, | |
| 880 | + author = {Hendel, Igal and Nevo, Aviv and Ortalo-Magné, François}, | |
| 881 | + title = {The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: {MLS} versus {FSBOMadison.com}}, | |
| 882 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 883 | + year = {2009}, | |
| 884 | + volume = {99}, | |
| 885 | + number = {5}, | |
| 886 | + pages = {1878--1898}, | |
| 887 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.99.5.1878} | |
| 888 | +} | |
| 889 | + | |
| 890 | +@article{knight2002listing, | |
| 891 | + author = {Knight, John R.}, | |
| 892 | + title = {Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects of Listing Price Changes}, | |
| 893 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 894 | + year = {2002}, | |
| 895 | + volume = {30}, | |
| 896 | + number = {2}, | |
| 897 | + pages = {213--237}, | |
| 898 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00038} | |
| 899 | +} | |
| 900 | + | |
| 901 | +@article{merlo2004bargaining, | |
| 902 | + author = {Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François}, | |
| 903 | + title = {Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England}, | |
| 904 | + journal = {Journal of Urban Economics}, | |
| 905 | + year = {2004}, | |
| 906 | + volume = {56}, | |
| 907 | + number = {2}, | |
| 908 | + pages = {192--216}, | |
| 909 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004} | |
| 910 | +} | |
| 911 | + | |
| 912 | +@article{carrillo2013heat, | |
| 913 | + author = {Carrillo, Paul E.}, | |
| 914 | + title = {To Sell or Not to Sell: Measuring the Heat of the Housing Market}, | |
| 915 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 916 | + year = {2013}, | |
| 917 | + volume = {41}, | |
| 918 | + number = {2}, | |
| 919 | + pages = {310--346}, | |
| 920 | + doi = {10.1111/reec.12003} | |
| 921 | +} | |
| 922 | + | |
| 923 | +@article{carrillo2015tightness, | |
| 924 | + author = {Carrillo, Paul E. and de Wit, Eric R. and Larson, William}, | |
| 925 | + title = {Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands}, | |
| 926 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 927 | + year = {2015}, | |
| 928 | + volume = {43}, | |
| 929 | + number = {3}, | |
| 930 | + pages = {609--651}, | |
| 931 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.12082} | |
| 932 | +} | |
| 933 | + | |
| 934 | +@article{han2016askingprice, | |
| 935 | + author = {Han, Lu and Strange, William C.}, | |
| 936 | + title = {What is the role of the asking price for a house?}, | |
| 937 | + journal = {Journal of Urban Economics}, | |
| 938 | + year = {2016}, | |
| 939 | + volume = {93}, | |
| 940 | + pages = {115--130}, | |
| 941 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.008} | |
| 942 | +} | |
| 943 | + | |
| 944 | +@article{han2014biddingwars, | |
| 945 | + author = {Han, Lu and Strange, William C.}, | |
| 946 | + title = {Bidding Wars for Houses}, | |
| 947 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 948 | + year = {2014}, | |
| 949 | + volume = {42}, | |
| 950 | + number = {1}, | |
| 951 | + pages = {1--32}, | |
| 952 | + doi = {10.1111/reec.12015} | |
| 953 | +} | |
| 954 | + | |
| 955 | +@article{jud1996brokerage, | |
| 956 | + author = {Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G. and Winkler, Daniel T.}, | |
| 957 | + title = {Time on the Market: The Impact of Residential Brokerage}, | |
| 958 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | |
| 959 | + year = {1996}, | |
| 960 | + volume = {12}, | |
| 961 | + number = {3}, | |
| 962 | + pages = {447--458}, | |
| 963 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.1996.12090852} | |
| 964 | +} | |
| 965 | + | |
| 966 | +@article{huang2001withdrawal, | |
| 967 | + author = {Huang, Ju-Chin and Palmquist, Raymond B.}, | |
| 968 | + title = {Environmental Conditions, Reservation Prices, and Time on the Market for Housing}, | |
| 969 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 970 | + year = {2001}, | |
| 971 | + volume = {22}, | |
| 972 | + number = {2-3}, | |
| 973 | + pages = {203--219}, | |
| 974 | + doi = {10.1023/a:1007891430162} | |
| 975 | +} | |
| 976 | + | |
| 977 | +@article{campbell2011forced, | |
| 978 | + author = {Campbell, John Y. and Giglio, Stefano and Pathak, Parag}, | |
| 979 | + title = {Forced Sales and House Prices}, | |
| 980 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 981 | + year = {2011}, | |
| 982 | + volume = {101}, | |
| 983 | + number = {5}, | |
| 984 | + pages = {2108--2131}, | |
| 985 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.101.5.2108} | |
| 986 | +} | |
| 987 | + | |
| 988 | +@article{mayer1998auctions, | |
| 989 | + author = {Mayer, Christopher J.}, | |
| 990 | + title = {Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions}, | |
| 991 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 992 | + year = {1998}, | |
| 993 | + volume = {26}, | |
| 994 | + number = {1}, | |
| 995 | + pages = {41--66}, | |
| 996 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00737} | |
| 997 | +} | |
| 998 | + | |
| 999 | +@article{harding2009contagion, | |
| 1000 | + author = {Harding, John P. and Rosenblatt, Eric and Yao, Vincent W.}, | |
| 1001 | + title = {The contagion effect of foreclosed properties}, | |
| 1002 | + journal = {Journal of Urban Economics}, | |
| 1003 | + year = {2009}, | |
| 1004 | + volume = {66}, | |
| 1005 | + number = {3}, | |
| 1006 | + pages = {164--178}, | |
| 1007 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jue.2009.07.003} | |
| 1008 | +} | |
| 1009 | + | |
| 1010 | +@article{anenberg2014foreclosures, | |
| 1011 | + author = {Anenberg, Elliot and Kung, Edward}, | |
| 1012 | + title = {Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures}, | |
| 1013 | + journal = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 1014 | + year = {2014}, | |
| 1015 | + volume = {104}, | |
| 1016 | + number = {8}, | |
| 1017 | + pages = {2527--2551}, | |
| 1018 | + doi = {10.1257/aer.104.8.2527} | |
| 1019 | +} | |
| 1020 | + | |
| 1021 | +@article{mian2015foreclosures, | |
| 1022 | + author = {Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir and Trebbi, Francesco}, | |
| 1023 | + title = {Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy}, | |
| 1024 | + journal = {Journal of Finance}, | |
| 1025 | + year = {2015}, | |
| 1026 | + volume = {70}, | |
| 1027 | + number = {6}, | |
| 1028 | + pages = {2587--2634}, | |
| 1029 | + doi = {10.1111/jofi.12310} | |
| 1030 | +} | |
| 1031 | + | |
| 1032 | +@article{penningtoncross2006reo, | |
| 1033 | + author = {Pennington-Cross, Anthony}, | |
| 1034 | + title = {The Value of Foreclosed Property}, | |
| 1035 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | |
| 1036 | + year = {2006}, | |
| 1037 | + volume = {28}, | |
| 1038 | + number = {2}, | |
| 1039 | + pages = {193--214}, | |
| 1040 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.2006.12091177} | |
| 1041 | +} | |
| 1042 | + | |
| 1043 | +@article{clauretie2009foreclosure, | |
| 1044 | + author = {Clauretie, Terrence M. and Daneshvary, Nasser}, | |
| 1045 | + title = {Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time}, | |
| 1046 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 1047 | + year = {2009}, | |
| 1048 | + volume = {37}, | |
| 1049 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1050 | + pages = {43--67}, | |
| 1051 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00234.x} | |
| 1052 | +} | |
| 1053 | + | |
| 1054 | +@article{andersen2017firesales, | |
| 1055 | + author = {Andersen, Steffen and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner}, | |
| 1056 | + title = {Fire Sales and House Prices: Evidence from Estate Sales Due to Sudden Death}, | |
| 1057 | + journal = {Management Science}, | |
| 1058 | + year = {2017}, | |
| 1059 | + volume = {63}, | |
| 1060 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1061 | + pages = {201--212}, | |
| 1062 | + doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2015.2292} | |
| 1063 | +} | |
| 1064 | + | |
| 1065 | +@article{asabere1992cash, | |
| 1066 | + author = {Asabere, Paul K. and Huffman, Forrest E. and Mehdian, Seyed}, | |
| 1067 | + title = {The Price Effects of Cash versus Mortgage Transactions}, | |
| 1068 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal)}, | |
| 1069 | + year = {1992}, | |
| 1070 | + volume = {20}, | |
| 1071 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1072 | + pages = {141--154}, | |
| 1073 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00576} | |
| 1074 | +} | |
| 1075 | + | |
| 1076 | +@article{jauregui2019fundingprice, | |
| 1077 | + author = {Jauregui, Andres and Tidwell, Alan and Sah, Vivek}, | |
| 1078 | + title = {Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating and Allocating House Transaction Funding Price Differentials}, | |
| 1079 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 1080 | + year = {2019}, | |
| 1081 | + volume = {58}, | |
| 1082 | + number = {3}, | |
| 1083 | + pages = {366--407}, | |
| 1084 | + doi = {10.1007/s11146-018-9661-4} | |
| 1085 | +} | |
| 1086 | + | |
| 1087 | +@article{aroul2023cashdiscount, | |
| 1088 | + author = {Aroul, Ramya R. and Hansz, J. Andrew}, | |
| 1089 | + title = {The impact of cash financing on housing prices: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from a volatile United States market cycle}, | |
| 1090 | + journal = {Journal of Property Research}, | |
| 1091 | + year = {2023}, | |
| 1092 | + volume = {40}, | |
| 1093 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1094 | + pages = {25--52}, | |
| 1095 | + doi = {10.1080/09599916.2022.2119878} | |
| 1096 | +} | |
| 1097 | + | |
| 1098 | +@article{lin2025contingencies, | |
| 1099 | + author = {Lin, Zhenguo and Seiler, Michael J. and Siebert, Ralph B. and Winkler, Daniel T.}, | |
| 1100 | + title = {Selling price, time on the market, and contractual contingencies}, | |
| 1101 | + journal = {Journal of Housing Economics}, | |
| 1102 | + year = {2025}, | |
| 1103 | + volume = {68}, | |
| 1104 | + pages = {102062}, | |
| 1105 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102062} | |
| 1106 | +} | |
| 1107 | + | |
| 1108 | +@article{anenberg2019creditavailability, | |
| 1109 | + author = {Anenberg, Elliot and Hizmo, Aurel and Kung, Edward and Molloy, Raven}, | |
| 1110 | + title = {Measuring mortgage credit availability: A frontier estimation approach}, | |
| 1111 | + journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, | |
| 1112 | + year = {2019}, | |
| 1113 | + volume = {34}, | |
| 1114 | + number = {6}, | |
| 1115 | + pages = {865--882}, | |
| 1116 | + doi = {10.1002/jae.2720} | |
| 1117 | +} | |
| 1118 | + | |
| 1119 | +@article{bhutta2021insurance, | |
| 1120 | + author = {Bhutta, Neil and Ringo, Daniel}, | |
| 1121 | + title = {The effect of interest rates on home buying: Evidence from a shock to mortgage insurance premiums}, | |
| 1122 | + journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, | |
| 1123 | + year = {2021}, | |
| 1124 | + volume = {118}, | |
| 1125 | + pages = {195--211}, | |
| 1126 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.10.001} | |
| 1127 | +} | |
| 1128 | + | |
| 1129 | +@article{fuster2019technology, | |
| 1130 | + author = {Fuster, Andreas and Plosser, Matthew and Schnabl, Philipp and Vickery, James}, | |
| 1131 | + title = {The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending}, | |
| 1132 | + journal = {Review of Financial Studies}, | |
| 1133 | + year = {2019}, | |
| 1134 | + volume = {32}, | |
| 1135 | + number = {5}, | |
| 1136 | + pages = {1854--1899}, | |
| 1137 | + doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhz018} | |
| 1138 | +} | |
| 1139 | + | |
| 1140 | +@article{defusco2020leverage, | |
| 1141 | + author = {DeFusco, Anthony A. and Johnson, Stephanie and Mondragon, John}, | |
| 1142 | + title = {Regulating Household Leverage}, | |
| 1143 | + journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, | |
| 1144 | + year = {2020}, | |
| 1145 | + volume = {87}, | |
| 1146 | + number = {2}, | |
| 1147 | + pages = {914--958}, | |
| 1148 | + doi = {10.1093/restud/rdz040} | |
| 1149 | +} | |
| 1150 | + | |
| 1151 | +@article{allen2019searchfrictions, | |
| 1152 | + author = {Allen, Jason and Clark, Robert and Houde, Jean-François}, | |
| 1153 | + title = {Search Frictions and Market Power in {Negotiated-Price} Markets}, | |
| 1154 | + journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, | |
| 1155 | + year = {2019}, | |
| 1156 | + volume = {127}, | |
| 1157 | + number = {4}, | |
| 1158 | + pages = {1550--1598}, | |
| 1159 | + doi = {10.1086/701684} | |
| 1160 | +} | |
| 1161 | + | |
| 1162 | +@article{buchak2026ibuyers, | |
| 1163 | + author = {Buchak, Greg and Matvos, Gregor and Piskorski, Tomasz and Seru, Amit}, | |
| 1164 | + title = {Why Is Intermediating Houses So Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers}, | |
| 1165 | + journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, | |
| 1166 | + year = {2026}, | |
| 1167 | + volume = {forthcoming}, | |
| 1168 | + number = {NBER WP 28252, 2020, rev. 2025}, | |
| 1169 | + doi = {10.1086/742710} | |
| 1170 | +} | |
| 1171 | + | |
| 1172 | +@article{gatzlaff1997selection, | |
| 1173 | + author = {Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.}, | |
| 1174 | + title = {Sample Selection Bias and {Repeat-Sales} Index Estimates}, | |
| 1175 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 1176 | + year = {1997}, | |
| 1177 | + volume = {14}, | |
| 1178 | + number = {1-2}, | |
| 1179 | + pages = {33--50}, | |
| 1180 | + doi = {10.1023/a:1007763816289} | |
| 1181 | +} | |
| 1182 | + | |
| 1183 | +@article{gatzlaff1998selection, | |
| 1184 | + author = {Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.}, | |
| 1185 | + title = {Sample Selection and Biases in Local House Value Indices}, | |
| 1186 | + journal = {Journal of Urban Economics}, | |
| 1187 | + year = {1998}, | |
| 1188 | + volume = {43}, | |
| 1189 | + number = {2}, | |
| 1190 | + pages = {199--222}, | |
| 1191 | + doi = {10.1006/juec.1997.2045} | |
| 1192 | +} | |
| 1193 | + | |
| 1194 | +@article{hwang2004selectivity, | |
| 1195 | + author = {Hwang, Min and Quigley, John M.}, | |
| 1196 | + title = {Selectivity, Quality Adjustment and Mean Reversion in the Measurement of House Values}, | |
| 1197 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 1198 | + year = {2004}, | |
| 1199 | + volume = {28}, | |
| 1200 | + number = {2-3}, | |
| 1201 | + pages = {161--178}, | |
| 1202 | + doi = {10.1023/b:real.0000011152.40485.12} | |
| 1203 | +} | |
| 1204 | + | |
| 1205 | +@article{goetzmann2006reservation, | |
| 1206 | + author = {Goetzmann, William and Peng, Liang}, | |
| 1207 | + title = {Estimating House Price Indexes in the Presence of Seller Reservation Prices}, | |
| 1208 | + journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, | |
| 1209 | + year = {2006}, | |
| 1210 | + volume = {88}, | |
| 1211 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1212 | + pages = {100--112}, | |
| 1213 | + doi = {10.1162/003465306775565783} | |
| 1214 | +} | |
| 1215 | + | |
| 1216 | +@article{jud1994selection, | |
| 1217 | + author = {Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G.}, | |
| 1218 | + title = {Sample Selection Bias in Estimating Housing Sales Prices}, | |
| 1219 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | |
| 1220 | + year = {1994}, | |
| 1221 | + volume = {9}, | |
| 1222 | + number = {3}, | |
| 1223 | + pages = {289--298}, | |
| 1224 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.1994.12090753} | |
| 1225 | +} | |
| 1226 | + | |
| 1227 | +@techreport{case1989efficiency, | |
| 1228 | + author = {Case, Karl E. and Shiller, Robert J.}, | |
| 1229 | + title = {The Efficiency of the Market for {Single-Family} Homes}, | |
| 1230 | + institution = {American Economic Review}, | |
| 1231 | + year = {1989}, | |
| 1232 | + number = {79}, | |
| 1233 | + url = {https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v79y1989i1p125-37.html} | |
| 1234 | +} | |
| 1235 | + | |
| 1236 | +@article{bailey1963repeatsales, | |
| 1237 | + author = {Bailey, Martin J. and Muth, Richard F. and Nourse, Hugh O.}, | |
| 1238 | + title = {A Regression Method for Real Estate Price Index Construction}, | |
| 1239 | + journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, | |
| 1240 | + year = {1963}, | |
| 1241 | + volume = {58}, | |
| 1242 | + number = {304}, | |
| 1243 | + pages = {933--942}, | |
| 1244 | + doi = {10.1080/01621459.1963.10480679} | |
| 1245 | +} | |
| 1246 | + | |
| 1247 | +@article{clapp1992assessed, | |
| 1248 | + author = {Clapp, John M. and Giaccotto, Carmelo}, | |
| 1249 | + title = {Estimating Price Indices for Residential Property: A Comparison of Repeat Sales and Assessed Value Methods}, | |
| 1250 | + journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, | |
| 1251 | + year = {1992}, | |
| 1252 | + volume = {87}, | |
| 1253 | + number = {418}, | |
| 1254 | + pages = {300--306}, | |
| 1255 | + doi = {10.2307/2290260} | |
| 1256 | +} | |
| 1257 | + | |
| 1258 | +@article{harding2003bargainingpower, | |
| 1259 | + author = {Harding, John P. and Rosenthal, Stuart S. and Sirmans, C. F.}, | |
| 1260 | + title = {Estimating Bargaining Power in the Market for Existing Homes}, | |
| 1261 | + journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, | |
| 1262 | + year = {2003}, | |
| 1263 | + volume = {85}, | |
| 1264 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1265 | + pages = {178--188}, | |
| 1266 | + doi = {10.1162/003465303762687794} | |
| 1267 | +} | |
| 1268 | + | |
| 1269 | +@article{harding2003bargainingeffects, | |
| 1270 | + author = {Harding, John P. and Knight, John R. and Sirmans, C. F.}, | |
| 1271 | + title = {Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market}, | |
| 1272 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 1273 | + year = {2003}, | |
| 1274 | + volume = {31}, | |
| 1275 | + number = {4}, | |
| 1276 | + pages = {601--622}, | |
| 1277 | + doi = {10.1046/j.1080-8620.2003.00078.x} | |
| 1278 | +} | |
| 1279 | + | |
| 1280 | +@article{kurlat2015asymmetries, | |
| 1281 | + author = {Kurlat, Pablo and Stroebel, Johannes}, | |
| 1282 | + title = {Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets}, | |
| 1283 | + journal = {Review of Financial Studies}, | |
| 1284 | + year = {2015}, | |
| 1285 | + volume = {28}, | |
| 1286 | + number = {8}, | |
| 1287 | + pages = {2429--2461}, | |
| 1288 | + doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhv028} | |
| 1289 | +} | |
| 1290 | + | |
| 1291 | +@article{garmaise2004asymmetries, | |
| 1292 | + author = {Garmaise, Mark J. and Moskowitz, Tobias J.}, | |
| 1293 | + title = {Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real Estate Markets}, | |
| 1294 | + journal = {Review of Financial Studies}, | |
| 1295 | + year = {2004}, | |
| 1296 | + volume = {17}, | |
| 1297 | + number = {2}, | |
| 1298 | + pages = {405--437}, | |
| 1299 | + doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhg037} | |
| 1300 | +} | |
| 1301 | + | |
| 1302 | +@article{cheng2013liquidityrisk, | |
| 1303 | + author = {Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun}, | |
| 1304 | + title = {Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets}, | |
| 1305 | + journal = {Financial Review}, | |
| 1306 | + year = {2013}, | |
| 1307 | + volume = {48}, | |
| 1308 | + number = {4}, | |
| 1309 | + pages = {671--696}, | |
| 1310 | + doi = {10.1111/fire.12020} | |
| 1311 | +} | |
| 1312 | + | |
| 1313 | +@article{fisher2007tbi, | |
| 1314 | + author = {Fisher, Jeff and Geltner, David and Pollakowski, Henry}, | |
| 1315 | + title = {A Quarterly Transactions-based Index of Institutional Real Estate Investment Performance and Movements in Supply and Demand}, | |
| 1316 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 1317 | + year = {2007}, | |
| 1318 | + volume = {34}, | |
| 1319 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1320 | + pages = {5--33}, | |
| 1321 | + doi = {10.1007/s11146-007-9001-6} | |
| 1322 | +} | |
| 1323 | + | |
| 1324 | +@article{clayton2008liquidity, | |
| 1325 | + author = {Clayton, Jim and MacKinnon, Greg and Peng, Liang}, | |
| 1326 | + title = {Time Variation of Liquidity in the Private Real Estate Market: An Empirical Investigation}, | |
| 1327 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | |
| 1328 | + year = {2008}, | |
| 1329 | + volume = {30}, | |
| 1330 | + number = {2}, | |
| 1331 | + pages = {125--160}, | |
| 1332 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.2008.12091217} | |
| 1333 | +} | |
| 1334 | + | |
| 1335 | +@article{clayton2010pricevolume, | |
| 1336 | + author = {Clayton, Jim and Miller, Norman and Peng, Liang}, | |
| 1337 | + title = {Price-volume Correlation in the Housing Market: Causality and Co-movements}, | |
| 1338 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 1339 | + year = {2010}, | |
| 1340 | + volume = {40}, | |
| 1341 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1342 | + pages = {14--40}, | |
| 1343 | + doi = {10.1007/s11146-008-9128-0} | |
| 1344 | +} | |
| 1345 | + | |
| 1346 | +@article{berkovec1996turnover, | |
| 1347 | + author = {Berkovec, James A. and Goodman, John L.}, | |
| 1348 | + title = {Turnover as a Measure of Demand for Existing Homes}, | |
| 1349 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 1350 | + year = {1996}, | |
| 1351 | + volume = {24}, | |
| 1352 | + number = {4}, | |
| 1353 | + pages = {421--440}, | |
| 1354 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.00698} | |
| 1355 | +} | |
| 1356 | + | |
| 1357 | +@article{hort2000turnover, | |
| 1358 | + author = {Hort, Katinka}, | |
| 1359 | + title = {Prices and turnover in the market for owner-occupied homes}, | |
| 1360 | + journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, | |
| 1361 | + year = {2000}, | |
| 1362 | + volume = {30}, | |
| 1363 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1364 | + pages = {99--119}, | |
| 1365 | + doi = {10.1016/s0166-0462(99)00028-9} | |
| 1366 | +} | |
| 1367 | + | |
| 1368 | +@article{andrew2003transactions, | |
| 1369 | + author = {Andrew, Mark and Meen, Geoffrey}, | |
| 1370 | + title = {House Price Appreciation, Transactions and Structural Change in the British Housing Market: A Macroeconomic Perspective}, | |
| 1371 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | |
| 1372 | + year = {2003}, | |
| 1373 | + volume = {31}, | |
| 1374 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1375 | + pages = {99--116}, | |
| 1376 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1080-8620.2003.00059.x} | |
| 1377 | +} | |
| 1378 | + | |
| 1379 | +@techreport{leamer2007businesscycle, | |
| 1380 | + author = {Leamer, Edward E.}, | |
| 1381 | + title = {Housing {IS} the Business Cycle}, | |
| 1382 | + institution = {NBER Working Paper 13428 (also Proceedings, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 149-233)}, | |
| 1383 | + year = {2007}, | |
| 1384 | + number = {NBER}, | |
| 1385 | + doi = {10.3386/w13428} | |
| 1386 | +} | |
| 1387 | + | |
| 1388 | +@article{dachis2012transfertax, | |
| 1389 | + author = {Dachis, Ben and Duranton, Gilles and Turner, Matthew A.}, | |
| 1390 | + title = {The effects of land transfer taxes on real estate markets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto}, | |
| 1391 | + journal = {Journal of Economic Geography}, | |
| 1392 | + year = {2012}, | |
| 1393 | + volume = {12}, | |
| 1394 | + number = {2}, | |
| 1395 | + pages = {327--354}, | |
| 1396 | + doi = {10.1093/jeg/lbr007} | |
| 1397 | +} | |
| 1398 | + | |
| 1399 | +@article{carrillo2012potatoes, | |
| 1400 | + author = {Carrillo, Paul E. and Pope, Jaren C.}, | |
| 1401 | + title = {Are homes hot or cold potatoes? The distribution of marketing time in the housing market}, | |
| 1402 | + journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, | |
| 1403 | + year = {2012}, | |
| 1404 | + volume = {42}, | |
| 1405 | + number = {1-2}, | |
| 1406 | + pages = {189--197}, | |
| 1407 | + doi = {10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.08.010} | |
| 1408 | +} | |
| 1409 | + | |
| 1410 | +@article{benefield2015measurement, | |
| 1411 | + author = {Benefield, Justin D. and Hardin, William G.}, | |
| 1412 | + title = {Does {Time-on-Market} Measurement Matter?}, | |
| 1413 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | |
| 1414 | + year = {2015}, | |
| 1415 | + volume = {50}, | |
| 1416 | + number = {1}, | |
| 1417 | + pages = {52--73}, | |
| 1418 | + doi = {10.1007/s11146-013-9450-z} | |
| 1419 | +} | |
| 1420 | + | |
| 1421 | +@article{anglin2006liquidity, | |
| 1422 | + author = {Anglin, Paul M.}, | |
| 1423 | + title = {Value and liquidity under changing market conditions}, | |
| 1424 | + journal = {Journal of Housing Economics}, | |
| 1425 | + year = {2006}, | |
| 1426 | + volume = {15}, | |
| 1427 | + number = {4}, | |
| 1428 | + pages = {293--304}, | |
| 1429 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jhe.2006.10.003} | |
| 1430 | +} | |
added
paper/sections/abstract.tex
+16 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\newcommand{\WPabstract}{% | |
| 2 | +This paper studies how search frictions, heterogeneous seller urgency, financing frictions and bargaining jointly determine | |
| 3 | +the liquidity discount, transaction prices, sale hazards and price dispersion in a local housing market. In a continuous-time | |
| 4 | +matching model with free entry of buyers, sellers differ in a permanent carrying cost, buyers draw match-specific valuations, and | |
| 5 | +prices are set by Nash bargaining. The urgency discount, defined relative to the most patient seller, is nonnegative and | |
| 6 | +increasing in the carrying cost, and the expected price falls by less than the reservation price. A fall in buyer arrivals or | |
| 7 | +in mortgage qualification lowers prices, lengthens time on market and widens the discount when the valuation distribution has | |
| 8 | +an increasing failure rate; with heavy-tailed valuations a more liquid market can lengthen time on market, under an explicit | |
| 9 | +condition on the carrying cost. Liquidity shocks move prices, volume, inventory and durations with no change in housing-service | |
| 10 | +values, and buyer entry amplifies them. The gap between mortgage and cash prices decomposes into a delay-bargaining term that | |
| 11 | +rises with urgency, an outside-option term, and a selection term that can be negative. The composition of transactions shifts | |
| 12 | +after a liquidity shock in a direction governed by the shape of the valuation distribution, and its effect on a | |
| 13 | +transaction-price index is an order of magnitude smaller than the within-type liquidity effect, which no quality adjustment | |
| 14 | +removes. The Walrasian free-entry price is shown not to be a liquidity premium benchmark, since search prices exceed it in thick | |
| 15 | +markets. Results are illustrated numerically with a documented parameterisation and reproducible code; no data are used.% | |
| 16 | +} | |
added
paper/sections/baseline.tex
+118 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{The baseline equilibrium} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:baseline} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +\subsection{Tightness, durations and prices} | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +Figure~\ref{fig:equilibrium} shows the free-entry residual and the matching technology. The residual is strictly decreasing in | |
| 7 | +tightness and crosses zero once, at $\theta^*=\thetaBase$ buyers per listing, so the equilibrium is unique in the baseline; the | |
| 8 | +same sign pattern obtains in all \uniqDraws{} random parameter draws of Section~\ref{sec:robustness}. At this tightness a | |
| 9 | +listing meets a qualified buyer \LamSBase{} times per year and a buyer meets a listing \LamBBase{} times per year. | |
| 10 | +Table~\ref{tab:baseline} reports the baseline moments and Table~\ref{tab:types} the cross-section by seller type. | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 13 | +\centering | |
| 14 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig01_equilibrium_matching.pdf} | |
| 15 | +\caption{Free entry and matching in the baseline. Panel (a): the free-entry residual $R(\theta)$ (model-generated, baseline | |
| 16 | +parameterisation of Table~\ref{tab:parameters}) and its unique root. Panel (b): seller and buyer meeting rates implied by the | |
| 17 | +Cobb--Douglas matching function; the dashed line marks equilibrium tightness.} | |
| 18 | +\label{fig:equilibrium} | |
| 19 | +\end{figure} | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 22 | +\centering | |
| 23 | +\caption{Baseline stationary equilibrium: aggregate moments (model-generated)} | |
| 24 | +\label{tab:baseline} | |
| 25 | +\small | |
| 26 | +\input{tables/tab02_baseline_moments} | |
| 27 | +\end{table} | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +The most patient sellers accept \accPatientBase{} percent of qualified offers and sell at the hazard \etaPatientBase{} per year; | |
| 30 | +the most urgent accept \accUrgentBase{} percent and sell at \etaUrgentBase{} per year. The mean time on market of houses that | |
| 31 | +sell is \tomBase{} months and \soldShareBase{} percent of listings eventually sell; the remainder are withdrawn. A buyer searches | |
| 32 | +for \buyerDurBase{} months on average, longer than a seller because free entry crowds the buyer side of the market until the | |
| 33 | +surplus a buyer expects per meeting just covers the cost of searching. The transaction-weighted mean price is \priceBase, close to | |
| 34 | +the mean buyer valuation by construction of the units, with reservation prices between \VUrgentBase{} and \VPatientBase. | |
| 35 | + | |
| 36 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 37 | +\centering | |
| 38 | +\caption{Baseline cross-section by seller type (model-generated; $c$ in units of value per year, durations in months)} | |
| 39 | +\label{tab:types} | |
| 40 | +\footnotesize | |
| 41 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab02b_baseline_types}} | |
| 42 | +\begin{tablenotes} | |
| 43 | +\footnotesize | |
| 44 | +\item Note: $f(c)$ is the listing composition, ``stock share'' the share of type $c$ in the stock of listings and ``sales share'' | |
| 45 | +its share in transactions. $D(c)$ is the urgency discount \eqref{eq:Ddef}. | |
| 46 | +\end{tablenotes} | |
| 47 | +\end{table} | |
| 48 | + | |
| 49 | +\subsection{The urgency discount and its attenuation} | |
| 50 | + | |
| 51 | +The most urgent sellers obtain \pbarUrgentBase{} against \pbarPatientBase{} for the most patient, an urgency discount of | |
| 52 | +\DurgentBase{} percent; weighted by transactions the discount is \DmeanBase{} percent because most sellers are patient. The | |
| 53 | +reservation-price gap between the two extreme types is larger than the gap in expected prices, as Proposition~\ref{prop:urgency}(iii) | |
| 54 | +predicts: urgent sellers accept lower valuations, but conditional on acceptance the buyer's surplus is larger, and the seller's | |
| 55 | +share of it recovers part of the concession. Figures~\ref{fig:urgency_price} and~\ref{fig:urgency_hazard} trace the reservation | |
| 56 | +value, the expected price, the sale hazard and the expected duration along a fine grid of carrying costs for five levels of | |
| 57 | +matching efficiency, holding tightness at its baseline value. Three properties of Proposition~\ref{prop:urgency} and | |
| 58 | +\ref{prop:arrival} are visible. The schedules are monotone in $c$; they shift down (prices) and up (hazards) when matching | |
| 59 | +efficiency falls; and they become steeper, so that the gap between patient and urgent sellers widens when the market is less | |
| 60 | +liquid. The slope of the reservation value equals the analytic expression $-1/[(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(c)]$ along the whole grid. | |
| 61 | + | |
| 62 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 63 | +\centering | |
| 64 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig02_urgency_reservation_price.pdf} | |
| 65 | +\caption{Urgency, reservation values and expected prices (model-generated, partial equilibrium with tightness fixed at its | |
| 66 | +baseline value). Each curve corresponds to a multiple of baseline matching efficiency; the effective arrival rate $\Lambda_s$ is | |
| 67 | +given in the legend. Panel (a): reservation value $V(c)$. Panel (b): expected transaction price $\bar p(c)$ conditional on sale.} | |
| 68 | +\label{fig:urgency_price} | |
| 69 | +\end{figure} | |
| 70 | + | |
| 71 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 72 | +\centering | |
| 73 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig03_urgency_sale_hazard.pdf} | |
| 74 | +\caption{Urgency and the sale hazard (model-generated, partial equilibrium). Panel (a): sale hazard $\eta(c)$ per year for five | |
| 75 | +levels of matching efficiency; dots mark the nine baseline types. Panel (b): expected listing duration in months.} | |
| 76 | +\label{fig:urgency_hazard} | |
| 77 | +\end{figure} | |
| 78 | + | |
| 79 | +\subsection{Dispersion, survival and duration dependence} | |
| 80 | + | |
| 81 | +Among identical houses the standard deviation of transaction prices is \sdPriceBase{} percent of the mean, of which | |
| 82 | +\betweenShareBase{} percent of the variance is between seller types and the remainder reflects the match-specific component of | |
| 83 | +the Nash price. Figure~\ref{fig:price_dist} shows the mixture density of prices by seller type: urgent sellers populate the left | |
| 84 | +tail, and a fall in matching efficiency shifts and widens the whole distribution. Figure~\ref{fig:survival} shows the survival | |
| 85 | +functions of listings for three types and for the population, and the population exit hazard, which declines with duration as | |
| 86 | +Lemma~\ref{lem:duration} requires although every individual hazard is constant. The decline is modest in the baseline because | |
| 87 | +the dispersion of hazards across types is modest; it would be invisible in a sample of the size usually available, which is why | |
| 88 | +the duration literature's finding of positive dependence \citep{zuehlke1987duration,jud1996brokerage} is not evidence against | |
| 89 | +heterogeneity but evidence that other mechanisms, such as list-price revisions and learning \citep{knight2002listing, | |
| 90 | +anenberg2016information}, dominate. | |
| 91 | + | |
| 92 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 93 | +\centering | |
| 94 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig08_seller_type_price_distributions.pdf} | |
| 95 | +\caption{Transaction-price distributions among identical houses (model-generated). Panel (a): mixture density of transaction | |
| 96 | +prices in the baseline, stacked by seller type from the most patient (light) to the most urgent (dark). Panel (b): the same | |
| 97 | +density at baseline matching efficiency and at 60 percent of it.} | |
| 98 | +\label{fig:price_dist} | |
| 99 | +\end{figure} | |
| 100 | + | |
| 101 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 102 | +\centering | |
| 103 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig07_tom_survival.pdf} | |
| 104 | +\caption{Survival of listings and duration dependence (model-generated). Panel (a): survival functions of three seller types and | |
| 105 | +of the population mixture. Panel (b): population exit hazard (sale or withdrawal) as a function of elapsed duration; individual | |
| 106 | +hazards are constant.} | |
| 107 | +\label{fig:survival} | |
| 108 | +\end{figure} | |
| 109 | + | |
| 110 | +\subsection{The Walrasian benchmark} | |
| 111 | + | |
| 112 | +The frictionless free-entry price is $p^*=\pstarBase$ and the market liquidity gap is $\Gamma=\GammaBase$ percent in the baseline. | |
| 113 | +Figure~\ref{fig:discount}(c) traces $\Gamma$ for the patient type across effective arrival rates from 0.05 to 2{,}000 per year: the | |
| 114 | +gap is 43 percent in a frozen market, falls monotonically, and turns negative beyond about \GammaCrossLam{} contacts per year, as | |
| 115 | +Proposition~\ref{prop:arrival}(iv) predicts. At that point the seller's option to wait for a high-valuation buyer is worth more | |
| 116 | +than the delay costs, and the search price exceeds the uniform Walrasian price. The baseline is far from this region, so the | |
| 117 | +gap is positive and of the same order as the discounts reported for distressed sales, but the sign change is the reason the paper | |
| 118 | +does not interpret $\Gamma$ as a liquidity premium. | |
added
paper/sections/benchmark.tex
+62 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Institutional intuition and the frictionless benchmark} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:benchmark} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +A house is sold through a sequence of costly events: a listing, visits and offers from buyers who arrive at random, a | |
| 5 | +negotiation in which the seller's willingness to wait and the buyer's alternatives both matter, and, for most buyers, a financing | |
| 6 | +step whose outcome is uncertain and takes time. During this sequence the seller pays a carrying cost that differs across | |
| 7 | +sellers: mortgage interest and maintenance for all, the cost of a second residence or a bridge loan for those who have already | |
| 8 | +moved, and the psychological or financial cost of an unresolved sale for those under distress. The evidence reviewed in | |
| 9 | +Section~\ref{sec:literature} shows that these costs translate into prices and durations in a systematic way: motivated, | |
| 10 | +relocated and foreclosed sellers obtain lower prices and sell faster, and the discount they accept is larger when the market is | |
| 11 | +thin. The purpose of the model is to make this logic explicit in a setting where the arrival of buyers, the acceptance decisions | |
| 12 | +of sellers of different urgency, the price that results from bargaining, and the entry of buyers that determines how many of | |
| 13 | +them there are per listing, are all determined jointly. | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +Two benchmarks are used throughout, and they answer different questions. The first is the most patient seller in the same | |
| 16 | +market. Sellers who differ only in their carrying cost face the same buyers, the same matching technology and the same | |
| 17 | +bargaining protocol, so the gap between their expected transaction prices isolates the price of urgency. The \emph{urgency | |
| 18 | +discount} of a seller with carrying cost $c$ is defined relative to the most patient type, | |
| 19 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 20 | +D(c)\equiv\frac{\bar p(c_L)-\bar p(c)}{\bar p(c_L)}, | |
| 21 | +\label{eq:Ddef} | |
| 22 | +\end{equation} | |
| 23 | +where $\bar p(c)$ is the expected transaction price conditional on a sale. This is the model counterpart of the forced-sale | |
| 24 | +discount measured by \citet{campbell2011forced} or \citet{andersen2017firesales}: a comparison among houses that are identical | |
| 25 | +except for the circumstances of their owners. Proposition~\ref{prop:urgency} shows that $D(c)$ is nonnegative and increasing in | |
| 26 | +$c$ under weak conditions, so that it can be called a discount without further qualification. | |
| 27 | + | |
| 28 | +The second benchmark is a frictionless market. Consider the same buyers, with the same entry cost $k$, the same distribution $G$ | |
| 29 | +of match-specific valuations $w$ and the same discount rate $r$, but suppose that buyers meet listings instantly and that each | |
| 30 | +house trades at a uniform price $p^*$ at which the buyer either buys or walks away. With free entry, buyers enter until the | |
| 31 | +expected gain from an immediate purchase equals the entry cost: | |
| 32 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 33 | +\int (w-p^*)^+\,dG(w)=rk\qquad\Longleftrightarrow\qquad H(p^*)=rk, | |
| 34 | +\label{eq:pstar} | |
| 35 | +\end{equation} | |
| 36 | +where $H(v)\equiv\int(w-v)^+dG(w)$ is the expected surplus function that recurs throughout the paper.\footnote{The entry | |
| 37 | +cost is a stock and the surplus flow is a present value; equating the flow equivalent $rk$ to the expected surplus of a single | |
| 38 | +immediate purchase is the Walrasian counterpart of the free-entry condition of the search economy, where the value of an active | |
| 39 | +buyer equals $k$. Details are in Appendix~\ref{app:proofs}.} Sellers in this benchmark trade immediately at $p^*$ and pay no | |
| 40 | +carrying cost, so $p^*$ does not depend on $c$, on tightness, on bargaining power or on matching efficiency. The \emph{market | |
| 41 | +liquidity gap} is defined as | |
| 42 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 43 | +\Gamma\equiv\frac{p^*-\bar p_T}{p^*}, | |
| 44 | +\label{eq:Gammadef} | |
| 45 | +\end{equation} | |
| 46 | +where $\bar p_T$ is the transaction-weighted mean price of the search economy. It would be natural to call $\Gamma$ the liquidity | |
| 47 | +premium of the housing market, and the sign convention $D=(p^*-p)/p^*$ suggests that it should be positive. It is not: search | |
| 48 | +delays and carrying costs push transaction prices below $p^*$, but in a search market with bargaining a seller also has the option | |
| 49 | +to wait for a buyer with a high match-specific valuation and to capture part of that valuation, an option that the uniform-price | |
| 50 | +benchmark rules out. Proposition~\ref{prop:arrival}(iv) shows that $\Gamma$ is positive in thin markets and negative in | |
| 51 | +sufficiently thick ones. The paper therefore reports $\Gamma$ as a decomposition and reserves the term liquidity discount for | |
| 52 | +$D(c)$ and its transaction-weighted average $\bar D=\int D(c)\,\omega(c)\,dc$, where $\omega$ is the composition of transactions | |
| 53 | +across seller types. Two further objects are used: the \emph{seller's liquidity cost} $L(c)=c/(r+\delta+\eta(c))$, the expected | |
| 54 | +discounted carrying cost paid over a listing spell with sale hazard $\eta(c)$ and withdrawal hazard $\delta$, and the | |
| 55 | +\emph{reservation-value gap} $V(c_L)-V(c)$ between the most patient and a type-$c$ seller. A buyer's willingness to pay to avoid | |
| 56 | +search is a distinct object, measured by the buyer's value $U$, and is not reported as a price discount. | |
| 57 | + | |
| 58 | +The distinction between the two benchmarks matters for interpretation. Because the model has no quality heterogeneity within a | |
| 59 | +market segment (quality is a scale factor, Lemma~\ref{lem:scale}), every price gap it produces is a gap among identical houses. In | |
| 60 | +data, the comparison of forced and unforced sales also requires conditioning on quality and condition, and | |
| 61 | +\citet{clauretie2009foreclosure} show that about a third of naive foreclosure discounts disappears once this is done. The urgency | |
| 62 | +discount $D(c)$ is the part that survives such conditioning; the model is silent on the part that does not. | |
added
paper/sections/conclusion.tex
+48 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Limitations, falsifiable predictions and conclusion} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:conclusion} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +\subsection{Limitations} | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +The model is stationary and local, with exogenous listing inflow, no construction and no spillovers across segments. Urgency is a | |
| 7 | +permanent, nonnegative carrying cost, so sellers whose reservation price rises with their constraints, as in | |
| 8 | +\citet{genesove1997equity} and \citet{genesove2001lossaversion}, and mechanisms that generate positive duration dependence, such as | |
| 9 | +list-price revisions, learning \citep{anenberg2016information} and stigma \citep{taylor1999time}, are outside its scope. | |
| 10 | +Information is complete within a match, so the adverse-selection channels of \citet{kurlat2015asymmetries} and | |
| 11 | +\citet{garmaise2004asymmetries} are absent. Buyers never exit, which makes the financing extension inadmissible when the approval | |
| 12 | +probability is low. The welfare criterion is a steady-state flow, and the welfare results are numerical statements for that | |
| 13 | +criterion. Transition paths assume unanticipated shocks and free entry at every instant, which makes prices jump; anticipation or | |
| 14 | +sluggish entry would smooth them. Quality is a scale factor, so the correlation between distress and condition that confounds | |
| 15 | +measured forced-sale discounts \citep{clauretie2009foreclosure} is not modelled. Finally, no data were used: all magnitudes are | |
| 16 | +illustrative, and the paper claims nothing about any particular market. | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +\subsection{Falsifiable predictions} | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +Six predictions distinguish the mechanism from its alternatives. (1) Among observationally identical houses, the price | |
| 21 | +concession of urgent sellers is larger, and their sale hazard higher, in markets with fewer buyers per listing. (2) The dispersion | |
| 22 | +of prices among identical houses rises when matching efficiency or qualification falls. (3) After a liquidity shock, within-type | |
| 23 | +prices adjust at once while inventories and volumes adjust over months, and a temporary shock is followed by a rebound of sales. | |
| 24 | +(4) The cash--mortgage gap rises with seller urgency and with approval delay, and its selection component can be negative for | |
| 25 | +patient sellers, so that measured gaps understate the delay-bargaining compensation when sellers are patient. (5) The | |
| 26 | +steady-state sales-to-listings ratio falls with liquidity only in markets with non-trivial withdrawal. (6) In segments with | |
| 27 | +heavy-tailed buyer valuations, greater buyer traffic can lengthen the time on market of urgent sellers. The natural data are | |
| 28 | +listing-level records with time on market, withdrawals, financing type and a proxy for the seller's circumstances, as in | |
| 29 | +\citet{glower1998motivation} or \citet{andersen2017firesales}, with the competing-risks structure that Lemma~\ref{lem:duration} | |
| 30 | +implies. | |
| 31 | + | |
| 32 | +\subsection{Conclusion} | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +The paper has formalised the housing liquidity discount as the price of urgency in a search market and has shown how it is | |
| 35 | +determined jointly with sale hazards, tightness and the composition of transactions. Four results carry the weight. The expected | |
| 36 | +transaction price falls with the seller's carrying cost by less than the reservation price does, and the gap between patient and | |
| 37 | +urgent sellers widens when buyers are scarce, provided the distribution of buyer valuations has an increasing failure rate; with | |
| 38 | +heavy-tailed valuations a more liquid market can lengthen time on market, under a condition that depends on the seller's | |
| 39 | +carrying cost but not on the arrival rate. A fall in matching efficiency or in qualification moves prices, volume, inventory and | |
| 40 | +durations together with no change in the distribution of housing-service values, and buyer entry amplifies the response. The | |
| 41 | +composition of transactions changes after such a shock in a direction that depends on the shape of the valuation distribution, | |
| 42 | +and its effect on a transaction-price index is an order of magnitude smaller than the within-type liquidity effect that no | |
| 43 | +quality adjustment can remove. The gap between what mortgage and cash buyers pay decomposes into a delay-bargaining term that | |
| 44 | +rises with urgency and whose sign depends on who bears the larger cost of waiting, an outside-option term, and a selection term | |
| 45 | +that can be negative. The frictionless benchmark against which these objects are measured is not a liquidity premium in the | |
| 46 | +usual sense, since a seller with the option to wait for a high-valuation buyer may obtain more than the Walrasian price in a | |
| 47 | +sufficiently thick market. The next step is empirical: the predictions above are stated in terms of objects that listing-level | |
| 48 | +data can measure. | |
added
paper/sections/counterfactuals.tex
+304 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Counterfactuals: arrivals, financing, heterogeneity, dynamics and selection} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:counterfactuals} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +Each experiment of this section was pre-registered with a hypothesis, run from the stored configuration, and saved with its | |
| 5 | +diagnostics before any text was written; the hypotheses and outcomes are listed in Appendix~\ref{app:extra}. | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +\subsection{A collapse in buyer arrivals} | |
| 8 | +\label{sec:arrival} | |
| 9 | + | |
| 10 | +Table~\ref{tab:compstat} and Figure~\ref{fig:discount} vary matching efficiency between 20 and 300 percent of its baseline | |
| 11 | +value, in general equilibrium (tightness re-solved) and in partial equilibrium (tightness fixed). Halving $A$ lowers the | |
| 12 | +transaction-weighted price by \priceDropHalfA{} percent in general equilibrium against \priceDropHalfAPE{} percent with tightness | |
| 13 | +fixed, lengthens the time on market of sales from \tomBase{} to \tomHalfA{} months, raises the inventory of listings from | |
| 14 | +\inventoryBase{} to \inventoryHalfA, lowers tightness from \thetaBase{} to \thetaHalfA, and raises the urgency discount of the | |
| 15 | +most urgent type from \DurgentBase{} to \DurgentHalfA{} percent. The amplification through entry is modest but systematic: the | |
| 16 | +elasticity of the effective contact rate with respect to matching efficiency is \elAGELam{} in general equilibrium against | |
| 17 | +exactly one in partial equilibrium, and the elasticities of prices and durations are correspondingly larger | |
| 18 | +(\elAGEPrice{} against \elAPEPrice{} for prices, \elAGETom{} against \elAPETom{} for time on market). Because $A$ and $\phi$ are | |
| 19 | +observationally equivalent in the baseline (Proposition~\ref{prop:entry}), the same table describes a tightening of | |
| 20 | +qualification; Table~\ref{tab:screen} in Appendix~\ref{app:extra} reports the $\phi$ experiment directly. | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 23 | +\centering | |
| 24 | +\caption{Comparative statics of matching efficiency in general (GE) and partial (PE) equilibrium (model-generated)} | |
| 25 | +\label{tab:compstat} | |
| 26 | +\footnotesize | |
| 27 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab03_comparative_statics}} | |
| 28 | +\begin{tablenotes} | |
| 29 | +\footnotesize | |
| 30 | +\item Note: PE holds tightness at its baseline value. $D_{urg}$ is the urgency discount of the most urgent type, $\bar D$ the | |
| 31 | +transaction-weighted discount, $\Gamma$ the gap to the Walrasian free-entry price. | |
| 32 | +\end{tablenotes} | |
| 33 | +\end{table} | |
| 34 | + | |
| 35 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 36 | +\centering | |
| 37 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig04_liquidity_discount_vs_arrivals.pdf} | |
| 38 | +\caption{Liquidity and the urgency discount (model-generated). Panel (a): urgency discount of the most urgent type and | |
| 39 | +transaction-weighted discount as functions of matching efficiency, in general (solid) and partial (dashed) equilibrium. Panel | |
| 40 | +(b): transaction-weighted mean price. Panel (c): market liquidity gap $\Gamma$ of the patient type relative to the Walrasian | |
| 41 | +free-entry price as a function of the effective arrival rate, partial equilibrium with $\delta=0$.} | |
| 42 | +\label{fig:discount} | |
| 43 | +\end{figure} | |
| 44 | + | |
| 45 | +Figure~\ref{fig:volume} plots the comovement that the experiment generates. Across liquidity states the steady-state sales flow | |
| 46 | +and the mean price move together and inventory and time on market move inversely, all with the same distribution of buyer | |
| 47 | +valuations. The movement of the steady-state sales flow is entirely due to withdrawals: with $\delta=0$ every listing eventually | |
| 48 | +sells and the sales flow equals the listing inflow at every level of liquidity (Proposition~\ref{prop:shock}(iv)), as verified in | |
| 49 | +the $\delta=0$ experiment of Section~\ref{sec:dynamics}. | |
| 50 | + | |
| 51 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 52 | +\centering | |
| 53 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig06_volume_vs_price.pdf} | |
| 54 | +\caption{Volume, price, inventory and time on market across liquidity states (model-generated, general equilibrium). Each point | |
| 55 | +is a stationary equilibrium for a different matching efficiency, from 20 to 300 percent of the baseline. Panel (a): sales flow | |
| 56 | +and mean price. Panel (b): inventory of listings and mean time on market of sales.} | |
| 57 | +\label{fig:volume} | |
| 58 | +\end{figure} | |
| 59 | + | |
| 60 | +\subsection{Financing: qualification, approval delay and the cash--mortgage gap} | |
| 61 | +\label{sec:financing_results} | |
| 62 | + | |
| 63 | +In the extension with cash and mortgage buyers, the baseline equilibrium has tightness close to the baseline screen, a share | |
| 64 | +$\tilde\pi=\piTildeBase$ of meetings with cash buyers (below their 30 percent entry share, because mortgage buyers spend longer | |
| 65 | +searching), and buyer values $U_c=\UcBase$ against $U_m=\UmBase$: a cash buyer's search is worth four times a mortgage buyer's. | |
| 66 | +Table~\ref{tab:financing} and Figure~\ref{fig:financing} report the decomposition of Proposition~\ref{prop:financing}. For the | |
| 67 | +same house, mortgage buyers pay \gapMeanBase{} percent more than cash buyers on average, \gapPatientBase{} percent when the seller | |
| 68 | +is the most patient and \gapUrgentBase{} percent when she is the most urgent. The delay-bargaining term rises from | |
| 69 | +\deltaBPatientBase{} to \deltaBUrgentBase{} percent across types, as part (i) of the proposition requires; the outside-option term | |
| 70 | +is \outsideBase{} percent for every type; and the selection term is negative for patient sellers, because cash buyers' better | |
| 71 | +outside option raises the valuation at which a cash deal is struck above the valuation at which a mortgage deal is struck, and | |
| 72 | +turns positive only for the most urgent sellers, for whom the pending wedge dominates. On average the selection term is | |
| 73 | +\selMeanBase{} percent. The measured gap is therefore smaller than the sum of its bargaining and outside-option components, and | |
| 74 | +its cross-sectional gradient in urgency comes entirely from the delay-bargaining term. | |
| 75 | + | |
| 76 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 77 | +\centering | |
| 78 | +\caption{Financing extension: the cash--mortgage gap and its components as the approval probability varies (model-generated)} | |
| 79 | +\label{tab:financing} | |
| 80 | +\footnotesize | |
| 81 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab04b_financing_extension}} | |
| 82 | +\begin{tablenotes} | |
| 83 | +\footnotesize | |
| 84 | +\item Note: components are listing-weighted averages across seller types, in percent of the house value; ``listed'' is the | |
| 85 | +expected duration in the listed state and ``to closing'' the expected total duration including pending spells (Little's law). | |
| 86 | +Rows with $U_m<0$ violate the mortgage buyers' participation constraint and are not used in the text. | |
| 87 | +\end{tablenotes} | |
| 88 | +\end{table} | |
| 89 | + | |
| 90 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 91 | +\centering | |
| 92 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig05_financing_counterfactual.pdf} | |
| 93 | +\caption{The cash--mortgage gap (model-generated, financing extension). Panel (a): decomposition of the gap by seller type at the | |
| 94 | +baseline into the delay-bargaining term $\Delta_b(c)$, the outside-option term and the selection term. Panel (b): listing-weighted | |
| 95 | +gap as a function of the approval probability $\phi_m$ (values below 0.70 violate buyer participation). Panel (c): gap as a | |
| 96 | +function of the expected approval delay.} | |
| 97 | +\label{fig:financing} | |
| 98 | +\end{figure} | |
| 99 | + | |
| 100 | +Tighter approval widens the gap: at $\phi_m=0.70$ the average gap is \gapPhiSeventy{} percent and at $\phi_m=0.60$ the value of searching as a | |
| 101 | +mortgage buyer turns negative, so that the model's assumption that buyers never exit is violated and the economy is no longer | |
| 102 | +admissible (Table~\ref{tab:financing}, last column); results are reported only for $\phi_m\ge\phiMinParticipation$. A longer | |
| 103 | +approval delay widens the gap almost linearly, from \gapNuWeek{} percent with a one-week decision to \gapNuFourMonths{} percent with a four-month | |
| 104 | +decision (Table~\ref{tab:fin_delay}, Appendix~\ref{app:extra}), while the baseline screen corresponds to the instantaneous limit in | |
| 105 | +which the gap collapses to the outside-option term. Bargaining power shifts the sign of the delay term: with $\beta=0.8$ the delay | |
| 106 | +term is negative for patient sellers, who then compensate mortgage buyers for the risk the buyers bear (Table~\ref{tab:fin_beta}). | |
| 107 | +The magnitudes are in the range of the 2--3.9 percent structural discount of \citet{han2024cash} and well below the 11 percent | |
| 108 | +reduced-form premium of \citet{reher2024mortgage}, which is the pattern the decomposition leads one to expect when the selection | |
| 109 | +term is small or negative. | |
| 110 | + | |
| 111 | +\subsection{Matching efficiency versus approval} | |
| 112 | +\label{sec:matching_vs_approval} | |
| 113 | + | |
| 114 | +The extension distinguishes the two shocks that the baseline cannot. Table~\ref{tab:match_vs_approval} compares a 30 percent fall | |
| 115 | +in matching efficiency with a fall in the approval probability from 0.85 to 0.70. The first lowers prices by \expSixPriceA{} | |
| 116 | +percent and raises the expected time to closing from \expSixClosingBase{} to \expSixClosingA{} months; the second lowers prices by | |
| 117 | +\expSixPricePhi{} percent, raises the time to closing to \expSixClosingPhi{} months, and widens the cash--mortgage gap from \gapMeanBase{} to | |
| 118 | +\expSixGapPhi{} percent, whereas the matching shock leaves the gap almost unchanged (\expSixGapA{} percent). An approval shock also | |
| 119 | +\emph{raises} the hazard of agreements in the listed state, because mortgage buyers whose search is worth less accept more | |
| 120 | +readily, while lowering the hazard of completed sales. The two shocks therefore have different signatures: a fall in matching | |
| 121 | +efficiency shows up in durations and prices alike, a fall in approval shows up in the cash--mortgage gap and in the ratio of | |
| 122 | +agreements to closings. | |
| 123 | + | |
| 124 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 125 | +\centering | |
| 126 | +\caption{Matching-efficiency versus approval shocks in the financing extension (model-generated)} | |
| 127 | +\label{tab:match_vs_approval} | |
| 128 | +\footnotesize | |
| 129 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab04e_matching_vs_approval}} | |
| 130 | +\end{table} | |
| 131 | + | |
| 132 | +\subsection{Bargaining power and entry costs} | |
| 133 | +\label{sec:bargaining} | |
| 134 | + | |
| 135 | +A higher seller share $\beta$ raises prices, lowers tightness sharply because buyers' expected surplus per meeting falls, and | |
| 136 | +lengthens time on market (Table~\ref{tab:welfare}): between $\beta=0.2$ and $\beta=0.8$ tightness falls from \thetaBetaTwenty{} to \thetaBetaEighty{} | |
| 137 | +buyers per listing and the time on market of sales rises from \tomBetaTwenty{} to \tomBetaEighty{} months. The urgency discount falls with $\beta$, since | |
| 138 | +the carrying cost enters the price with weight $1-\beta$ in \eqref{eq:price}, but it does not vanish as $\beta\to1$, because urgency | |
| 139 | +still governs which matches are accepted. Entry and search costs work through the same channel: halving the buyer's search cost | |
| 140 | +raises tightness and prices and shortens sellers' time on market (Table~\ref{tab:entry}, Appendix~\ref{app:extra}). | |
| 141 | + | |
| 142 | +\subsection{Heterogeneity and dispersion} | |
| 143 | +\label{sec:heterogeneity} | |
| 144 | + | |
| 145 | +Table~\ref{tab:heterogeneity} varies the upper bound of the carrying-cost distribution, which scales its dispersion, and the | |
| 146 | +seller's bargaining share. Widening the support from $c_H=0.3$ to $0.6$ raises the between-type share of price variance from | |
| 147 | +\betweenShareCmaxThree{} to \betweenShareCmaxSix{} percent and the discount of the most urgent type from \DurgentBase{} to | |
| 148 | +\DurgentCmaxSix{} percent; lowering matching efficiency to 70 percent of baseline raises the between-type share from | |
| 149 | +\betweenShareBase{} to \betweenShareLowA{} percent and the total standard deviation from \sdPriceBase{} to \sdPriceLowA{} percent, | |
| 150 | +the widening of Proposition~\ref{prop:dispersion}(iii). As $\beta\to0$ the within-type component vanishes and all dispersion is | |
| 151 | +urgency-driven; as $\beta\to1$ the between-type component shrinks but, as noted, does not vanish (Table~\ref{tab:disp_beta}, | |
| 152 | +Appendix~\ref{app:extra}). | |
| 153 | + | |
| 154 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 155 | +\centering | |
| 156 | +\caption{Seller heterogeneity and price dispersion among identical houses (model-generated)} | |
| 157 | +\label{tab:heterogeneity} | |
| 158 | +\footnotesize | |
| 159 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab05_heterogeneity}} | |
| 160 | +\begin{tablenotes} | |
| 161 | +\footnotesize | |
| 162 | +\item Note: $c_H$ is the upper bound of the carrying-cost support (Beta$(2,4)$ shape rescaled), ``between'' the share of the | |
| 163 | +transaction-price variance between seller types, ``$\bar p$ range'' the gap in expected price between the most patient and the | |
| 164 | +most urgent type. | |
| 165 | +\end{tablenotes} | |
| 166 | +\end{table} | |
| 167 | + | |
| 168 | +\subsection{Propagation and recovery} | |
| 169 | +\label{sec:dynamics} | |
| 170 | + | |
| 171 | +Figure~\ref{fig:irf} and Table~\ref{tab:dynamics} show transition paths after a permanent 20 percent fall in matching | |
| 172 | +efficiency, a permanent 20 percent rise, and a temporary 20 percent fall that lasts one year. Prices adjust immediately: the | |
| 173 | +observed index falls by \dynPriceImpact{} percent on impact and stays there, because the seller value is forward-looking and | |
| 174 | +tightness, pinned by free entry at every instant, barely moves along the path. Quantities adjust slowly: the sales flow falls by | |
| 175 | +\dynQImpact{} percent on impact and recovers to \dynQEnd{} percent below its initial level as the stock of listings builds up, | |
| 176 | +inventory rises by \dynSEnd{} percent with a half-life of \dynSHalfLifeMonths{} months, and the time on market of completed sales | |
| 177 | +rises and stays up. After the temporary shock, the end of the shock releases the accumulated inventory in a burst of sales | |
| 178 | +\dynTempQRebound{} percent above the initial flow before the economy returns to its original steady state. A permanent fall in | |
| 179 | +qualification produces the same path as the fall in $A$, by the observational equivalence of the baseline. | |
| 180 | + | |
| 181 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 182 | +\centering | |
| 183 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig10_shock_impulse_responses.pdf} | |
| 184 | +\caption{Transition paths after liquidity shocks at date zero (model-generated, free entry at every instant). Permanent and | |
| 185 | +temporary 20 percent changes in matching efficiency. Panel (a): tightness. Panel (b): observed transaction-price index relative | |
| 186 | +to the initial steady state. Panel (c): sales flow. Panel (d): inventory of listings. Panel (e): mean time on market of completed | |
| 187 | +sales. Panel (f): composition term $\ln(P_t/P^{fix}_t)$ in basis points, where $P^{fix}_t$ uses the pre-shock transaction weights.} | |
| 188 | +\label{fig:irf} | |
| 189 | +\end{figure} | |
| 190 | + | |
| 191 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 192 | +\centering | |
| 193 | +\caption{Transition experiments: impact and long-run values (model-generated)} | |
| 194 | +\label{tab:dynamics} | |
| 195 | +\footnotesize | |
| 196 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab06b_dynamics}} | |
| 197 | +\begin{tablenotes} | |
| 198 | +\footnotesize | |
| 199 | +\item Note: ``comp.'' is the composition term $\ln(P_t/P^{fix}_t)$ in basis points; ``conv.'' and ``iter.'' report the convergence | |
| 200 | +flag and the number of iterations on the tightness path. | |
| 201 | +\end{tablenotes} | |
| 202 | +\end{table} | |
| 203 | + | |
| 204 | +\subsection{Sale selection and the observed price index} | |
| 205 | +\label{sec:selection} | |
| 206 | + | |
| 207 | +The composition term of \eqref{eq:decomp} is at most \dynCompMaxBp{} basis points along every transition path in | |
| 208 | +Table~\ref{tab:dynamics}, against a within-type price change of about 150 basis points: in the baseline, selection is an order of | |
| 209 | +magnitude smaller than the liquidity effect it accompanies, and it dampens rather than amplifies. Table~\ref{tab:selection} and | |
| 210 | +Figure~\ref{fig:index} apply the impact decomposition of Proposition~\ref{prop:selection} to four match-value distributions and | |
| 211 | +three widths of the carrying-cost distribution, for 30 percent falls and rises in matching efficiency. The sign condition works | |
| 212 | +as the proposition states. For the truncated normal and the Weibull with shape two, both light-tailed with $h_GM$ increasing over | |
| 213 | +the relevant range, the hazard elasticity rises with urgency, the sales mix shifts toward patient sellers after a negative shock, | |
| 214 | +and the index falls by \emph{less} than within-type prices (ratio below one). For the exponential, where $h_GM=1$, and for the | |
| 215 | +Pareto, where $h_GM$ is a constant above one, the elasticity falls with urgency and the index falls by more. The magnitudes are | |
| 216 | +small in every case: the largest composition term is \compMaxAbs{} log-percent (\compMaxG, $c_H=\compMaxCmax$, $A\times\compMaxA$), | |
| 217 | +and the ratio of the observed to the within-type change lies between \ampRatioMin{} and \ampRatioMax. In the baseline | |
| 218 | +distribution with $c_H=0.3$ the within-type change after a 30 percent fall in $A$ is \withinTN{} percent and the composition term | |
| 219 | +\compTN{} percent; with exponential valuations the figures are \withinExp{} and \compExp{} percent. Steady-state composition | |
| 220 | +effects, which exist only through withdrawals, are smaller still. | |
| 221 | + | |
| 222 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 223 | +\centering | |
| 224 | +\caption{Impact decomposition of the observed price index by match-value distribution (model-generated, general equilibrium, | |
| 225 | +$\pm30$ percent matching-efficiency shocks)} | |
| 226 | +\label{tab:selection} | |
| 227 | +\footnotesize | |
| 228 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab06_selection_bias}} | |
| 229 | +\begin{tablenotes} | |
| 230 | +\footnotesize | |
| 231 | +\item Note: ``within'' is $\ln(P^{fix}/P_0)$, ``comp.\ impact'' is $\ln(P^{obs}/P^{fix})$ with the pre-shock stock, ``comp.\ s.s.'' | |
| 232 | +the same across steady states, ``ratio'' the observed over the within-type log change, $\epsilon(c)$ the hazard elasticity of the | |
| 233 | +most patient and most urgent type. | |
| 234 | +\end{tablenotes} | |
| 235 | +\end{table} | |
| 236 | + | |
| 237 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 238 | +\centering | |
| 239 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig09_observed_vs_latent_index.pdf} | |
| 240 | +\caption{Sale selection and the transaction-price index (model-generated, $c_H=0.3$). Panel (a): within-type (liquidity) term of | |
| 241 | +the impact decomposition for four match-value distributions. Panel (b): composition (selection) term in basis points. Panel (c): | |
| 242 | +the sign condition of Proposition~\ref{prop:selection}: the product of the hazard function and the mean residual valuation, | |
| 243 | +$h_G(v)M(v)$, is constant for the exponential and the Pareto and increasing for the truncated normal and the Weibull.} | |
| 244 | +\label{fig:index} | |
| 245 | +\end{figure} | |
| 246 | + | |
| 247 | +The conclusion for measurement is twofold. A transaction-price index can move by one to two percent, in either direction, with | |
| 248 | +no change in the distribution of housing-service values, and the movement is almost entirely a within-type liquidity effect | |
| 249 | +that a hedonic or repeat-sales index cannot remove, because the carrying cost of the seller is not a characteristic of the house. | |
| 250 | +The additional bias from the changing composition of sellers who transact, the object of \citet{gatzlaff1997selection} and | |
| 251 | +\citet{goetzmann2006reservation}, is of second order under the present mechanism and has a sign that depends on the shape of the | |
| 252 | +distribution of buyer valuations. Larger composition effects would require a wider dispersion of urgency than the one assumed, or | |
| 253 | +mechanisms outside the model, such as the foreclosure externalities of \citet{guren2020foreclosures}. | |
| 254 | + | |
| 255 | +\subsection{Posted prices} | |
| 256 | +\label{sec:posted_results} | |
| 257 | + | |
| 258 | +Under posted prices sellers hold out for better matches: tightness falls to \postedTheta, the time on market of sales rises to | |
| 259 | +\postedTom{} months, the expected price conditional on sale rises to \postedPrice, and the sales flow falls (Table~\ref{tab:protocols}, | |
| 260 | +Figure~\ref{fig:posted}). All dispersion is between types by construction, and the total standard deviation of prices falls to | |
| 261 | +\postedSd{} percent. The urgency gradient is preserved, with a discount of \postedDurg{} percent for the most urgent type, and | |
| 262 | +flow welfare is \postedWelfareGap{} percent lower than under bargaining, because the monopoly mark-up that each seller applies to | |
| 263 | +her own listing delays trade without creating surplus. The qualitative results of the previous subsections do not depend on the | |
| 264 | +price-setting protocol. | |
| 265 | + | |
| 266 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 267 | +\centering | |
| 268 | +\caption{Nash bargaining versus posted prices at three levels of matching efficiency (model-generated)} | |
| 269 | +\label{tab:protocols} | |
| 270 | +\footnotesize | |
| 271 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab09_protocols}} | |
| 272 | +\end{table} | |
| 273 | + | |
| 274 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 275 | +\centering | |
| 276 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig14_posted_vs_nash.pdf} | |
| 277 | +\caption{Price-setting protocols (model-generated, baseline). Panel (a): expected price by seller type under Nash bargaining and | |
| 278 | +the posted price under commitment. Panel (b): sale hazard by seller type.} | |
| 279 | +\label{fig:posted} | |
| 280 | +\end{figure} | |
| 281 | + | |
| 282 | +\subsection{Sensitivity and robustness} | |
| 283 | +\label{sec:robustness} | |
| 284 | + | |
| 285 | +Figure~\ref{fig:tornado} and Table~\ref{tab:sensitivity} (Appendix~\ref{app:extra}) report one-at-a-time changes of $\pm25$ | |
| 286 | +percent in every parameter, together with the dispersion of match values and the width of the carrying-cost distribution. The | |
| 287 | +urgency discount is most sensitive to the width of the carrying-cost distribution, to the own-use value of withdrawal and to the | |
| 288 | +dispersion of valuations; time on market is most sensitive to the own-use value, the dispersion of valuations and bargaining | |
| 289 | +power. In \globalN{} random draws of all parameters within wide ranges, an equilibrium exists and is unique in every draw, the | |
| 290 | +urgency discount is positive and expected prices are decreasing in urgency in \globalSignD{} percent of draws, and hazards are | |
| 291 | +increasing in urgency in \globalSignEta{} percent (the exceptions are draws in which hazards are flat to numerical precision, not | |
| 292 | +reversals); time on market ranges from \globalTomMin{} to \globalTomMax{} months and the discount of the most urgent type from | |
| 293 | +\globalDurgMin{} to \globalDurgMax{} percent. Alternative match-value families (Table~\ref{tab:distributions}, Appendix~\ref{app:extra}) | |
| 294 | +preserve every sign; heavy-tailed families produce equilibria with prices above the mean valuation and a between-type share of | |
| 295 | +dispersion above 90 percent, which is why they are used only to illustrate the sign conditions. | |
| 296 | + | |
| 297 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 298 | +\centering | |
| 299 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig12_sensitivity_tornado.pdf} | |
| 300 | +\caption{One-at-a-time sensitivity (model-generated). Change in the urgency discount of the most urgent type (left) and in the | |
| 301 | +mean time on market of sales (right) when each parameter is set to 75 and 125 percent of its baseline value ($\sigma_w$: 0.05 and | |
| 302 | +0.20; $c_{max}$: 0.2 and 0.45).} | |
| 303 | +\label{fig:tornado} | |
| 304 | +\end{figure} | |
added
paper/sections/introduction.tex
+89 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Introduction} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:introduction} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +Houses do not trade at a single price. Two identical houses listed in the same street in the same month can sell weeks apart at | |
| 5 | +prices several percent apart, and the difference is systematically related to the circumstances of the sellers: those who | |
| 6 | +have already moved, who carry two mortgages, or who face a deadline sell faster and for less \citep{glower1998motivation, | |
| 7 | +springer1996motivation,campbell2011forced,andersen2017firesales}. The size of this concession varies with the state of the market, | |
| 8 | +larger when buyers are scarce \citep{mayer1998auctions}, and it varies with the way the sale is financed, since cash buyers pay | |
| 9 | +less than mortgage buyers for the same house \citep{han2024cash,reher2024mortgage}. At the aggregate level, transaction-price | |
| 10 | +indices and sales volumes move together over the cycle and inventories move against them \citep{clayton2010pricevolume, | |
| 11 | +leamer2007businesscycle}, and the houses that transact in a downturn are not the houses that transact in a boom | |
| 12 | +\citep{gatzlaff1997selection,goetzmann2006reservation}. These facts are usually discussed separately, as a liquidity discount, a cash | |
| 13 | +discount, a volume--price correlation and a selection bias. This paper argues that they are four faces of one object: the price | |
| 14 | +of urgency in a market where buyers arrive slowly, sellers differ in what waiting costs them, and the two sides bargain. | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +The paper asks how market tightness, heterogeneous seller reservation values, financing frictions, time-on-market costs and | |
| 17 | +bargaining power jointly determine an endogenous liquidity discount, transaction prices, sale hazards and price dispersion, and | |
| 18 | +under which conditions a liquidity shock propagates through prices and quantities when the value of housing services has not | |
| 19 | +changed. It answers with a continuous-time search model of a local housing market that is deliberately simple. New listings | |
| 20 | +arrive at a constant rate and their owners pay a permanent, heterogeneous carrying cost while the house is listed; buyers enter | |
| 21 | +freely at a sunk cost, meet listings through a constant-returns matching technology, and draw a match-specific valuation at each | |
| 22 | +meeting; a meeting is with a qualified buyer with some probability; the surplus is split by Nash bargaining; listings are | |
| 23 | +withdrawn at an exogenous rate. Free entry pins the buyer's value at the entry cost, which isolates the seller side of the | |
| 24 | +market and makes tightness the only general-equilibrium channel. Two controlled extensions add a financing contingency, in which | |
| 25 | +a mortgage agreement spends time in a pending state and fails with some probability while cash agreements close at once, and a | |
| 26 | +posted-price protocol. A dynamic version tracks the economy after an unanticipated change in matching efficiency or | |
| 27 | +qualification. | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +The model yields a set of analytical results and a program of numerical experiments. On the analytical side, the reservation | |
| 30 | +price of a seller falls with her carrying cost by less than one-for-one, her sale hazard rises, and her expected transaction | |
| 31 | +price falls by less than her reservation price, because urgent sellers accept lower valuations but capture a share of the larger | |
| 32 | +surplus of the matches they accept; the urgency discount defined relative to the most patient seller is therefore a discount | |
| 33 | +without qualification. A fall in buyer arrivals or in qualification lowers every seller's reservation price and expected price; it | |
| 34 | +lengthens time on market and widens the dispersion of reservation prices when the distribution of buyer valuations has an | |
| 35 | +increasing failure rate, and the paper gives an exact counterexample: with Pareto valuations, a more liquid market lengthens the | |
| 36 | +time on market of every seller whose carrying cost exceeds a threshold that does not depend on the arrival rate. With free entry | |
| 37 | +and homogeneous sellers, tightness is unique and amplifies qualification and matching shocks, which are observationally | |
| 38 | +equivalent in the baseline. A liquidity shock moves prices, volume, inventory and durations together with no change in | |
| 39 | +fundamentals, and the steady-state sales flow falls only if listings are withdrawn. Price dispersion among identical houses | |
| 40 | +has a between-type component that is positive whenever sellers are heterogeneous, bounded by the dispersion of carrying costs | |
| 41 | +scaled by the effective discount rate, and widening when liquidity falls. The composition of transactions shifts after a | |
| 42 | +liquidity shock in proportion to the elasticity of each seller type's hazard, and the resulting bias in a transaction-price index | |
| 43 | +has a sign that depends on whether the product of the hazard function and the mean residual valuation of the match-value | |
| 44 | +distribution rises or falls: exponential and Pareto valuations make selection amplify measured price changes, light-tailed | |
| 45 | +valuations make it dampen them. In the financing extension the gap between mortgage and cash prices for the same house | |
| 46 | +decomposes exactly into a delay-bargaining term whose sign depends on which party bears the larger bargaining-weighted cost of | |
| 47 | +waiting and which rises with the seller's urgency, an outside-option term, and a selection term that is positive only when the | |
| 48 | +pending wedge exceeds the cash buyers' advantage in continuation value. Finally, the Walrasian free-entry price that would seem | |
| 49 | +the natural benchmark for a liquidity premium is shown to lie \emph{below} the search price in thick markets, because a seller | |
| 50 | +with the option to wait for a high-valuation buyer captures match-specific rents that a uniform price does not; the paper | |
| 51 | +therefore measures the liquidity discount among sellers in the same market and reports the gap to the Walrasian price only as a | |
| 52 | +decomposition. | |
| 53 | + | |
| 54 | +The numerical part solves the stationary equilibrium, the posted-price and financing variants, a steady-state planner's problem | |
| 55 | +and transition paths for an illustrative parameterisation in which a listing sells in about two months, a buyer searches for | |
| 56 | +about eleven months, and the most urgent seller concedes about six percent of the price of the most patient. Twelve | |
| 57 | +pre-registered experiments trace the comparative statics of arrivals, qualification, approval delay, bargaining power, entry | |
| 58 | +costs and seller heterogeneity, the transition after permanent and temporary shocks, the decomposition of the observed price index | |
| 59 | +across four match-value distributions, the posted-price protocol, and the sensitivity of every result to the parameters. | |
| 60 | +Three numerical findings stand out. Entry amplifies arrival shocks by about ten percent in the baseline. Prices adjust on impact | |
| 61 | +while inventories and sales adjust over months, and a temporary shock is followed by a burst of sales. The composition term in | |
| 62 | +the observed price index is at most a few basis points against a within-type liquidity effect of one to two percent, in every | |
| 63 | +distribution and at every urgency dispersion considered, so that the bias from sale selection is second order under the present | |
| 64 | +mechanism while the liquidity effect that quality adjustment cannot remove is first order. In the financing extension mortgage | |
| 65 | +buyers pay 1.7 percent more than cash buyers on average, between 1.1 and 3.0 percent depending on the seller's urgency, with a | |
| 66 | +negative selection term for patient sellers; tighter approval and longer delays widen the gap. All code, tests, results and the | |
| 67 | +manuscript are reproducible from a single configuration file; no data are used and no empirical claim is made. | |
| 68 | + | |
| 69 | +The paper is related to four literatures, reviewed in Section~\ref{sec:literature}. It builds on the search-and-matching theory | |
| 70 | +of housing markets \citep{wheaton1990vacancy,krainer2001theory,albrecht2007opportunistic,diaz2013house,ngai2014hot,head2014search, | |
| 71 | +han2015microstructure}, from which it takes the acceptance margin, the matching technology and free entry, and to which it adds a | |
| 72 | +continuous distribution of seller urgency as a state of the market. It is related to the theory of illiquid housing and credit | |
| 73 | +\citep{hedlund2016illiquidity,eerola2018borrowing,gabrovski2021search,guren2020foreclosures}, to which it adds an explicit financing | |
| 74 | +contingency and the decomposition of the cash--mortgage gap that the evidence of \citet{han2024cash} and \citet{reher2024mortgage} | |
| 75 | +calls for. It is related to the measurement literature on constant-liquidity values and sale selection | |
| 76 | +\citep{fisher2003controlling,lin2007illiquidity,goetzmann2006reservation}, to which it adds the sign condition for the selection | |
| 77 | +bias in a search equilibrium. And it rests on the foundations of \citet{diamond1982aggregate}, \citet{mortensen1994job}, | |
| 78 | +\citet{hosios1990efficiency}, \citet{lippman1976economics} and \citet{bagnoli2005logconcave}. The first proposition restates a | |
| 79 | +known comparative static in a new setting and is presented as a benchmark; the contributions that survive the novelty audit | |
| 80 | +documented with the replication material are the joint treatment of continuous urgency, free entry and pending financing, the | |
| 81 | +exact condition under which liquidity lengthens time on market, the sign condition for the index-selection bias, the three-term | |
| 82 | +decomposition of the cash--mortgage gap, and the welfare analysis with heterogeneous sellers. | |
| 83 | + | |
| 84 | +Section~\ref{sec:literature} reviews the literature. Section~\ref{sec:benchmark} sets out the institutional intuition and the two | |
| 85 | +benchmarks. Section~\ref{sec:model} presents the model, its dynamic version and the two extensions. Section~\ref{sec:propositions} | |
| 86 | +states the analytical results. Section~\ref{sec:numerical} describes the numerical solution, the parameterisation and its | |
| 87 | +validation. Section~\ref{sec:baseline} presents the baseline equilibrium, Section~\ref{sec:counterfactuals} the counterfactual | |
| 88 | +experiments, and Section~\ref{sec:welfare} the welfare analysis. Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} states limitations, falsifiable | |
| 89 | +predictions and conclusions. Proofs, computational details and additional tables are in the appendices. | |
added
paper/sections/literature.tex
+129 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Related literature} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:literature} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +This paper belongs to the search-and-matching literature on housing markets and borrows its tools from the | |
| 5 | +Diamond--Mortensen--Pissarides framework \citep{diamond1982aggregate,mortensen1994job,pissarides2000equilibrium,rogerson2005search}. | |
| 6 | +It is organised around four themes: the theory of housing liquidity and seller urgency, the credit and financing | |
| 7 | +channel, the measurement of prices and liquidity, and the foundations on which the formal results rest. The review | |
| 8 | +draws on a verified bibliography of 132 references; the closest antecedents of each proposition are identified explicitly so | |
| 9 | +that what is restated and what is new can be told apart. | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +\subsection{Search, liquidity and seller urgency} | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +The matching approach to housing begins with \citet{arnott1989housing}, who shows that idiosyncratic tastes generate | |
| 14 | +equilibrium vacancies in a thin market, and \citet{wheaton1990vacancy}, in which a mismatched owner searches while carrying a | |
| 15 | +vacant unit, so that the Nash-bargained price depends on the vacancy rate through the expected time to sell and the cost of | |
| 16 | +holding two houses. \citet{yavas1992simple} adds two-sided search intensity, and \citet{williams1995pricing} prices heterogeneous | |
| 17 | +real assets as optimal-stopping values under Poisson buyer arrivals, which yields the first explicit search-induced price | |
| 18 | +discount. \citet{krainer2001theory} is the reference theory of residential \emph{liquidity}: buyers draw match-specific values, | |
| 19 | +sellers set reservation prices that anticipate the aggregate state, and time on market lengthens in downturns because waiting | |
| 20 | +is rational; \citet{krainer2002equilibrium} value an illiquid asset relative to a liquid benchmark as a function of the | |
| 21 | +arrival intensity. \citet{han2015microstructure} organise the field into one-sided search, random matching, directed search, | |
| 22 | +bargaining and brokerage. The present model is a random-matching, Nash-bargaining model with a posted-price robustness check, | |
| 23 | +and it inherits from this strand the two objects it formalises: the sale hazard and a discount measured against a benchmark | |
| 24 | +price. A distinction that matters for what follows is that the ``liquidity shock'' of \citet{krainer2001theory} is a shock to | |
| 25 | +the dividend from housing services, whereas the shocks studied here change matching efficiency or buyer qualification and leave | |
| 26 | +the distribution of housing-service values unchanged. \citet{ngai2014hot} provide the closest precedent for a non-fundamental | |
| 27 | +driver: thick-market effects on match quality turn small seasonal shifts into large seasonal swings in prices and volume. | |
| 28 | +\citet{novymarx2009hot} shows that the feedback between the buyer--seller ratio and bargaining positions amplifies demand | |
| 29 | +shocks; \citet{diaz2013house} and \citet{head2014search} reproduce the comovement of prices, sales and time on market with random | |
| 30 | +matching, bargaining and entry; \citet{ngai2020decision}, \citet{ngai2024ins}, \citet{moen2021buying}, \citet{gabrovski2019beveridge}, | |
| 31 | +\citet{caplin2011trading}, \citet{guren2018house}, \citet{anenberg2016information}, \citet{leung2017flipping} and | |
| 32 | +\citet{piazzesi2020segmented} develop the aggregate-dynamics branch. The model below is stationary and local in scope: it asks | |
| 33 | +what a fall in matching efficiency or qualification does to the cross-section of hazards and prices and to the composition of | |
| 34 | +transactions, not what drives the cycle. | |
| 35 | + | |
| 36 | +The nearest antecedent of the central device of this paper is \citet{albrecht2007opportunistic}, in which buyers and sellers switch | |
| 37 | +from a ``relaxed'' to a ``desperate'' flow value at a Poisson rate and the bargained price depends on the urgency states of the | |
| 38 | +pair; they derive that the expected price conditional on time on market falls with duration while its variance is hump-shaped. | |
| 39 | +Other formal treatments of urgency are deadlines \citep{salant1991sale}, the seller's discount rate \citep{arnold1999search}, the | |
| 40 | +endogenous cost of holding two homes \citep{anenberg2020endogenous}, debt overhang that \emph{raises} asking prices | |
| 41 | +\citep{head2023default}, and an estimated motivation parameter \citep{carrillo2012empirical}. The empirical call for | |
| 42 | +heterogeneous-seller theory is explicit in \citet{glower1998motivation}: sellers with a planned move sell faster and motivation | |
| 43 | +lowers the sale price but not the list markup. \citet{springer1996motivation} finds lower prices for eager, relocated, vacant and | |
| 44 | +foreclosed sellers; \citet{harding2003bargainingeffects} find weaker bargaining power for vacant sellers; \citet{levitt2008agents} | |
| 45 | +estimate that agents selling their own homes obtain about 3.7 percent more after about 9.5 more days on the market. Equity and | |
| 46 | +reference dependence work in the opposite direction: high loan-to-value and loss-facing sellers set higher asking prices and sell | |
| 47 | +more slowly \citep{genesove1997equity,genesove2001lossaversion}, and patient sellers sort into for-sale-by-owner platforms | |
| 48 | +\citep{hendel2009fsbo}. In every theoretical treatment cited, urgency is a two-state process, a deadline, a debt position or a | |
| 49 | +nuisance parameter. None models a continuous, permanent carrying-cost type whose cross-sectional distribution determines the stock | |
| 50 | +of listings, the composition of transactions and, through free entry, market tightness. That is the modelling choice made here, | |
| 51 | +and Proposition~\ref{prop:urgency} should accordingly be read as the continuous-type version of a known comparative static | |
| 52 | +\citep{lippman1976economics} rather than as a new result. | |
| 53 | + | |
| 54 | +The size and state dependence of liquidity discounts are documented by \citet{campbell2011forced} (foreclosure sales about 27 | |
| 55 | +percent below comparable houses in Massachusetts, smaller discounts for death- and bankruptcy-related sales, and a spillover of | |
| 56 | +about one percent per nearby foreclosure), \citet{clauretie2009foreclosure} (naive discounts above 20 percent overstated by about | |
| 57 | +one third once condition, endogenous marketing time and spatial dependence are controlled), \citet{penningtoncross2006reo}, | |
| 58 | +\citet{mayer1998auctions} (a price of immediacy of 0--9 percent in a boom against 9--21 percent in a bust) and | |
| 59 | +\citet{andersen2017firesales} (forced sales after sudden death: discounts rising with urgency, poor market conditions and seller | |
| 60 | +constraints, with demand held fixed). Spillovers from urgent sellers \citep{harding2009contagion,anenberg2014foreclosures, | |
| 61 | +mian2015foreclosures} show that a larger mass of urgent sellers lowers prices for all sellers without a change in fundamentals, | |
| 62 | +which is the empirical content of Proposition~\ref{prop:shock}. What these studies do not provide is a decomposition of the | |
| 63 | +discount into bargaining under a high carrying cost and the selection of which houses transact. | |
| 64 | + | |
| 65 | +\subsection{Credit, qualification and the cash--mortgage gap} | |
| 66 | + | |
| 67 | +\citet{hedlund2016illiquidity}, \citet{hedlund2016cyclical} and \citet{garriga2020mortgage} make search-based illiquidity a state | |
| 68 | +variable that interacts with long-term defaultable mortgages; \citet{guren2020foreclosures} show how foreclosures freeze the | |
| 69 | +non-distressed market; \citet{eerola2018borrowing} find that a moderate tightening of borrowing constraints raises time on market | |
| 70 | +and idiosyncratic price dispersion; \citet{gabrovski2021search} open a channel from credit to liquidity with multiplicity; | |
| 71 | +\citet{diaz2024housing} have wealthier buyers paying to transact faster under competitive search; and \citet{stein1995prices} and | |
| 72 | +\citet{ortalomagne2006housing} are the frictionless benchmarks with credit constraints. On the evidence side, qualification is | |
| 73 | +elastic and delays are measurable \citep{anenberg2019creditavailability,bhutta2021insurance,defusco2020leverage,fuster2019technology}; | |
| 74 | +\citet{allen2019searchfrictions} show that the Canadian insured-mortgage market is itself a negotiated-price search market. | |
| 75 | + | |
| 76 | +The cash--mortgage gap is the empirical object to which the financing extension of Section~\ref{sec:model} speaks. | |
| 77 | +\citet{reher2024mortgage} estimate a mortgage premium of about 11 percent over 1980--2017, against about 3 percent from a | |
| 78 | +representative-seller model, and find that heterogeneity in selling conditions closes half of the gap. \citet{han2024cash} | |
| 79 | +estimate a cash discount of 2--3.9 percent with 29 percent faster closing in Los Angeles and show, with a calibrated search model, | |
| 80 | +that closing risk alone is insufficient: the risk that a relisted property fails to sell is needed, which makes the discount smaller | |
| 81 | +in booms and in larger markets. \citet{asabere1992cash}, \citet{jauregui2019fundingprice}, \citet{aroul2023cashdiscount}, | |
| 82 | +\citet{lin2025contingencies} and \citet{buchak2026ibuyers} add magnitudes and selection caveats. The only formal bargaining theory | |
| 83 | +with financing that could be verified is \citet{bian2018bargaining}. No paper decomposes the measured gap into a bargaining | |
| 84 | +component that depends on seller urgency, an outside-option component, and a selection component arising from which matches are | |
| 85 | +accepted; Proposition~\ref{prop:financing} does so. | |
| 86 | + | |
| 87 | +\subsection{Selection, indices and comovement} | |
| 88 | + | |
| 89 | +The measurement literature establishes that sold houses are not a random sample of the stock and that the resulting bias | |
| 90 | +co-moves with the cycle \citep{jud1994selection,gatzlaff1997selection,gatzlaff1998selection,hwang2004selectivity}. The closest | |
| 91 | +antecedent of Proposition~\ref{prop:selection} is \citet{goetzmann2006reservation}: with heterogeneous reservation prices, falling | |
| 92 | +volume biases index returns upward and rising volume biases them downward. In commercial real estate, \citet{fisher2003controlling}, | |
| 93 | +\citet{fisher2007tbi} and \citet{clayton2008liquidity} build constant-liquidity indices that lead transaction indices and are more | |
| 94 | +volatile; \citet{lin2007illiquidity}, \citet{bond2007marketing}, \citet{cheng2010illiquidity}, \citet{lin2008real} and | |
| 95 | +\citet{cheng2013liquidityrisk} show that ignoring the uncertain marketing period biases returns upward and risk downward, and that | |
| 96 | +the risk is seller-specific. The classical index tools \citep{bailey1963repeatsales,case1989efficiency,clapp1992assessed} assume | |
| 97 | +random sampling. Bargaining and information confounders are documented by \citet{harding2003bargainingpower}, | |
| 98 | +\citet{kurlat2015asymmetries} and \citet{garmaise2004asymmetries}; volume leads prices in \citet{berkovec1996turnover}, | |
| 99 | +\citet{hort2000turnover}, \citet{clayton2010pricevolume}, \citet{andrew2003transactions} and \citet{leamer2007businesscycle}; | |
| 100 | +\citet{dachis2012transfertax} provide a Canadian transfer-tax experiment. The literature recognises the bias; no verified paper | |
| 101 | +derives its sign from primitives in a search equilibrium, and the result below is that the sign is not a general law. | |
| 102 | + | |
| 103 | +The duration literature \citep{zuehlke1987duration,haurin1988duration,jud1996brokerage,anglin2003tradeoff,knight2002listing, | |
| 104 | +haurin2010listprices,huang2001withdrawal,benefield2015measurement,carrillo2012potatoes,anglin2006liquidity} documents the | |
| 105 | +price--time trade-off, positive duration dependence in parametric hazards without unobserved heterogeneity, and the sensitivity of | |
| 106 | +results to withdrawals and relistings; \citet{taylor1999time} (stigma) and \citet{anenberg2016information} (learning) are competing | |
| 107 | +explanations of duration effects. The observed hazard in the model is a mixture over urgency types with a competing withdrawal | |
| 108 | +risk and predicts spurious negative duration dependence (Lemma~\ref{lem:duration}); positive dependence in the data requires | |
| 109 | +mechanisms that are outside the model. | |
| 110 | + | |
| 111 | +\subsection{Foundations and tools} | |
| 112 | + | |
| 113 | +Efficiency is assessed against the Hosios condition \citep{hosios1990efficiency}, with the caveat of \citet{gabrovski2025note} that | |
| 114 | +two-sided entry breaks it in housing markets; the model keeps listing inflow exogenous so that heterogeneity is the only | |
| 115 | +additional wedge. The reservation-value characterisation follows \citet{lippman1976economics}; the monotone-hazard results use | |
| 116 | +the log-concavity properties catalogued by \citet{bagnoli2005logconcave}; the matching function and the interpretation of its | |
| 117 | +efficiency parameter follow \citet{petrongolo2001looking}, with the contact-hazard elasticity of 0.84 estimated by | |
| 118 | +\citet{genesove2012search} and the tightness measures of \citet{carrillo2013heat}, \citet{carrillo2015tightness} and | |
| 119 | +\citet{han2014biddingwars} as empirical counterparts; \citet{shimer2005cyclical} and \citet{mortensen1999new} provide the | |
| 120 | +labour-market benchmarks. Bargaining follows \citet{nash1950bargaining}, with \citet{rubinstein1982perfect} as its strategic | |
| 121 | +foundation; posted prices and directed search follow \citet{moen1997competitive}, \citet{wright2021directed} and | |
| 122 | +\citet{albrecht2016directed}, and the list-price literature \citep{horowitz1992role,yavas1995strategic,merlo2004bargaining, | |
| 123 | +merlo2015home,han2016askingprice} provides the empirical counterpart of the posted-price protocol. Price dispersion among | |
| 124 | +homogeneous agents goes back to \citet{burdett1983equilibrium}, with \citet{maury2014search} and \citet{sagi2021asset} as housing | |
| 125 | +and asset-market applications. The asset-market search literature \citep{duffie2005over,lagos2009liquidity,rocheteau2011liquidity} | |
| 126 | +supplies the finance notion of an endogenous liquidity premium; the housing unit here is indivisible and match-specific, so the | |
| 127 | +holdings margin that offsets frictions in those models is absent and the premium is driven by seller urgency and tightness | |
| 128 | +instead. \citet{head2012housing} first used ``liquidity as how fast owners can sell'' as a state variable linking housing and | |
| 129 | +labour markets, and \citet{piazzesi2009momentum} note that the composition of marginal traders moves prices. | |
added
paper/sections/model.tex
+182 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{A search model of a local housing market} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:model} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +\subsection{Environment} | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +Time is continuous and the horizon infinite; all agents discount at the rate $r>0$. The market is a quality segment of a local | |
| 7 | +housing market with houses of quality $q>0$; Lemma~\ref{lem:scale} shows that $q$ scales values and prices, so the exposition | |
| 8 | +sets $q=1$ and measures prices, values and costs in units of the mean buyer valuation of the segment. | |
| 9 | + | |
| 10 | +\paragraph{Sellers.} New listings arrive at the exogenous flow $s>0$ per unit time. The owner of a listing has a permanent | |
| 11 | +\emph{carrying cost} $c$, drawn at listing from a distribution $F$ with support $[c_L,c_H]$, $0\le c_L<c_H<\infty$, and pays $c$ | |
| 12 | +per unit time while the house is listed. Listings are withdrawn at the exogenous rate $\delta\ge0$; a seller who withdraws keeps | |
| 13 | +the house and obtains its own-use value $w_0\ge0$. The value of being listed, $V(c)$, is therefore measured relative to this | |
| 14 | +outside option. | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +\paragraph{Buyers.} A buyer enters the market at the sunk cost $k>0$, pays the flow search cost $\kappa_b\ge0$ while active, and | |
| 17 | +exits upon purchase. Upon meeting a listing the buyer draws a match-specific valuation $w\sim G$, the present value of the | |
| 18 | +housing-service flow to that buyer, with density $g$ on $[w_L,w_H]$, $0\le w_L<w_H\le\infty$. A purchase at price $p$ yields | |
| 19 | +$w-p$; resale is abstracted from. | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +\paragraph{Matching.} With $B$ active buyers and $S$ listed sellers, meetings occur at the rate $m(B,S)=AB^{\alpha}S^{1-\alpha}$ | |
| 22 | +with $\alpha\in(0,1)$ and $A>0$. Tightness is $\theta=B/S$; a seller meets buyers at the rate $\lambda_s(\theta)=A\theta^{\alpha}$ and a | |
| 23 | +buyer meets listings at $\lambda_b(\theta)=A\theta^{\alpha-1}$. Meetings are random across the stock of listings, so a buyer meets a | |
| 24 | +type-$c$ seller with probability $N(c)=n(c)/S$, where $n$ is the stock density of listed sellers. A meeting is with a qualified | |
| 25 | +buyer with probability $\phi\in(0,1]$ (a pre-approval screen); unqualified meetings are wasted. The effective contact rates are | |
| 26 | +$\Lambda_s=\phi\lambda_s(\theta)$ and $\Lambda_b=\phi\lambda_b(\theta)$. Section~\ref{sec:financing} replaces the screen by a financing | |
| 27 | +contingency with cash and mortgage buyers. | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +\paragraph{Bargaining.} Within a match both parties observe $(w,c)$ and split the surplus by generalised Nash bargaining with | |
| 30 | +seller share $\beta\in(0,1)$; trade occurs if and only if the match surplus is nonnegative. Section~\ref{sec:posted} replaces | |
| 31 | +bargaining by posted prices. | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +\paragraph{Liquidity shocks.} A liquidity shock is an unanticipated change in matching efficiency $A$ or in qualification $\phi$ | |
| 34 | +with $(G,F,r,k,\kappa_b,s,\delta,w_0)$ unchanged, so that the distribution of housing-service values is the same before and after. | |
| 35 | + | |
| 36 | +\begin{assumption}[Match-value distribution] | |
| 37 | +\label{ass:G} | |
| 38 | +$G$ is continuous with a density $g$ that is positive on the interior of its support and has a finite mean. Where stated, $G$ is | |
| 39 | +IFR (increasing failure rate: $1-G$ is log-concave), which holds whenever $g$ is log-concave \citep{bagnoli2005logconcave}; the | |
| 40 | +truncated normal of the baseline parameterisation satisfies this, the exponential is the boundary case, and the Pareto | |
| 41 | +violates it. | |
| 42 | +\end{assumption} | |
| 43 | + | |
| 44 | +Three functions of $G$ recur. The expected surplus function $H(v)=\int(w-v)^+dG(w)=\int_v^{w_H}(1-G(w))\,dw$ is nonincreasing and | |
| 45 | +convex with $H'(v)=-(1-G(v))$; the hazard function is $h_G(v)=g(v)/(1-G(v))$; and the mean residual valuation is | |
| 46 | +$M(v)=H(v)/(1-G(v))=E[w-v\mid w\ge v]$. Two facts are used repeatedly: $M'(v)=-1+h_G(v)M(v)>-1$ wherever $g(v)>0$, with $M'\le0$ | |
| 47 | +under IFR; and $gH\le(1-G)^2$ under IFR. | |
| 48 | + | |
| 49 | +\subsection{Value functions, trade and prices} | |
| 50 | + | |
| 51 | +Let $U$ be the value of an active buyer. A listed seller of type $c$ solves | |
| 52 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 53 | +(r+\delta)V(c)=-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_s\,\beta\,H\big(V(c)+U\big), | |
| 54 | +\label{eq:S} | |
| 55 | +\end{equation} | |
| 56 | +and an active buyer solves | |
| 57 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 58 | +rU=-\kappa_b+\Lambda_b\,(1-\beta)\int H\big(V(c)+U\big)\,dN(c). | |
| 59 | +\label{eq:B} | |
| 60 | +\end{equation} | |
| 61 | +The match surplus is $\Sigma(w,c)=w-V(c)-U$, so trade occurs iff $w\ge v^*(c)\equiv V(c)+U$, the \emph{reservation valuation} of a | |
| 62 | +type-$c$ seller; $V(c)$ is the seller's reservation price and $w-U$ the buyer's. The Nash price is | |
| 63 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 64 | +p(w,c)=V(c)+\beta\,\Sigma(w,c)=(1-\beta)V(c)-\beta U+\beta w . | |
| 65 | +\label{eq:price} | |
| 66 | +\end{equation} | |
| 67 | +The \emph{sale hazard} of a type-$c$ listing is $\eta(c)=\Lambda_s[1-G(v^*(c))]$, the product of the meeting hazard and the | |
| 68 | +conditional sale probability; the exit hazard is $\eta(c)+\delta$; the survival of a listing is $e^{-(\eta(c)+\delta)\tau}$; the | |
| 69 | +expected listing duration is $1/(\eta(c)+\delta)$ and the probability of eventual sale is $\eta(c)/(\eta(c)+\delta)$. The expected | |
| 70 | +transaction price of type $c$ is | |
| 71 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 72 | +\bar p(c)\equiv E[p\mid\text{sale},c]=V(c)+\beta M(v^*(c)), | |
| 73 | +\label{eq:pbar} | |
| 74 | +\end{equation} | |
| 75 | +the reservation price plus the seller's share of the mean surplus of accepted matches. | |
| 76 | + | |
| 77 | +\subsection{Stocks, composition and equilibrium} | |
| 78 | + | |
| 79 | +In a stationary state the inflow of type-$c$ listings equals their outflow, so that $sf(c)=(\eta(c)+\delta)n(c)$ and | |
| 80 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 81 | +n(c)=\frac{sf(c)}{\eta(c)+\delta},\qquad S=\int n(c)\,dc,\qquad B=\theta S,\qquad Q=\int\eta(c)n(c)\,dc,\qquad | |
| 82 | +\omega(c)=\frac{\eta(c)n(c)}{Q}, | |
| 83 | +\label{eq:stocks} | |
| 84 | +\end{equation} | |
| 85 | +where $Q$ is the sales flow and $\omega$ the \emph{transaction composition}, the distribution of carrying costs among houses that | |
| 86 | +sell. Three weightings are therefore distinguished: the listing cohort $f$, the stock $N$, and the transactions $\omega$. Buyers | |
| 87 | +exit only by purchase, so the buyer entry flow equals $Q$. | |
| 88 | + | |
| 89 | +\begin{definition}[Stationary equilibrium] | |
| 90 | +\label{def:eq} | |
| 91 | +Given primitives $(r,\delta,w_0,s,F,G,A,\alpha,\phi,\beta,k,\kappa_b)$, a stationary equilibrium with free entry is a tuple | |
| 92 | +$(\theta,U,V(\cdot),n(\cdot))$ such that \eqref{eq:S} holds for every $c$, \eqref{eq:B} holds, buyers enter until $U=k$, and the | |
| 93 | +stock equations \eqref{eq:stocks} hold. A \emph{partial equilibrium} fixes $\theta$, sets $U=k$, and drops \eqref{eq:B}. | |
| 94 | +\end{definition} | |
| 95 | + | |
| 96 | +Free entry pins the buyer's value at the entry cost at every tightness. This has two consequences that organise the analysis. | |
| 97 | +First, the seller block \eqref{eq:S} can be studied at a given $\Lambda_s$ with $U=k$, and all comparative statics of reservation | |
| 98 | +prices, hazards and prices with respect to arrival rates are partial-equilibrium statements that hold conditionally on | |
| 99 | +tightness. Second, tightness itself responds: a fall in $\phi$ or $A$ lowers the surplus buyers expect per meeting, buyers exit, | |
| 100 | +$\theta$ falls, and sellers meet buyers even less often. Proposition~\ref{prop:entry} characterises this feedback. | |
| 101 | + | |
| 102 | +Listing is worthwhile for a type-$c$ seller iff $V(c)\ge w_0$. Proposition~\ref{prop:urgency}(iv) gives the threshold carrying cost | |
| 103 | +$\bar c=\Lambda_s\beta H(w_0+k)-rw_0$ above which a seller would not list; the baseline parameterisation satisfies $c_H<\bar c$, and the | |
| 104 | +condition is checked in every reported equilibrium. | |
| 105 | + | |
| 106 | +\subsection{Transition dynamics} | |
| 107 | +\label{sec:dynamics_model} | |
| 108 | + | |
| 109 | +An unanticipated permanent or temporary shock to $A$ or $\phi$ at date zero leaves the stock of listings predetermined and | |
| 110 | +moves the economy along a path $(\theta_t,V_t(\cdot),n_t(\cdot))$. Buyers enter or exit freely at every instant, so $U_t=k$ | |
| 111 | +throughout. The seller value obeys the backward equation | |
| 112 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 113 | +\dot V_t(c)=(r+\delta)V_t(c)+c-\delta w_0-\Lambda_s(\theta_t)\,\beta\,H\big(V_t(c)+k\big), | |
| 114 | +\label{eq:HJBdyn} | |
| 115 | +\end{equation} | |
| 116 | +free entry holds pointwise and the stock evolves forward, | |
| 117 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 118 | +rk=-\kappa_b+\Lambda_b(\theta_t)(1-\beta)\int H\big(V_t(c)+k\big)\,dN_t(c),\qquad | |
| 119 | +\dot n_t(c)=sf(c)-(\eta_t(c)+\delta)\,n_t(c). | |
| 120 | +\label{eq:dynsystem} | |
| 121 | +\end{equation} | |
| 122 | +The observed transaction-price index is $P_t=\int\bar p_t(c)\,\omega_t(c)\,dc$; a | |
| 123 | +fixed-composition index $P^{fix}_t=\int\bar p_t(c)\,\omega_0(c)\,dc$ holds the pre-shock transaction weights fixed, so that | |
| 124 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 125 | +\ln P_t-\ln P_0=\underbrace{\big[\ln P^{fix}_t-\ln P_0\big]}_{\text{within-type (liquidity)}} | |
| 126 | ++\underbrace{\big[\ln P_t-\ln P^{fix}_t\big]}_{\text{composition (selection)}} . | |
| 127 | +\label{eq:decomp} | |
| 128 | +\end{equation} | |
| 129 | +Because $G$ is unchanged, a fundamental index is flat and the whole movement of $P_t$ is non-fundamental. Section~\ref{sec:selection} | |
| 130 | +signs the composition term. | |
| 131 | + | |
| 132 | +\subsection{Financing contingency: cash and mortgage buyers} | |
| 133 | +\label{sec:financing} | |
| 134 | + | |
| 135 | +In the baseline the qualification screen $\phi$ multiplies both contact rates, so that $A$ and $\phi$ enter every equilibrium | |
| 136 | +condition only through the product $\phi A$ (Proposition~\ref{prop:entry}): a qualification shock and a matching-efficiency | |
| 137 | +shock are observationally equivalent. The extension of this subsection breaks the equivalence by modelling the financing step | |
| 138 | +explicitly. A buyer is a cash buyer with probability $\pi$ and a mortgage buyer otherwise, the type being drawn at entry. A cash | |
| 139 | +agreement closes immediately. A mortgage agreement at price $p$ enters a \emph{pending} state: the lender's decision arrives at | |
| 140 | +rate $\nu$ and is favourable with probability $\phi_m$; on failure the house returns to the market and the buyer to search. During | |
| 141 | +the pending spell the seller keeps paying $c$ and the buyer $\kappa_b$. The pending values are | |
| 142 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 143 | +P_s(c,p)=\frac{-c+\nu\phi_m p+\nu(1-\phi_m)V(c)}{r+\nu},\qquad | |
| 144 | +P_b(w,p)=\frac{-\kappa_b+\nu\phi_m(w-p)+\nu(1-\phi_m)U_m}{r+\nu}, | |
| 145 | +\label{eq:pending} | |
| 146 | +\end{equation} | |
| 147 | +where $U_m$ is the value of a searching mortgage buyer and $U_c$ that of a cash buyer. The joint surplus of a mortgage agreement | |
| 148 | +is $\Sigma_m(w,c)=[\nu\phi_m(w-V-U_m)-c-\kappa_b-r(V+U_m)]/(r+\nu)$, so a mortgage agreement requires | |
| 149 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 150 | +w\ge v^*_m(c)\equiv V(c)+U_m+\frac{c+\kappa_b+r\,(V(c)+U_m)}{\nu\phi_m}, | |
| 151 | +\label{eq:vm} | |
| 152 | +\end{equation} | |
| 153 | +whereas a cash agreement requires $w\ge v^*_c(c)=V(c)+U_c$. Sellers meet cash buyers in a share $\tilde\pi$ of meetings that is | |
| 154 | +determined by the stocks of searching buyers of each type; buyers of each type solve their own version of \eqref{eq:B}; ex-ante | |
| 155 | +free entry requires $\pi U_c+(1-\pi)U_m=k$; and the stock equations account for pending houses and for houses returning to the | |
| 156 | +market. Appendix~\ref{app:computation} states the full system. The baseline is the limit $\nu\to\infty$ with $\phi=\tilde\pi+(1-\tilde\pi)\phi_m$. | |
| 157 | + | |
| 158 | +\subsection{Posted prices} | |
| 159 | +\label{sec:posted} | |
| 160 | + | |
| 161 | +As a robustness protocol the seller commits to a price $p$ before the buyer's valuation is drawn, and the buyer accepts iff | |
| 162 | +$w-p\ge U$. Writing $y=p+U$, the seller solves | |
| 163 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 164 | +(r+\delta)V(c)=-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_s\max_{y}\,[1-G(y)]\,\big(y-U-V(c)\big), | |
| 165 | +\label{eq:posted} | |
| 166 | +\end{equation} | |
| 167 | +whose interior optimum satisfies $y(c)-U-V(c)=1/h_G(y(c))$. Prices are deterministic within a type, so all dispersion among | |
| 168 | +identical houses is urgency-driven under this protocol. | |
| 169 | + | |
| 170 | +\subsection{Welfare} | |
| 171 | +\label{sec:welfare_model} | |
| 172 | + | |
| 173 | +The steady-state flow of surplus generated by the market is | |
| 174 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 175 | +\Omega=\int\eta(c)n(c)\,\big(E[w\mid w\ge v^*(c)]-w_0\big)\,dc-\int c\,n(c)\,dc-\kappa_bB-kQ, | |
| 176 | +\label{eq:welfare} | |
| 177 | +\end{equation} | |
| 178 | +the value created by sales net of the own-use value forgone, carrying costs, search costs and entry costs. Under free entry | |
| 179 | +buyers earn zero net of entry, so $\Omega$ accrues to sellers in equilibrium; the ex-ante value of a listing cohort is | |
| 180 | +$s\int(V(c)-w_0)\,dF(c)$. This flow criterion ignores discounting across cohorts and transition costs; the Hosios condition | |
| 181 | +$\beta=1-\alpha$ of the discounted problem \citep{hosios1990efficiency} is used as a reference point, not as a theorem about | |
| 182 | +\eqref{eq:welfare}. | |
added
paper/sections/numerical.tex
+62 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Numerical solution, parameterisation and validation} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:numerical} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +\subsection{Algorithms} | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +The seller block \eqref{eq:S} is solved type by type as the unique root of the strictly decreasing function | |
| 7 | +$\Phi(V)=-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_s\beta H(V+U)-(r+\delta)V$ (Lemma~\ref{lem:value}) by Brent's method with a bracket that is widened | |
| 8 | +automatically when the support of $G$ is unbounded. The distribution of carrying costs $F$ is discretised into $\nTypes$ types at | |
| 9 | +the conditional means of equiprobable-mass bins of a Beta distribution; the expected surplus $H$, the mean residual valuation $M$ | |
| 10 | +and the conditional variance of $G$ are computed in closed form for the truncated normal, exponential, Pareto and Weibull | |
| 11 | +families. Equilibrium tightness is found by scanning the free-entry residual on a logarithmic grid of 60 points in $[0.02,60]$ | |
| 12 | +and applying Brent's method on every sign change; the number of roots is recorded, so that multiplicity would be reported rather | |
| 13 | +than hidden. The posted-price protocol nests the seller's first-order condition inside the value root. The financing extension | |
| 14 | +is solved as a three-equation root problem in $(\ln\theta,U_c,\operatorname{logit}\tilde\pi)$ with $U_m$ imposed by ex-ante free entry; | |
| 15 | +a damped fixed-point iteration on the buyer values was tried first and diverged, because the buyer map has a slope of order | |
| 16 | +$\lambda_b/r$, and was replaced. The planner's steady-state problem maximises \eqref{eq:welfare} over tightness and the vector of | |
| 17 | +acceptance thresholds by derivative-free optimisation started at the decentralised allocation. Transition paths solve the | |
| 18 | +backward equation \eqref{eq:HJBdyn} by a semi-implicit scheme, the forward stock equation by implicit Euler, and the pointwise | |
| 19 | +free-entry condition by damped iteration on the tightness path until the maximum update falls below $10^{-7}$. Tolerances, | |
| 20 | +iteration counts and residuals are stored with every result file; Appendix~\ref{app:computation} gives details. | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +\subsection{Parameterisation} | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +The parameterisation is illustrative. No moment is estimated and no data are used; the values in Table~\ref{tab:parameters} | |
| 25 | +are chosen so that the baseline equilibrium displays durations, discounts and dispersion of the order of magnitude reported in | |
| 26 | +the literature reviewed in Section~\ref{sec:literature}, and every experiment reports how the results move when they change. | |
| 27 | +Time is measured in years and values in units of the mean buyer valuation of the segment. The discount rate is 4 percent. Match | |
| 28 | +values are normally distributed with a 10 percent standard deviation and truncated at three standard deviations, which makes | |
| 29 | +$G$ log-concave. Carrying costs range from 2 percent of the house value per year (maintenance and property taxes for an owner | |
| 30 | +who still lives in the house) to 30 percent (a seller carrying two homes, a bridge loan or a relocation deadline) with a | |
| 31 | +right-skewed Beta$(2,4)$ shape, so that most sellers are patient and a minority urgent. Withdrawals occur at the rate 0.5 per | |
| 32 | +year, which at baseline hazards removes about a tenth of listings, and a withdrawing seller keeps a house worth 0.8 to her. A | |
| 33 | +buyer pays an entry cost of 2 percent of the house value and a flow search cost of 5 percent per year, a figure that includes | |
| 34 | +temporary housing and that must be comparable to sellers' carrying costs for the free-entry condition to deliver a tightness of | |
| 35 | +a few buyers per listing; 85 percent of meetings are with qualified buyers. The matching function is Cobb--Douglas with | |
| 36 | +elasticity one half and efficiency 4.5 meetings per year per side at unit tightness: a meeting is a serious offer, not a visit. | |
| 37 | +The seller's Nash share is one half, the Hosios value for $\alpha=1/2$. The financing extension uses a 30 percent share of cash | |
| 38 | +buyers, a one-month expected financing decision and an approval probability of 0.85. | |
| 39 | + | |
| 40 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 41 | +\centering | |
| 42 | +\caption{Baseline parameterisation (illustrative; units of the mean buyer valuation, time in years)} | |
| 43 | +\label{tab:parameters} | |
| 44 | +\footnotesize | |
| 45 | +\input{tables/tab01_parameters} | |
| 46 | +\end{table} | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +\subsection{Validation} | |
| 49 | + | |
| 50 | +Twenty-four unit tests cover the closed forms of the distributions, the residuals and uniqueness of the seller value, the | |
| 51 | +analytic derivatives of Lemma~\ref{lem:value} against finite differences, each part of Propositions~\ref{prop:urgency} | |
| 52 | +to~\ref{prop:posted} on the baseline parameterisation, the Pareto counterexample in both regions of \eqref{eq:pareto}, the | |
| 53 | +exponential elasticity formula of Proposition~\ref{prop:selection}, boundary cases (zero urgency and no withdrawal, a frozen market | |
| 54 | +with $\Lambda_s\to0$, a very liquid market with $\Lambda_s=10^7$ in which $v^*\to w_H$ and $\bar p\to w_H-k$), the equilibrium stock | |
| 55 | +equations and probability sums, and the convergence of the equilibrium in the type grid and the root tolerance. All tests pass. | |
| 56 | +Independently of the analytic solution, the listing process was simulated listing by listing (type draw, Poisson meetings, | |
| 57 | +exponential withdrawal, match draws and the acceptance rule) for \mcN{} listings and three seeds; the simulated sold share, | |
| 58 | +durations, meetings per listing, mean and standard deviation of prices agree with the analytic moments to within | |
| 59 | +\mcMaxRelErr{} percent, and the per-type mean prices to within \mcTypesRelErr{} percent. With 9 seller types the mean price differs | |
| 60 | +from the solution with \convTypesMax{} types by \convTypesRelErr{} percent (Figure~\ref{fig:convergence}); tightness is invariant to | |
| 61 | +the root tolerance between $10^{-6}$ and $10^{-12}$; and the transition solver converges at first order in the time step. | |
| 62 | +Appendix~\ref{app:computation} reports these diagnostics in full. | |
added
paper/sections/propositions.tex
+178 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Analytical results} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:propositions} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +Proofs are in Appendix~\ref{app:proofs}. Unless stated otherwise, the buyer value $U$ is held fixed (under free entry $U=k$) and | |
| 5 | +$\Lambda_s>0$ is given; results that involve the response of tightness are stated separately. | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +\begin{lemma}[Scale invariance in quality] | |
| 8 | +\label{lem:scale} | |
| 9 | +Let $w=q\varepsilon$ with $\varepsilon\sim G_\varepsilon$, $c=q\kappa$, $k=q\tilde k$ and $\kappa_b=q\tilde\kappa_b$. If $(\theta,U,V,n)$ | |
| 10 | +is a stationary equilibrium of the economy with $q=1$, then $(\theta,qU,qV,n)$ is a stationary equilibrium of the economy with | |
| 11 | +quality $q$; prices scale by $q$, while hazards, durations, tightness, the transaction composition and the discounts $D(c)$ are | |
| 12 | +invariant. | |
| 13 | +\end{lemma} | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +\begin{lemma}[Seller value] | |
| 16 | +\label{lem:value} | |
| 17 | +For any $U$, $\Lambda_s>0$ and $c\ge0$, equation \eqref{eq:S} has a unique solution $V(c)$, continuously differentiable in | |
| 18 | +$(c,\Lambda_s,U)$, with | |
| 19 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 20 | +\frac{\partial V}{\partial c}=\frac{-1}{(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))},\qquad | |
| 21 | +\frac{\partial V}{\partial\Lambda_s}=\frac{\beta H(v^*)}{(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))},\qquad | |
| 22 | +\frac{\partial V}{\partial U}\in(-1,0]. | |
| 23 | +\label{eq:Vderiv} | |
| 24 | +\end{equation} | |
| 25 | +\end{lemma} | |
| 26 | + | |
| 27 | +\begin{lemma}[Spurious negative duration dependence] | |
| 28 | +\label{lem:duration} | |
| 29 | +If the exit hazard $\mu(c)=\eta(c)+\delta$ is non-degenerate under $F$, the population exit hazard | |
| 30 | +$\bar h(\tau)=-\frac{d}{d\tau}\ln\int e^{-\mu(c)\tau}dF(c)$ is strictly decreasing in listing duration $\tau$, although every | |
| 31 | +individual hazard is constant. | |
| 32 | +\end{lemma} | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +\begin{proposition}[Seller urgency] | |
| 35 | +\label{prop:urgency} | |
| 36 | +(i) The reservation price falls with the carrying cost, by less than one-for-one in present-value terms: | |
| 37 | +$V'(c)\in(-1/(r+\delta),0)$. (ii) The sale hazard $\eta(c)$ is nondecreasing in $c$, strictly where $g(v^*(c))>0$, and the expected | |
| 38 | +listing duration is nonincreasing. (iii) The expected transaction price is strictly decreasing in $c$, | |
| 39 | +$\bar p'(c)=V'(c)\,[1+\beta M'(v^*(c))]$ with $1+\beta M'>1-\beta>0$, and under IFR $|\bar p'(c)|\le|V'(c)|$: the price falls by less | |
| 40 | +than the reservation price. The urgency discount $D(c)$ is therefore zero at $c_L$, nonnegative and strictly increasing. | |
| 41 | +(iv) Under free entry a type-$c$ seller prefers listing to keeping the house iff $c\le\bar c\equiv\Lambda_s\beta H(w_0+k)-rw_0$. | |
| 42 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 43 | + | |
| 44 | +Part (i) is the classical reservation-value result of \citet{lippman1976economics} in the present setting and the | |
| 45 | +continuous-type counterpart of the desperate-seller effect of \citet{albrecht2007opportunistic}; it is stated for completeness | |
| 46 | +and because the magnitude of the slope, $1/[(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(c)]$, is what later results build on. Part (iii) contains the | |
| 47 | +less obvious point that transaction prices respond to urgency \emph{less} than reservation prices. An urgent seller accepts | |
| 48 | +lower matches, but conditional on acceptance the buyer's surplus is larger on average, and the seller captures the share $\beta$ | |
| 49 | +of it. No log-concavity is needed for the sign; IFR is needed only for the attenuation. | |
| 50 | + | |
| 51 | +\begin{proposition}[Effective arrival rate] | |
| 52 | +\label{prop:arrival} | |
| 53 | +(i) $\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s>0$ and $\partial\bar p/\partial\Lambda_s>0$ whenever $v^*<w_H$. (ii) If $G$ is IFR, | |
| 54 | +$\partial\eta/\partial\Lambda_s>0$: a decline in buyer arrivals or in qualification lengthens expected time on market. The sign can | |
| 55 | +reverse without IFR: for the Pareto distribution $G(w)=1-(w_L/w)^a$, $a>1$, | |
| 56 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 57 | +\frac{\partial\eta}{\partial\Lambda_s}<0\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \beta\eta(c)>(a-1)(r+\delta)\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad | |
| 58 | +c>\delta w_0+(r+\delta)U, | |
| 59 | +\label{eq:pareto} | |
| 60 | +\end{equation} | |
| 61 | +a condition that does not depend on $\Lambda_s$. (iii) Under IFR the reservation-value gap $V(c_L)-V(c)$ is strictly decreasing in | |
| 62 | +$\Lambda_s$ for every $c>c_L$: lower liquidity widens the cross-sectional dispersion of reservation prices. (iv) For the patient | |
| 63 | +type $c=0$ with $U=k\le w_L$ and $w_H<\infty$, $\bar p\to\beta(E[w]-k)$ as $\Lambda_s\to0$ and $\bar p\to w_H-k$ as $\Lambda_s\to\infty$; if | |
| 64 | +$\beta(E[w]-k)<p^*<w_H-k$, which holds iff $H(w_H-k)<rk$, the market liquidity gap $\Gamma$ is positive in thin markets and | |
| 65 | +negative in thick ones. | |
| 66 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 67 | + | |
| 68 | +Part (ii) is the result that a more liquid market shortens time on market, together with the condition under which it fails. | |
| 69 | +A higher arrival rate raises the seller's reservation valuation (part (i)); whether the hazard rises depends on whether the | |
| 70 | +direct effect of more meetings dominates the indirect effect of greater selectivity. Under IFR the mean residual valuation is | |
| 71 | +bounded by the reciprocal hazard, $M\le1/h_G$, which is exactly what is needed. With heavy-tailed valuations the seller's option to | |
| 72 | +wait for an exceptional buyer becomes more valuable faster than buyers arrive, and the condition in \eqref{eq:pareto} shows that | |
| 73 | +this happens for every sufficiently urgent seller, at every arrival rate. The empirical counterpart is a segment of unique or | |
| 74 | +luxury properties in which greater buyer traffic does not shorten marketing time. Part (iv) is the formal reason for not calling | |
| 75 | +$\Gamma$ a liquidity premium. | |
| 76 | + | |
| 77 | +\begin{proposition}[Free entry and tightness] | |
| 78 | +\label{prop:entry} | |
| 79 | +(a) With homogeneous sellers the free-entry residual $R(\theta)=-\kappa_b+\phi\lambda_b(\theta)(1-\beta)H(V(\theta)+k)-rk$ is continuous | |
| 80 | +and strictly decreasing from $+\infty$ to $-\kappa_b-rk$, so equilibrium tightness $\theta^*$ is unique; $d\theta^*/d\phi>0$, | |
| 81 | +$d\theta^*/dA>0$, and $d\ln\Lambda_s/d\ln\phi=1+\alpha\,d\ln\theta^*/d\ln\phi>1$. In the baseline, $A$ and $\phi$ enter all equilibrium | |
| 82 | +conditions only through the product $\phi A$. (b) With heterogeneous sellers an equilibrium exists; uniqueness is not guaranteed, | |
| 83 | +because the stock composition $N$ depends on $\theta$, and is verified numerically. | |
| 84 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 85 | + | |
| 86 | +\begin{proposition}[A liquidity shock without a fundamental shock] | |
| 87 | +\label{prop:shock} | |
| 88 | +Let $G$ be IFR. A fall in $A$ or in $\phi$ with all other primitives unchanged (i) lowers $V(c)$ and $\bar p(c)$ for every $c$, in | |
| 89 | +partial equilibrium and, since $\theta^*$ falls as well, in general equilibrium with homogeneous sellers; (ii) lowers every sale | |
| 90 | +hazard and the sales flow on impact, when the stock of listings is predetermined; (iii) raises the steady-state inventory $S$ | |
| 91 | +and mean listing duration; (iv) lowers the steady-state sales flow if and only if $\delta>0$: with $\delta=0$ every listing | |
| 92 | +eventually sells and the steady-state sales flow equals the listing inflow whatever the level of liquidity. Transaction prices and | |
| 93 | +volume therefore co-move, and inventory and time on market move inversely, with no change in the distribution of housing-service | |
| 94 | +values. | |
| 95 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 96 | + | |
| 97 | +Part (iv) is a diagnostic rather than a curiosity. In a market where listings are rarely withdrawn, a permanent fall in | |
| 98 | +liquidity lowers volume only during the transition; a persistent fall in the sales-to-listings ratio across steady states | |
| 99 | +requires withdrawals or relistings, which the duration literature finds to be common \citep{anglin2003tradeoff, | |
| 100 | +benefield2015measurement}. | |
| 101 | + | |
| 102 | +\begin{proposition}[Price dispersion among identical houses] | |
| 103 | +\label{prop:dispersion} | |
| 104 | +Conditional on sale, | |
| 105 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 106 | +\mathrm{Var}_\omega(p)=\beta^2E_\omega\big[\mathrm{Var}(w\mid w\ge v^*(c))\big]+\mathrm{Var}_\omega\big[\bar p(c)\big]. | |
| 107 | +\label{eq:vardecomp} | |
| 108 | +\end{equation} | |
| 109 | +(i) The | |
| 110 | +between-type component is strictly positive iff the transaction composition is non-degenerate. (ii) With $\beta=0$ all dispersion | |
| 111 | +is urgency-driven and $\mathrm{Var}_\omega(p)\le\mathrm{Var}_\omega(c)/(r+\delta)^2$; under IFR the range of expected prices satisfies | |
| 112 | +$\bar p(c_L)-\bar p(c_H)\le(c_H-c_L)/(r+\delta)$. (iii) Under IFR the between-type reservation-value gap widens when $\Lambda_s$ falls. | |
| 113 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 114 | + | |
| 115 | +\begin{proposition}[Sale selection and transaction-price indices] | |
| 116 | +\label{prop:selection} | |
| 117 | +(i) If $\delta=0$, the steady-state transaction composition equals the listing composition, $\omega=f$, for every $\Lambda_s$: | |
| 118 | +comparisons across steady states contain no composition effect. (ii) On impact of an unanticipated change $d\ln\Lambda_s$ with the | |
| 119 | +stock predetermined, let $\epsilon(c)=\partial\ln\eta(c)/\partial\ln\Lambda_s=1-\beta\eta(c)\,h_G(v^*)M(v^*)/[(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(c)]$. | |
| 120 | +Then $d\ln\omega(c)=[\epsilon(c)-E_\omega\epsilon]\,d\ln\Lambda_s$ and | |
| 121 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 122 | +d\ln P=E_\omega\big[d\ln\bar p(c)\big]+\frac{\mathrm{Cov}_\omega\big(\bar p(c),\epsilon(c)\big)}{P}\,d\ln\Lambda_s . | |
| 123 | +\label{eq:impact} | |
| 124 | +\end{equation} | |
| 125 | +If $\epsilon$ is decreasing in $c$ the covariance is positive and the index moves by more than every within-type price | |
| 126 | +(selection amplifies); if $\epsilon$ is increasing in $c$ the covariance is negative and selection dampens. (iii) For exponential | |
| 127 | +$G$, $\epsilon(c)=(r+\delta)/[(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(c)]$ is strictly decreasing in $c$, and for Pareto $G$ likewise; a sufficient condition | |
| 128 | +for amplification is that $v\mapsto h_G(v)M(v)$ be nonincreasing. When $h_GM$ is increasing, as for light-tailed distributions such | |
| 129 | +as the truncated normal, $\epsilon$ can be increasing in $c$ and selection dampens. (iv) With $\delta=0$ the composition returns to $f$ | |
| 130 | +in the new steady state, so the impact composition effect is transitory. | |
| 131 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 132 | + | |
| 133 | +The economics of part (ii) is a race between two forces. After a fall in arrivals every seller lowers the valuation she accepts, | |
| 134 | +and the share of sales made by each type changes in proportion to the elasticity of its hazard. Urgent sellers already accept | |
| 135 | +most offers, so their hazard is less elastic to arrivals through the acceptance margin, which pushes the sales mix toward them and | |
| 136 | +pulls the index down by more than the fall in any individual price; this is the mechanism of \citet{goetzmann2006reservation} seen | |
| 137 | +from the supply side. But urgent sellers also sit lower in the valuation distribution, where the product of the hazard function and | |
| 138 | +the mean residual valuation of $G$ can be smaller, which makes their acceptance threshold more responsive. The exponential | |
| 139 | +distribution, for which $h_GM=1$, is the knife-edge where only the first force operates; for lighter tails the second force can | |
| 140 | +dominate. The sign of the selection bias in a transaction index is therefore a property of the distribution of buyer | |
| 141 | +valuations, not a general law; Section~\ref{sec:selection} quantifies both cases. | |
| 142 | + | |
| 143 | +\begin{proposition}[Financing contingency] | |
| 144 | +\label{prop:financing} | |
| 145 | +In the extension of Section~\ref{sec:financing}, for a seller of type $c$ and a match $w$ acceptable to both buyer types, | |
| 146 | +\begin{equation} | |
| 147 | +p_m(w,c)-p_c(w,c)=\underbrace{\frac{(1-\beta)\,[c+rV(c)]-\beta\,[\kappa_b+rU_m]}{\nu\phi_m}}_{\Delta_b(c)\ \text{(delay-bargaining term)}} | |
| 148 | ++\underbrace{\beta\,(U_c-U_m)}_{\text{outside-option term}} . | |
| 149 | +\label{eq:gap} | |
| 150 | +\end{equation} | |
| 151 | +(i) $\Delta_b(c)$ is positive iff the seller's bargaining-weighted flow cost of waiting, $(1-\beta)[c+rV(c)]$, exceeds the buyer's, | |
| 152 | +$\beta[\kappa_b+rU_m]$; it is nondecreasing in $c$ and vanishes as $\nu\to\infty$. (ii) The acceptance thresholds differ by | |
| 153 | +$v^*_m(c)-v^*_c(c)=[c+\kappa_b+r(V+U_m)]/(\nu\phi_m)-(U_c-U_m)$, a pending wedge increasing in $c$ net of the cash buyers' | |
| 154 | +outside-option advantage; the observed mean price gap conditional on sale adds the selection term | |
| 155 | +$\beta\{E[w\mid w\ge v^*_m]-E[w\mid w\ge v^*_c]\}$, which has the sign of $v^*_m-v^*_c$ and can be negative for patient sellers. | |
| 156 | +(iii) The baseline screen is the limit $\nu\to\infty$. | |
| 157 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 158 | + | |
| 159 | +Equation \eqref{eq:gap} says that the party with the larger bargaining-weighted cost of delay pays for the financing contingency. | |
| 160 | +When sellers are urgent and buyers patient, mortgage buyers pay more than cash buyers for the same house: this is the cash | |
| 161 | +discount of \citet{han2024cash} and \citet{reher2024mortgage}, derived rather than assumed. When buyers bear the larger cost of | |
| 162 | +waiting, or when sellers have most of the bargaining power and extract less from a buyer whose own waiting cost reduces the | |
| 163 | +surplus, the sign reverses. The measured gap adds two further terms. Cash buyers have a better continuation value, which lowers | |
| 164 | +the price they pay by $\beta(U_c-U_m)$, and the two types of agreement are selected from different parts of the valuation | |
| 165 | +distribution. The third term is the one that \citet{reher2024mortgage} attribute to ``heterogeneity in selling conditions''; the | |
| 166 | +proposition shows that it need not be positive. | |
| 167 | + | |
| 168 | +\begin{proposition}[Posted prices] | |
| 169 | +\label{prop:posted} | |
| 170 | +Let $g$ be log-concave. (i) The posted-price problem \eqref{eq:posted} has a unique interior solution $y(c)$ with | |
| 171 | +$y(c)-U-V(c)=1/h_G(y(c))$. (ii) $V(c)$ is unique with $V'(c)=-1/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s(1-G(y(c)))]<0$; the posted price and the | |
| 172 | +acceptance threshold are strictly decreasing in $c$ and the hazard is increasing in $c$. (iii) At equal $(V,U)$, $y(c)>V(c)+U$: | |
| 173 | +posted-price sellers hold out for better matches than bargaining sellers. | |
| 174 | +\end{proposition} | |
| 175 | + | |
| 176 | +Two statements are made numerically rather than proved: the uniqueness of tightness with heterogeneous sellers | |
| 177 | +(Proposition~\ref{prop:entry}(b)), and the location of the welfare-maximising bargaining share relative to the Hosios value. | |
| 178 | +Both are reported in Section~\ref{sec:welfare} with the parameter regions in which they were checked. | |
added
paper/sections/titlepage.tex
+77 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ | ||
| 1 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 2 | +% Title Page | |
| 3 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 4 | +\thispagestyle{empty} | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +\begin{center} | |
| 7 | + | |
| 8 | +% --- Logo --- | |
| 9 | +\includegraphics[width=3.5cm]{uq_logo.jpg} | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +\vspace{0.6cm} | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +{\footnotesize\textsc{Université du Québec en Outaouais}}\\[0.15cm] | |
| 14 | +{\footnotesize\textsc{Département des sciences administratives}} | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +\vspace{0.8cm} | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +{\footnotesize\textsc{Working Paper No.~\WPnumber}} | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +\vspace{1.2cm} | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +% --- Title --- | |
| 23 | +{\LARGE\bfseries \WPtitle\par} | |
| 24 | + | |
| 25 | +\ifx\WPsubtitle\empty\else | |
| 26 | + \vspace{0.3cm} | |
| 27 | + {\large\itshape \WPsubtitle\par} | |
| 28 | +\fi | |
| 29 | + | |
| 30 | +\vspace{1.2cm} | |
| 31 | + | |
| 32 | +% --- Author --- | |
| 33 | +{\large \WPauthor}\\[0.3cm] | |
| 34 | +{\normalsize \WPaffiliation}\\[0.15cm] | |
| 35 | +{\normalsize \href{mailto:\WPemail}{\WPemail}}\\[0.15cm] | |
| 36 | +{\small \WPaddress} | |
| 37 | + | |
| 38 | +\vspace{0.8cm} | |
| 39 | + | |
| 40 | +% --- Date & Version --- | |
| 41 | +{\normalsize \WPdate}\\[0.1cm] | |
| 42 | +{\small Version~\WPversion} | |
| 43 | + | |
| 44 | +\end{center} | |
| 45 | + | |
| 46 | +\vfill | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +\newpage | |
| 49 | + | |
| 50 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 51 | +% Abstract Page | |
| 52 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 53 | +\thispagestyle{empty} | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +\vspace*{1cm} | |
| 56 | + | |
| 57 | +\noindent\rule{\textwidth}{0.4pt} | |
| 58 | +\vspace{0.3cm} | |
| 59 | + | |
| 60 | +\noindent\textbf{Abstract} | |
| 61 | + | |
| 62 | +\vspace{0.15cm} | |
| 63 | + | |
| 64 | +\noindent\WPabstract | |
| 65 | + | |
| 66 | +\vspace{0.4cm} | |
| 67 | + | |
| 68 | +\noindent\textbf{Keywords:} \WPkeywords | |
| 69 | + | |
| 70 | +\vspace{0.15cm} | |
| 71 | + | |
| 72 | +\noindent\textbf{JEL Classification:} \WPjel | |
| 73 | + | |
| 74 | +\vspace{0.3cm} | |
| 75 | +\noindent\rule{\textwidth}{0.4pt} | |
| 76 | + | |
| 77 | +\newpage | |
added
paper/sections/titlepage_anon.tex
+53 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ | ||
| 1 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 2 | +% ANONYMOUS TITLE PAGE — for double-anonymized journal submission | |
| 3 | +% Used by paper/main_anon.tex (same macros as main.tex, no author block, | |
| 4 | +% no institution, no logo). Abstract/keywords/JEL page identical to titlepage.tex. | |
| 5 | +% ============================================================================ | |
| 6 | +\thispagestyle{empty} | |
| 7 | +\begin{center} | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +\vspace*{3cm} | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +{\LARGE\bfseries \WPtitle\par} | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +\ifx\WPsubtitle\empty\else | |
| 14 | + \vspace{0.3cm} | |
| 15 | + {\large\itshape \WPsubtitle\par} | |
| 16 | +\fi | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +\vspace{1.5cm} | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +{\normalsize [Author identity withheld for review]} | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +\vspace{0.8cm} | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +{\normalsize \WPdate} | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | +\end{center} | |
| 27 | + | |
| 28 | +\vfill | |
| 29 | + | |
| 30 | +\newpage | |
| 31 | +\thispagestyle{empty} | |
| 32 | +\vspace*{1cm} | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +\noindent\rule{\textwidth}{0.4pt} | |
| 35 | +\vspace{0.3cm} | |
| 36 | + | |
| 37 | +\noindent\textbf{Abstract} | |
| 38 | +\vspace{0.15cm} | |
| 39 | + | |
| 40 | +\noindent\WPabstract | |
| 41 | + | |
| 42 | +\vspace{0.4cm} | |
| 43 | + | |
| 44 | +\noindent\textbf{Keywords:} \WPkeywords | |
| 45 | + | |
| 46 | +\vspace{0.15cm} | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +\noindent\textbf{JEL Classification:} \WPjel | |
| 49 | + | |
| 50 | +\vspace{0.3cm} | |
| 51 | +\noindent\rule{\textwidth}{0.4pt} | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +\newpage | |
added
paper/sections/welfare.tex
+52 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\section{Welfare and policy} | |
| 2 | +\label{sec:welfare} | |
| 3 | + | |
| 4 | +Table~\ref{tab:welfare} and Figure~\ref{fig:welfare} report the steady-state flow surplus \eqref{eq:welfare} across bargaining | |
| 5 | +shares and matching elasticities, for the baseline economy with heterogeneous sellers and for an economy with a single seller | |
| 6 | +type at the mean carrying cost. Welfare is hump-shaped in the seller's share. Too low a share crowds the market with buyers who | |
| 7 | +search long and transact at low prices; too high a share deters entry and leaves sellers waiting. The welfare-maximising share is | |
| 8 | +$\beta=\betaStarHet$ in both economies, slightly above the Hosios value $1-\alpha=0.5$; the welfare loss at the Hosios value is | |
| 9 | +\welfareLossHet{} percent and the loss at $\beta=0.2$ is \welfareLossBetaTwenty{} percent. Across matching elasticities the | |
| 10 | +welfare-maximising share tracks the Hosios line with a small upward displacement (Figure~\ref{fig:welfare}(a)). The displacement | |
| 11 | +reflects the criterion, not heterogeneity: the flow surplus does not discount across cohorts, whereas the Hosios condition | |
| 12 | +characterises the discounted problem, and the homogeneous economy displays the same displacement. Heterogeneity in carrying costs | |
| 13 | +adds a wedge that is numerically negligible at the baseline dispersion: the planner's flow optimum exceeds the decentralised | |
| 14 | +one by \plannerGainHet{} percent with heterogeneous sellers and by \plannerGainHom{} percent with homogeneous sellers, with lower | |
| 15 | +tightness in both cases (\plannerThetaHet{} against \thetaBase{} buyers per listing), and the planner's acceptance thresholds are | |
| 16 | +flatter across urgency types than the decentralised ones (Table~\ref{tab:planner}, Appendix~\ref{app:extra}). These are numerical | |
| 17 | +statements for the flow criterion, not theorems, and they do not extend to economies with endogenous listing, where | |
| 18 | +\citet{gabrovski2025note} show that two-sided entry breaks the Hosios condition. | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +\begin{table}[H] | |
| 21 | +\centering | |
| 22 | +\caption{Bargaining power and steady-state flow welfare, heterogeneous and homogeneous sellers (model-generated, $\alpha=0.5$)} | |
| 23 | +\label{tab:welfare} | |
| 24 | +\footnotesize | |
| 25 | +\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{\input{tables/tab08_welfare}} | |
| 26 | +\begin{tablenotes} | |
| 27 | +\footnotesize | |
| 28 | +\item Note: ``welfare'' is the flow surplus \eqref{eq:welfare}; ``sellers' value'' the ex-ante value of a listing cohort net of the | |
| 29 | +own-use value; ``holding costs'' the flow of carrying costs paid by the stock of listings. | |
| 30 | +\end{tablenotes} | |
| 31 | +\end{table} | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +\begin{figure}[H] | |
| 34 | +\centering | |
| 35 | +\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig11_welfare_friction_contours.pdf} | |
| 36 | +\caption{Welfare and market frictions (model-generated). Panel (a): steady-state flow surplus over the seller's bargaining share | |
| 37 | +and the matching elasticity, heterogeneous sellers; the dashed line is the Hosios locus $\beta=1-\alpha$ and the dots the | |
| 38 | +welfare-maximising share at each elasticity. Panel (b): welfare as a function of the bargaining share at $\alpha=0.5$ for | |
| 39 | +heterogeneous and homogeneous sellers.} | |
| 40 | +\label{fig:welfare} | |
| 41 | +\end{figure} | |
| 42 | + | |
| 43 | +Three policy readings follow, each conditional on the model's assumptions. First, measures that raise matching efficiency or | |
| 44 | +qualification, such as faster or more reliable mortgage decisions, raise prices, shorten durations and narrow the urgency | |
| 45 | +discount, and part of their effect works through buyer entry; the general-equilibrium elasticities of Section~\ref{sec:arrival} | |
| 46 | +exceed the partial-equilibrium ones by about ten percent. Second, the welfare cost of a liquidity shock is borne by sellers in | |
| 47 | +proportion to their urgency: the holding-cost flow and the reservation-value gap both rise when arrivals fall, so that policies | |
| 48 | +that reduce the carrying cost of urgent sellers (bridge financing, forbearance) have a distributional rationale even when total | |
| 49 | +surplus is little affected. Third, the welfare of the market is insensitive to the split of the surplus in a wide neighbourhood of | |
| 50 | +the Hosios share but falls steeply outside it, and institutions that shift bargaining power toward one side, such as the bidding | |
| 51 | +wars documented by \citet{han2014biddingwars} or the brokerage arrangements studied by \citet{levitt2008agents}, matter for | |
| 52 | +welfare through their effect on entry rather than through the price level. | |
added
paper/tables/numbers.tex
+130 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ | ||
| 1 | +% generated by src/tables.py from results/ — do not edit | |
| 2 | +\newcommand{\DmeanBase}{1.98} | |
| 3 | +\newcommand{\DurgentBase}{5.59} | |
| 4 | +\newcommand{\DurgentCmaxSix}{8.9} | |
| 5 | +\newcommand{\DurgentHalfA}{7.6} | |
| 6 | +\newcommand{\GammaBase}{16.63} | |
| 7 | +\newcommand{\GammaCrossLam}{135} | |
| 8 | +\newcommand{\LamBBase}{1.83} | |
| 9 | +\newcommand{\LamSBase}{8.01} | |
| 10 | +\newcommand{\UcBase}{0.0426} | |
| 11 | +\newcommand{\UmBase}{0.0103} | |
| 12 | +\newcommand{\VPatientBase}{0.976} | |
| 13 | +\newcommand{\VUrgentBase}{0.902} | |
| 14 | +\newcommand{\accPatientBase}{51.67} | |
| 15 | +\newcommand{\accUrgentBase}{78.39} | |
| 16 | +\newcommand{\ampRatioMax}{1.023} | |
| 17 | +\newcommand{\ampRatioMin}{0.979} | |
| 18 | +\newcommand{\betaStarHet}{0.55} | |
| 19 | +\newcommand{\betaStarHom}{0.55} | |
| 20 | +\newcommand{\betweenShareBase}{13.06} | |
| 21 | +\newcommand{\betweenShareCmaxSix}{26.5} | |
| 22 | +\newcommand{\betweenShareCmaxThree}{13.1} | |
| 23 | +\newcommand{\betweenShareLowA}{14.0} | |
| 24 | +\newcommand{\buyerDurBase}{10.79} | |
| 25 | +\newcommand{\cashShareBase}{30.0} | |
| 26 | +\newcommand{\compExp}{-0.081} | |
| 27 | +\newcommand{\compMaxA}{0.7} | |
| 28 | +\newcommand{\compMaxAbs}{0.15} | |
| 29 | +\newcommand{\compMaxCmax}{0.6} | |
| 30 | +\newcommand{\compMaxG}{pareto} | |
| 31 | +\newcommand{\compTN}{0.017} | |
| 32 | +\newcommand{\convTypesMax}{81} | |
| 33 | +\newcommand{\convTypesRelErr}{2.2e-04} | |
| 34 | +\newcommand{\deltaBMeanBase}{0.49} | |
| 35 | +\newcommand{\deltaBPatientBase}{0.14} | |
| 36 | +\newcommand{\deltaBUrgentBase}{1.28} | |
| 37 | +\newcommand{\dynCompImpactBp}{0.95} | |
| 38 | +\newcommand{\dynCompMaxBp}{0.95} | |
| 39 | +\newcommand{\dynPriceImpact}{-1.46} | |
| 40 | +\newcommand{\dynQEnd}{-1.4} | |
| 41 | +\newcommand{\dynQImpact}{-13.1} | |
| 42 | +\newcommand{\dynSEnd}{13.2} | |
| 43 | +\newcommand{\dynSHalfLifeMonths}{1.9} | |
| 44 | +\newcommand{\dynTempQRebound}{27.9} | |
| 45 | +\newcommand{\elAGELam}{1.10} | |
| 46 | +\newcommand{\elAGEPrice}{0.064} | |
| 47 | +\newcommand{\elAGETom}{-0.53} | |
| 48 | +\newcommand{\elAPELam}{1.00} | |
| 49 | +\newcommand{\elAPEPrice}{0.059} | |
| 50 | +\newcommand{\elAPETom}{-0.49} | |
| 51 | +\newcommand{\elPhiGELam}{1.10} | |
| 52 | +\newcommand{\elPhiGEPrice}{0.064} | |
| 53 | +\newcommand{\elPhiGETom}{-0.53} | |
| 54 | +\newcommand{\elPhiPELam}{1.00} | |
| 55 | +\newcommand{\elPhiPEPrice}{0.059} | |
| 56 | +\newcommand{\elPhiPETom}{-0.49} | |
| 57 | +\newcommand{\etaPatientBase}{4.14} | |
| 58 | +\newcommand{\etaUrgentBase}{6.28} | |
| 59 | +\newcommand{\expSixClosingA}{3.44} | |
| 60 | +\newcommand{\expSixClosingBase}{2.97} | |
| 61 | +\newcommand{\expSixClosingPhi}{3.31} | |
| 62 | +\newcommand{\expSixGapA}{1.81} | |
| 63 | +\newcommand{\expSixGapPhi}{2.41} | |
| 64 | +\newcommand{\expSixPriceA}{2.34} | |
| 65 | +\newcommand{\expSixPricePhi}{0.94} | |
| 66 | +\newcommand{\expSixQA}{0.887} | |
| 67 | +\newcommand{\expSixQPhi}{0.900} | |
| 68 | +\newcommand{\expSixSA}{0.226} | |
| 69 | +\newcommand{\expSixSPhi}{0.201} | |
| 70 | +\newcommand{\gapMeanBase}{1.73} | |
| 71 | +\newcommand{\gapNuFourMonths}{6.0} | |
| 72 | +\newcommand{\gapNuWeek}{0.6} | |
| 73 | +\newcommand{\gapPatientBase}{1.12} | |
| 74 | +\newcommand{\gapPhiSeventy}{2.42} | |
| 75 | +\newcommand{\gapUrgentBase}{2.96} | |
| 76 | +\newcommand{\globalConvShare}{100.0} | |
| 77 | +\newcommand{\globalDurgMax}{20.3} | |
| 78 | +\newcommand{\globalDurgMin}{2.9} | |
| 79 | +\newcommand{\globalN}{150} | |
| 80 | +\newcommand{\globalSignD}{100.0} | |
| 81 | +\newcommand{\globalSignEta}{98.7} | |
| 82 | +\newcommand{\globalSignP}{100.0} | |
| 83 | +\newcommand{\globalTomMax}{10.7} | |
| 84 | +\newcommand{\globalTomMin}{0.6} | |
| 85 | +\newcommand{\inventoryBase}{0.19} | |
| 86 | +\newcommand{\inventoryHalfA}{0.284} | |
| 87 | +\newcommand{\mcMaxRelErr}{0.39} | |
| 88 | +\newcommand{\mcN}{100{,}000} | |
| 89 | +\newcommand{\mcTypesRelErr}{0.50} | |
| 90 | +\newcommand{\nTypes}{9} | |
| 91 | +\newcommand{\outsideBase}{1.61} | |
| 92 | +\newcommand{\pbarPatientBase}{1.016} | |
| 93 | +\newcommand{\pbarUrgentBase}{0.959} | |
| 94 | +\newcommand{\phiMinParticipation}{0.70} | |
| 95 | +\newcommand{\piTildeBase}{0.284} | |
| 96 | +\newcommand{\plannerGainHet}{0.30} | |
| 97 | +\newcommand{\plannerGainHom}{0.24} | |
| 98 | +\newcommand{\plannerThetaHet}{3.80} | |
| 99 | +\newcommand{\plannerThetaHom}{3.85} | |
| 100 | +\newcommand{\postedDurg}{4.52} | |
| 101 | +\newcommand{\postedPrice}{1.0195} | |
| 102 | +\newcommand{\postedSd}{2.80} | |
| 103 | +\newcommand{\postedTheta}{2.91} | |
| 104 | +\newcommand{\postedTom}{4.38} | |
| 105 | +\newcommand{\postedWelfareGap}{-11.2} | |
| 106 | +\newcommand{\priceBase}{0.996} | |
| 107 | +\newcommand{\priceDropHalfA}{4.8} | |
| 108 | +\newcommand{\priceDropHalfAPE}{4.3} | |
| 109 | +\newcommand{\pstarBase}{1.19} | |
| 110 | +\newcommand{\sdPriceBase}{3.47} | |
| 111 | +\newcommand{\sdPriceLowA}{3.82} | |
| 112 | +\newcommand{\selMeanBase}{-0.37} | |
| 113 | +\newcommand{\soldShareBase}{90.72} | |
| 114 | +\newcommand{\thetaBase}{4.39} | |
| 115 | +\newcommand{\thetaBetaEighty}{1.0} | |
| 116 | +\newcommand{\thetaBetaTwenty}{16.8} | |
| 117 | +\newcommand{\thetaHalfA}{3.73} | |
| 118 | +\newcommand{\tomBase}{2.23} | |
| 119 | +\newcommand{\tomBetaEighty}{3.8} | |
| 120 | +\newcommand{\tomBetaTwenty}{1.1} | |
| 121 | +\newcommand{\tomHalfA}{3.4} | |
| 122 | +\newcommand{\tomHalfAPE}{3.2} | |
| 123 | +\newcommand{\uniqDraws}{60} | |
| 124 | +\newcommand{\uniqMultiple}{0} | |
| 125 | +\newcommand{\uniqNone}{0} | |
| 126 | +\newcommand{\welfareLossBetaTwenty}{14.1} | |
| 127 | +\newcommand{\welfareLossHet}{0.11} | |
| 128 | +\newcommand{\welfareLossHom}{0.10} | |
| 129 | +\newcommand{\withinExp}{-4.21} | |
| 130 | +\newcommand{\withinTN}{-2.40} | |
added
paper/tables/tab01_parameters.tex
+20 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lp{2.7cm}lp{2.3cm}p{4.6cm}} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +Symbol & Parameter & Value & Units & Illustrative justification \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +$r$ & discount rate & 0.04 & per year & real rate of 4\%; standard in housing search models \\ | |
| 6 | +$s$ & listing inflow & 1.0 & listings per year & normalisation \\ | |
| 7 | +$\delta$ & withdrawal hazard & 0.50 & per year & 10--20\% of listings withdrawn at baseline hazards \\ | |
| 8 | +$w_0$ & own-use value on withdrawal & 0.80 & units of $q$ & gains from trade of about 20\% plus match component \\ | |
| 9 | +$[c_L,c_H]$ & carrying-cost support & [0.02, 0.30] & share of value per year & maintenance and taxes to double housing / distress \\ | |
| 10 | +$F$ & carrying-cost distribution & Beta(2,4), 9 types & -- & right-skewed: most sellers patient, a minority urgent \\ | |
| 11 | +$k$ & buyer entry cost & 0.02 & units of $q$ & search set-up, inspections \\ | |
| 12 | +$\kappa_b$ & buyer flow search cost & 0.05 & units of $q$ per year & temporary housing, time; comparable to seller carrying costs \\ | |
| 13 | +$\phi$ & qualification probability & 0.85 & per meeting & pre-approval screen \\ | |
| 14 | +$A$ & matching efficiency & 4.5 & meetings per year at $\theta=1$ & meetings = serious offers, not viewings \\ | |
| 15 | +$\alpha$ & matching elasticity (buyers) & 0.50 & -- & symmetric Cobb--Douglas \\ | |
| 16 | +$\beta$ & seller Nash share & 0.50 & -- & symmetric; Hosios value $1-\alpha$ \\ | |
| 17 | +$G$ & match-value distribution & $N(1.0,0.10^2)$ on $[0.7,1.3]$ & units of $q$ & log-concave (IFR); 10\% dispersion of buyer valuations \\ | |
| 18 | +$\pi,\nu,\phi_m$ & financing extension & 0.30, 12, 0.85 & --, per year, -- & cash share; one-month approval; approval probability \\ | |
| 19 | +\bottomrule | |
| 20 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab02_baseline_moments.tex
+22 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +Moment & Value \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +Tightness $\theta^*$ (buyers per listing) & 4.39 \\ | |
| 6 | +Effective seller contact rate $\Lambda_s$ (per year) & 8.01 \\ | |
| 7 | +Effective buyer contact rate $\Lambda_b$ (per year) & 1.83 \\ | |
| 8 | +Inventory of listings $S$ (inflow $=1$) & 0.186 \\ | |
| 9 | +Sales flow $Q$ (share of listings eventually sold) & 0.907 \\ | |
| 10 | +Mean time on market of sold listings (months) & 2.23 \\ | |
| 11 | +Mean buyer search duration (months) & 10.79 \\ | |
| 12 | +Transaction-weighted mean price & 0.9960 \\ | |
| 13 | +Price s.d. among identical houses & 0.0347 \\ | |
| 14 | +Between-type share of price variance & 0.131 \\ | |
| 15 | +Expected price, most patient / most urgent type & 1.0162 / 0.9594 \\ | |
| 16 | +Urgency discount $D$, most urgent type / transaction-weighted (\%) & 5.59 / 1.98 \\ | |
| 17 | +Sale hazard, most patient / most urgent type (per year) & 4.14 / 6.28 \\ | |
| 18 | +Walrasian free-entry benchmark $p^*$; gap $\Gamma$ (\%) & 1.195; 16.6 \\ | |
| 19 | +Welfare flow: total / sellers / holding costs & 0.1582 / 0.1505 / 0.0202 \\ | |
| 20 | +Max.\ seller residual / free-entry residual & 3.9e-13 / 1.6e-17 \\ | |
| 21 | +\bottomrule | |
| 22 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab02b_baseline_types.tex
+15 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$c$ & $f(c)$ & $V(c)$ & $v^*(c)$ & $1-G(v^*)$ & $\eta(c)$ & E[$\tau$] (mo.) & $\bar p(c)$ & $D(c)$ (\%) & stock share & sales share \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.040 & 0.098 & 0.9758 & 0.9958 & 0.517 & 4.14 & 2.59 & 1.0162 & 0.00 & 0.114 & 0.097 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.067 & 0.211 & 0.9657 & 0.9857 & 0.557 & 4.46 & 2.42 & 1.0080 & 0.80 & 0.228 & 0.209 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.098 & 0.230 & 0.9551 & 0.9751 & 0.599 & 4.80 & 2.27 & 0.9996 & 1.63 & 0.234 & 0.230 \\ | |
| 8 | +0.128 & 0.196 & 0.9450 & 0.9650 & 0.637 & 5.11 & 2.14 & 0.9916 & 2.41 & 0.188 & 0.197 \\ | |
| 9 | +0.159 & 0.139 & 0.9353 & 0.9553 & 0.673 & 5.39 & 2.04 & 0.9842 & 3.14 & 0.127 & 0.140 \\ | |
| 10 | +0.189 & 0.080 & 0.9260 & 0.9460 & 0.706 & 5.66 & 1.95 & 0.9772 & 3.83 & 0.070 & 0.081 \\ | |
| 11 | +0.220 & 0.035 & 0.9172 & 0.9372 & 0.736 & 5.90 & 1.88 & 0.9706 & 4.48 & 0.030 & 0.036 \\ | |
| 12 | +0.249 & 0.009 & 0.9090 & 0.9290 & 0.762 & 6.11 & 1.82 & 0.9646 & 5.07 & 0.008 & 0.010 \\ | |
| 13 | +0.275 & 0.001 & 0.9017 & 0.9217 & 0.784 & 6.28 & 1.77 & 0.9594 & 5.59 & 0.001 & 0.001 \\ | |
| 14 | +\bottomrule | |
| 15 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab03_comparative_statics.tex
+20 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$A/A_0$ & Eq. & $\theta$ & $\Lambda_s$ & price & TOM (mo.) & $S$ & $Q$ & $D_{urg}$ (\%) & $\bar D$ (\%) & s.d.\ price & $\Gamma$ (\%) \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.50 & GE & 3.73 & 3.69 & 0.9485 & 3.41 & 0.284 & 0.858 & 7.56 & 2.67 & 0.0420 & 20.6 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.50 & PE & 4.39 & 4.01 & 0.9536 & 3.24 & 0.270 & 0.865 & 7.32 & 2.59 & 0.0412 & 20.2 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.70 & GE & 4.07 & 5.40 & 0.9723 & 2.73 & 0.228 & 0.886 & 6.50 & 2.30 & 0.0382 & 18.6 \\ | |
| 8 | +0.70 & PE & 4.39 & 5.61 & 0.9746 & 2.68 & 0.223 & 0.888 & 6.41 & 2.27 & 0.0379 & 18.4 \\ | |
| 9 | +0.85 & GE & 4.25 & 6.70 & 0.9854 & 2.44 & 0.203 & 0.898 & 5.98 & 2.12 & 0.0363 & 17.5 \\ | |
| 10 | +0.85 & PE & 4.39 & 6.81 & 0.9864 & 2.41 & 0.201 & 0.899 & 5.95 & 2.11 & 0.0361 & 17.4 \\ | |
| 11 | +1.00 & GE & 4.39 & 8.01 & 0.9960 & 2.23 & 0.186 & 0.907 & 5.59 & 1.98 & 0.0347 & 16.6 \\ | |
| 12 | +1.00 & PE & 4.39 & 8.01 & 0.9960 & 2.23 & 0.186 & 0.907 & 5.59 & 1.98 & 0.0347 & 16.6 \\ | |
| 13 | +1.20 & GE & 4.54 & 9.78 & 1.0075 & 2.03 & 0.169 & 0.915 & 5.19 & 1.84 & 0.0331 & 15.7 \\ | |
| 14 | +1.20 & PE & 4.39 & 9.62 & 1.0065 & 2.04 & 0.170 & 0.915 & 5.22 & 1.86 & 0.0333 & 15.8 \\ | |
| 15 | +1.50 & GE & 4.71 & 12.45 & 1.0209 & 1.82 & 0.152 & 0.924 & 4.75 & 1.69 & 0.0313 & 14.5 \\ | |
| 16 | +1.50 & PE & 4.39 & 12.02 & 1.0190 & 1.85 & 0.154 & 0.923 & 4.81 & 1.71 & 0.0316 & 14.7 \\ | |
| 17 | +2.00 & GE & 4.92 & 16.97 & 1.0374 & 1.61 & 0.134 & 0.933 & 4.27 & 1.52 & 0.0293 & 13.2 \\ | |
| 18 | +2.00 & PE & 4.39 & 16.03 & 1.0345 & 1.64 & 0.137 & 0.931 & 4.35 & 1.55 & 0.0296 & 13.4 \\ | |
| 19 | +\bottomrule | |
| 20 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab04a_qualification_screen.tex
+9 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$\phi$ & $\theta$ & $\Lambda_s$ & price & TOM (mo.) & $D_{urg}$ (\%) & $S$ \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.40 & 3.66 & 3.45 & 0.9440 & 3.56 & 7.77 & 0.297 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.80 & 4.34 & 7.50 & 0.9921 & 2.30 & 5.73 & 0.192 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.85 & 4.39 & 8.01 & 0.9960 & 2.23 & 5.59 & 0.186 \\ | |
| 8 | +\bottomrule | |
| 9 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab04b_financing_extension.tex
+15 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$\phi_m$ & $\theta$ & $U_c$ & $U_m$ & $\tilde\pi$ & $\Delta_b$ (\%) & outside (\%) & selection (\%) & gap (\%) & listed (mo.) & to closing (mo.) & $S$ & $U_m\ge0$ \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.50 & 3.89 & 0.0862 & -0.0084 & 0.232 & 0.83 & 4.73 & -1.63 & 3.93 & 1.98 & 4.07 & 0.236 & no \\ | |
| 6 | +0.60 & 4.04 & 0.0699 & -0.0014 & 0.250 & 0.69 & 3.56 & -1.20 & 3.06 & 2.05 & 3.63 & 0.215 & no \\ | |
| 7 | +0.70 & 4.16 & 0.0572 & 0.0041 & 0.266 & 0.60 & 2.66 & -0.84 & 2.42 & 2.12 & 3.31 & 0.201 & yes \\ | |
| 8 | +0.75 & 4.21 & 0.0518 & 0.0064 & 0.272 & 0.56 & 2.27 & -0.67 & 2.16 & 2.15 & 3.18 & 0.195 & yes \\ | |
| 9 | +0.80 & 4.26 & 0.0470 & 0.0084 & 0.279 & 0.52 & 1.93 & -0.52 & 1.93 & 2.19 & 3.07 & 0.189 & yes \\ | |
| 10 | +0.85 & 4.30 & 0.0426 & 0.0103 & 0.284 & 0.49 & 1.61 & -0.37 & 1.73 & 2.22 & 2.97 & 0.185 & yes \\ | |
| 11 | +0.90 & 4.34 & 0.0385 & 0.0121 & 0.290 & 0.47 & 1.32 & -0.24 & 1.55 & 2.25 & 2.88 & 0.181 & yes \\ | |
| 12 | +0.95 & 4.38 & 0.0347 & 0.0137 & 0.295 & 0.44 & 1.05 & -0.11 & 1.39 & 2.28 & 2.80 & 0.177 & yes \\ | |
| 13 | +1.00 & 4.41 & 0.0313 & 0.0152 & 0.300 & 0.42 & 0.80 & 0.01 & 1.24 & 2.31 & 2.72 & 0.174 & yes \\ | |
| 14 | +\bottomrule | |
| 15 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab04c_financing_delay.tex
+12 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$\nu$ & delay (mo.) & $\theta$ & $\Delta_b$ (\%) & selection (\%) & gap (\%) & TOM (mo.) & cash sales (\%) \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +3 & 4.00 & 3.92 & 1.96 & -0.34 & 6.03 & 2.37 & 30.0 \\ | |
| 6 | +6 & 2.00 & 4.17 & 0.98 & -0.36 & 3.17 & 2.26 & 30.0 \\ | |
| 7 | +12 & 1.00 & 4.30 & 0.49 & -0.37 & 1.73 & 2.22 & 30.0 \\ | |
| 8 | +24 & 0.50 & 4.37 & 0.25 & -0.38 & 1.01 & 2.20 & 30.0 \\ | |
| 9 | +52 & 0.23 & 4.40 & 0.11 & -0.39 & 0.62 & 2.18 & 30.0 \\ | |
| 10 | +$\infty$ & 0 & 4.43 & 0.00 & -0.39 & 0.28 & 2.17 & 30.0 \\ | |
| 11 | +\bottomrule | |
| 12 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab04d_financing_bargaining.tex
+11 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$\beta$ & $\theta$ & $\Delta_b$ (\%) & outside (\%) & selection (\%) & gap (\%) & $\Delta_b$ patient & $\Delta_b$ urgent \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.20 & 16.42 & 1.08 & 0.66 & -0.15 & 1.59 & 0.52 & 2.33 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.35 & 7.91 & 0.79 & 1.13 & -0.26 & 1.66 & 0.33 & 1.80 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.50 & 4.30 & 0.49 & 1.61 & -0.37 & 1.73 & 0.14 & 1.28 \\ | |
| 8 | +0.65 & 2.30 & 0.20 & 2.11 & -0.49 & 1.82 & -0.05 & 0.74 \\ | |
| 9 | +0.80 & 1.03 & -0.10 & 2.66 & -0.60 & 1.96 & -0.24 & 0.21 \\ | |
| 10 | +\bottomrule | |
| 11 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab04e_matching_vs_approval.tex
+18 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +shock & value & agreement hazard & $\theta$ & price & listed (mo.) & to closing (mo.) & $S$ & $Q$ & gap (\%) & $U_m\ge0$ \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +A & 0.70 & 3.928 & 3.99 & 0.9732 & 2.71 & 3.44 & 0.226 & 0.887 & 1.81 & yes \\ | |
| 6 | +A & 0.85 & 4.455 & 4.16 & 0.9861 & 2.42 & 3.16 & 0.202 & 0.899 & 1.76 & yes \\ | |
| 7 | +A & 1.00 & 4.910 & 4.30 & 0.9965 & 2.22 & 2.97 & 0.185 & 0.908 & 1.73 & yes \\ | |
| 8 | +A & 1.15 & 5.309 & 4.41 & 1.0052 & 2.07 & 2.82 & 0.172 & 0.914 & 1.71 & yes \\ | |
| 9 | +A & 1.30 & 5.665 & 4.51 & 1.0126 & 1.95 & 2.70 & 0.162 & 0.919 & 1.69 & yes \\ | |
| 10 | +$\phi_m$ & 0.55 & 5.458 & 3.97 & 0.9748 & 2.01 & 3.83 & 0.225 & 0.888 & 3.44 & no \\ | |
| 11 | +$\phi_m$ & 0.70 & 5.159 & 4.16 & 0.9871 & 2.12 & 3.31 & 0.201 & 0.900 & 2.41 & yes \\ | |
| 12 | +$\phi_m$ & 0.75 & 5.070 & 4.21 & 0.9905 & 2.15 & 3.18 & 0.195 & 0.903 & 2.16 & yes \\ | |
| 13 | +$\phi_m$ & 0.80 & 4.987 & 4.26 & 0.9936 & 2.19 & 3.07 & 0.189 & 0.905 & 1.93 & yes \\ | |
| 14 | +$\phi_m$ & 0.85 & 4.910 & 4.30 & 0.9965 & 2.22 & 2.97 & 0.185 & 0.908 & 1.73 & yes \\ | |
| 15 | +$\phi_m$ & 0.95 & 4.769 & 4.38 & 1.0016 & 2.28 & 2.80 & 0.177 & 0.911 & 1.39 & yes \\ | |
| 16 | +$\phi_m$ & 1.00 & 4.706 & 4.41 & 1.0040 & 2.31 & 2.72 & 0.174 & 0.913 & 1.24 & yes \\ | |
| 17 | +\bottomrule | |
| 18 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab05_heterogeneity.tex
+24 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$c_H$ & s.d.$(c)$ & $A/A_0$ & $\theta$ & price & s.d.\ price & between (\%) & $D_{urg}$ (\%) & $\bar p$ range & TOM (mo.) \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.05 & 0.005 & 0.7 & 2.71 & 0.9881 & 0.0334 & 0.4 & 0.97 & 0.0096 & 3.54 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.05 & 0.005 & 1.0 & 3.00 & 1.0096 & 0.0307 & 0.3 & 0.84 & 0.0085 & 2.90 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.05 & 0.005 & 1.3 & 3.20 & 1.0246 & 0.0289 & 0.3 & 0.75 & 0.0077 & 2.54 \\ | |
| 8 | +0.10 & 0.014 & 0.7 & 2.98 & 0.9845 & 0.0342 & 2.2 & 2.39 & 0.0237 & 3.33 \\ | |
| 9 | +0.10 & 0.014 & 1.0 & 3.28 & 1.0065 & 0.0313 & 2.0 & 2.05 & 0.0208 & 2.72 \\ | |
| 10 | +0.10 & 0.014 & 1.3 & 3.48 & 1.0218 & 0.0295 & 1.9 & 1.85 & 0.0190 & 2.39 \\ | |
| 11 | +0.20 & 0.032 & 0.7 & 3.53 & 0.9780 & 0.0361 & 7.9 & 4.69 & 0.0466 & 2.99 \\ | |
| 12 | +0.20 & 0.032 & 1.0 & 3.84 & 1.0009 & 0.0330 & 7.3 & 4.03 & 0.0409 & 2.44 \\ | |
| 13 | +0.20 & 0.032 & 1.3 & 4.05 & 1.0168 & 0.0309 & 6.9 & 3.62 & 0.0373 & 2.14 \\ | |
| 14 | +0.30 & 0.049 & 0.7 & 4.07 & 0.9723 & 0.0382 & 14.0 & 6.50 & 0.0647 & 2.73 \\ | |
| 15 | +0.30 & 0.049 & 1.0 & 4.39 & 0.9960 & 0.0347 & 13.1 & 5.59 & 0.0568 & 2.23 \\ | |
| 16 | +0.30 & 0.049 & 1.3 & 4.60 & 1.0124 & 0.0325 & 12.5 & 5.03 & 0.0518 & 1.95 \\ | |
| 17 | +0.45 & 0.075 & 0.7 & 4.89 & 0.9649 & 0.0413 & 21.8 & 8.66 & 0.0863 & 2.44 \\ | |
| 18 | +0.45 & 0.075 & 1.0 & 5.22 & 0.9895 & 0.0373 & 20.6 & 7.44 & 0.0757 & 1.98 \\ | |
| 19 | +0.45 & 0.075 & 1.3 & 5.43 & 1.0065 & 0.0348 & 19.8 & 6.69 & 0.0691 & 1.73 \\ | |
| 20 | +0.60 & 0.102 & 0.7 & 5.71 & 0.9584 & 0.0441 & 27.9 & 10.39 & 0.1036 & 2.21 \\ | |
| 21 | +0.60 & 0.102 & 1.0 & 6.04 & 0.9839 & 0.0397 & 26.5 & 8.91 & 0.0907 & 1.79 \\ | |
| 22 | +0.60 & 0.102 & 1.3 & 6.25 & 1.0013 & 0.0369 & 25.7 & 8.02 & 0.0828 & 1.57 \\ | |
| 23 | +\bottomrule | |
| 24 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab05b_dispersion_beta.tex
+11 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$\beta$ & $\theta$ & within s.d. & between s.d. & between share (\%) & $D_{urg}$ (\%) \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.00 & 60.00 & 0.0493 & 0.0909 & 77.3 & 65.32 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.25 & 12.79 & 0.0336 & 0.0153 & 17.1 & 7.08 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.50 & 4.39 & 0.0324 & 0.0126 & 13.1 & 5.59 \\ | |
| 8 | +0.75 & 1.42 & 0.0336 & 0.0112 & 9.9 & 4.84 \\ | |
| 9 | +1.00 & 0.02 & 0.0473 & 0.0037 & 0.6 & 1.23 \\ | |
| 10 | +\bottomrule | |
| 11 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab06_selection_bias.tex
+30 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$G$ & $c_H$ & $A/A_0$ & within (\%) & comp.\ impact (\%) & comp.\ s.s.\ (\%) & ratio & $\epsilon(c_L)$ & $\epsilon(c_H)$ & selection \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +truncnorm & 0.1 & 0.7 & -2.21 & 0.002 & -0.000 & 0.9993 & 0.633 & 0.678 & dampens \\ | |
| 6 | +truncnorm & 0.1 & 1.3 & 1.51 & -0.001 & 0.000 & 0.9996 & 0.557 & 0.587 & dampens \\ | |
| 7 | +truncnorm & 0.3 & 0.7 & -2.40 & 0.017 & -0.001 & 0.9928 & 0.596 & 0.760 & dampens \\ | |
| 8 | +truncnorm & 0.3 & 1.3 & 1.63 & -0.007 & 0.001 & 0.9957 & 0.526 & 0.646 & dampens \\ | |
| 9 | +truncnorm & 0.6 & 0.7 & -2.62 & 0.056 & -0.001 & 0.9787 & 0.560 & 0.867 & dampens \\ | |
| 10 | +truncnorm & 0.6 & 1.3 & 1.76 & -0.024 & 0.001 & 0.9864 & 0.496 & 0.735 & dampens \\ | |
| 11 | +exponential & 0.1 & 0.7 & -3.66 & -0.014 & -0.008 & 1.0038 & 0.601 & 0.472 & amplifies \\ | |
| 12 | +exponential & 0.1 & 1.3 & 2.72 & 0.007 & 0.004 & 1.0025 & 0.532 & 0.421 & amplifies \\ | |
| 13 | +exponential & 0.3 & 0.7 & -4.21 & -0.081 & -0.034 & 1.0193 & 0.510 & 0.250 & amplifies \\ | |
| 14 | +exponential & 0.3 & 1.3 & 3.06 & 0.041 & 0.015 & 1.0135 & 0.459 & 0.232 & amplifies \\ | |
| 15 | +exponential & 0.6 & 0.7 & -4.58 & -0.033 & -0.033 & 1.0073 & 0.425 & 1.140 & amplifies \\ | |
| 16 | +exponential & 0.6 & 1.3 & 3.37 & 0.078 & 0.021 & 1.0233 & 0.392 & 0.315 & amplifies \\ | |
| 17 | +weibull & 0.1 & 0.7 & -2.76 & 0.000 & -0.001 & 0.9999 & 0.573 & 0.583 & dampens \\ | |
| 18 | +weibull & 0.1 & 1.3 & 1.93 & 0.000 & 0.000 & 1.0000 & 0.507 & 0.508 & amplifies \\ | |
| 19 | +weibull & 0.3 & 0.7 & -3.00 & 0.010 & -0.003 & 0.9968 & 0.531 & 0.621 & dampens \\ | |
| 20 | +weibull & 0.3 & 1.3 & 2.07 & -0.003 & 0.002 & 0.9988 & 0.474 & 0.519 & dampens \\ | |
| 21 | +weibull & 0.6 & 0.7 & -3.26 & 0.046 & -0.005 & 0.9859 & 0.491 & 0.747 & dampens \\ | |
| 22 | +weibull & 0.6 & 1.3 & 2.23 & -0.015 & 0.003 & 0.9932 & 0.440 & 0.585 & dampens \\ | |
| 23 | +pareto & 0.1 & 0.7 & -8.77 & -0.005 & -0.002 & 1.0006 & 0.326 & 0.254 & amplifies \\ | |
| 24 | +pareto & 0.1 & 1.3 & 6.60 & 0.003 & 0.001 & 1.0004 & 0.283 & 0.221 & amplifies \\ | |
| 25 | +pareto & 0.3 & 0.7 & -9.20 & -0.052 & -0.016 & 1.0056 & 0.295 & 0.087 & amplifies \\ | |
| 26 | +pareto & 0.3 & 1.3 & 6.86 & 0.026 & 0.008 & 1.0038 & 0.258 & 0.078 & amplifies \\ | |
| 27 | +pareto & 0.6 & 0.7 & -9.69 & -0.155 & -0.037 & 1.0159 & 0.257 & -0.066 & amplifies \\ | |
| 28 | +pareto & 0.6 & 1.3 & 7.17 & 0.080 & 0.018 & 1.0112 & 0.227 & -0.060 & amplifies \\ | |
| 29 | +\bottomrule | |
| 30 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab06b_dynamics.tex
+12 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +scenario & $\theta_{0^+}$ & $\theta_\infty$ & $P_{0^+}$ & $P_\infty$ & comp.\ $0^+$ (bp) & max $|$comp.$|$ (bp) & $Q_{0^+}$ & $Q_{min}$ & $Q_\infty$ & $S_{max}$ & conv. & iter. \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +perm\_A\_minus20 & 4.19 & 4.20 & 0.9815 & 0.9814 & 1.0 & 1.0 & 0.789 & 0.789 & 0.895 & 0.210 & yes & 28 \\ | |
| 6 | +perm\_A\_plus20 & 4.55 & 4.54 & 1.0074 & 1.0075 & -0.5 & 0.5 & 1.007 & 0.915 & 0.915 & 0.186 & yes & 27 \\ | |
| 7 | +temp\_A\_minus20\_1y & 4.17 & 4.39 & 0.9816 & 0.9960 & 0.8 & 1.1 & 0.786 & 0.755 & 0.907 & 0.237 & yes & 46 \\ | |
| 8 | +perm\_phi\_minus20 & 4.19 & 4.20 & 0.9815 & 0.9814 & 1.0 & 1.0 & 0.789 & 0.789 & 0.895 & 0.210 & yes & 28 \\ | |
| 9 | +perm\_A\_minus20\_exponential & 2.58 & 2.58 & 0.8455 & 0.8456 & -4.7 & 4.9 & 0.752 & 0.752 & 0.807 & 0.386 & yes & 27 \\ | |
| 10 | +perm\_A\_minus20\_delta0 & 2.79 & 2.81 & 0.9952 & 0.9949 & 3.2 & 3.2 & 0.904 & 0.904 & 1.000 & 0.325 & yes & 30 \\ | |
| 11 | +\bottomrule | |
| 12 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab07_sensitivity.tex
+29 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +parameter & value & $\theta$ & price & TOM (mo.) & $D_{urg}$ (\%) & between (\%) & $Q$ & conv. \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +r & 0.030 & 4.24 & 0.9975 & 2.29 & 5.74 & 13.9 & 0.905 & yes \\ | |
| 6 | +r & 0.050 & 4.54 & 0.9945 & 2.17 & 5.45 & 12.3 & 0.910 & yes \\ | |
| 7 | +delta & 0.375 & 4.04 & 0.9988 & 2.37 & 6.12 & 15.8 & 0.924 & yes \\ | |
| 8 | +delta & 0.625 & 4.73 & 0.9934 & 2.11 & 5.16 & 11.0 & 0.892 & yes \\ | |
| 9 | +w0 & 0.600 & 6.21 & 0.9836 & 1.74 & 4.49 & 7.7 & 0.928 & yes \\ | |
| 10 | +w0 & 1.000 & 2.62 & 1.0129 & 3.22 & 7.57 & 25.4 & 0.865 & yes \\ | |
| 11 | +k & 0.015 & 4.46 & 1.0007 & 2.21 & 5.52 & 12.8 & 0.908 & yes \\ | |
| 12 | +k & 0.025 & 4.32 & 0.9912 & 2.25 & 5.66 & 13.3 & 0.906 & yes \\ | |
| 13 | +kappa\_b & 0.037 & 5.98 & 1.0049 & 2.07 & 5.28 & 12.7 & 0.914 & yes \\ | |
| 14 | +kappa\_b & 0.062 & 3.45 & 0.9889 & 2.36 & 5.85 & 13.3 & 0.901 & yes \\ | |
| 15 | +phi & 0.637 & 4.14 & 0.9770 & 2.62 & 6.31 & 13.8 & 0.891 & yes \\ | |
| 16 | +phi & 0.980 & 4.51 & 1.0050 & 2.07 & 5.27 & 12.7 & 0.914 & yes \\ | |
| 17 | +A & 3.375 & 4.14 & 0.9770 & 2.62 & 6.31 & 13.8 & 0.891 & yes \\ | |
| 18 | +A & 5.625 & 4.57 & 1.0100 & 1.99 & 5.11 & 12.6 & 0.917 & yes \\ | |
| 19 | +alpha & 0.375 & 4.23 & 0.9842 & 2.46 & 6.03 & 13.5 & 0.897 & yes \\ | |
| 20 | +alpha & 0.625 & 4.55 & 1.0079 & 2.02 & 5.18 & 12.6 & 0.916 & yes \\ | |
| 21 | +beta & 0.375 & 7.27 & 0.9824 & 1.74 & 6.17 & 14.8 & 0.927 & yes \\ | |
| 22 | +beta & 0.625 & 2.62 & 1.0055 & 2.77 & 5.17 & 11.5 & 0.885 & yes \\ | |
| 23 | +sigma\_w & 0.050 & 4.18 & 0.9618 & 1.71 & 3.98 & 5.8 & 0.929 & yes \\ | |
| 24 | +sigma\_w & 0.150 & 4.73 & 1.0413 & 2.62 & 6.50 & 21.3 & 0.891 & yes \\ | |
| 25 | +sigma\_w & 0.200 & 5.14 & 1.0924 & 2.91 & 6.99 & 30.5 & 0.879 & yes \\ | |
| 26 | +c\_max & 0.200 & 3.84 & 1.0009 & 2.44 & 4.03 & 7.3 & 0.898 & yes \\ | |
| 27 | +c\_max & 0.450 & 5.22 & 0.9895 & 1.98 & 7.44 & 20.6 & 0.917 & yes \\ | |
| 28 | +\bottomrule | |
| 29 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab07b_distributions.tex
+11 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$G$ & IFR & $\theta$ & price & TOM (mo.) & $D_{urg}$ (\%) & between (\%) & s.d.\ price & conv. \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +truncnorm & yes & 4.39 & 0.9960 & 2.23 & 5.59 & 13.1 & 0.0347 & yes \\ | |
| 6 | +exponential & yes & 2.82 & 0.8683 & 4.27 & 13.44 & 27.8 & 0.0531 & yes \\ | |
| 7 | +weibull & yes & 4.21 & 0.9877 & 2.68 & 7.13 & 18.2 & 0.0376 & yes \\ | |
| 8 | +weibull\_dfr & no & 7.27 & 1.4166 & 5.07 & 10.91 & 93.9 & 0.0359 & yes \\ | |
| 9 | +pareto & no & 7.26 & 1.4247 & 5.23 & 12.11 & 95.2 & 0.0404 & yes \\ | |
| 10 | +\bottomrule | |
| 11 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab07c_convergence_types.tex
+14 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +types & $\theta$ & price & TOM (mo.) & $\bar D$ (\%) & seconds \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +1 & 4.45970 & 0.99589 & 2.1893 & 0.000 & 0.07 \\ | |
| 6 | +3 & 4.40627 & 0.99598 & 2.2182 & 0.977 & 0.19 \\ | |
| 7 | +5 & 4.39557 & 0.99599 & 2.2239 & 1.544 & 0.31 \\ | |
| 8 | +9 & 4.39075 & 0.99599 & 2.2265 & 1.984 & 0.55 \\ | |
| 9 | +15 & 4.38921 & 0.99599 & 2.2274 & 2.222 & 0.91 \\ | |
| 10 | +25 & 4.38864 & 0.99599 & 2.2277 & 2.370 & 1.51 \\ | |
| 11 | +41 & 4.38843 & 0.99599 & 2.2278 & 2.459 & 2.40 \\ | |
| 12 | +81 & 4.38833 & 0.99599 & 2.2279 & 2.528 & 4.73 \\ | |
| 13 | +\bottomrule | |
| 14 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab07d_convergence_dt.tex
+10 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$\Delta t$ & $\theta_{0^+}$ & $P_{0^+}$ & $P_{1y}$ & $Q_{1y}$ & $S_{1y}$ & conv. & iter. & seconds \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.10 & 4.18693 & 0.98146 & 0.98137 & 0.89270 & 0.20977 & yes & 25 & 1.2 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.05 & 4.18627 & 0.98146 & 0.98137 & 0.89335 & 0.20993 & yes & 27 & 1.5 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.02 & 4.18581 & 0.98147 & 0.98137 & 0.89370 & 0.21001 & yes & 28 & 2.1 \\ | |
| 8 | +0.01 & 4.18565 & 0.98147 & 0.98137 & 0.89380 & 0.21004 & yes & 29 & 3.2 \\ | |
| 9 | +\bottomrule | |
| 10 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab07e_entry_costs.tex
+15 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$k/k_0$ & $\kappa_b/\kappa_{b0}$ & $\theta$ & $\Lambda_s$ & price & TOM (mo.) & $D_{urg}$ (\%) & $S$ & $Q$ \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.50 & 0.50 & 9.53 & 11.81 & 1.0268 & 1.84 & 4.75 & 0.154 & 0.923 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.50 & 1.00 & 4.53 & 8.14 & 1.0055 & 2.19 & 5.45 & 0.182 & 0.909 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.50 & 2.00 & 2.12 & 5.56 & 0.9825 & 2.66 & 6.31 & 0.222 & 0.889 \\ | |
| 8 | +1.00 & 0.50 & 9.18 & 11.59 & 1.0170 & 1.88 & 4.88 & 0.157 & 0.922 \\ | |
| 9 | +1.00 & 1.00 & 4.39 & 8.01 & 0.9960 & 2.23 & 5.59 & 0.186 & 0.907 \\ | |
| 10 | +1.00 & 2.00 & 2.06 & 5.49 & 0.9733 & 2.71 & 6.46 & 0.226 & 0.887 \\ | |
| 11 | +2.00 & 0.50 & 8.50 & 11.15 & 0.9974 & 1.96 & 5.15 & 0.163 & 0.918 \\ | |
| 12 | +2.00 & 1.00 & 4.13 & 7.77 & 0.9771 & 2.31 & 5.88 & 0.193 & 0.904 \\ | |
| 13 | +2.00 & 2.00 & 1.95 & 5.34 & 0.9548 & 2.80 & 6.79 & 0.234 & 0.883 \\ | |
| 14 | +\bottomrule | |
| 15 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab07f_uniqueness.tex
+15 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +Item & Value \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +draws & 60 \\ | |
| 6 | +draws with exactly one root & 60 \\ | |
| 7 | +draws with several roots & 0 \\ | |
| 8 | +draws without a root & 0 \\ | |
| 9 | +range of $A$ & [2.30, 6.75] \\ | |
| 10 | +range of $\beta$ & [0.21, 0.80] \\ | |
| 11 | +range of $\delta$ & [0.10, 1.00] \\ | |
| 12 | +range of $\phi$ & [0.51, 0.99] \\ | |
| 13 | +range of $\theta^*$ & [0.44, 24.76] \\ | |
| 14 | +\bottomrule | |
| 15 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab08_welfare.tex
+18 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +$\beta$ & sellers & $\theta$ & price & TOM (mo.) & welfare & sellers' value & holding costs & $D_{urg}$ (\%) \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +0.20 & heterogeneous & 16.77 & 0.9514 & 1.08 & 0.1360 & 0.1314 & 0.0098 & 7.64 \\ | |
| 6 | +0.20 & homogeneous & 17.03 & 0.9513 & 1.06 & 0.1359 & 0.1314 & 0.0100 & 0.00 \\ | |
| 7 | +0.35 & heterogeneous & 8.08 & 0.9790 & 1.65 & 0.1527 & 0.1466 & 0.0150 & 6.31 \\ | |
| 8 | +0.35 & homogeneous & 8.21 & 0.9789 & 1.62 & 0.1525 & 0.1465 & 0.0153 & 0.00 \\ | |
| 9 | +0.50 & heterogeneous & 4.39 & 0.9960 & 2.23 & 0.1582 & 0.1505 & 0.0202 & 5.59 \\ | |
| 10 | +0.50 & homogeneous & 4.46 & 0.9959 & 2.19 & 0.1580 & 0.1504 & 0.0207 & 0.00 \\ | |
| 11 | +0.55 & heterogeneous & 3.59 & 1.0002 & 2.43 & 0.1584 & 0.1501 & 0.0221 & 5.41 \\ | |
| 12 | +0.55 & homogeneous & 3.65 & 1.0001 & 2.39 & 0.1582 & 0.1500 & 0.0226 & 0.00 \\ | |
| 13 | +0.65 & heterogeneous & 2.34 & 1.0069 & 2.89 & 0.1562 & 0.1466 & 0.0263 & 5.10 \\ | |
| 14 | +0.65 & homogeneous & 2.38 & 1.0067 & 2.84 & 0.1559 & 0.1465 & 0.0268 & 0.00 \\ | |
| 15 | +0.80 & heterogeneous & 1.05 & 1.0114 & 3.79 & 0.1436 & 0.1315 & 0.0347 & 4.71 \\ | |
| 16 | +0.80 & homogeneous & 1.06 & 1.0111 & 3.74 & 0.1432 & 0.1314 & 0.0353 & 0.00 \\ | |
| 17 | +\bottomrule | |
| 18 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab08b_planner.tex
+8 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +sellers & $\theta$ decentralised & $\theta$ planner & welfare decentralised & welfare planner & gain (\%) \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +heterogeneous & 4.391 & 3.802 & 0.15820 & 0.15867 & 0.299 \\ | |
| 6 | +homogeneous & 4.460 & 3.850 & 0.15799 & 0.15838 & 0.243 \\ | |
| 7 | +\bottomrule | |
| 8 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/tables/tab09_protocols.tex
+12 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ | ||
| 1 | +\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrrrrr} | |
| 2 | +\toprule | |
| 3 | +protocol & $A/A_0$ & $\theta$ & price & TOM (mo.) & s.d.\ price & between (\%) & $D_{urg}$ (\%) & welfare & $Q$ \\ | |
| 4 | +\midrule | |
| 5 | +nash & 0.7 & 4.07 & 0.9723 & 2.73 & 0.0382 & 14.0 & 6.50 & 0.1285 & 0.886 \\ | |
| 6 | +posted & 0.7 & 2.53 & 0.9998 & 5.26 & 0.0300 & 14.7 & 5.01 & 0.1088 & 0.780 \\ | |
| 7 | +nash & 1.0 & 4.39 & 0.9960 & 2.23 & 0.0347 & 13.1 & 5.59 & 0.1582 & 0.907 \\ | |
| 8 | +posted & 1.0 & 2.91 & 1.0195 & 4.38 & 0.0280 & 14.2 & 4.52 & 0.1404 & 0.817 \\ | |
| 9 | +nash & 1.3 & 4.60 & 1.0124 & 1.95 & 0.0325 & 12.5 & 5.03 & 0.1780 & 0.919 \\ | |
| 10 | +posted & 1.3 & 3.17 & 1.0336 & 3.88 & 0.0266 & 13.8 & 4.19 & 0.1615 & 0.838 \\ | |
| 11 | +\bottomrule | |
| 12 | +\end{tabular} | |
added
paper/uq_logo.jpg
+0 −0
Binary file not shown.
added
pytest.ini
+5 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ | ||
| 1 | +[pytest] | |
| 2 | +testpaths = tests | |
| 3 | +markers = | |
| 4 | + slow: slow equilibrium tests (financing extension, transition) | |
| 5 | +addopts = -ra | |
added
requirements.txt
+6 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ | ||
| 1 | +numpy>=2.0 | |
| 2 | +scipy>=1.14 | |
| 3 | +pandas>=2.2 | |
| 4 | +matplotlib>=3.9 | |
| 5 | +pyyaml>=6.0 | |
| 6 | +pytest>=8.0 | |
added
research/inaccessible_sources.md
+68 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Literature review, Part A (theory): candidates NOT verified / NOT retained | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Date: 2026-10-20. Rule applied: an item enters `lit_part_A.csv` only if a Crossref record (title, authors, year, container) matches the citation and the DOI resolves, or, for items without Crossref records, a publisher/RePEc page was fetched and saved as evidence. Everything below failed that test or was deliberately excluded; none of it may be cited from this file. | |
| 4 | + | |
| 5 | +## A. Could not be verified (no usable bibliographic record reached) | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +| Candidate (as suggested or found) | What was tried | Why unverified | | |
| 8 | +|---|---|---| | |
| 9 | +| Kotova, N. & Zhang, A. L., "Search Frictions and Idiosyncratic Price Dispersion in the US Housing Market" (SSRN 3386353, 2019) / later circulated as "Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets" (2020-21) | Crossref (only the SSRN DOI 10.2139/ssrn.3386353 exists, no journal version), WebSearch, SSRN page (HTTP 403) | Working paper only; no journal record; SSRN page could not be fetched to confirm current title/authors. Relevant to WP19's dispersion result (model-based liquidity measures: time-on-market and price dispersion) — Part B may wish to retry via the authors' websites. | | |
| 10 | +| Han, L. & Stacey, D.(?) "Housing Market Frictions and Affordability: A Search-and-Matching Perspective" (SSRN 6703338 / 6703260, 2026) | Crossref (SSRN DOIs only), WebSearch (only UEA Summer School 2026 slides by Lu Han with that title surfaced), SSRN page (HTTP 403) | Preprint of 2026; co-author could not be confirmed; no journal record. Potentially a very recent competing survey/model; the lead should check SSRN manually before any mention. | | |
| 11 | +| "Hendershott & Rutherford (brokers)" (suggested in the brief) | Crossref bibliographic queries | No paper with these two authors on brokerage theory could be located; the brokerage-theory slot is covered instead by Yavaş (1992), verified. Rutherford, Springer & Yavaş (2005, JFE) is empirical and belongs to Part B if wanted. | | |
| 12 | +| A formal search-bargaining theory of mortgage/financing contingencies other than Bian, Lin & Liu (2018) | Two WebSearch passes + Crossref keyword queries ("financing contingency", "mortgage contingency", "cash buyers" + "search model") | Nothing further found. The literature's theoretical treatment of financing contingencies in housing transactions appears limited to the calibrated model in Han & Hong (2024), the representative-seller model in Reher & Valkanov (2024), and Bian, Lin & Liu (2018). This is itself a finding for the novelty audit. | | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +## B. Verified via Crossref but deliberately NOT retained in Part A (verification JSON deleted to keep the folder = cited set) | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +| Item | DOI | Reason for exclusion | | |
| 17 | +|---|---|---| | |
| 18 | +| Kaplan, Mitman & Violante (2020), "The Housing Boom and Bust: Model Meets Evidence", JPE 128(9) | 10.1086/708816 | Brief asked to include only if clearly relevant to liquidity; the model has no search/liquidity margin (beliefs vs credit). Mention at most in passing. | | |
| 19 | +| Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo (2016), "Understanding Booms and Busts in Housing Markets", JPE 124(4) | 10.1086/686732 | Belief-diffusion model of cycles; no search friction or liquidity discount; belongs to the cycles theme (Part B / general literature review), not to Part A microstructure. | | |
| 20 | +| Guerrieri, Shimer & Wright (2010), "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium", Econometrica 78(6) | 10.3982/ECTA8535 | Adverse-selection/competitive-search tool; WP19 has no private information about house quality. Taylor (1999) already covers the stale-listing stigma channel. | | |
| 21 | +| Burdett & Mortensen (1998), "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment", IER 39(2) | 10.2307/2527292 | Marked optional in the brief; Burdett & Judd (1983) suffices as the price-dispersion benchmark. | | |
| 22 | +| Chen & Rosenthal (1996), "On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists", RAND 27(2) | 10.2307/2555923 | List-price-as-ceiling theory; Horowitz (1992) and Arnold (1999) already cover the list-price role within housing. | | |
| 23 | +| Williams (1998), "Agency and Brokerage of Real Assets in Competitive Equilibrium", RFS 11(2) | 10.1093/rfs/11.2.239 | Brokerage/agency focus; outside WP19's mechanism. | | |
| 24 | +| Read (1991), "A Price Dispersion Equilibrium in a Spatially Differentiated Housing Market with Search Costs", REE 19(4) | 10.1111/1540-6229.00566 | Rental-market dispersion from spatial differentiation; Maury & Tripier (2014) and Burdett & Judd (1983) retained instead. | | |
| 25 | +| Cheng, Lin & Liu (2013), "Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets", Financial Review 48(4) | 10.1111/fire.12020 | Portfolio-risk metric for commercial real estate; Lin & Vandell (2007), Lin & Liu (2008) and Cheng, Lin & Liu (2010) already represent this strand. | | |
| 26 | +| Ben-Shahar & Golan (2022), "Price dispersion and time-on-market in the housing market", JHE 58 | 10.1016/j.jhe.2022.101875 | No abstract could be read (ScienceDirect/IDEAS fetch failed); appears empirical — handed to Part B rather than cited blind. | | |
| 27 | +| Gabrovski & Ortego-Marti (2025), "Home construction financing and search frictions in the housing market", RED 55 | 10.1016/j.red.2024.101253 | Verified but abstract not read; construction-financing focus is peripheral to WP19. Could be added later if the lead reads it. | | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +## C. Corrections to the brief's bibliographic hints (verified outlets differ from the ones suggested) | |
| 30 | + | |
| 31 | +- Albrecht, Gautier & Vroman, "Directed Search in the Housing Market" is in the **Review of Economic Dynamics** 19 (2016), not IER. | |
| 32 | +- Ngai & Sheedy, "The Decision to Move House…" is in the **JEEA** 18(5) (2020), not AER. | |
| 33 | +- Moen, Nenov & Sniekers, "Buying First or Selling First…" is in the **JEEA** 19(1) (2021; online 2019), not REStud. | |
| 34 | +- Piazzesi, Schneider & Stroebel, "Segmented Housing Search" is in the **AER** 110(3) (2020), not JPE. | |
| 35 | +- Gabrovski & Ortego-Marti, Beveridge-curve paper is in the **Journal of Economic Theory** 181 (2019), not JUE; their efficiency paper is "A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions", **Macroeconomic Dynamics** 29 (2025). | |
| 36 | +- Williams (1995), "Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search" is in the **Review of Financial Studies** 8(1), not JREFE. | |
| 37 | +- Novy-Marx (2009), "Hot and Cold Markets" is in **Real Estate Economics** 37(1), not RFS. | |
| 38 | +- Hedlund's "Illiquidity and its discontents" is JME 83 (2016) and "The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing…" is Quantitative Economics 7(1) (2016) — both as suggested. | |
| 39 | +- Reher & Valkanov, "The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle", **Journal of Finance** 79(5): 3149-3201 (2024) — confirmed. | |
| 40 | +- Han & Hong, "Cash is King? Understanding financing risk in housing markets", **Review of Finance** 28(6): 2083-2118 (2024) — confirmed. | |
| 41 | +- Guren & McQuade (2020) REStud DOI is 10.1093/restud/**rdaa001** (a first guess, rdz059, belongs to an unrelated article and was discarded). | |
| 42 | +# Part B — candidates not verified (excluded from lit_part_B.csv) | |
| 43 | + | |
| 44 | +Compiled 2026-10-20. Items below were in the Part B brief or surfaced during searching but could not be matched to a Crossref record or an authoritative page with the stated authors/outlet/year, or were verified but judged out of scope. None is cited in the CSV or the notes. | |
| 45 | + | |
| 46 | +## Not found / misattributed in the brief | |
| 47 | +- "Benefield, Cain & Johnson 2014 JREFE (withdrawn listings)": no such JREFE paper found. The three authors' JREFE paper is Benefield, Cain and Johnson (2011), "On the Relationship Between Property Price, Time-on-Market, and Photo Depictions in a Multiple Listing Service," JREFE 43, 401–422 (photos, not withdrawals); their 2014 item is a Journal of Real Estate Literature review of simultaneous price/TOM modelling. Replaced by Benefield & Hardin (2015, JREFE 50(1)) on TOM measurement and relisting, which is verified. | |
| 48 | +- "Carrillo, de Wit & Larson 2015 — Can tightness in the housing market be measured?": the verified title is "Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands," Real Estate Economics 43(3), 609–651 (included under the correct title). | |
| 49 | +- "Harding, Rosenblatt & Yao 2012 JUE": the paper is 2009, JUE 66(3), 164–178 (included with the correct year). | |
| 50 | +- "Goetzmann & Peng 2006 JREFE — Estimating house price distributions when sales are selected": no JREFE record; the verified paper is "Estimating House Price Indexes in the Presence of Seller Reservation Prices," Review of Economics and Statistics 88(1), 100–112 (included under the correct title/outlet). | |
| 51 | +- "Springer 1996 JREFE — The impact of seller motivation on price and marketing time": verified title is "Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time," JREFE 13(3) (included). | |
| 52 | +- "Hort 2000 JUE": the paper is in Regional Science and Urban Economics 30(1), 99–119 (included with the correct outlet; abstract not retrievable, content flagged [unconfirmed]). | |
| 53 | +- "Clayton, MacKinnon & Peng 2008 JREFE": the paper is in Journal of Real Estate Research 30(2), 125–160 (included with the correct outlet). | |
| 54 | +- "Bian, Brastow, Waller — financing contingency": no paper by these authors on financing contingencies was found; the verified contingency paper is Lin, Seiler, Siebert & Winkler (2025, Journal of Housing Economics 68; CESifo WP 9947, 2022, first-authored by Gordon). Included. | |
| 55 | +- "Anglin 2006?" on withdrawal: Anglin (2006, Journal of Housing Economics 15(4)) is verified bibliographically and included, but no abstract could be retrieved from IDEAS, Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex or the publisher, so its content is flagged [unconfirmed]. | |
| 56 | + | |
| 57 | +## Verified but excluded (out of scope for Part B) | |
| 58 | +- Peterson, Brian (2012), "Fooled by Search: Housing Prices, Turnover and Bubbles," Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 12-3 — verified via IDEAS (evidence saved in `verification/B_peterson2012fooled.evidence.txt`). It is a behavioural search model estimated on US data, not Canadian time-on-market evidence; it belongs, if anywhere, in Part A. | |
| 59 | +- Guren & McQuade (2020, REStud), Taylor (1999, REStud), Yavas & Yang (1995, REE), Stein (1995, QJE), Guren (2018, JPE): theory/structural papers already verified by Part A (`verification/A_*.crossref.json`); not duplicated here. | |
| 60 | +- Lambie-Hanson (2015, JUE 90, 1–16), "When does delinquency result in neglect?": verified in Crossref but concerns property maintenance externalities rather than liquidity; dropped to keep the CSV focused. | |
| 61 | +- Bhutta & Ringo, Fuster et al., DeFusco et al., Allen–Clark–Houde are mortgage-market papers retained only as inputs to WP19's qualification/approval parameters; they are not housing-liquidity papers per se. | |
| 62 | + | |
| 63 | +## Searched for and not found | |
| 64 | +- Canadian or Québec studies of residential time on market, cash discounts or forced-sale discounts (academic, peer-reviewed): none surfaced in standard web search beyond industry commentary (RBC, BMO, Scotiabank notes on sales-to-new-listings ratios and months of inventory, which are not citable research). Dachis, Duranton & Turner (2012) and Allen, Clark & Houde (2019) are the only verified Canadian papers included. | |
| 65 | +- Statistics Canada analytical papers on housing liquidity: none identified with verifiable bibliographic records. | |
| 66 | + | |
| 67 | +## Abstract not retrievable (included with reduced confidence) | |
| 68 | +- `zuehlke1987duration`, `carrillo2012potatoes`, `hort2000turnover`, `anglin2006liquidity`, `gatzlaff1998selection`: Crossref records confirm authors/title/outlet/year, but JSTOR/Elsevier pages blocked extraction and no open abstract exists on IDEAS, Semantic Scholar or OpenAlex. Their `key_finding` fields are deliberately generic and marked "[details unconfirmed]"; confidence = medium. | |
added
research/limitations.md
+46 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Limitations, identification limits and falsifiable predictions | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +## Modelling limitations | |
| 4 | +1. **No data.** All results are model-generated under an illustrative parameterisation (`config/baseline.yaml`). No moment is | |
| 5 | + estimated; no Québec representativeness is claimed. The Canadian/Québec case study was not pursued. | |
| 6 | +2. **Stationary local market with exogenous listing inflow.** Listing decisions, construction, buyer heterogeneity in valuations | |
| 7 | + beyond the match draw, and spatial/segment spillovers (piazzesi2020segmented) are absent. One-sided entry means the Hosios | |
| 8 | + condition is the relevant efficiency benchmark only in the homogeneous case (gabrovski2025note). | |
| 9 | +3. **Carrying cost is a permanent nonnegative type.** Sellers whose reservation price *rises* with constraints (high LTV, loss aversion: | |
| 10 | + genesove1997equity, genesove2001lossaversion) are outside the model; so are learning and list-price revisions | |
| 11 | + (anenberg2016information) and stigma (taylor1999time), which can generate positive duration dependence. | |
| 12 | +4. **Complete information within a match; no asymmetric information** (kurlat2015asymmetries, garmaise2004asymmetries). | |
| 13 | +5. **Buyers never exit.** In the financing extension the buyer value can turn negative for low approval probabilities, a region we | |
| 14 | + exclude rather than model (an exit option would truncate it). | |
| 15 | +6. **Welfare criterion.** Steady-state flow surplus (no discounting across cohorts, no transition costs); the Hosios theorem concerns | |
| 16 | + the discounted problem, so the numerical optimum at $\beta=0.55$ is a flow-criterion result. | |
| 17 | +7. **Dynamics.** Unanticipated, perfectly understood shocks with free entry at every instant; prices jump immediately. Anticipation, | |
| 18 | + learning, or sticky buyer entry would slow price adjustment. | |
| 19 | +8. **Quality.** Lemma 1 makes quality a scale factor; correlated quality and urgency (e.g. distressed owners of poorly maintained | |
| 20 | + houses, clauretie2009foreclosure) is not modelled, although it is the main confounder of forced-sale discounts. | |
| 21 | +9. **Numerical.** Nine-type discretisation of $F$ (converged to 2e-4 \% in the mean price); the match-value distribution is bounded in | |
| 22 | + the baseline, which matters for the frictionless limit (Prop. 2(iv)). | |
| 23 | + | |
| 24 | +## Identification limits | |
| 25 | +- Liquidity versus quality: the urgency discount $D(c)$ is defined among identical houses; in data it requires conditioning on quality | |
| 26 | + and on the unobserved carrying cost (proxies: planned move dates, vacancy, double housing, estate sales). | |
| 27 | +- Selection into sale: the observed index mixes within-type price changes and composition; the model's prediction is that the | |
| 28 | + composition term is small and of a sign governed by the shape of the match-value distribution, which is not directly observable. | |
| 29 | +- Cash discount: measured gaps are conditional on sale and mix three terms whose signs differ; only the delay-bargaining term rises | |
| 30 | + monotonically with seller urgency. | |
| 31 | +- Duration dependence: mixture (negative) versus learning/stigma (positive) require competing-risks models with unobserved | |
| 32 | + heterogeneity and withdrawal as a separate exit. | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +## Falsifiable predictions (stated in the conclusion) | |
| 35 | +1. Among observationally identical houses, the price concession of urgent sellers is larger, and their sale hazard higher, in | |
| 36 | + markets with fewer buyers per listing (Prop. 2(iii), Fig. 2–4). | |
| 37 | +2. The cross-sectional dispersion of prices among identical houses rises when matching efficiency or qualification falls | |
| 38 | + (Prop. 5(iii), Table 5). | |
| 39 | +3. After a liquidity shock, within-type prices move immediately whereas inventories and volumes adjust with a half-life of about | |
| 40 | + two months in the baseline; a temporary shock is followed by a sales rebound (Fig. 10). | |
| 41 | +4. The cash–mortgage gap rises with seller urgency and with approval delay, and its selection component can be negative for patient | |
| 42 | + sellers (Prop. 7, Fig. 5). | |
| 43 | +5. The withdrawal share of listings rises when liquidity falls, and the steady-state sales/listing ratio falls only in markets with | |
| 44 | + non-trivial withdrawal (Prop. 4(iv)). | |
| 45 | +6. In markets with heavy-tailed buyer valuations (e.g. unique or luxury properties), a more liquid market can lengthen time on market | |
| 46 | + for urgent sellers (Prop. 2(ii) Pareto case). | |
added
research/lit_notes_A.md
+61 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Verified literature notes, Part A: Theory | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Scope: housing search-and-matching theory, illiquid-housing/credit theory, search-theory foundations, real-options/transaction-cost/price-discovery theory, and the mortgage–cash premium. Companion files: `lit_part_A.csv` (73 verified rows, keys cited below), `lit_unverified_A.md`, `verification/A_*.crossref.json` and `verification/A_*.evidence.txt`. Every reference cited by key below has a verified Crossref record (DOI resolved) except `pissarides2000equilibrium` (publisher/RePEc page). Statements about a paper's content are based on the abstract retrieved from Crossref/Semantic Scholar/RePEc or on the paper itself; claims I could not confirm from a retrieved source are flagged "[unconfirmed]". Empirical papers are covered by Part B; a few that are "both" are mentioned here only for their theoretical content. | |
| 4 | + | |
| 5 | +--- | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +## 1. Housing search-and-matching theory | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +**What is known.** The modern literature begins with `wheaton1990vacancy`, which embeds owner-occupiers in a matching model in which a mismatched household searches while carrying a vacant unit, so that the equilibrium price (Nash bargaining) depends on the vacancy rate through expected time to sell and the cost of holding two houses. `arnott1989housing` had already shown that idiosyncratic tastes in a thin market generate equilibrium vacancies, the first formalisation of the idiosyncratic match-value draw that nearly all later models (and WP19) use as the acceptance margin. `yavas1992simple` introduced two-sided search intensity with Nash bargaining into real estate, and `williams1995pricing` priced heterogeneous real assets as optimal-stopping values under Poisson buyer arrivals, giving the first explicit notion of a search-induced price discount for real assets. `krainer2001theory` is the reference theory of *liquidity* in residential markets: buyers draw match values, sellers set reservation prices that anticipate the future aggregate state, and time on market rises in downturns because sellers rationally wait; with `krainer2002equilibrium`, which values an illiquid asset relative to a liquid benchmark as a function of the arrival intensity, this gives the two objects WP19 formalises — expected selling time and the discount D = (p* − p)/p* against a frictionless price. The survey `han2015microstructure` organises this material into one-sided search, random matching, directed search, bargaining/auctions and brokerage, and is the natural taxonomy for positioning WP19 (random matching + Nash bargaining, with a posted-price robustness check). | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +**Urgency and seller heterogeneity.** The closest antecedent to WP19's central device is `albrecht2007opportunistic`: buyers and sellers switch from a "relaxed" to a "desperate" flow value at a Poisson rate, matching is opportunistic, and the equilibrium price depends on the urgency states of the pair. The paper derives that the expected price conditional on time on market falls with duration while its conditional variance is hump-shaped — i.e., urgency produces both lower prices and dispersion. Related but distinct treatments of urgency are: `salant1991sale` (a finite-horizon seller with a moving deadline lowers price over time), `arnold1999search` (comparative statics of the optimal reservation and asking prices in the seller's discount rate and the buyer's outside option), `anenberg2020endogenous` (the cost of holding two homes, i.e., the carrying cost of the joint buyer–seller problem, varies endogenously over the cycle and amplifies volatility), `head2023default` (indebted sellers set higher asking prices and sell more slowly, so debt lowers rather than raises urgency), and `carrillo2012empirical`, whose estimated stationary equilibrium includes heterogeneity in the motivation to trade with posting plus bargaining. On the empirical side (shared with Part B), `glower1998selling` document that motivated sellers sell faster and at lower prices and explicitly call for theory with heterogeneous sellers. In all these papers urgency is either a two-state Markov process, a deadline, a debt position, or an estimated nuisance parameter; none treats it as a continuous permanent holding-cost type c whose cross-sectional distribution feeds back into tightness, hazards and the composition of transactions, which is WP19's modelling choice. | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +**Aggregate dynamics and tightness feedback.** A second branch uses the matching framework to explain price–volume–TOM comovement and amplification: `novymarx2009hot` (feedback between the buyer–seller ratio and bargaining positions amplifies demand shocks), `diaz2013house` (random matching, Nash bargaining and entry reproduce the cyclical comovements and propagate shocks), `head2014search` (search with construction and buyer entry generates momentum because time to sell varies), `ngai2014hot` (thick-market effects on match quality turn small seasonal drivers into large seasonal swings), `ngai2020decision` and `ngai2024ins` (listing inflows versus sale outflows), `moen2021buying` (buy-first/sell-first complementarity and multiplicity), `gabrovski2019beveridge` (two-sided entry is needed for an upward-sloping housing Beveridge curve), `caplin2011trading` (trading frictions linking prices, sales and inventory), `guren2018house` (concave demand in relative list price and strategic complementarity), `anenberg2016information` (Bayesian learning by sellers generates list-price cuts and momentum), `leung2017flipping` (middlemen as liquidity providers, multiple equilibria), and `piazzesi2020segmented` (search across overlapping segments). WP19 inherits from this branch the free-entry determination of tightness and the result that matching conditions move prices without changes in housing-service values — most explicitly in `ngai2014hot`, where match quality rather than dividends moves prices — but it is stationary and partial in scope: it asks what a fall in matching efficiency A or in qualification phi does to the cross-section of hazards and prices, not what drives the cycle. | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +**Price formation: bargaining versus posting.** The list-price literature (`horowitz1992role`: list price as a ceiling distinct from the reservation price; `yavas1995strategic`: list price trades off arrival rate against bargained price; `merlo2015home`: optimal stopping with tiny menu costs rationalises sticky list prices) and the directed-search literature (`albrecht2016directed`: asking prices with limited commitment signal seller reservation types and the equilibrium is constrained efficient; `diaz2024housing`: competitive search with credit constraints where wealthier buyers pay to transact faster) provide the two benchmarks between which WP19 sits. Dispersion for observationally identical houses has been derived from buyer search strategies (`maury2014search`) and from search-based asset pricing with transaction risk (`sagi2021asset`); seller-urgency-driven dispersion appears only in `albrecht2007opportunistic`. Non-search theories of volume–price comovement through credit constraints (`stein1995prices`, `ortalomagne2006housing`) are the relevant frictionless-with-credit benchmarks; belief-based cycle models (Burnside–Eichenbaum–Rebelo 2016; Kaplan–Mitman–Violante 2020, both verified but not retained, see `lit_unverified_A.md`) do not contain a liquidity margin. | |
| 16 | + | |
| 17 | +**What is open.** (i) No stationary model combines a continuous seller urgency distribution, free entry of buyers and a definition of the liquidity discount against a frictionless benchmark. (ii) The mapping from a *pure* matching-efficiency shock (fundamentals fixed) to the joint distribution of hazards and prices, including which sellers transact, is implicit at best in `ngai2014hot` and `novymarx2009hot`. (iii) None of the housing search papers above derives the bias in a transaction-based price index induced by the urgency composition of sellers after a liquidity shock. | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | +## 2. Illiquid housing, credit and foreclosure theory | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +**What is known.** `hedlund2016illiquidity` and `hedlund2016cyclical` make search-based housing illiquidity a state variable in a model with long-term defaultable mortgages: longer selling times raise foreclosure risk, foreclosures tighten credit, and the resulting "liquidity spiral" amplifies busts; `garriga2020mortgage` embeds endogenously illiquid housing in a heterogeneous-agent macro model and shows that the joint deterioration of prices and liquidity, transmitted through balance sheets, is central to the Great Recession patterns. `guren2020foreclosures` show in a dynamic search model that foreclosures freeze the non-distressed market through choosier buyers, ruined credit and lender losses, which is the extreme form of a composition/selection effect: distressed sellers are a high-urgency type. On the credit–search interaction without default, `eerola2018borrowing` find that a moderate tightening of borrowing constraints raises average time on market and idiosyncratic price dispersion substantially, and `gabrovski2021search` show that search and credit frictions together open a channel from the financial sector to liquidity and prices (with multiplicity) and that credit shocks move liquidity more than prices. `head2012housing` first used "liquidity = how fast owners can sell" as the state variable linking housing and labour markets. | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +**Competing mechanisms.** Two different routes connect credit to liquidity: through buyers (fewer qualified or wealthy buyers → lower effective arrival rate, lower bargained prices, longer TOM: `eerola2018borrowing`, `gabrovski2021search`, `diaz2024housing`) and through sellers (debt overhang raises asking prices and lengthens TOM: `head2023default`; foreclosure externalities: `guren2020foreclosures`). WP19's financing extension belongs to the buyer route but is more specific than any of these: it introduces a *pending* state (approval at rate nu, success with probability phi) that converts a mortgage match into a delayed and uncertain sale, so that the cash–mortgage price gap is derived rather than assumed. | |
| 24 | + | |
| 25 | +**What is open.** The cited models are quantitative and dynamic; none isolates analytically (a) how a fall in phi alone changes the hazard and the discount, (b) how the induced cash discount decomposes into a bargaining component (compensation for delay/failure risk) and a selection component (which sellers accept cash), or (c) the implied bias in observed price indices. These are the gaps WP19's Propositions on qualification and the cash discount target. | |
| 26 | + | |
| 27 | +## 3. Search-theory foundations and tools | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +The equilibrium architecture of WP19 — CRS matching function, tightness theta, free entry pinning the entrant's value, Nash surplus sharing, continuous-time Bellman equations — is the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides framework (`diamond1982aggregate`, `mortensen1994job`, `pissarides2000equilibrium`, surveyed in `mortensen1999new` and `rogerson2005search`). The efficiency benchmark is the Hosios condition (`hosios1990efficiency`); `gabrovski2025note` is the housing-specific caveat that with *two-sided* entry the Hosios–Mortensen–Pissarides condition no longer delivers efficiency because of congestion and participation externalities, so WP19's welfare proposition must state clearly that listing inflow is exogenous (one-sided entry) and that urgency heterogeneity adds a composition wedge of its own. The reservation-value characterisation and its comparative statics (a higher flow cost of search lowers the reservation value) go back to `lippman1976economics`; WP19's "reservation price decreasing in c" is an application of this classical result inside a market equilibrium. The monotone-hazard result "sale hazard increasing in the effective arrival rate under log-concave G" uses the properties catalogued in `bagnoli2005logconcave`. The CRS matching assumption and the interpretation of A as matching efficiency are supported by `petrongolo2001looking`; the volatility-of-tightness benchmark for calibration discussions is `shimer2005cyclical`. Bargaining: `nash1950bargaining` (axiomatic split, WP19's baseline), `rubinstein1982perfect` (impatience determines the split, which gives a strategic reading of why urgent sellers obtain lower prices). Posted prices and directed search: `moen1997competitive`, surveyed in `wright2021directed`. Price dispersion with homogeneous agents: `burdett1983equilibrium`. The asset-market search literature supplies the finance notion of an endogenous liquidity premium: `duffie2005over` (spreads and premia decreasing in search intensity and shaped by bargaining power), `lagos2009liquidity` (with unrestricted holdings, investors offset frictions by adjusting positions), surveyed in `rocheteau2011liquidity`. WP19's housing unit is indivisible and heterogeneous in match value, so the holdings margin is absent and the premium is driven by seller urgency and tightness instead; this distinction should be made explicit in the paper. | |
| 30 | + | |
| 31 | +## 4. Real options to wait, transaction costs, marketing-period risk and price discovery | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +**What is known.** `lin2007illiquidity` argue that the defining features of real estate illiquidity are the time required to sell and the *uncertainty* of the marketing period, and that valuation based only on sold properties with implicit immediate execution biases estimated returns upward and risks downward. `bond2007marketing` price marketing-period risk in a portfolio context; `cheng2010illiquidity` derive an optimal holding period from illiquidity and transaction costs; `lin2008real` show that sellers with different degrees of financial distress face different marketing-period risk and realised return distributions, so "return and risk are investor-specific" — the closest statement in this strand to WP19's urgency gradient, but in partial equilibrium without bargaining or tightness. On indices, `fisher2003controlling` define a "constant-liquidity value" and show that transaction-based indices embed time-varying ease of sale, with constant-liquidity indices leading and showing larger amplitude (both/theory-informed econometrics; see also Part B). `taylor1999time` provides the competing explanation of duration dependence in which time on the market signals low quality (stigma). | |
| 34 | + | |
| 35 | +**What is open.** This literature treats the marketing period as exogenous risk to be priced or corrected; it does not derive the distribution of time on market and the selection of transacting sellers from an equilibrium with heterogeneous urgency, and it does not sign the index bias after a liquidity shock from primitives. WP19's "dynamic selection bias" proposition is the equilibrium counterpart of `fisher2003controlling` and `lin2007illiquidity`, and its duration-dependence result must be distinguished from `taylor1999time` (stigma) and `anenberg2016information` (learning). | |
| 36 | + | |
| 37 | +## 5. The mortgage–cash premium | |
| 38 | + | |
| 39 | +**What is known.** `reher2024mortgage` estimate that mortgaged buyers pay roughly 11% more than all-cash buyers; a dynamic representative-seller model with mortgage transaction frictions delivers only about 3%; heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half of the remaining gap and belief distortions the rest in high-risk states. `han2024cash` estimate a 2–3.9% cash discount and 29% shorter time to close in Los Angeles and show, with a calibrated search model, that closing risk alone is insufficient: the discount turns on the possibility that a property returned to the market fails to sell, so that the discount is smaller in booms and in larger markets — "the inseparability of financial frictions in the mortgage market and search frictions in the housing market". `bian2018bargaining` is the only formal bargaining theory with financing I could verify: embedding mortgage terms in bilateral bargaining changes the gain from trade and allows trade even when the buyer's valuation is below the seller's reservation. No other formal theory of financing contingencies in housing transactions was found (see `lit_unverified_A.md`, section A). | |
| 40 | + | |
| 41 | +**Competing mechanisms and what is open.** The literature attributes the cash discount to (i) compensation for delay and failure risk given relisting costs (`han2024cash`), (ii) seller beliefs about mortgage frictions (`reher2024mortgage`), and (iii) financing-induced changes in the bargaining surplus (`bian2018bargaining`). What is missing is an equilibrium statement of which sellers accept cash and how that selection contributes to the measured discount; `reher2024mortgage`'s finding that "heterogeneity in selling conditions" closes half the puzzle is exactly the margin WP19's decomposition (bargaining term + selection term by urgency type) formalises, with tightness feedback through free entry. WP19 should also note that both empirical papers measure a discount conditional on sale, i.e., subject to the same selection its index proposition analyses. | |
| 42 | + | |
| 43 | +--- | |
| 44 | + | |
| 45 | +## Closest prior work for the WP19 propositions | |
| 46 | + | |
| 47 | +Judgment scale: **established** (result exists in essentially the same form), **partially established** (mechanism present but in a different setting, informal, or without the WP19 object), **open** (no verified prior statement). | |
| 48 | + | |
| 49 | +1. **Urgency (holding cost c) → lower reservation price and lower bargained price.** Closest: `albrecht2007opportunistic` (desperate state lowers price), `lippman1976economics` (reservation value decreasing in search cost), `arnold1999search` (reservation price decreasing in seller discount rate), `salant1991sale` (deadline lowers price path). Judgment: **established** as a comparative static; WP19's contribution is the continuous-type equilibrium version with tightness feedback, which should be presented as a benchmark result, not as new. | |
| 50 | + | |
| 51 | +2. **Lower effective arrival/qualification rate → lower hazard, longer TOM, wider discount (log-concave G).** Closest: `krainer2001theory` (TOM rises when sellers wait), `eerola2018borrowing` (credit tightening raises TOM and dispersion), `gabrovski2021search` (credit shocks move liquidity), `williams1995pricing` / `krainer2002equilibrium` (discount decreasing in arrival intensity), tools in `bagnoli2005logconcave`. Judgment: **partially established** — the direction is known; the joint hazard–discount statement with an explicit pending/qualification stage and the log-concavity condition for monotone hazards is not in the housing literature. | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +3. **Liquidity shock (fall in A or phi) moves prices and volume with housing-service values unchanged.** Closest: `ngai2014hot` (thick-market match quality, not dividends, moves prices), `novymarx2009hot` (tightness feedback amplifies), `diaz2013house`, `duffie2005over` (search intensity moves asset prices in OTC markets), `hedlund2016cyclical` (liquidity spirals). Judgment: **partially established** — qualitatively present, but no paper isolates a pure matching-efficiency or qualification shock in a stationary model and traces it to the cross-section of sellers; `krainer2001theory`'s liquidity shock is itself a dividend shock, which is the distinction WP19 must stress. | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +4. **Price dispersion from seller urgency for identical houses.** Closest: `albrecht2007opportunistic` (hump-shaped conditional variance), `eerola2018borrowing` (dispersion from credit), `maury2014search` (buyer strategies), `burdett1983equilibrium` (homogeneous-agent dispersion), `sagi2021asset`. Judgment: **partially established** — dispersion from a two-state urgency process exists; the continuous-type mapping from the distribution of c to the transaction-price distribution, and its response to A and phi, is open. | |
| 56 | + | |
| 57 | +5. **Dynamic selection bias in transaction indices after a liquidity shock (urgent sellers' hazards less elastic → composition shift).** Closest: `fisher2003controlling` (constant-liquidity value), `lin2007illiquidity` (bias from ignoring marketing period), `guren2020foreclosures` (distressed composition), `piazzesi2009momentum` (composition of marginal traders moves prices). Judgment: **open** as a theoretical proposition from primitives — the empirical/econometric literature recognises the bias but no verified paper derives its sign from heterogeneous hazard elasticities in a search equilibrium. This is WP19's strongest novelty claim and should be audited carefully against Part B's empirical index literature (Gatzlaff–Haurin selection papers belong there). | |
| 58 | + | |
| 59 | +6. **Cash discount = bargaining term + selection term.** Closest: `han2024cash` (closing risk plus failure-to-resell risk, calibrated search model), `reher2024mortgage` (representative-seller model, heterogeneity in selling conditions closes half the puzzle), `bian2018bargaining` (financing in bargaining), `diaz2024housing` (buyers pay to transact faster). Judgment: **partially established** — the bargaining/compensation term is established and quantified; the selection term by seller urgency type and its interaction with tightness is open and directly addresses the residual in `reher2024mortgage`. | |
| 60 | + | |
| 61 | +**Overall novelty assessment for Part A.** Propositions 1 and (the direction of) 2–3 are re-derivations in a new setting and must be labelled as such; the paper's genuine contributions, as far as the theoretical literature verified here is concerned, are the joint treatment (continuous urgency × free entry × pending financing), the decomposition of the cash discount, and the index-selection proposition (5). The novelty gate in CLAUDE.md is therefore passed provided the manuscript explicitly credits `albrecht2007opportunistic`, `krainer2001theory`, `eerola2018borrowing`, `han2024cash` and `fisher2003controlling` as the nearest antecedents. | |
added
research/lit_notes_B.md
+56 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# Literature notes — Part B: Empirical evidence and measurement (WP19) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Scope: empirical and measurement literature bearing on WP19's mechanisms (seller urgency, time on market, forced sales, cash versus mortgage buyers, sale selection and price indices, volume–price comovement, duration and censoring). Search theory proper (Wheaton, Krainer, Albrecht et al., Díaz–Jerez, Head et al., Ngai–Tenreyro, Guren, Hedlund, Guren–McQuade, Taylor, Yavas–Yang) is covered in Part A and only referenced here where an empirical paper depends on it. Every key below corresponds to a row of `research/lit_part_B.csv` and a Crossref record or evidence file in `research/verification/B_<key>.*`. Statements are based on abstracts actually retrieved (Crossref, IDEAS/RePEc, NBER, CESifo, OpenAlex) or on content known with certainty; anything else is marked "[unconfirmed]". Compiled 2026-10-20. | |
| 4 | + | |
| 5 | +## Theme 1 — Time on market, price and seller motivation | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +The micro literature on marketing time began as an application of optimal-stopping theory to listings data. `haurin1988duration` showed that houses with atypical characteristics, which face a wider dispersion of offers, remain on the market longer, and `zuehlke1987duration` fitted Weibull hazards to MLS listings and found stronger time dependence of the sale hazard for vacant than for occupied houses (the vacancy split is reported by secondary sources; the original abstract was not retrievable [unconfirmed magnitudes]). `jud1996brokerage` likewise reports positive duration dependence and finds that pricing strategy, not broker identity, drives marketing time. These early studies treat the seller as homogeneous apart from observable house traits, so the estimated duration dependence confounds genuine state dependence with unobserved heterogeneity; WP19's prediction that a mixture of urgency types produces apparent negative duration dependence is therefore not contradicted by them, but it does require a reading of the positive-dependence results as reflecting list-price revisions or learning. | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +Seller heterogeneity entered explicitly with `springer1996motivation` and `glower1998motivation`. Springer finds that sellers flagged as eager or motivated, relocated sellers, vacant homes and foreclosures all obtain lower prices, but only foreclosures sell faster, and he concludes that the list price is the seller's primary instrument. Glower, Haurin and Hendershott, using a survey of sellers linked to outcomes, show that a planned move date shortens marketing time, that a shorter horizon to the planned move shortens realised time on market, and that motivation lowers the sale price but not the list-price markup; their closing recommendation that "theoretical models of the housing search process should be recast to allow for heterogeneous sellers" is essentially the research programme of WP19. The price–time tradeoff itself is documented by `anglin2003tradeoff` (a higher degree of overpricing raises expected time on market, more strongly where list prices are informative) and `knight2002listing` (large list-price revisions are associated with longer marketing and lower final prices; vacant and overpriced homes are the most likely to be cut), and formalised with a joint list/reservation-price model in `haurin2010listprices`, where greater offer dispersion raises the list-to-expected-price ratio. `huang2001withdrawal` provides an estimator that recovers the seller's reservation price jointly with duration and finds that reservation prices fall with elapsed time on market, consistent either with learning or with rising effective carrying costs. `levitt2008agents` gives the cleanest estimate of the marginal value of waiting: agents selling their own homes obtain about 3.7% more while waiting about 9.5 days longer. | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +Equity and reference points move the reservation price in the opposite direction from urgency. `genesove1997equity` shows that high loan-to-value sellers in Boston set higher asking prices, expect longer marketing periods and obtain higher prices conditional on sale (the often-cited 12% asking-price gap between 100% and 80% LTV sellers was not visible in the abstract [unconfirmed]); `genesove2001lossaversion` attributes a similar pattern to loss aversion, with asking prices higher by roughly 25–35% of the prospective nominal loss and a markedly lower hazard of sale. For WP19 these papers argue that the distribution of carrying costs should admit "locked" or patient sellers with effectively negative urgency, not only motivated ones, and that constrained sellers can raise, rather than lower, transaction prices conditional on sale. The remaining papers in this theme measure the market state. `genesove2012search` estimates, from NAR surveys, that seller time on market falls sharply as demand rises and that the elasticity of the seller contact hazard with respect to the buyer–seller ratio is 0.84 under constant returns, a direct calibration target for WP19's matching function. `carrillo2013heat` recovers a seller-bargaining-power index from list price, sale price and TOM, and `carrillo2015tightness` shows that sale probabilities and bargaining power forecast subsequent appreciation and turning points; `han2014biddingwars` documents the rise of above-list sales from 3–4% to over 30% of transactions in hot markets, and `han2016askingprice` shows that the asking price directs buyer search without being a ceiling. `hendel2009fsbo` documents endogenous sorting of patient sellers to the FSBO platform (no price penalty but longer time to sell and lower sale probability), a platform-level instance of selection on urgency, while `merlo2004bargaining` provides the only dataset with every list-price change and every offer, and `anenberg2016information` shows that seller uncertainty and learning can produce momentum, an alternative mechanism WP19 must distinguish from liquidity-driven selection. | |
| 12 | + | |
| 13 | +## Theme 2 — Forced and distressed sales, liquidity discounts | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +`campbell2011forced` is the reference point: in twenty years of Massachusetts transactions, foreclosure sales trade about 27% below comparable houses, death- and bankruptcy-related sales also sell at discounts, and a foreclosure within 0.05 miles lowers a neighbouring house's price by about 1%. `clauretie2009foreclosure` cautions that the earlier literature's discounts above 20% are roughly one-third too large once property condition, the endogenous relationship between marketing time and price, and spatial dependence are controlled, so a substantial but smaller component is attributable to the forced nature of the sale per se. `penningtoncross2006reo` shows that the REO shortfall relative to metro appreciation varies with legal regime, market conditions and marketing time, and `mayer1998auctions` establishes that the price of immediacy is state dependent: auction discounts of 0–9% in the Los Angeles boom versus 9–21% in post-bust Dallas, consistent with a seller trading an immediate sale against a long expected search. `andersen2017firesales` identifies forced sales from sudden death, so the supply shock is orthogonal to current demand, and finds discounts that increase with urgency, with poor market conditions and with the seller's financial constraints, which is the sharpest causal support available for WP19's interaction between carrying cost and market liquidity. Externality and aggregate evidence complete the picture: `harding2009contagion` estimates a peak contagion discount of roughly 1% per nearby foreclosed property that decays with distance; `anenberg2014foreclosures` shows that sellers react in the exact week a nearby REO is listed, with competition effects everywhere and disamenity effects only in dense, low-price areas; `mian2015foreclosures` uses judicial-foreclosure laws to show that foreclosures caused large declines in house prices, residential investment and consumption in 2007–2009. Collectively these papers establish that an increase in the mass of urgent sellers lowers prices for urgent and non-urgent sellers alike without any change in fundamentals, which is the empirical content of WP19's liquidity-shock proposition; what they do not provide is a decomposition of the discount into bargaining under high carrying cost versus selection of which houses transact. | |
| 16 | + | |
| 17 | +## Theme 3 — Cash versus mortgage buyers and financing contingencies | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | +The cash discount has been measured for three decades with widely varying magnitudes. `asabere1992cash` reports a discount of roughly 13% on a small sample of row houses; `jauregui2019fundingprice` shows that a large part of raw differentials across cash, conventional, FHA and VA funding reflects selection on property and neighbourhood characteristics, leaving an unexplained "financing premium"; `aroul2023cashdiscount` finds that cash discounts widen in distressed markets, at lower price levels and for smaller or poorer-condition properties. Two recent papers supply the mechanism WP19 formalises. `han2024cashisking` shows that in Los Angeles a cash offer closes 29% faster and carries a 2–3.9% discount, that the discount is smaller in booms and in larger markets, and, crucially, that closing risk alone cannot rationalise it: the seller must also price the risk that a property returned to the market after a failed contingency does not sell. `reher2024mortgagecash` estimates an 11% mortgage premium over 1980–2017 against a 3% prediction from a representative-seller model; heterogeneity in selling conditions closes half of the gap and belief distortions are invoked for the remainder in high-transaction-risk states. The gap between the 2–4% structural discount of Han–Hong and the 11% reduced-form premium of Reher–Valkanov is exactly the space where WP19's heterogeneous urgency and selection into cash sales operate. `lin2025contingencies` (CESifo WP 9947 version: Gordon, Seiler, Siebert and Winkler 2022) documents that contingency clauses in Miami-Dade carry price premia from −3.7% to +2.2% depending on clause and market state, and `buchak2026ibuyers` shows that intermediaries who sell immediacy (iBuyers) earn about a 5% spread and survive only in liquid, easy-to-value markets. | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +The qualification side is documented by mortgage-market studies that WP19 uses only as inputs to its buyer-arrival and approval parameters. `anenberg2019creditavailability` builds a loan frontier showing credit expanding for all borrowers in the boom and contracting most for low-score borrowers; `bhutta2021insurance` shows that a 50 basis point cut in FHA premiums raised home buying by 14% among FHA-reliant households through DTI thresholds, i.e. qualification is highly elastic at the margin; `defusco2020leverage` finds that the Ability-to-Repay rule eliminated 15% of the affected market while raising rates only 10–15 basis points; `fuster2019technology` measures approval speed, with FinTech lenders processing applications about 20% faster. `allen2019searchfrictions` is the only verified Canadian structural evidence: the Canadian insured-mortgage market is itself a negotiated-price search market in which frictions cost about $12 per month per borrower. No verified Canadian or Québec study of residential time on market or cash discounts was found (see `lit_unverified_B.md`). | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +## Theme 4 — Selection, indices and volume–price comovement | |
| 24 | + | |
| 25 | +The measurement literature establishes that transacted houses are not a random sample of the stock and that the bias co-moves with the cycle. `jud1994selection` found Heckman-type selection to be significant for appreciation estimates; `gatzlaff1997selection` showed that repeat-sales indices built from homes that sell more than once are biased and that the bias is strongly correlated with changes in economic conditions; `gatzlaff1998selection` extends this to local hedonic indices [details unconfirmed]; `hwang2004selectivity`, using all sales in Sweden's largest metropolitan area, shows that repeat-sales estimates of the value of the stock are systematically biased once selectivity, quality change and mean reversion are modelled. The paper closest to WP19's selection proposition is `goetzmann2006reservation`: when sellers have heterogeneous reservation prices, falling volume biases index returns upward and rising volume biases them downward, and a reserve-conditional index differs substantially from the standard repeat-sales index for Los Angeles. In commercial real estate, `fisher2003liquidity` and `fisher2007tbi` build constant-liquidity (demand-side) and supply-side indices and find that constant-liquidity values lead transaction-based indices and are more volatile, while `clayton2008liquidity` finds that time variation in liquidity is best explained by the option value of waiting. The classical index tools (`bailey1963repeatsales`, `case1989efficiency` with its finding of positive serial correlation in 39,210 repeat sales, `clapp1992assessed` with the assessed-value alternative) assume random sampling of the stock and are the objects whose bias WP19 characterises. | |
| 26 | + | |
| 27 | +Bargaining power and information are the remaining confounders. `harding2003bargainingpower` identifies bargaining effects from the characteristics of both parties in the American Housing Survey and shows that seasonal bargaining variation explains anomalies in quality-adjusted indices; `harding2003bargainingeffects` finds that vacant sellers receive lower prices and that bargaining alters attribute prices. `kurlat2015asymmetries` and `garmaise2004asymmetries` document adverse-selection channels (informed sellers exit before declines; buyers avoid informationally disadvantaged trades) that WP19 excludes by assuming symmetric information; `piazzesi2020segmented` shows that broad searchers spread local shocks across segments, a dampening mechanism absent from a single-segment model. On comovement, `berkovec1996turnover` and `hort2000turnover` [details unconfirmed] find that turnover responds to demand before prices; `clayton2010pricevolume` finds, across 114 MSAs, that price declines reduce volume while increases do not, that volume Granger-causes prices only where supply is inelastic, and that the positive correlation is mostly co-movement from common shocks; `andrew2003transactions` documents a structural break in the British price–transactions relation; `leamer2007businesscycle` makes the macro case that housing volumes lead the cycle. `dachis2012transfertax` is the one verified Canadian natural experiment: Toronto's 1.1% land transfer tax cut sales by about 15% and lowered prices by roughly the tax. `cheng2013liquidityrisk` translates uncertain marketing time into a liquidity risk premium on private-asset returns, which is large in down markets. | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +## Theme 5 — Duration, censoring and withdrawn listings | |
| 30 | + | |
| 31 | +Observed time on market is right-censored by withdrawals and relistings, and the treatment of these margins changes results. `anglin2003tradeoff` reports that withdrawn homes have higher and more variable list prices and that withdrawal limits what can be learned about marketing time; `benefield2015measurement` shows that five alternative definitions of TOM and the handling of relisted properties substantially change coefficient estimates and significance; `huang2001withdrawal` treats withdrawal as censoring within a joint reservation-price/duration estimator. `carrillo2012potatoes` characterises the distribution of marketing time (the "hot or cold potatoes" framing) and `anglin2006liquidity` studies the joint movement of value and liquidity as conditions change, although neither abstract could be retrieved [details unconfirmed]. The duration-dependence evidence (`zuehlke1987duration`, `jud1996brokerage`) is positive in parametric models without unobserved heterogeneity; WP19's mixture-over-urgency hazard predicts negative dependence in the observed hazard unless list-price revisions or learning dominate, which makes a competing-risks (sale vs withdrawal) specification with heterogeneity the appropriate empirical counterpart. | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +## Empirical facts WP19 must be consistent with | |
| 34 | + | |
| 35 | +1. Price–time tradeoff: a higher list markup or longer optimal waiting raises the expected price and the expected time on market; marginal value of waiting about 3.7% for roughly 9.5 extra days in Levitt–Syverson (`anglin2003tradeoff`, `knight2002listing`, `haurin2010listprices`, `levitt2008agents`, `springer1996motivation`). | |
| 36 | +2. Seller urgency lowers price and shortens duration: planned-move sellers sell faster; motivated, vacant, relocated and foreclosed sellers obtain lower prices; vacant sellers have weaker bargaining power (`glower1998motivation`, `springer1996motivation`, `harding2003bargainingeffects`, `knight2002listing`). | |
| 37 | +3. Patient or constrained sellers do the opposite: high-LTV and loss-facing sellers set higher asking prices (about 25–35% of the prospective loss), sell more slowly and obtain higher prices conditional on sale (`genesove1997equity`, `genesove2001lossaversion`, `hendel2009fsbo`). | |
| 38 | +4. Forced-sale discounts: about 27% for foreclosures in Massachusetts, smaller for death and bankruptcy sales; roughly one-third of naive foreclosure discounts is condition/TOM selection; the discount rises with urgency, poor market conditions and seller financial constraints; auction (immediacy) discounts 0–9% in booms versus 9–21% in busts (`campbell2011forced`, `clauretie2009foreclosure`, `andersen2017firesales`, `mayer1998auctions`, `penningtoncross2006reo`). | |
| 39 | +5. Spillovers from urgent sellers: about 1% lower price per nearby foreclosure, operating within the week of REO listing through competition; aggregate foreclosure waves cause large price declines (`campbell2011forced`, `harding2009contagion`, `anenberg2014foreclosures`, `mian2015foreclosures`). | |
| 40 | +6. Cash discount: 2–3.9% structurally with 29% faster closing in Los Angeles; 11% reduced-form mortgage premium nationally versus 3% from a representative-seller model; about 13% in an early small sample; discount smaller in booms and larger markets, larger in distressed markets; contingency price effects between −3.7% and +2.2% (`han2024cashisking`, `reher2024mortgagecash`, `asabere1992cash`, `aroul2023cashdiscount`, `lin2025contingencies`, `jauregui2019fundingprice`). | |
| 41 | +7. Qualification is elastic and delay is measurable: a 50bp rate cut raised FHA-reliant purchases by 14%; a leverage rule removed 15% of the affected segment; FinTech processing is about 20% faster; credit frontiers expanded for all and contracted most for low scores (`bhutta2021insurance`, `defusco2020leverage`, `fuster2019technology`, `anenberg2019creditavailability`). | |
| 42 | +8. Matching and tightness: seller TOM falls strongly with demand; contact-hazard elasticity with respect to buyer–seller ratio about 0.84; bidding wars from 3–4% to over 30% of sales in hot markets; tightness indicators lead appreciation (`genesove2012search`, `han2014biddingwars`, `carrillo2013heat`, `carrillo2015tightness`). | |
| 43 | +9. Volume–price comovement with volume leading: turnover responds before prices; price declines reduce volume asymmetrically; the correlation is mostly common-shock co-movement; a 1.1% transfer tax cut Toronto sales by about 15% (`berkovec1996turnover`, `hort2000turnover`, `clayton2010pricevolume`, `goetzmann2006reservation`, `dachis2012transfertax`, `leamer2007businesscycle`). | |
| 44 | +10. Index selection bias: indices from sold homes are biased, the bias co-moves with the cycle, falling volume biases returns upward; constant-liquidity indices lead and are more volatile than transaction indices (`gatzlaff1997selection`, `goetzmann2006reservation`, `hwang2004selectivity`, `fisher2003liquidity`, `fisher2007tbi`, `jud1994selection`). | |
| 45 | +11. Duration dependence and censoring: parametric hazards without heterogeneity show positive duration dependence; withdrawn listings have higher, more variable list prices; TOM definition and relisting treatment change estimates materially (`zuehlke1987duration`, `jud1996brokerage`, `anglin2003tradeoff`, `benefield2015measurement`, `huang2001withdrawal`). | |
| 46 | +12. Immediacy has a market price: iBuyers earn about a 5% spread and operate only in liquid segments; liquidity risk on private assets is large in down markets (`buchak2026ibuyers`, `cheng2013liquidityrisk`, `clayton2008liquidity`). | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +## Identification challenges the model should speak to | |
| 49 | + | |
| 50 | +- Liquidity discount versus quality: forced-sale and cash discounts shrink substantially when condition, location and TOM are controlled (`clauretie2009foreclosure`, `jauregui2019fundingprice`); WP19 should state which part of D = (p* − p)/p* survives conditioning on house quality, i.e. the bargaining component among identical houses. | |
| 51 | +- Selection into sale versus price change: observed indices average over sellers who chose to transact; with heterogeneous urgency the composition of sellers shifts with liquidity (`goetzmann2006reservation`, `gatzlaff1997selection`, `fisher2003liquidity`). The model should deliver an explicit expression for the index bias as a function of the urgency distribution and tightness, and conditions under which a constant-liquidity index recovers p*. | |
| 52 | +- Selection into cash: cash buyers choose distressed or low-price properties (`aroul2023cashdiscount`, `jauregui2019fundingprice`); WP19's decomposition of the cash discount into bargaining (contingency risk) and selection should map to the Han–Hong versus Reher–Valkanov gap. | |
| 53 | +- Duration dependence versus heterogeneity: positive dependence in homogeneous hazards versus negative dependence predicted by mixing (`zuehlke1987duration`, `jud1996brokerage`); the model's observed hazard should be stated as a mixture and the competing risk of withdrawal (`anglin2003tradeoff`, `benefield2015measurement`) should be part of the observable mapping. | |
| 54 | +- Reverse causation between price and TOM: list price, TOM and sale price are jointly determined (`knight2002listing`, `carrillo2013heat`); the structural mapping from reduced-form coefficients to bargaining power and arrival rates in Carrillo's framework is the template WP19 can extend to urgency types. | |
| 55 | +- Equity and reference dependence: constrained sellers raise, rather than lower, reservation prices (`genesove1997equity`, `genesove2001lossaversion`); a model with only positive carrying costs will understate the dispersion of reservation prices and predict the wrong sign for some sellers. | |
| 56 | +- Competing frictions: information (`anenberg2016information`, `kurlat2015asymmetries`, `garmaise2004asymmetries`), agency (`levitt2008agents`) and segmentation (`piazzesi2020segmented`) generate similar reduced-form patterns; the novelty claim should identify a moment (e.g. the response of urgent versus patient sellers' prices to a pure matching-efficiency shock, as in `andersen2017firesales`) that separates liquidity from these alternatives. | |
added
research/lit_part_A.csv
+74 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ | ||
| 1 | +"key","authors","year","title","outlet","volume_pages","doi_url","mechanism","approach","key_finding","overlap_with_wp19","gaps","confidence","verified_via" | |
| 2 | +"albrecht2007opportunistic","Albrecht, James and Anderson, Axel and Smith, Eric and Vroman, Susan","2007","Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market","International Economic Review","48(2): 641-664","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x","Buyers and sellers switch from relaxed to desperate flow values at a Poisson rate; matching is opportunistic and price depends on the pair's urgency states.","theory","Expected price falls with time on market and the conditional price variance is hump-shaped; urgent sellers accept lower prices and sell faster.","Closest antecedent for 'urgency lowers the reservation price and generates dispersion'; WP19 instead treats urgency as a continuous permanent holding cost, adds free entry and a financing stage, and derives index-selection bias.","No liquidity-shock comparative statics on matching efficiency, no mortgage/cash distinction, no formal selection correction for price indices.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 3 | +"albrecht2016directed","Albrecht, James and Gautier, Pieter A. and Vroman, Susan","2016","Directed search in the housing market","Review of Economic Dynamics","19: 218-231","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002","Sellers post asking prices with limited commitment; buyers direct search; asking price signals seller reservation type and houses sell above, at or below ask.","theory","Directed-search equilibrium with heterogeneous seller reservation values is constrained efficient; asking prices separate seller types.","Provides the posted-price benchmark against which WP19's Nash bargaining is checked for robustness; both feature private seller reservation types.","Two seller types only; no continuous urgency distribution, no financing contingency, no transaction-hazard or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 4 | +"anenberg2016information","Anenberg, Elliot","2016","Information Frictions And Housing Market Dynamics","International Economic Review","57(4): 1449-1479","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12204","Sellers learn about demand for their house through Bayesian updating while listed; information frictions shape list-price dynamics.","structural","Seller uncertainty about current demand explains list-price reductions and generates microfounded momentum in aggregate prices.","Alternative explanation of declining prices with time on market (learning) against which WP19's urgency/selection explanation must be distinguished.","No permanent urgency heterogeneity, no financing stage, no selection-corrected indices.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 5 | +"anenberg2020endogenous","Anenberg, Elliot and Bayer, Patrick","2020","Endogenous Sources Of Volatility In Housing Markets: The Joint Buyer–Seller Problem","International Economic Review","61(3): 1195-1228","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12454","Cost of holding two homes varies endogenously over the cycle; moving owners' joint buy-sell problem amplifies volume and price volatility.","structural","Internal movement is highly procyclical; frictions from the joint buyer-seller problem substantially amplify cyclical price volatility.","Their time-varying cost of holding two homes is an endogenous version of WP19's carrying cost c; WP19 treats c as a permanent type and studies its cross-sectional implications.","No cash/mortgage distinction; no stationary dispersion or index-selection results.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 6 | +"arnold1999search","Arnold, Michael A.","1999","Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices","Real Estate Economics","27(3): 453-481","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00780","Asking price affects the arrival rate of inspecting buyers; reservation and asking prices solved jointly in a search-bargaining model.","theory","Existence of a subgame-perfect asking/reservation strategy; discount rates and buyer outside options move both prices.","Provides the comparative statics of the reservation price with respect to the seller's discount rate, the closest analogue to WP19's urgency gradient.","Partial equilibrium; no tightness feedback, dispersion across sellers or financing.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 7 | +"arnott1989housing","Arnott, Richard","1989","Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","2(1): 5-30","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00161714","Idiosyncratic tastes in a thin market generate equilibrium vacancies in rental housing.","theory","Vacancies are an equilibrium outcome of search with idiosyncratic match quality; thinness raises vacancies and affects rents.","Early formalisation of idiosyncratic match value x ~ G, central to WP19's acceptance rule.","Rental market, no urgency, financing or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 8 | +"bagnoli2005logconcave","Bagnoli, Mark and Bergstrom, Ted","2005","Log-concave probability and its applications","Economic Theory","26(2): 445-469","https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4","Log-concavity of densities implies monotone hazard rates and preserved properties under integration and truncation.","theory","Catalogue of log-concave distributions and of their implications for hazard and mean-residual-life functions.","Technical basis for WP19's proposition that the sale hazard is increasing in the effective arrival rate under log-concave G.","Pure probability tool.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 9 | +"bian2018bargaining","Bian, Xun and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2018","Bargaining, Mortgage Financing, and Housing Prices","Journal of Real Estate Research","40(3): 419-452","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506","Financing embedded in a bilateral bargaining model: mortgage terms create gains from trade beyond valuations.","theory","With financing, trade can occur even if buyer valuation is below seller reservation; omitting financing misstates the gain from trade and price.","Only formal bargaining theory with financing found; WP19 instead models financing as a contingency affecting timing and success, not surplus.","No search, no tightness, no cash discount from selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 10 | +"bond2007marketing","Bond, Shaun A. and Hwang, Soosung and Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Theory and Empirical Estimates from the UK Commercial Real Estate Market","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","34(4): 447-461","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1","Marketing period risk adds a second moment to real estate returns in portfolio choice.","theory","UK commercial real estate: marketing-period risk materially raises ex ante risk and reduces optimal allocations.","Supports treating time to sale as a priced risk, as in WP19; WP19 endogenises its distribution.","No equilibrium or seller heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 11 | +"burdett1983equilibrium","Burdett, Kenneth and Judd, Kenneth L.","1983","Equilibrium Price Dispersion","Econometrica","51(4): 955-969","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912045","Noisy search (consumers observe one or several prices) sustains equilibrium price dispersion for a homogeneous good.","theory","Price dispersion is an equilibrium outcome of search frictions even with identical sellers and buyers.","Benchmark for WP19's dispersion result, which instead derives dispersion from seller heterogeneity in urgency under bargaining.","Posted prices by sellers with no holding-cost heterogeneity; no dynamics or hazard.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)" | |
| 12 | +"caplin2011trading","Caplin, Andrew and Leahy, John","2011","Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 283-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x","Liquidity modelled through a trading-friction process linking prices, sales and inventory.","theory","Model generates large price changes and positive price-sales correlation but counterfactual negative autocorrelation; informational frictions help.","Shares the goal of a joint characterisation of prices, sales and inventory; WP19 provides a micro-founded stationary version with seller heterogeneity.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 13 | +"carrillo2012empirical","Carrillo, Paul E.","2012","An Empirical Stationary Equilibrium Search Model Of The Housing Market","International Economic Review","53(1): 203-234","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x","Stationary equilibrium with two-sided search, heterogeneous motivation to trade, posting and bargaining, and endogenous matching via advertising.","structural","Estimated model fits MLS data; more listing information and lower commissions change prices and time on market.","Shares heterogeneous seller motivation and a stationary equilibrium with posting plus bargaining; WP19 is analytical, adds financing and derives propositions and index bias.","No explicit liquidity-discount definition, no mortgage/cash contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 14 | +"cheng2010illiquidity","Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2010","Illiquidity, transaction cost, and optimal holding period for real estate: Theory and application","Journal of Housing Economics","19(2): 109-118","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002","Illiquidity and transaction costs determine an optimal holding period for real estate.","theory","Optimal holding period increases with transaction costs and marketing-period uncertainty.","Relates holding cost and illiquidity to timing decisions; WP19 treats the holding cost as the seller's urgency type.","Partial equilibrium; no market feedback.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 15 | +"diamond1982aggregate","Diamond, Peter A.","1982","Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","90(5): 881-894","https://doi.org/10.1086/261099","Trading externalities in a search economy produce multiple equilibria and inefficiently low activity.","theory","Thick-market externalities can sustain low-activity equilibria; aggregate demand management can be welfare-improving.","Origin of the matching externalities WP19 invokes when matching efficiency falls; WP19 keeps a unique stationary equilibrium under stated conditions.","No housing, prices by bargaining absent, no heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 16 | +"diaz2013house","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén","2013","House Prices, Sales, And Time On The Market: A Search-Theoretic Framework","International Economic Review","54(3): 837-872","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12019","Random matching with Nash bargaining and endogenous entry; aggregate demand/supply shocks propagate through vacancies, sales and time on market.","theory","Search frictions reproduce positive price-sales and negative price-TOM comovement; trading delays amplify price volatility and propagate shocks.","WP19 shares the matching-function, bargaining and free-entry architecture; it adds urgency heterogeneity, financing contingency and a selection-corrected index, and studies non-fundamental shocks.","Representative seller; no cross-sectional price dispersion from urgency; shocks are to fundamentals rather than to matching efficiency or buyer qualification.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 17 | +"diaz2024housing","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén and Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo","2024","Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search","The Economic Journal","134(657): 220-270","https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead054","Competitive search with credit constraints: wealthier, risk-averse buyers pay more to transact faster; block recursivity via intermediaries.","theory","Credit availability raises long-run prices and debt more than a Walrasian model, especially with inelastic supply.","Links buyers' financial position to transaction speed and price, the mirror image of WP19's cash discount on the seller side.","No seller urgency distribution, no pending-approval stage, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 18 | +"duffie2005over","Duffie, Darrell and Garleanu, Nicolae and Pedersen, Lasse Heje","2005","Over-the-Counter Markets","Econometrica","73(6): 1815-1847","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x","Search and bargaining in OTC asset markets; prices depend on search intensity and bargaining power through outside options.","theory","Bid-ask spreads and liquidity premia are decreasing in search intensity and depend on bargaining power; marketmakers' role derived.","Finance analogue of WP19's endogenous liquidity discount: price departs from the frictionless value because of search and bargaining.","Homogeneous asset units, no housing-specific match value or financing stage.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 19 | +"eerola2018borrowing","Eerola, Essi and Määttänen, Niku","2018","Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity","Review of Economic Dynamics","27: 184-204","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003","Matching plus credit frictions with risk-averse households; tighter borrowing constraints change who can buy and bargain.","theory","Moderate tightening of borrowing constraints substantially increases time on market and idiosyncratic price dispersion.","Very close to WP19's qualification channel: credit tightening raises TOM and dispersion; WP19 adds explicit seller urgency types and a pending-approval stage with cash buyers.","No cash discount, no decomposition of dispersion into urgency vs buyer wealth, no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 20 | +"fisher2003controlling","Fisher, Jeffrey and Gatzlaff, Dean and Geltner, David and Haurin, Donald","2003","Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices","Real Estate Economics","31(2): 269-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00066","Constant-liquidity value concept: transaction indices embed time-varying ease of sale; procyclical volume.","empirical","Constant-liquidity indices lead transaction and appraisal indices and show greater amplitude.","Closest antecedent to WP19's dynamic selection bias proposition; WP19 derives the sign of the bias from heterogeneous hazard elasticities (both/theory-informed econometrics).","No structural model of seller heterogeneity; residential application and financing absent.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 21 | +"gabrovski2019beveridge","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2019","The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market","Journal of Economic Theory","181: 361-381","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003","Free entry of both buyers and sellers in a housing search model generates an upward-sloping Beveridge curve.","theory","Baseline housing search models imply a downward-sloping Beveridge curve; two-sided entry restores the positive vacancy-buyer correlation in data.","WP19 uses free entry of buyers only (listing inflow exogenous); this paper warns that seller entry can reverse tightness comparative statics.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or index selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 22 | +"gabrovski2021search","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2021","Search and credit frictions in the housing market","European Economic Review","134: 103699","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699","Interaction of search and credit frictions: credit conditions shift buyer entry and liquidity, with multiple equilibria.","theory","Credit shocks affect mortgage debt and liquidity more than prices; combined frictions produce multiple equilibria.","Closest to WP19's financing extension: both route credit into buyer arrival/qualification; WP19 models an explicit pending-approval stage and the cash discount.","No cash-versus-mortgage buyers, no seller urgency distribution, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 23 | +"gabrovski2025note","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2025","A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions","Macroeconomic Dynamics","29","https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100525100692","Congestion and participation externalities with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers; equilibrium inefficient even under Hosios condition.","theory","With two-sided entry the Hosios-Mortensen-Pissarides condition no longer delivers efficiency in the housing market; externalities quantified for the US.","Direct benchmark for WP19's welfare/Hosios proposition; WP19 has one-sided (buyer) entry, so the standard Hosios logic applies but urgency heterogeneity adds a composition wedge.","No seller heterogeneity in holding cost and no financing stage in the welfare analysis.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 24 | +"garriga2020mortgage","Garriga, Carlos and Hedlund, Aaron","2020","Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession","American Economic Review","110(6): 1603-1634","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170772","Endogenously illiquid housing from search frictions plus long-term defaultable mortgages transmit the bust to consumption.","structural","Deterioration in house prices and liquidity, transmitted via balance sheets, explains aggregate and cross-sectional patterns of the Great Recession.","Establishes that housing liquidity is a distinct state variable in macro-housing models; WP19 provides the microfoundation of the liquidity discount they embed.","No cash discount, no urgency dispersion or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 25 | +"genesove2012search","Genesove, David and Han, Lu","2012","Search and matching in the housing market","Journal of Urban Economics","72(1): 31-45","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002","Search intensity and matching in a housing market with buyers and sellers; tests of increasing returns in matching and strategic search behaviour.","empirical","Evidence on the matching technology and on buyer search behaviour consistent with search-theoretic predictions (both/empirical with theory motivation).","Informs WP19's assumption of a CRS matching function and the interpretation of theta; WP19 does not estimate the matching function.","Does not model seller urgency, financing or price discounts.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 26 | +"glower1998selling","Glower, Michel and Haurin, Donald R. and Hendershott, Patric H.","1998","Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation","Real Estate Economics","26(4): 719-740","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00763","Seller motivation (planned moving date) shifts reservation price and selling time.","empirical","Motivated sellers sell faster and at lower prices; motivation affects sale price but not list-price markup; models should allow heterogeneous sellers.","Empirical motivation for WP19's heterogeneous carrying cost; WP19 supplies the theory they call for (also relevant to Part B).","No formal equilibrium model, no index-selection or financing analysis.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 27 | +"guren2018house","Guren, Adam M.","2018","House Price Momentum and Strategic Complementarity","Journal of Political Economy","126(3): 1172-1218","https://doi.org/10.1086/697207","Concave demand in relative list price generates strategic complementarity among sellers, amplifying momentum.","structural","Sellers adjust prices gradually toward the average; concave demand amplifies price momentum two- to threefold.","Both link the sale hazard to the seller's price; WP19 derives the hazard from match-value acceptance under log-concavity rather than estimated demand curvature.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; momentum rather than stationary dispersion and selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 28 | +"guren2020foreclosures","Guren, Adam M and McQuade, Timothy J","2020","How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?","The Review of Economic Studies","87(3): 1331-1364","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa001","Foreclosures freeze the non-foreclosure market: choosier buyers, ruined credit and lender losses create price-default spirals.","structural","Foreclosure amplification accounts for a large share of the non-distressed price decline; principal reduction is more effective than payment reduction.","Distressed sellers are an extreme urgency type; WP19 generalises urgency to a continuum and derives the composition effect on observed prices.","No explicit cash/mortgage stage; selection in observed indices not the focus.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 29 | +"han2015microstructure","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2015","The Microstructure of Housing Markets","Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics","vol. 5: 813-886","https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2","Survey of search (one-sided, random, directed), bargaining and auctions, and brokerage in housing markets.","survey","Organises the microstructure literature and identifies open questions on matching, bargaining and intermediaries.","WP19's positioning follows this taxonomy (random matching plus Nash bargaining with posted-price robustness).","Identifies but does not resolve the interaction of seller heterogeneity, financing and observed price indices.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)" | |
| 30 | +"han2024cash","Han, Lu and Hong, Seung-Hyun","2024","Cash is king? Understanding financing risk in housing markets","Review of Finance","28(6): 2083-2118","https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae025","Financing risk: a mortgage contingency may fail, returning the house to the market; cash offers avoid this risk.","empirical","Cash offers close 29% faster and carry a 2-3.9% discount; closing risk alone is insufficient, the risk of failing to resell is key (both/empirical with calibrated model).","WP19's pending-approval stage with success probability phi and relisting is the formal version of their mechanism; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness feedback.","No analytical propositions on dispersion or index selection; no urgency heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 31 | +"head2012housing","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw","2012","Housing Liquidity, Mobility, and the Labour Market","The Review of Economic Studies","79(4): 1559-1589","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds004","Homeowners' acceptance of out-of-town jobs depends on how fast they can sell; housing liquidity links labour and housing search.","theory","Housing illiquidity lowers mobility of owners relative to renters; the aggregate unemployment effect is small except in high-unemployment states.","Introduces 'liquidity as time to sell' as a state variable for owners, which WP19 adopts, but WP19 does not model labour markets.","No seller urgency distribution or financing; liquidity measured by selling speed only, not by a price discount.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 32 | +"head2014search","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw and Sun, Hongfei","2014","Search, Liquidity, and the Dynamics of House Prices and Construction","American Economic Review","104(4): 1172-1210","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1172","City-level search with construction and buyer entry; variation in time to sell induces serially correlated price growth.","theory","Search plus endogenous construction and entry explains momentum in house prices and the joint dynamics of sales, prices and population after income shocks.","Free entry of buyers and the role of time to sell in prices are shared; WP19 is a local stationary model focused on microstructure rather than dynamics with construction.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; the liquidity concept is aggregate time to sell rather than a decomposed discount.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 33 | +"head2023default","Head, Allen and Sun, Hongfei and Zhou, Chenggang","2023","Indebted sellers, liquidity and mortgage standards","European Economic Review","151: 104321","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104321","Indebted sellers set higher asking prices and take longer to sell; asking prices and time-to-sell determine liquidity and default risk.","structural","Higher LTV sellers ask more and sell slower; policies reducing default can loosen lending standards and lower welfare.","Debt-driven heterogeneity in reservation prices is the mirror of WP19's holding-cost heterogeneity: debt lowers urgency to accept, carrying cost raises it.","No cash/mortgage buyer contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 34 | +"hedlund2016cyclical","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing, debt, and foreclosures","Quantitative Economics","7(1): 289-328","https://doi.org/10.3982/qe483","Liquidity spirals from search frictions and endogenous credit constraints; longer selling times raise foreclosure risk and tighten credit.","structural","Search-based housing illiquidity with equilibrium default matches cyclical housing and mortgage dynamics; full-recourse reform reduces foreclosures.","Dynamic macro analogue of WP19's liquidity shock propagation; WP19 is stationary and analytical with explicit hazard and discount decompositions.","No urgency heterogeneity among sellers beyond debt; no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 35 | +"hedlund2016illiquidity","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","Illiquidity and its discontents: Trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market","Journal of Monetary Economics","83: 1-13","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005","Search frictions make housing illiquid; trading delays interact with mortgage default to produce foreclosures.","theory","Trading delays raise foreclosure risk and endogenously tighten credit; illiquidity amplifies downturns.","Shares endogenous illiquidity from search and its credit feedback; WP19 isolates the microstructure and adds a pending-financing stage and urgency.","No cash/mortgage buyer distinction, no price dispersion, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 36 | +"horowitz1992role","Horowitz, Joel L.","1992","The role of the list price in housing markets: Theory and an econometric model","Journal of Applied Econometrics","7(2): 115-129","https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.3950070202","List price is a ceiling distinct from the reservation price; sellers optimally hold list prices even when unsold for long periods.","theory","Sale prices fall below but not above list; structural model predicts sale and reservation prices and explains sticky list prices.","Reservation price as the operative state variable, as in WP19; WP19 derives it from carrying cost and tightness.","No urgency heterogeneity or equilibrium feedback.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 37 | +"hosios1990efficiency","Hosios, Arthur J.","1990","On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","57(2): 279-298","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297382","Efficiency of search equilibria requires bargaining shares to equal matching elasticities.","theory","Hosios condition: Nash bargaining power equal to the elasticity of matching w.r.t. the agent's side internalises congestion externalities.","WP19's welfare proposition uses the Hosios condition and shows how urgency heterogeneity creates a composition wedge.","Homogeneous agents; no financing stage or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)" | |
| 38 | +"krainer2001theory","Krainer, John","2001","A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets","Journal of Urban Economics","49(1): 32-53","https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.2000.2180","Buyers draw idiosyncratic match values; sellers set reservation prices anticipating future aggregate states; liquidity (time on market) varies with expected housing-service values.","theory","Sellers rationally hold out in downturns when expected future states improve, so time on market rises while prices adjust sluggishly: endogenous liquidity co-moves with prices.","WP19 uses the same idiosyncratic match-value draw and reservation logic and the definition of liquidity through expected selling time; WP19 differs by holding fundamentals fixed and shocking matching efficiency/qualification instead.","Homogeneous sellers; the liquidity shock is itself a shock to future dividends, so it cannot separate a pure liquidity shock from a fundamental shock, which is WP19's central question.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 39 | +"krainer2002equilibrium","Krainer, John and LeRoy, Stephen F.","2002","Equilibrium valuation of illiquid assets","Economic Theory","19(2): 223-242","https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004214","Illiquid asset valued by an owner who can only sell when a stochastic buyer arrives; equilibrium price reflects expected search delay and the owner-specific dividend.","theory","Equilibrium valuation of an illiquid asset: the price discount relative to a liquid benchmark depends on arrival intensity and the cross-section of dividends.","Provides the cleanest frictionless-benchmark comparison that WP19 formalises as D=(p*-p)/p*; WP19 endogenises the arrival rate through tightness and makes the discount depend on seller urgency.","Exogenous arrival intensity, no tightness, no bargaining-vs-selection decomposition and no implications for observed hazard distributions.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 40 | +"lagos2009liquidity","Lagos, Ricardo and Rocheteau, Guillaume","2009","Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions","Econometrica","77(2): 403-426","https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7250","Unrestricted asset holdings in an OTC search model; trading frictions shape asset demands, volume, spreads and delays.","theory","Investors offset frictions by adjusting positions; frictions affect liquidity measures and asset prices through this margin.","Clarifies what a liquidity premium means in search markets; WP19's indivisible housing unit removes the holdings margin and emphasises seller urgency instead.","Divisible assets; no housing.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)" | |
| 41 | +"leung2017flipping","Leung, Charles Ka Yui and Tse, Chung-Yi","2017","Flipping in the housing market","Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control","76: 232-263","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2017.01.003","Arbitrage middlemen (flippers) enter a housing search model; multiple equilibria in turnover, vacancy and prices.","theory","Flipping arises in sluggish and tight markets; it is socially useful in illiquid markets and wasteful in liquid ones.","Flippers act as liquidity providers to urgent sellers, a role WP19 attributes to cash buyers; both find liquidity provision changes prices and turnover.","No explicit seller urgency distribution or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 42 | +"lin2007illiquidity","Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Illiquidity and Pricing Biases in the Real Estate Market","Real Estate Economics","35(3): 291-330","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00191.x","Uncertain marketing period and time to sale bias transaction-based return and risk estimates that assume immediate execution.","theory","Estimated returns are biased upward and risks downward when marketing-period uncertainty is ignored; biases can be large.","Shares the view that transaction-price measures understate illiquidity; WP19 derives the bias from equilibrium selection on seller urgency.","No equilibrium pricing or hazards; no urgency heterogeneity; no financing.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 43 | +"lin2008real","Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2008","Real Estate Returns and Risk with Heterogeneous Investors","Real Estate Economics","36(4): 753-776","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00229.x","Sellers with different degrees of financial distress face different TOM risk and return distributions.","theory","Return and risk are investor-specific; ignoring TOM uncertainty and financial circumstances understates risk.","Explicitly ties seller financial distress to marketing-period risk and realised prices, close to WP19's urgency gradient but without equilibrium.","No equilibrium tightness, no bargaining, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 44 | +"lippman1976economics","Lippman, Steven A. and McCall, John J.","1976","The Economics Of Job Search: A Survey","Economic Inquiry","14(2): 155-189","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x","Sequential search with reservation values; comparative statics of the reservation value in offer distribution and search costs.","survey","Reservation-value characterisation of optimal stopping; higher search costs lower the reservation value.","WP19's result that the reservation price decreases in holding cost c is a direct application of this classical comparative static.","Partial equilibrium; no two-sided market.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 45 | +"maury2014search","Maury, Tristan-Pierre and Tripier, Fabien","2014","Search strategies on the housing market and their implications on price dispersion","Journal of Housing Economics","26: 55-80","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2014.09.001","Buyers' choice of search strategy generates equilibrium price dispersion in a housing market.","theory","Heterogeneous search strategies produce price dispersion for identical houses; dispersion responds to search costs.","Dispersion from buyer-side heterogeneity complements WP19's dispersion from seller urgency.","No seller urgency, financing or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 46 | +"merlo2015home","Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François and Rust, John","2015","The Home Selling Problem: Theory And Evidence","International Economic Review","56(2): 457-484","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12111","Single seller's optimal stopping with list-price menu costs and stochastic offer arrivals.","structural","Tiny menu costs rationalise sticky list prices; the model fits list-price and sale dynamics for English properties.","Partial-equilibrium seller problem that WP19 embeds in a market equilibrium; both treat the sale as optimal stopping with offer arrivals.","No equilibrium feedback on arrival rates, no urgency cross-section or selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 47 | +"moen1997competitive","Moen, Espen R.","1997","Competitive Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","105(2): 385-411","https://doi.org/10.1086/262077","Competitive (directed) search: posted terms direct searchers; equilibrium is constrained efficient.","theory","Competitive search equilibrium decentralises the Hosios condition; submarkets price time to trade.","WP19's posted-price robustness check uses this benchmark.","No seller urgency continuum with private information in the housing sense; no financing.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 48 | +"moen2021buying","Moen, Espen R and Nenov, Plamen T and Sniekers, Florian","2021","Buying First or Selling First in Housing Markets","Journal of the European Economic Association","19(1): 38-81","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz069","Moving owners choose to buy first or sell first; strategic complementarity in that choice generates multiple steady states.","theory","Buy-first incentives congest the buyer side and raise the buyer-seller ratio, producing multiplicity and large fluctuations consistent with housing cycles.","Both make tightness endogenous through participation decisions; WP19 keeps a single seller population and studies urgency within it.","No urgency distribution, financing contingency or price-index selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 49 | +"mortensen1994job","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1994","Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","61(3): 397-415","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297896","Matching function with free entry of vacancies and Nash wage bargaining; endogenous job destruction.","theory","Canonical DMP equilibrium: tightness pinned by free entry; surplus split by Nash bargaining; comparative statics of shocks on flows.","WP19's free-entry condition for buyers and Nash split are direct transplants; sellers play the role of vacancies.","Labour market; no heterogeneous holding costs of the posting side or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 50 | +"mortensen1999new","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1999","Chapter 39 New developments in models of search in the labor market","Handbook of Labor Economics","vol. 3B: 2567-2627","https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30025-0","Survey of search and matching models in labour markets including endogenous destruction and efficiency.","survey","Summarises the DMP class and its comparative statics.","Reference for WP19's standard results that are not new.","Labour framing.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 51 | +"nash1950bargaining","Nash, John F.","1950","The Bargaining Problem","Econometrica","18(2): 155-162","https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266","Axiomatic bargaining solution maximising the product of surpluses.","theory","The Nash solution is the unique split satisfying the stated axioms.","WP19's baseline price-setting rule.","No frictions or dynamics.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)" | |
| 52 | +"ngai2014hot","Ngai, L. Rachel and Tenreyro, Silvana","2014","Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market","American Economic Review","104(12): 3991-4026","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3991","Thick-market externality in match quality: more participants raise expected match quality, raising willingness to pay and transaction rates.","theory","Small deterministic seasonal drivers are amplified into large seasonal swings in prices and volumes through thick-market effects.","Both models let matching efficiency affect prices and volume with unchanged housing-service values; WP19 shocks efficiency A directly and studies seller urgency rather than seasonality.","Homogeneous sellers; no financing stage; no selection bias in indices.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 53 | +"ngai2020decision","Ngai, L Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D","2020","The Decision to Move House and Aggregate Housing-Market Dynamics","Journal of the European Economic Association","18(5): 2487-2531","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa001","Moving is an investment in match quality; the decision to list (inflows) rather than selling speed drives transactions.","theory","Transactions are driven mainly by listings; a model with endogenous moving explains the 1995-2003 boom and has welfare implications through mismatch.","Shares search-and-matching with idiosyncratic match quality; WP19 keeps listing inflow exogenous and focuses on hazards and prices conditional on listing.","No urgency heterogeneity, no financing, no observed-index selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 54 | +"ngai2024ins","Ngai, L. Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D.","2024","The Ins And Outs Of Selling Houses: Understanding Housing-Market Volatility","International Economic Review","65(3): 1415-1440","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12693","Inflows (new listings) and outflows (sales) jointly determine housing-market volatility; correlations with inventory depend on shock source and persistence.","theory","Both listing inflows and sales outflows matter quantitatively; signs of inventory correlations are time-varying and depend on the nature of shocks.","WP19's exogenous withdrawal rate delta and matching-efficiency shocks are the stationary analogue of their outflow margins; WP19 adds urgency and financing.","No seller heterogeneity in holding costs, no cash/mortgage distinction, no composition correction of price indices.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 55 | +"novymarx2009hot","Novy-Marx, Robert","2009","Hot and Cold Markets","Real Estate Economics","37(1): 1-22","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x","Feedback between buyer-seller ratio and bargaining positions amplifies demand shocks: sellers sell faster, inventory falls, tightness rises further.","theory","Equilibrium tightness, expected time to sale and prices are highly sensitive to fundamentals because of endogenous stock feedback.","WP19 shares the tightness-feedback mechanism through free entry; it isolates shocks to matching efficiency and qualification and adds urgency heterogeneity.","Homogeneous agents; no decomposition of the price response into bargaining and composition; no financing.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 56 | +"ortalomagne2006housing","Ortalo-Magné, François and Rady, Sven","2006","Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints","Review of Economic Studies","73(2): 459-485","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.383_1.x","Life-cycle credit constraints and the property ladder transmit income shocks into price overshooting and volume dynamics.","theory","Credit-constrained young buyers make prices overreact to income shocks; prices and transactions comove without search frictions.","Provides the frictionless-with-credit benchmark; WP19 isolates the search channel holding credit constant except through qualification.","No search, no time on market, no dispersion.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 57 | +"petrongolo2001looking","Petrongolo, Barbara and Pissarides, Christopher A","2001","Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function","Journal of Economic Literature","39(2): 390-431","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.390","Survey of the aggregate matching function: microfoundations, CRS Cobb-Douglas estimates, aggregation issues.","survey","CRS Cobb-Douglas matching function fits many markets; microfoundations remain debated.","Justifies WP19's CRS matching assumption and the interpretation of A as matching efficiency.","Labour market focus.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 58 | +"piazzesi2009momentum","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin","2009","Momentum Traders in the Housing Market: Survey Evidence and a Search Model","American Economic Review","99(2): 406-411","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.406","Survey-based heterogeneity in beliefs; a search model where a small share of momentum traders can move prices because trading is frictional.","theory","In a search market a minority of optimistic traders raises transaction prices substantially because they are overrepresented among marginal buyers.","Illustrates how composition of transacting agents, not fundamentals, moves transaction prices; WP19 formalises an analogous composition effect for sellers after a liquidity shock.","Belief heterogeneity on the buyer side only; no seller urgency, hazards or selection correction.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 59 | +"piazzesi2020segmented","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin and Stroebel, Johannes","2020","Segmented Housing Search","American Economic Review","110(3): 720-759","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141772","Heterogeneous clienteles search across overlapping market segments; broad searchers flow toward high-inventory segments.","structural","Within-city inventory and search activity covary positively because broad searchers spread localized shocks across segments.","WP19 is a single-segment local market; segmentation is a natural extension and the paper's treatment of inventory and search intensity informs theta.","No seller urgency distribution, financing contingency or liquidity-discount decomposition.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 60 | +"pissarides2000equilibrium","Pissarides, Christopher A.","2000","Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd edition","MIT Press (book)","Cambridge, MA","https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html","Textbook treatment of matching, free entry, Nash bargaining, efficiency and endogenous destruction.","theory","Standard reference for equilibrium search with matching functions and the Hosios efficiency condition.","Source of WP19's modelling conventions (CRS matching, tightness, Bellman equations in continuous time).","Labour framing; no asset-price discount or transaction-index implications.","medium","publisher page https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html" | |
| 61 | +"reher2024mortgage","Reher, Michael and Valkanov, Rossen","2024","The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle","The Journal of Finance","79(5): 3149-3201","https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13373","Mortgage transaction frictions make sellers demand a premium from mortgaged buyers; representative-seller model yields a small premium.","empirical","Mortgaged buyers pay about 11% more than cash buyers; a rational model implies 3%; heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half the gap.","WP19's cash discount = bargaining term + selection term speaks directly to their puzzle by adding seller urgency heterogeneity (both/empirical with model).","No equilibrium tightness feedback or hazard-based selection decomposition.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 62 | +"rocheteau2011liquidity","Rocheteau, Guillaume and Weill, Pierre-Olivier","2011","Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 261-282","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00435.x","Review of frictional asset markets in finance and monetary theory with a simple search model.","survey","Unifies the literature on liquidity in search markets, including housing and credit market dynamics.","Places WP19 in the search-based liquidity literature.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 63 | +"rogerson2005search","Rogerson, Richard and Shimer, Robert and Wright, Randall","2005","Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey","Journal of Economic Literature","43(4): 959-988","https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362014","Survey of search-theoretic models: reservation strategies, matching, bargaining, directed search, wage dispersion.","survey","Unifies partial and equilibrium search; explains coexistence of unmatched agents on both sides and dispersion.","Reference for WP19's reservation-value and dispersion results that are standard.","Labour framing; no financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 64 | +"rubinstein1982perfect","Rubinstein, Ariel","1982","Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model","Econometrica","50(1): 97-109","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531","Alternating-offers bargaining; impatience determines the unique perfect-equilibrium split.","theory","Unique subgame-perfect division; the more patient party obtains more; limit approximates Nash bargaining.","Justifies WP19's Nash split with bargaining weight beta and links seller urgency (impatience) to lower bargained prices.","No market equilibrium or search.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)" | |
| 65 | +"sagi2021asset","Sagi, Jacob S","2021","Asset-Level Risk and Return in Real Estate Investments","The Review of Financial Studies","34(8): 3647-3694","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa122","Search-based asset pricing with transaction risk explains why idiosyncratic real estate returns do not scale with holding period.","structural","Equilibrium search model fits commercial real estate transactions; transaction risk is crucial for price dynamics.","Shares search-generated idiosyncratic price dispersion; WP19 focuses on residential sellers' urgency and financing.","No seller urgency types or cash/mortgage contingency.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 66 | +"salant1991sale","Salant, Stephen W.","1991","For sale by owner: When to use a broker and how to price the house","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","4(2): 157-173","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00173122","Finite-horizon seller with a deadline chooses between selling by owner and using a broker and sets a declining price path.","theory","A seller facing a moving deadline optimally lowers price over time and may switch to a broker; urgency is a deadline.","Early treatment of seller urgency (deadline) and declining reservation prices; WP19 models urgency as a flow cost in stationary equilibrium.","No market equilibrium, no dispersion or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)" | |
| 67 | +"shimer2005cyclical","Shimer, Robert","2005","The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies","American Economic Review","95(1): 25-49","https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828572","Standard matching model cannot generate observed volatility of tightness from productivity shocks.","theory","Vacancy-unemployment ratio is far more volatile than productivity; the textbook model lacks amplification.","Benchmark for elasticities of tightness to shocks used in WP19's numerical calibration discussion.","Labour market.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 68 | +"stein1995prices","Stein, Jeremy C.","1995","Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A Model with Down-Payment Effects","The Quarterly Journal of Economics","110(2): 379-406","https://doi.org/10.2307/2118444","Down-payment constraints make repeat buyers' demand depend on equity; price declines reduce volume and amplify themselves.","theory","Price-volume comovement and amplification arise from down-payment constraints without search frictions.","Alternative, non-search channel for volume-price comovement; WP19 shares the role of financing in sellers' ability to transact but routes it through buyer qualification.","No search frictions, hazards or price dispersion.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 69 | +"taylor1999time","Taylor, Curtis R.","1999","Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality","Review of Economic Studies","66(3): 555-578","https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00098","Time on the market signals unobserved quality when inspections are informative, creating stigma for stale listings.","theory","Long TOM lowers buyers' beliefs and reduces subsequent sale probability and price.","Competing explanation of declining hazard with duration; WP19 obtains duration dependence from urgency composition instead.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 70 | +"wheaton1990vacancy","Wheaton, William C.","1990","Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model","Journal of Political Economy","98(6): 1270-1292","https://doi.org/10.1086/261734","Owner-occupiers mismatched with their house search while holding two units; vacancy and matching rate pin down reservation prices and equilibrium price via Nash bargaining.","theory","First housing matching model: higher vacancy lowers prices; price depends on expected time to sell and the cost of carrying two units.","WP19 keeps the stationary matching structure and carrying cost of unsold housing, but makes carrying cost heterogeneous across sellers and derives the hazard and discount jointly with free entry of buyers.","No seller heterogeneity in urgency, no financing contingency, no selection correction for transaction indices; liquidity is vacancy-driven rather than a defined discount relative to a frictionless price.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 71 | +"williams1995pricing","Williams, Joseph T.","1995","Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search","Review of Financial Studies","8(1): 55-90","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/8.1.55","Owners of heterogeneous real assets search costly for buyers; the asset price is an optimal-stopping value under Poisson arrivals and dispersed offers.","theory","Equilibrium prices of real assets embed a search discount; time to sale and prices respond to arrival rates and the dispersion of buyer offers.","Shares the Poisson-arrival/optimal-stopping core and the idea of a price below the frictionless value; WP19 adds two-sided tightness, free entry, urgency heterogeneity and a financing stage.","Partial-equilibrium arrival rate; no matching function or tightness feedback, no composition effects in observed transaction prices.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 72 | +"wright2021directed","Wright, Randall and Kircher, Philipp and Julien, Benoît and Guerrieri, Veronica","2021","Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour","Journal of Economic Literature","59(1): 90-148","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191505","Survey of directed and competitive search: efficiency, private information, sorting with heterogeneity.","survey","Directed search prices goods plus time to obtain them; equilibria are often efficient; technical results collected.","Guides WP19's posted-price robustness section and the efficiency comparison.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 73 | +"yavas1992simple","Yavaş, Abdullah","1992","A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets","Real Estate Economics","20(4): 533-548","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00595","Buyers and sellers choose search intensities; price by Nash bargaining; brokers change incentives to search.","theory","Brokers reduce own search; price rises by less than the commission; the split depends on bargaining powers (half under Nash).","Nash bargaining over the match surplus with endogenous search intensity is a direct antecedent of WP19's bargaining block.","No seller urgency distribution, financing, liquidity shock or index selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
| 74 | +"yavas1995strategic","Yavas, Abdullah and Yang, Shiawee","1995","The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence","Real Estate Economics","23(3): 347-368","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00668","Listing price trades off arrival rate (TOM) against bargained transaction price.","theory","Theory and evidence that higher list prices lengthen TOM and raise sale price; optimal list price balances the two.","WP19's reservation-price/hazard trade-off is the bargaining analogue of the list-price/TOM trade-off here.","Homogeneous seller urgency; no financing; no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi" | |
added
research/lit_part_B.csv
+67 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ | ||
| 1 | +key,authors,year,title,outlet,volume_pages,doi_url,mechanism,approach,key_finding,overlap_with_wp19,gaps,confidence,verified_via | |
| 2 | +zuehlke1987duration,"Zuehlke, Thomas W.",1987,Duration Dependence in the Housing Market,Review of Economics and Statistics,"69(4), 701-704",https://doi.org/10.2307/1935966,Sale hazard as a function of elapsed marketing time; vacancy as proxy for seller carrying cost/urgency,"empirical; Weibull hazard on MLS listings (New Orleans, Tallahassee)",Early parametric duration evidence; vacant houses display stronger (positive) duration dependence than occupied ones [magnitudes not abstract-verified],WP19 derives observed duration dependence from unobserved urgency heterogeneity; Zuehlke's vacancy split is a direct empirical analogue of carrying-cost heterogeneity,No control for unobserved heterogeneity vs true duration dependence; no price outcome; small samples,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_zuehlke1987duration.crossref.json) | |
| 3 | +haurin1988duration,"Haurin, Donald",1988,The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing,Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal),"16(4), 396-410",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00463,"Optimal stopping: atypical houses face higher offer variance, so sellers wait longer",empirical; failure-time model on resale houses,"Marketing time rises with house atypicality (offer dispersion), confirming reservation-price search behaviour by sellers",WP19's idiosyncratic match-value dispersion plays the role of Haurin's offer variance; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness,Seller heterogeneity in holding costs ignored; no equilibrium tightness,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin1988duration.crossref.json) | |
| 4 | +glower1998motivation,"Glower, Michel and Haurin, Donald R. and Hendershott, Patric H.",1998,Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation,Real Estate Economics,"26(4), 719-740",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00763,Heterogeneous seller motivation (planned move date) lowers reservation price and shortens marketing time,"empirical; seller survey linked to MLS outcomes (Columbus, Ohio)",Sellers with a planned move date sell faster; shorter planned horizon implies shorter actual TOM; motivation lowers sale price but not list-price markup,Closest empirical counterpart to WP19's carrying-cost heterogeneity: urgency raises hazard and lowers price; WP19 formalises and adds market-level feedback,Small survey; motivation self-reported; no general-equilibrium or selection-into-sales analysis,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_glower1998motivation.crossref.json) | |
| 5 | +springer1996motivation,"Springer, Thomas M.",1996,"Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time",Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"13(3), 237-254",https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00217393,Motivated/relocated/foreclosed/vacant sellers accept lower prices; list price is the main selling instrument,"empirical; hedonic price and marketing-time equations (Arlington, Texas 1991-1993)","Eager/motivated, relocated, vacant and foreclosure sellers sell at lower prices; only foreclosures sell faster; lower list price speeds sale at the cost of price",Supports WP19's prediction that urgency lowers transaction price; mixed evidence on hazard is a caution for the hazard-urgency prediction,Motivation flags from listing remarks; endogeneity of TOM and price not fully addressed,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_springer1996motivation.crossref.json) | |
| 6 | +anglin2003tradeoff,"Anglin, Paul M. and Rutherford, Ronald and Springer, Thomas M.",2003,The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"26(1), 95-111",https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021526332732,Higher list price (degree of overpricing) lengthens expected TOM; buyers infer information from price,"empirical; hazard model of TOM with withdrawn listings (Arlington, Texas)","Higher list-price premium raises expected TOM, more strongly where list prices have low predicted variance; withdrawn homes have higher, more variable list prices",Price-TOM tradeoff is WP19's core comparative static; withdrawal selection matches WP19's listing-withdrawal margin,Reduced-form; no structural mapping to reservation prices or urgency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2003tradeoff.crossref.json) | |
| 7 | +haurin2010listprices,"Haurin, Donald R. and Haurin, Jessica L. and Nadauld, Taylor and Sanders, Anthony",2010,"List Prices, Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets",Real Estate Economics,"38(4), 659-685",https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00279.x,List price trades off slower offer arrival against higher maximal offer; set jointly with reservation price,"theory + empirical; numerical comparative statics and Columbus, Ohio data",Greater dispersion of buyer offers raises list-to-expected-sale ratio; atypical dwellings have higher list markups and longer TOM,WP19's posted-price robustness case; dispersion of match values driving markups and TOM,No seller urgency heterogeneity; no financing contingency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin2010listprices.crossref.json) | |
| 8 | +genesove1997equity,"Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher J.",1997,Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market,American Economic Review,"87(3), 255-269",https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v87y1997i3p255-69.html,"Down-payment constraint raises high-LTV sellers' reservation prices: higher asking price, longer TOM, higher price if sold","empirical; Boston condominiums, early 1990s; list price, TOM hazard and sale price regressions","Owners with high loan-to-value ratios set higher asking prices, have longer expected time on market and obtain higher prices conditional on sale",Opposite sign to urgency: equity constraints raise effective reservation values; WP19 should allow carrying-cost distribution to include 'patient/locked' sellers,Owner-occupants only; cannot separate liquidity constraints from loss aversion (addressed in 2001 paper),high,"IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_genesove1997equity.evidence.txt)" | |
| 9 | +genesove2001lossaversion,"Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher",2001,Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market,Quarterly Journal of Economics,"116(4), 1233-1260",https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265561,"Sellers facing nominal losses set higher asking prices, sell at higher prices and with much lower hazard","empirical; Boston condominiums 1990s; asking price, sale price and hazard regressions","Sellers facing a prospective nominal loss set asking prices roughly 25-35% of the loss higher, achieve higher prices and sell much less often per period; effect about twice as large for owner-occupants as investors",Behavioural source of reservation-price heterogeneity and price-volume comovement; WP19 is rational but can nest reference-dependent carrying costs,No equilibrium feedback; identification relies on purchase-price proxy for reference point,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_genesove2001lossaversion.crossref.json) | |
| 10 | +levitt2008agents,"Levitt, Steven D. and Syverson, Chad",2008,Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions,Review of Economics and Statistics,"90(4), 599-611",https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.90.4.599,Agent incentives push clients to accept early low offers; agents' own homes wait longer for better offers,"empirical; MLS data, agent-owned vs client-owned homes with controls",Agent-owned homes sell for about 3.7% more and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer; distortion larger when information asymmetry is greater,"Quantifies the price gain from a longer optimal stopping horizon, i.e. the slope of the TOM-price tradeoff at the margin",Agency friction rather than seller carrying cost; no tightness variation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_levitt2008agents.crossref.json) | |
| 11 | +hendel2009fsbo,"Hendel, Igal and Nevo, Aviv and Ortalo-Magné, François",2009,The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com,American Economic Review,"99(5), 1878-1898",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1878,Platform choice sorts patient sellers to FSBO; buyer arrival rate differs across platforms,"empirical; Madison, Wisconsin FSBO vs MLS sales, prices, TOM, sale probability","FSBO pre-commission prices are no lower, but FSBO has longer time to sell and lower probability of sale; patient sellers select into FSBO","Endogenous sorting by seller patience is exactly WP19's heterogeneous-urgency selection mechanism, here across platforms",Single market; network size effects not identified,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hendel2009fsbo.crossref.json) | |
| 12 | +knight2002listing,"Knight, John R.",2002,"Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects of Listing Price Changes",Real Estate Economics,"30(2), 213-237",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00038,List-price revisions under demand uncertainty; initial overpricing is costly in time and money,empirical; probit for list-price changes plus price/TOM equations,Homes with high initial markups and vacant homes most likely to cut list price; large percentage list-price changes imply longer TOM and lower final prices,Supports WP19's reservation-price updating and vacancy (carrying cost) channel; stale-listing penalty,Missing revision data in most datasets; no equilibrium interpretation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_knight2002listing.crossref.json) | |
| 13 | +merlo2004bargaining,"Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François",2004,Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England,Journal of Urban Economics,"56(2), 192-216",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004,"Full listing histories: list-price changes, offers, visits; strategic buyer-seller interaction",empirical; novel English transaction-history dataset; stylized facts,"Documents timing and terms of agreement from listing to sale, every list-price change and offer; argues existing theories fit poorly and proposes a strategic framework",Micro facts on offers and revisions that WP19's bargaining-with-outside-option structure must match,Descriptive; no structural estimation of urgency or arrival rates,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_merlo2004bargaining.crossref.json) | |
| 14 | +carrillo2013heat,"Carrillo, Paul E.",2013,To Sell or Not to Sell: Measuring the Heat of the Housing Market,Real Estate Economics,"41(2), 310-346",https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12003,"Seller bargaining power index from structural home-seller search model combining list price, sale price and TOM",structural; Washington DC transactions; mapping from hedonic/TOM reduced forms to structural parameters,Index of seller bargaining power tracks up- and downturns in appreciation and popular perceptions of market 'heat',"Shows WP19's objects (bargaining power, sale probability) are identifiable from listings data; WP19 adds urgency heterogeneity and financing",Homogeneous sellers; partial equilibrium,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2013heat.crossref.json) | |
| 15 | +carrillo2015tightness,"Carrillo, Paul E. and de Wit, Eric R. and Larson, William",2015,Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands,Real Estate Economics,"43(3), 609-651",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12082,"Market tightness (sale probabilities, seller bargaining power) leads price appreciation","empirical; listings data, Netherlands and US regions; time-series forecasting",Current sale probabilities and bargaining-power index significantly reduce appreciation forecast errors and predict turning points,"Supports WP19's claim that liquidity (hazard, tightness) moves before and separately from transaction prices",Reduced-form forecasting; no decomposition into selection vs bargaining,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2015tightness.crossref.json) | |
| 16 | +anenberg2016information,"Anenberg, Elliot",2016,Information Frictions and Housing Market Dynamics,International Economic Review,"57(4), 1449-1479",https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12204,Seller uncertainty about demand with Bayesian learning generates list-price cuts and aggregate momentum,structural; dynamic micro-search model estimated on listings and transactions,Sellers lack full information about current demand; estimated learning model produces a significant microfounded momentum in short-run price appreciation,Alternative (information) source of TOM-price patterns; WP19 keeps full information and isolates urgency and liquidity,Abstracts from financing and seller carrying-cost heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2016information.crossref.json) | |
| 17 | +genesove2012search,"Genesove, David and Han, Lu",2012,Search and matching in the housing market,Journal of Urban Economics,"72(1), 31-45",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002,Random matching with CRS: buyer and seller TOM respond to demand through buyer-seller ratio,empirical; NAR buyer/seller surveys across years and markets,"Buyer TOM, homes visited and especially seller TOM fall as demand rises; elasticity of seller contact hazard with respect to buyer-seller ratio estimated at 0.84 under CRS",Direct calibration target for WP19's matching elasticity and tightness response; stronger response to demand growth than levels,Survey-based TOM; no prices or urgency heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_genesove2012search.crossref.json) | |
| 18 | +han2016askingprice,"Han, Lu and Strange, William C.",2016,What is the role of the asking price for a house?,Journal of Urban Economics,"93, 115-130",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.008,Asking price directs buyer search without being a ceiling or commitment,theory + empirical; survey data on buyer search and sale-at-list incidence,"Mass of sales exactly at asking price; asking price steers buyer visits, more so for atypical houses and in weak-demand markets",Informs WP19's posted-price robustness: list price as a directing device rather than a ceiling,No welfare or urgency analysis,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2016askingprice.crossref.json) | |
| 19 | +han2014biddingwars,"Han, Lu and Strange, William C.",2014,Bidding Wars for Houses,Real Estate Economics,"42(1), 1-32",https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12015,Above-list sales as a measure of tightness; list price not a ceiling in hot markets,empirical; time-series and cross-section of sales above list price,"Bidding wars rose from a stable 3-4% of transactions to over 30% in some markets by 2005, fell in the bust but remained about twice historical levels",Regime where WP19's buyer-side competition dominates; tightness changes bargaining split,Descriptive; mechanism not structurally identified,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2014biddingwars.crossref.json) | |
| 20 | +jud1996brokerage,"Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G. and Winkler, Daniel T.",1996,Time on the Market: The Impact of Residential Brokerage,Journal of Real Estate Research,"12(3), 447-458",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1996.12090852,"Duration model of TOM with brokerage, pricing strategy and duration dependence",empirical; duration model on MLS data,Positive duration dependence (sale probability rises with TOM); pricing-related strategies strongly affect TOM; agent/firm characteristics insignificant,Positive duration dependence contrasts with WP19's heterogeneity-induced negative dependence; useful discipline on the mixing distribution,No correction for unobserved heterogeneity; no price outcome,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1996brokerage.crossref.json) | |
| 21 | +huang2001withdrawal,"Huang, Ju-Chin and Palmquist, Raymond B.",2001,"Environmental Conditions, Reservation Prices, and Time on the Market for Housing",Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"22(2-3), 203-219",https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007891430162,Joint estimation of seller reservation price and marketing duration; reservation price declines with elapsed time,empirical; structural duration/reservation-price estimator applied to highway noise,Noise lowers reservation and predicted sale prices but not TOM significantly; longer TOM is associated with lower reservation prices (sellers revise down),Provides an estimator of the reservation price WP19 models; downward revision consistent with learning or rising carrying cost,Withdrawals treated as censoring; no urgency heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_huang2001withdrawal.crossref.json) | |
| 22 | +campbell2011forced,"Campbell, John Y. and Giglio, Stefano and Pathak, Parag",2011,Forced Sales and House Prices,American Economic Review,"101(5), 2108-2131",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.2108,"Forced sales (foreclosure, death, bankruptcy) sell at discounts; nearby foreclosures depress prices",empirical; all Massachusetts transactions over 20 years; hedonic with forced-sale indicators and spatial spillovers,Foreclosure discount averages about 27% of house value; a foreclosure within 0.05 miles lowers a house's price by about 1%; death and bankruptcy sales also discounted,Canonical magnitude for WP19's urgency-driven discount; WP19 explains why discount exceeds pure selection via bargaining under high carrying cost,Cannot fully separate quality deterioration from liquidity discount; no TOM,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_campbell2011forced.crossref.json) | |
| 23 | +mayer1998auctions,"Mayer, Christopher J.",1998,Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions,Real Estate Economics,"26(1), 41-66",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00737,Auction trades immediate sale against expected waiting in a search market; discount larger in downturns,"empirical; repeat-sales comparison of auction vs negotiated sales, Los Angeles and Dallas",Auction discounts 0-9% in the 1980s Los Angeles boom vs 9-21% in Dallas after the oil bust; consistent with discount rising when expected TOM is long,"Cleanest early estimate of the price of immediacy and its dependence on market liquidity, central to WP19's state-dependent discount",Auctioned properties may differ in unobservables despite repeat-sales control,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mayer1998auctions.crossref.json) | |
| 24 | +harding2009contagion,"Harding, John P. and Rosenblatt, Eric and Yao, Vincent W.",2009,The contagion effect of foreclosed properties,Journal of Urban Economics,"66(3), 164-178",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2009.07.003,"Nearby foreclosures lower sale prices via visual externality/neglect, growing through the distress process",empirical; repeat-sales with local trend and distance rings,"Peak contagion discount roughly 1% per nearby foreclosed property, decaying quickly with distance, growing from distress onset to foreclosure sale then levelling off",Externality channel distinct from WP19's competition/selection channel; WP19 abstracts from neighbourhood spillovers,Cannot cleanly separate supply competition from disamenity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2009contagion.crossref.json) | |
| 25 | +anenberg2014foreclosures,"Anenberg, Elliot and Kung, Edward",2014,Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures,American Economic Review,"104(8), 2527-2551",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2527,"REO listings depress nearby prices through competition (supply) and, in dense low-price areas, disamenity",empirical; weekly listings data; timing of seller response to new REO listings,"Sellers respond in the exact week an REO is listed; competition effects matter everywhere, disamenity only in high-density low-price neighbourhoods",Competition from urgent (REO) sellers lowering prices of non-urgent sellers is a market-level implication WP19 can generate through tightness,Local partial-equilibrium; no hazard estimates,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2014foreclosures.crossref.json) | |
| 26 | +mian2015foreclosures,"Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir and Trebbi, Francesco",2015,"Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy",Journal of Finance,"70(6), 2587-2634",https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12310,Judicial-foreclosure laws as instrument: forced sales cause price declines and real effects,"empirical; state-border discontinuity, IV, 2007-2013","Nonjudicial states were twice as likely to foreclose in 2007-2009; foreclosures caused large declines in house prices, residential investment and consumer demand","Macro-level evidence that an increase in the mass of urgent sellers moves prices without a fundamentals change, as in WP19's liquidity-shock proposition",Aggregate; no micro TOM or discount decomposition,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mian2015foreclosures.crossref.json) | |
| 27 | +penningtoncross2006reo,"Pennington-Cross, Anthony",2006,The Value of Foreclosed Property,Journal of Real Estate Research,"28(2), 193-214",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2006.12091177,"REO properties appreciate less than their metro area; gap depends on loan traits, legal regime, market conditions and marketing time",empirical; loan-level REO sales vs metro appreciation,"Foreclosed properties appreciate below the area average; the gap varies with legal restrictions, housing-market conditions and marketing time",State-dependence of the forced-sale discount matches WP19's prediction that the liquidity discount widens in slow markets,Magnitudes depend on specification; condition of property unobserved,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_penningtoncross2006reo.crossref.json) | |
| 28 | +clauretie2009foreclosure,"Clauretie, Terrence M. and Daneshvary, Nasser",2009,Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time,Real Estate Economics,"37(1), 43-67",https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00234.x,Foreclosure discount overstated when property condition and endogenous TOM are ignored,empirical; spatial hedonic with endogenous marketing time (Las Vegas),"Previous >20% foreclosure discounts are about one-third too high once condition, TOM-price relationship and spatial dependence are controlled","Highlights WP19's identification point: part of the observed discount is quality/selection, part is a genuine liquidity (urgency) discount",Single market; condition proxies imperfect,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clauretie2009foreclosure.crossref.json) | |
| 29 | +andersen2017firesales,"Andersen, Steffen and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner",2017,Fire Sales and House Prices: Evidence from Estate Sales Due to Sudden Death,Management Science,"63(1), 201-212",https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2292,Exogenous forced sales (sudden death) isolate supply-side urgency from demand shocks,empirical; Danish registry natural experiment,"Forced estate sales carry fire-sale discounts that increase with urgency, poor market conditions and seller financial constraints; fire sales occur without demand shocks",Closest causal evidence for WP19's urgency-discount interaction with market liquidity; demand held fixed,Danish institutional setting; discount magnitudes not reported in abstract,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andersen2017firesales.crossref.json) | |
| 30 | +reher2024mortgagecash,"Reher, Michael and Valkanov, Rossen",2024,The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle,Journal of Finance,"79(5), 3149-3201",https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13373,"Sellers accept lower cash offers to avoid mortgage transaction frictions (delay, failure risk)",empirical + dynamic model + survey experiment; multiple US datasets 1980-2017,Mortgaged buyers pay an 11% premium over all-cash buyers; representative-seller model implies 3%; heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half the gap; belief distortions in high-risk states,WP19's financing-contingency block generates an endogenous cash discount; Reher-Valkanov's 'puzzle' is the gap WP19's urgency heterogeneity should narrow,Residual puzzle attributed to beliefs; bargaining-vs-selection split not fully decomposed,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_reher2024mortgagecash.crossref.json) | |
| 31 | +han2024cashisking,"Han, Lu and Hong, Seung-Hyun",2024,Cash is king? Understanding financing risk in housing markets,Review of Finance,"28(6), 2083-2118",https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae025,Mortgage contingency creates closing risk and risk of re-listing failure; cash discount compensates sellers,empirical + calibrated search model; Los Angeles transactions,"Cash offers close 29% faster and carry a 2-3.9% price discount; discount smaller in booms and larger markets; closing risk alone insufficient, re-listing failure risk needed",Nearly identical mechanism to WP19's financing contingency and relisting; WP19 adds heterogeneous urgency and general-equilibrium tightness,Single metro; interaction with seller carrying costs not modelled,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2024cashisking.crossref.json) | |
| 32 | +asabere1992cash,"Asabere, Paul K. and Huffman, Forrest E. and Mehdian, Seyed",1992,The Price Effects of Cash versus Mortgage Transactions,Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal),"20(1), 141-154",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00576,All-cash transactions trade at a discount relative to typically financed sales,empirical; hedonic on comparable row homes,All-cash transactions associated with roughly a 13% price discount relative to market-typical financing,"Earliest cash-discount magnitude; WP19 predicts a smaller equilibrium discount unless urgency is high, so the 13% invites a selection interpretation","Small, dated sample; buyer/seller selection uncontrolled",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_asabere1992cash.crossref.json) | |
| 33 | +jauregui2019fundingprice,"Jauregui, Andres and Tidwell, Alan and Sah, Vivek",2019,Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating and Allocating House Transaction Funding Price Differentials,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"58(3), 366-407",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-018-9661-4,"Price differentials across cash, conventional, FHA and VA funding reflect selection plus a financing premium","empirical; sample-selection and spatial corrections, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition","Selection and spatial bias detected; conventional sales have stronger characteristics than cash sales, FHA/VA weaker; unexplained component interpreted as a financing premium",Decomposition of observed cash differential into composition vs premium parallels WP19's selection-vs-bargaining decomposition,Magnitudes not in abstract; no time-to-close data,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jauregui2019fundingprice.crossref.json) | |
| 34 | +aroul2023cashdiscount,"Aroul, Ramya R. and Hansz, J. Andrew",2023,The impact of cash financing on housing prices: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from a volatile United States market cycle,Journal of Property Research,"40(1), 25-52",https://doi.org/10.1080/09599916.2022.2119878,Mortgage-contingency pricing effect measured as a cash discount that varies with market distress and property traits,theory + empirical; 12-year US cycle around 2008,"Cash discounts are larger in distressed markets, at lower price levels and for smaller/poorer-condition improvements; no single rule of thumb",State-dependence of the cash discount is a WP19 prediction (discount widens as qualification risk and seller urgency rise),No magnitudes in abstract; selection of cash buyers into distressed properties,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_aroul2023cashdiscount.crossref.json) | |
| 35 | +lin2025contingencies,"Lin, Zhenguo and Seiler, Michael J. and Siebert, Ralph B. and Winkler, Daniel T.",2025,"Selling price, time on the market, and contractual contingencies",Journal of Housing Economics,"68, 102062",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102062,Contingency clauses lengthen TOM and reduce closing certainty; buyers compensate with price,"empirical; Miami-Dade transactions (CESifo WP 9947 version: Gordon, Seiler, Siebert, Winkler 2022)","Contingency clauses relate to market conditions, TOM, list premiums and distressed sales; price premia range from -3.7% to +2.2% (-3.3% to +2.4% conditioning on TOM)","Direct evidence on WP19's contingency margin: contingent offers trade price for closing risk, sign depending on clause and market state",Clause types pooled in abstract; identification of contingency choice is endogenous,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_lin2025contingencies.crossref.json) | |
| 36 | +anenberg2019creditavailability,"Anenberg, Elliot and Hizmo, Aurel and Kung, Edward and Molloy, Raven",2019,Measuring mortgage credit availability: A frontier estimation approach,Journal of Applied Econometrics,"34(6), 865-882",https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2720,Loan frontier measures maximum obtainable mortgage; shifts in frontier proxy buyer qualification,empirical; stochastic frontier on originations 2001-2014,Credit expanded for all borrowers in the boom and contracted most for low-score borrowers; frontier variation across metros shows borrowing constraints mattered for the cycle,Provides an empirical counterpart to WP19's qualification probability phi and its cross-market variation,Frontier is an upper bound; approval delays and failures not measured,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2019creditavailability.crossref.json) | |
| 37 | +bhutta2021insurance,"Bhutta, Neil and Ringo, Daniel",2021,The effect of interest rates on home buying: Evidence from a shock to mortgage insurance premiums,Journal of Monetary Economics,"118, 195-211",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.10.001,Binding DTI thresholds make buyer qualification sensitive to small rate changes (extensive margin),empirical; regression discontinuity around FHA premium cut,"A surprise 50bp effective rate cut raised home buying among FHA-reliant households by 14% immediately, via DTI qualification thresholds","Quantifies how qualification (phi) responds to financing conditions, the input to WP19's buyer-arrival shock",Effect on prices and TOM not the focus,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bhutta2021insurance.crossref.json) | |
| 38 | +fuster2019technology,"Fuster, Andreas and Plosser, Matthew and Schnabl, Philipp and Vickery, James",2019,The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending,Review of Financial Studies,"32(5), 1854-1899",https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz018,Technology shortens mortgage processing time without raising defaults,empirical; loan-level application and origination data 2010-2016,FinTech lenders grew from 2% to 8% of lending and process applications about 20% faster with no higher defaults; more elastic supply to demand shocks,Approval delay is a structural parameter in WP19's financing contingency; this gives its empirical scale and variability,Refinance-heavy; purchase-closing failures not studied,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fuster2019technology.crossref.json) | |
| 39 | +defusco2020leverage,"DeFusco, Anthony A. and Johnson, Stephanie and Mondragon, John",2020,Regulating Household Leverage,Review of Economic Studies,"87(2), 914-958",https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz040,Leverage regulation removes marginal borrowers (quantity) more than it raises price,empirical; discontinuity in Ability-to-Repay rule,Rates on affected loans rose 10-15bp but 15% of the affected market was eliminated and leverage reduced for another 20%; lenders exited the regulated segment,"Credit tightening as a qualification shock reducing effective buyer arrival, a key WP19 counterfactual",Housing-market price/TOM consequences not traced,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_defusco2020leverage.crossref.json) | |
| 40 | +allen2019searchfrictions,"Allen, Jason and Clark, Robert and Houde, Jean-François",2019,Search Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated-Price Markets,Journal of Political Economy,"127(4), 1550-1598",https://doi.org/10.1086/701684,Search and negotiation frictions in the Canadian mortgage market generate dispersion and market power,structural; Canadian insured-mortgage contract data; search-and-bargaining model,"Frictions cost about $12/month/consumer (50% search costs, 28% price discrimination, 22% inefficient matching); large banks' margins about 70% higher",Only verified Canadian structural evidence on housing-finance search frictions; shows the financing side itself is a negotiated search market,"Mortgage pricing, not house transactions or TOM",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_allen2019searchfrictions.crossref.json) | |
| 41 | +buchak2026ibuyers,"Buchak, Greg and Matvos, Gregor and Piskorski, Tomasz and Seru, Amit",2026,Why Is Intermediating Houses So Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers,Journal of Political Economy,"forthcoming (NBER WP 28252, 2020, rev. 2025)",https://doi.org/10.1086/742710,Dealers supply immediacy; speed trades off against valuation accuracy and adverse selection,empirical + structural search model with adverse selection; iBuyer transactions,"iBuyers sell quickly and earn about a 5% spread; they intermediate only in liquid, easy-to-value markets; low underlying liquidity exacerbates adverse selection",Market price of immediacy (spread) is a benchmark for WP19's liquidity discount; adverse selection is a channel WP19 abstracts from,"Recent, narrow set of markets",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_buchak2026ibuyers.crossref.json) | |
| 42 | +gatzlaff1997selection,"Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.",1997,Sample Selection Bias and Repeat-Sales Index Estimates,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"14(1-2), 33-50",https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007763816289,Homes that sell are a nonrandom sample; repeat-sales index bias correlated with economic conditions,"empirical; censored-sample correction of repeat-sales index, Dade County FL","Index built from homes selling more than once is biased, and the bias is strongly correlated with changes in economic conditions",Empirical basis for WP19's proposition that transaction indices mix liquidity-driven selection with value changes,Selection equation relies on observables; no link to seller urgency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1997selection.crossref.json) | |
| 43 | +gatzlaff1998selection,"Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.",1998,Sample Selection and Biases in Local House Value Indices,Journal of Urban Economics,"43(2), 199-222",https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1997.2045,Selection into sale biases hedonic local value indices; bias varies with market state,empirical; selection-corrected hedonic indices [abstract not retrievable],Extends selection correction to local hedonic indices; selection bias varies systematically with local economic conditions [details unconfirmed],Same identification problem as WP19's index-selection proposition at the local-market level,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1998selection.crossref.json) | |
| 44 | +hwang2004selectivity,"Hwang, Min and Quigley, John M.",2004,"Selectivity, Quality Adjustment and Mean Reversion in the Measurement of House Values",Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"28(2-3), 161-178",https://doi.org/10.1023/b:real.0000011152.40485.12,"Joint model of sale selection, quality change and mean reversion in individual house prices",empirical; all sales in Sweden's largest metro 1982-1999 vs repeat-sales,Repeat-sales method yields systematically biased estimates of the value of the housing stock once selectivity and quality change are modelled,Supports WP19's distinction between index movements and fundamental value when sale selection is endogenous,Selection not linked to seller motives or liquidity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hwang2004selectivity.crossref.json) | |
| 45 | +goetzmann2006reservation,"Goetzmann, William and Peng, Liang",2006,Estimating House Price Indexes in the Presence of Seller Reservation Prices,Review of Economics and Statistics,"88(1), 100-112",https://doi.org/10.1162/003465306775565783,Reservation-price-to-value ratio drives both volume and selection bias in transaction indices,theory + econometric correction; simulations and Los Angeles repeat sales,Falling volume biases index returns upward and rising volume biases them downward; reserve-conditional unbiased index differs substantially from standard repeat-sales,"Formalises exactly WP19's selection proposition: with heterogeneous reservation prices, observed prices are a truncated sample tied to volume",Reservation prices exogenous; no search/bargaining microfoundation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_goetzmann2006reservation.crossref.json) | |
| 46 | +jud1994selection,"Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G.",1994,Sample Selection Bias in Estimating Housing Sales Prices,Journal of Real Estate Research,"9(3), 289-298",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1994.12090753,Appreciation estimates from sold homes suffer Heckman-type selection,empirical; Heckman two-step on sold vs all houses,Housing sample-selection problem is statistically significant for appreciation estimates,Early confirmation of the selection problem WP19 models,Direction and magnitude of bias not reported in abstract,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1994selection.crossref.json) | |
| 47 | +case1989efficiency,"Case, Karl E. and Shiller, Robert J.",1989,The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes,American Economic Review,"79(1), 125-137",https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v79y1989i1p125-37.html,Repeat-sales indices reveal positive serial correlation inconsistent with efficiency,"empirical; weighted repeat-sales on 39,210 homes in four cities 1970-1986",Market does not appear efficient: annual price changes are followed by same-direction changes; individual house price changes largely unforecastable,Momentum benchmark; WP19 argues part of index persistence can arise from slow-moving liquidity and sale selection,No volume or liquidity in the test,high,"IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_case1989efficiency.evidence.txt)" | |
| 48 | +bailey1963repeatsales,"Bailey, Martin J. and Muth, Richard F. and Nourse, Hugh O.",1963,A Regression Method for Real Estate Price Index Construction,Journal of the American Statistical Association,"58(304), 933-942",https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10480679,Repeat-sales regression as a constant-quality price index,econometric method,Introduces the repeat-sales regression index later generalised by Case-Shiller,Baseline index whose selection properties WP19 characterises,Assumes sales are random draws from the stock,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bailey1963repeatsales.crossref.json) | |
| 49 | +clapp1992assessed,"Clapp, John M. and Giaccotto, Carmelo",1992,Estimating Price Indices for Residential Property: A Comparison of Repeat Sales and Assessed Value Methods,Journal of the American Statistical Association,"87(418), 300-306",https://doi.org/10.2307/2290260,"Assessed-value method uses the full stock, mitigating repeat-sales selection",econometric method + empirical comparison,"Assessed-value index avoids the small, possibly unrepresentative repeat-sales sample and compares favourably",Alternative index design that WP19 can use as a less selection-prone benchmark,Assessment quality varies across jurisdictions,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clapp1992assessed.crossref.json) | |
| 50 | +harding2003bargainingpower,"Harding, John P. and Rosenthal, Stuart S. and Sirmans, C. F.",2003,Estimating Bargaining Power in the Market for Existing Homes,Review of Economics and Statistics,"85(1), 178-188",https://doi.org/10.1162/003465303762687794,Buyer and seller characteristics shift bargaining power within hedonic prices,empirical; American Housing Survey with both parties' traits,"Wealth, gender and demographics affect bargaining power; bargaining variation tied to school-age children explains seasonal anomalies in quality-adjusted indices",Empirical identification of the Nash bargaining weight WP19 treats as a parameter; shows it varies across parties and seasons,Cross-section; no urgency or TOM,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingpower.crossref.json) | |
| 51 | +harding2003bargainingeffects,"Harding, John P. and Knight, John R. and Sirmans, C. F.",2003,Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market,Real Estate Economics,"31(4), 601-622",https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1080-8620.2003.00078.x,"Vacancy weakens seller bargaining power, shifting the hedonic constant and attribute prices",empirical; hedonic with vacant-at-sale indicator across markets,Vacant (weak-bargaining) sellers receive lower prices; bargaining alters attribute shadow prices without a consistent cross-market pattern,Vacancy = high carrying cost in WP19; confirms urgency lowers negotiated price,Vacancy may also proxy quality/condition,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingeffects.crossref.json) | |
| 52 | +kurlat2015asymmetries,"Kurlat, Pablo and Stroebel, Johannes",2015,Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets,Review of Financial Studies,"28(8), 2429-2461",https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv028,Better-informed sellers (about neighbourhood) sell ahead of price declines,empirical; seller-pool composition and subsequent price changes,"When the seller pool shifts toward better-informed and high-supply-elasticity sellers, prices subsequently fall; stronger for neighbourhood-exposed houses",Adverse-selection explanation of volume-price dynamics that WP19 rules out by assumption; useful for the novelty audit,Information not directly observed,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_kurlat2015asymmetries.crossref.json) | |
| 53 | +garmaise2004asymmetries,"Garmaise, Mark J. and Moskowitz, Tobias J.",2004,Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real Estate Markets,Review of Financial Studies,"17(2), 405-437",https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg037,Asymmetric information measured by assessment quality shapes who trades and how,empirical; US commercial real estate,"Strong evidence information considerations matter: buyers favour nearby properties and long income histories, avoid informed brokers; financing-choice evidence weak",Information asymmetry is a competing friction; WP19 isolates search/urgency with symmetric information,"Commercial, not residential",high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_garmaise2004asymmetries.crossref.json) | |
| 54 | +piazzesi2020segmented,"Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin and Stroebel, Johannes",2020,Segmented Housing Search,American Economic Review,"110(3), 720-759",https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141772,Heterogeneous buyer search ranges across segments link inventory and search activity,"quantitative search model + Trulia search data, San Francisco Bay Area",Search activity and inventory covary negatively across cities but positively across segments within cities; broad searchers spread local shocks across segments,WP19's single-segment matching abstracts from segment spillovers that dampen local liquidity shocks,Prices not the focus; no seller urgency,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_piazzesi2020segmented.crossref.json) | |
| 55 | +cheng2013liquidityrisk,"Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun",2013,Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets,Financial Review,"48(4), 671-696",https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12020,Uncertain marketing period adds liquidity risk to ex ante returns of private assets,analytical + empirical calibration on commercial real estate,"Liquidity risk is too large to ignore, especially in down markets",Return-based framing of the liquidity premium that WP19 derives at the transaction level,Assumes exogenous TOM distribution,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_cheng2013liquidityrisk.crossref.json) | |
| 56 | +fisher2003liquidity,"Fisher, Jeffrey and Gatzlaff, Dean and Geltner, David and Haurin, Donald",2003,Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices,Real Estate Economics,"31(2), 269-303",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00066,Constant-liquidity value separates price movements from procyclical ease of selling,econometric index model with selection; NCREIF data,Constant-liquidity values lead transaction- and appraisal-based indices and show greater volatility and cycle amplitude,Operationalises WP19's distinction between a liquidity-adjusted price and the observed transaction index,Commercial; buyer/seller reservation distributions parametric,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fisher2003liquidity.crossref.json) | |
| 57 | +fisher2007tbi,"Fisher, Jeff and Geltner, David and Pollakowski, Henry",2007,A Quarterly Transactions-based Index of Institutional Real Estate Investment Performance and Movements in Supply and Demand,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"34(1), 5-33",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9001-6,Transaction-based index with separate supply-side and demand-side (constant-liquidity) indices,"econometric index construction; NCREIF, assessed-value hedonic","Produces variable-liquidity, demand-side (constant-liquidity) and supply-side quarterly indices from transaction prices, avoiding appraisal smoothing","Shows how buyer- and seller-side reservation movements can be separately tracked, as WP19's model implies",Institutional commercial assets,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fisher2007tbi.crossref.json) | |
| 58 | +clayton2008liquidity,"Clayton, Jim and MacKinnon, Greg and Peng, Liang",2008,Time Variation of Liquidity in the Private Real Estate Market: An Empirical Investigation,Journal of Real Estate Research,"30(2), 125-160",https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2008.12091217,"Time-varying liquidity from noisy signals, option value of waiting, or sentiment",empirical; tests of competing explanations on private real estate,Results broadly consistent with rational updating and support the opportunity-cost-of-waiting (option value) explanation of liquidity variation,Supports WP19's waiting-option microfoundation for countercyclical illiquidity,Commercial; aggregate liquidity measures,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2008liquidity.crossref.json) | |
| 59 | +clayton2010pricevolume,"Clayton, Jim and Miller, Norman and Peng, Liang",2010,Price-volume Correlation in the Housing Market: Causality and Co-movements,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"40(1), 14-40",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-008-9128-0,Prices and volume jointly endogenous; asymmetric causality and common shocks,"empirical; panel VAR/Granger tests, 114 US MSAs 1990-2002",Price declines reduce volume but increases do not; volume Granger-causes prices only in inelastic-supply markets; correlation mostly co-movement from common shocks,"WP19's liquidity shock generates common movement of price and volume without a fundamental shock, consistent with co-movement dominance",Reduced-form; no TOM,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2010pricevolume.crossref.json) | |
| 60 | +berkovec1996turnover,"Berkovec, James A. and Goodman, John L.",1996,Turnover as a Measure of Demand for Existing Homes,Real Estate Economics,"24(4), 421-440",https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00698,Search model: demand shocks move turnover before prices,theory + empirical; aggregate turnover and demand indicators,Positive correlation between changes in turnover and housing demand; at high frequency turnover is a better demand indicator than price,"Same ordering as WP19's dynamics: hazard/volume respond first, prices adjust through bargaining and selection",No seller heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_berkovec1996turnover.crossref.json) | |
| 61 | +hort2000turnover,"Hort, Katinka",2000,Prices and turnover in the market for owner-occupied homes,Regional Science and Urban Economics,"30(1), 99-119",https://doi.org/10.1016/s0166-0462(99)00028-9,Price-turnover comovement in a search framework with sluggish reservation prices,empirical; Swedish regional data [abstract not retrievable],Documents positive price-turnover relationship in Sweden with turnover responding ahead of prices [details unconfirmed],Non-US evidence on the volume-price fact WP19 targets,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hort2000turnover.crossref.json) | |
| 62 | +andrew2003transactions,"Andrew, Mark and Meen, Geoffrey",2003,"House Price Appreciation, Transactions and Structural Change in the British Housing Market: A Macroeconomic Perspective",Real Estate Economics,"31(1), 99-116",https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1080-8620.2003.00059.x,Aggregate price-transactions relationship with structural break,empirical; British aggregate time series,"Strong price-transactions relationship in Britain that changed in the 1990s, with transactions becoming much lower","Reminds that the volume-price mapping is regime-dependent, as WP19's tightness feedback implies",Macro; no micro liquidity measures,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andrew2003transactions.crossref.json) | |
| 63 | +leamer2007businesscycle,"Leamer, Edward E.",2007,Housing IS the Business Cycle,"NBER Working Paper 13428 (also Proceedings, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 149-233)",NBER WP 13428,https://doi.org/10.3386/w13428,Housing volumes (residential investment) lead recessions; volume adjusts before prices,descriptive macro; postwar US cycles,Residential investment is the best early warning of recession; eight postwar recessions were preceded by housing/durables problems,Macro motivation for a volume-first liquidity channel; WP19 provides the microstructure,No formal liquidity model,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_leamer2007businesscycle.crossref.json) | |
| 64 | +dachis2012transfertax,"Dachis, Ben and Duranton, Gilles and Turner, Matthew A.",2012,The effects of land transfer taxes on real estate markets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto,Journal of Economic Geography,"12(2), 327-354",https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbr007,"Transaction tax raises trading cost, reduces volume and lowers prices",empirical; Toronto land transfer tax natural experiment 2008,A 1.1% transfer tax reduced sales by about 15% and lowered prices by roughly the tax; welfare loss about $1 per $8 raised,"Only verified Canadian evidence on how a transaction cost shifts volume and prices, useful for WP19's transaction-cost calibration",No TOM or seller heterogeneity,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_dachis2012transfertax.crossref.json) | |
| 65 | +carrillo2012potatoes,"Carrillo, Paul E. and Pope, Jaren C.",2012,Are homes hot or cold potatoes? The distribution of marketing time in the housing market,Regional Science and Urban Economics,"42(1-2), 189-197",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.08.010,Shape of the marketing-time distribution: quick 'hot' sales vs long 'cold' spells,empirical; MLS listings [abstract not retrievable],Characterises the empirical distribution of marketing time and its heterogeneity across homes and market states [details unconfirmed],WP19 derives the TOM distribution as a mixture over urgency types; this paper is the natural empirical target,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2012potatoes.crossref.json) | |
| 66 | +benefield2015measurement,"Benefield, Justin D. and Hardin, William G.",2015,Does Time-on-Market Measurement Matter?,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,"50(1), 52-73",https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9450-z,TOM definitions and relisting treatment change estimated TOM relationships,"empirical; five TOM measures in one MLS, relisting in another",Choice of TOM definition and treatment of relisted properties substantially change model results and significance; much TOM literature needs re-evaluation,Relisting/withdrawal is WP19's withdrawal margin; measurement of observed hazards must account for it,No structural interpretation,high,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_benefield2015measurement.crossref.json) | |
| 67 | +anglin2006liquidity,"Anglin, Paul M.",2006,Value and liquidity under changing market conditions,Journal of Housing Economics,"15(4), 293-304",https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2006.10.003,"Joint response of price and liquidity (TOM, sale probability) to changing market conditions",empirical [abstract not retrievable],Studies how value and liquidity of listed homes co-move as market conditions change [details unconfirmed],Same price-liquidity duality as WP19's discount-hazard pair,Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here,medium,Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2006liquidity.crossref.json) | |
added
research/lit_unverified_A.md
+41 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Literature review, Part A (theory): candidates NOT verified / NOT retained | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Date: 2026-10-20. Rule applied: an item enters `lit_part_A.csv` only if a Crossref record (title, authors, year, container) matches the citation and the DOI resolves, or, for items without Crossref records, a publisher/RePEc page was fetched and saved as evidence. Everything below failed that test or was deliberately excluded; none of it may be cited from this file. | |
| 4 | + | |
| 5 | +## A. Could not be verified (no usable bibliographic record reached) | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +| Candidate (as suggested or found) | What was tried | Why unverified | | |
| 8 | +|---|---|---| | |
| 9 | +| Kotova, N. & Zhang, A. L., "Search Frictions and Idiosyncratic Price Dispersion in the US Housing Market" (SSRN 3386353, 2019) / later circulated as "Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets" (2020-21) | Crossref (only the SSRN DOI 10.2139/ssrn.3386353 exists, no journal version), WebSearch, SSRN page (HTTP 403) | Working paper only; no journal record; SSRN page could not be fetched to confirm current title/authors. Relevant to WP19's dispersion result (model-based liquidity measures: time-on-market and price dispersion) — Part B may wish to retry via the authors' websites. | | |
| 10 | +| Han, L. & Stacey, D.(?) "Housing Market Frictions and Affordability: A Search-and-Matching Perspective" (SSRN 6703338 / 6703260, 2026) | Crossref (SSRN DOIs only), WebSearch (only UEA Summer School 2026 slides by Lu Han with that title surfaced), SSRN page (HTTP 403) | Preprint of 2026; co-author could not be confirmed; no journal record. Potentially a very recent competing survey/model; the lead should check SSRN manually before any mention. | | |
| 11 | +| "Hendershott & Rutherford (brokers)" (suggested in the brief) | Crossref bibliographic queries | No paper with these two authors on brokerage theory could be located; the brokerage-theory slot is covered instead by Yavaş (1992), verified. Rutherford, Springer & Yavaş (2005, JFE) is empirical and belongs to Part B if wanted. | | |
| 12 | +| A formal search-bargaining theory of mortgage/financing contingencies other than Bian, Lin & Liu (2018) | Two WebSearch passes + Crossref keyword queries ("financing contingency", "mortgage contingency", "cash buyers" + "search model") | Nothing further found. The literature's theoretical treatment of financing contingencies in housing transactions appears limited to the calibrated model in Han & Hong (2024), the representative-seller model in Reher & Valkanov (2024), and Bian, Lin & Liu (2018). This is itself a finding for the novelty audit. | | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +## B. Verified via Crossref but deliberately NOT retained in Part A (verification JSON deleted to keep the folder = cited set) | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +| Item | DOI | Reason for exclusion | | |
| 17 | +|---|---|---| | |
| 18 | +| Kaplan, Mitman & Violante (2020), "The Housing Boom and Bust: Model Meets Evidence", JPE 128(9) | 10.1086/708816 | Brief asked to include only if clearly relevant to liquidity; the model has no search/liquidity margin (beliefs vs credit). Mention at most in passing. | | |
| 19 | +| Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo (2016), "Understanding Booms and Busts in Housing Markets", JPE 124(4) | 10.1086/686732 | Belief-diffusion model of cycles; no search friction or liquidity discount; belongs to the cycles theme (Part B / general literature review), not to Part A microstructure. | | |
| 20 | +| Guerrieri, Shimer & Wright (2010), "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium", Econometrica 78(6) | 10.3982/ECTA8535 | Adverse-selection/competitive-search tool; WP19 has no private information about house quality. Taylor (1999) already covers the stale-listing stigma channel. | | |
| 21 | +| Burdett & Mortensen (1998), "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment", IER 39(2) | 10.2307/2527292 | Marked optional in the brief; Burdett & Judd (1983) suffices as the price-dispersion benchmark. | | |
| 22 | +| Chen & Rosenthal (1996), "On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists", RAND 27(2) | 10.2307/2555923 | List-price-as-ceiling theory; Horowitz (1992) and Arnold (1999) already cover the list-price role within housing. | | |
| 23 | +| Williams (1998), "Agency and Brokerage of Real Assets in Competitive Equilibrium", RFS 11(2) | 10.1093/rfs/11.2.239 | Brokerage/agency focus; outside WP19's mechanism. | | |
| 24 | +| Read (1991), "A Price Dispersion Equilibrium in a Spatially Differentiated Housing Market with Search Costs", REE 19(4) | 10.1111/1540-6229.00566 | Rental-market dispersion from spatial differentiation; Maury & Tripier (2014) and Burdett & Judd (1983) retained instead. | | |
| 25 | +| Cheng, Lin & Liu (2013), "Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets", Financial Review 48(4) | 10.1111/fire.12020 | Portfolio-risk metric for commercial real estate; Lin & Vandell (2007), Lin & Liu (2008) and Cheng, Lin & Liu (2010) already represent this strand. | | |
| 26 | +| Ben-Shahar & Golan (2022), "Price dispersion and time-on-market in the housing market", JHE 58 | 10.1016/j.jhe.2022.101875 | No abstract could be read (ScienceDirect/IDEAS fetch failed); appears empirical — handed to Part B rather than cited blind. | | |
| 27 | +| Gabrovski & Ortego-Marti (2025), "Home construction financing and search frictions in the housing market", RED 55 | 10.1016/j.red.2024.101253 | Verified but abstract not read; construction-financing focus is peripheral to WP19. Could be added later if the lead reads it. | | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +## C. Corrections to the brief's bibliographic hints (verified outlets differ from the ones suggested) | |
| 30 | + | |
| 31 | +- Albrecht, Gautier & Vroman, "Directed Search in the Housing Market" is in the **Review of Economic Dynamics** 19 (2016), not IER. | |
| 32 | +- Ngai & Sheedy, "The Decision to Move House…" is in the **JEEA** 18(5) (2020), not AER. | |
| 33 | +- Moen, Nenov & Sniekers, "Buying First or Selling First…" is in the **JEEA** 19(1) (2021; online 2019), not REStud. | |
| 34 | +- Piazzesi, Schneider & Stroebel, "Segmented Housing Search" is in the **AER** 110(3) (2020), not JPE. | |
| 35 | +- Gabrovski & Ortego-Marti, Beveridge-curve paper is in the **Journal of Economic Theory** 181 (2019), not JUE; their efficiency paper is "A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions", **Macroeconomic Dynamics** 29 (2025). | |
| 36 | +- Williams (1995), "Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search" is in the **Review of Financial Studies** 8(1), not JREFE. | |
| 37 | +- Novy-Marx (2009), "Hot and Cold Markets" is in **Real Estate Economics** 37(1), not RFS. | |
| 38 | +- Hedlund's "Illiquidity and its discontents" is JME 83 (2016) and "The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing…" is Quantitative Economics 7(1) (2016) — both as suggested. | |
| 39 | +- Reher & Valkanov, "The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle", **Journal of Finance** 79(5): 3149-3201 (2024) — confirmed. | |
| 40 | +- Han & Hong, "Cash is King? Understanding financing risk in housing markets", **Review of Finance** 28(6): 2083-2118 (2024) — confirmed. | |
| 41 | +- Guren & McQuade (2020) REStud DOI is 10.1093/restud/**rdaa001** (a first guess, rdz059, belongs to an unrelated article and was discarded). | |
added
research/lit_unverified_B.md
+27 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# Part B — candidates not verified (excluded from lit_part_B.csv) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Compiled 2026-10-20. Items below were in the Part B brief or surfaced during searching but could not be matched to a Crossref record or an authoritative page with the stated authors/outlet/year, or were verified but judged out of scope. None is cited in the CSV or the notes. | |
| 4 | + | |
| 5 | +## Not found / misattributed in the brief | |
| 6 | +- "Benefield, Cain & Johnson 2014 JREFE (withdrawn listings)": no such JREFE paper found. The three authors' JREFE paper is Benefield, Cain and Johnson (2011), "On the Relationship Between Property Price, Time-on-Market, and Photo Depictions in a Multiple Listing Service," JREFE 43, 401–422 (photos, not withdrawals); their 2014 item is a Journal of Real Estate Literature review of simultaneous price/TOM modelling. Replaced by Benefield & Hardin (2015, JREFE 50(1)) on TOM measurement and relisting, which is verified. | |
| 7 | +- "Carrillo, de Wit & Larson 2015 — Can tightness in the housing market be measured?": the verified title is "Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands," Real Estate Economics 43(3), 609–651 (included under the correct title). | |
| 8 | +- "Harding, Rosenblatt & Yao 2012 JUE": the paper is 2009, JUE 66(3), 164–178 (included with the correct year). | |
| 9 | +- "Goetzmann & Peng 2006 JREFE — Estimating house price distributions when sales are selected": no JREFE record; the verified paper is "Estimating House Price Indexes in the Presence of Seller Reservation Prices," Review of Economics and Statistics 88(1), 100–112 (included under the correct title/outlet). | |
| 10 | +- "Springer 1996 JREFE — The impact of seller motivation on price and marketing time": verified title is "Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time," JREFE 13(3) (included). | |
| 11 | +- "Hort 2000 JUE": the paper is in Regional Science and Urban Economics 30(1), 99–119 (included with the correct outlet; abstract not retrievable, content flagged [unconfirmed]). | |
| 12 | +- "Clayton, MacKinnon & Peng 2008 JREFE": the paper is in Journal of Real Estate Research 30(2), 125–160 (included with the correct outlet). | |
| 13 | +- "Bian, Brastow, Waller — financing contingency": no paper by these authors on financing contingencies was found; the verified contingency paper is Lin, Seiler, Siebert & Winkler (2025, Journal of Housing Economics 68; CESifo WP 9947, 2022, first-authored by Gordon). Included. | |
| 14 | +- "Anglin 2006?" on withdrawal: Anglin (2006, Journal of Housing Economics 15(4)) is verified bibliographically and included, but no abstract could be retrieved from IDEAS, Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex or the publisher, so its content is flagged [unconfirmed]. | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +## Verified but excluded (out of scope for Part B) | |
| 17 | +- Peterson, Brian (2012), "Fooled by Search: Housing Prices, Turnover and Bubbles," Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 12-3 — verified via IDEAS (evidence saved in `verification/B_peterson2012fooled.evidence.txt`). It is a behavioural search model estimated on US data, not Canadian time-on-market evidence; it belongs, if anywhere, in Part A. | |
| 18 | +- Guren & McQuade (2020, REStud), Taylor (1999, REStud), Yavas & Yang (1995, REE), Stein (1995, QJE), Guren (2018, JPE): theory/structural papers already verified by Part A (`verification/A_*.crossref.json`); not duplicated here. | |
| 19 | +- Lambie-Hanson (2015, JUE 90, 1–16), "When does delinquency result in neglect?": verified in Crossref but concerns property maintenance externalities rather than liquidity; dropped to keep the CSV focused. | |
| 20 | +- Bhutta & Ringo, Fuster et al., DeFusco et al., Allen–Clark–Houde are mortgage-market papers retained only as inputs to WP19's qualification/approval parameters; they are not housing-liquidity papers per se. | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +## Searched for and not found | |
| 23 | +- Canadian or Québec studies of residential time on market, cash discounts or forced-sale discounts (academic, peer-reviewed): none surfaced in standard web search beyond industry commentary (RBC, BMO, Scotiabank notes on sales-to-new-listings ratios and months of inventory, which are not citable research). Dachis, Duranton & Turner (2012) and Allen, Clark & Houde (2019) are the only verified Canadian papers included. | |
| 24 | +- Statistics Canada analytical papers on housing liquidity: none identified with verifiable bibliographic records. | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | +## Abstract not retrievable (included with reduced confidence) | |
| 27 | +- `zuehlke1987duration`, `carrillo2012potatoes`, `hort2000turnover`, `anglin2006liquidity`, `gatzlaff1998selection`: Crossref records confirm authors/title/outlet/year, but JSTOR/Elsevier pages blocked extraction and no open abstract exists on IDEAS, Semantic Scholar or OpenAlex. Their `key_finding` fields are deliberately generic and marked "[details unconfirmed]"; confidence = medium. | |
added
research/literature_matrix.csv
+133 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ | ||
| 1 | +"key","authors","year","title","outlet","volume_pages","doi_url","mechanism","approach","key_finding","overlap_with_wp19","gaps","confidence","verified_via","part" | |
| 2 | +"albrecht2007opportunistic","Albrecht, James and Anderson, Axel and Smith, Eric and Vroman, Susan","2007","Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market","International Economic Review","48(2): 641-664","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x","Buyers and sellers switch from relaxed to desperate flow values at a Poisson rate; matching is opportunistic and price depends on the pair's urgency states.","theory","Expected price falls with time on market and the conditional price variance is hump-shaped; urgent sellers accept lower prices and sell faster.","Closest antecedent for 'urgency lowers the reservation price and generates dispersion'; WP19 instead treats urgency as a continuous permanent holding cost, adds free entry and a financing stage, and derives index-selection bias.","No liquidity-shock comparative statics on matching efficiency, no mortgage/cash distinction, no formal selection correction for price indices.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 3 | +"albrecht2016directed","Albrecht, James and Gautier, Pieter A. and Vroman, Susan","2016","Directed search in the housing market","Review of Economic Dynamics","19: 218-231","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002","Sellers post asking prices with limited commitment; buyers direct search; asking price signals seller reservation type and houses sell above, at or below ask.","theory","Directed-search equilibrium with heterogeneous seller reservation values is constrained efficient; asking prices separate seller types.","Provides the posted-price benchmark against which WP19's Nash bargaining is checked for robustness; both feature private seller reservation types.","Two seller types only; no continuous urgency distribution, no financing contingency, no transaction-hazard or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 4 | +"anenberg2016information","Anenberg, Elliot","2016","Information Frictions And Housing Market Dynamics","International Economic Review","57(4): 1449-1479","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12204","Sellers learn about demand for their house through Bayesian updating while listed; information frictions shape list-price dynamics.","structural","Seller uncertainty about current demand explains list-price reductions and generates microfounded momentum in aggregate prices.","Alternative explanation of declining prices with time on market (learning) against which WP19's urgency/selection explanation must be distinguished. | B: Alternative (information) source of TOM-price patterns; WP19 keeps full information and isolates urgency and liquidity","No permanent urgency heterogeneity, no financing stage, no selection-corrected indices.","high","crossref+doi","A+B" | |
| 5 | +"anenberg2020endogenous","Anenberg, Elliot and Bayer, Patrick","2020","Endogenous Sources Of Volatility In Housing Markets: The Joint Buyer–Seller Problem","International Economic Review","61(3): 1195-1228","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12454","Cost of holding two homes varies endogenously over the cycle; moving owners' joint buy-sell problem amplifies volume and price volatility.","structural","Internal movement is highly procyclical; frictions from the joint buyer-seller problem substantially amplify cyclical price volatility.","Their time-varying cost of holding two homes is an endogenous version of WP19's carrying cost c; WP19 treats c as a permanent type and studies its cross-sectional implications.","No cash/mortgage distinction; no stationary dispersion or index-selection results.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 6 | +"arnold1999search","Arnold, Michael A.","1999","Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices","Real Estate Economics","27(3): 453-481","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00780","Asking price affects the arrival rate of inspecting buyers; reservation and asking prices solved jointly in a search-bargaining model.","theory","Existence of a subgame-perfect asking/reservation strategy; discount rates and buyer outside options move both prices.","Provides the comparative statics of the reservation price with respect to the seller's discount rate, the closest analogue to WP19's urgency gradient.","Partial equilibrium; no tightness feedback, dispersion across sellers or financing.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 7 | +"arnott1989housing","Arnott, Richard","1989","Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","2(1): 5-30","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00161714","Idiosyncratic tastes in a thin market generate equilibrium vacancies in rental housing.","theory","Vacancies are an equilibrium outcome of search with idiosyncratic match quality; thinness raises vacancies and affects rents.","Early formalisation of idiosyncratic match value x ~ G, central to WP19's acceptance rule.","Rental market, no urgency, financing or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 8 | +"bagnoli2005logconcave","Bagnoli, Mark and Bergstrom, Ted","2005","Log-concave probability and its applications","Economic Theory","26(2): 445-469","https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4","Log-concavity of densities implies monotone hazard rates and preserved properties under integration and truncation.","theory","Catalogue of log-concave distributions and of their implications for hazard and mean-residual-life functions.","Technical basis for WP19's proposition that the sale hazard is increasing in the effective arrival rate under log-concave G.","Pure probability tool.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 9 | +"bian2018bargaining","Bian, Xun and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2018","Bargaining, Mortgage Financing, and Housing Prices","Journal of Real Estate Research","40(3): 419-452","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506","Financing embedded in a bilateral bargaining model: mortgage terms create gains from trade beyond valuations.","theory","With financing, trade can occur even if buyer valuation is below seller reservation; omitting financing misstates the gain from trade and price.","Only formal bargaining theory with financing found; WP19 instead models financing as a contingency affecting timing and success, not surplus.","No search, no tightness, no cash discount from selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 10 | +"bond2007marketing","Bond, Shaun A. and Hwang, Soosung and Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Theory and Empirical Estimates from the UK Commercial Real Estate Market","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","34(4): 447-461","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1","Marketing period risk adds a second moment to real estate returns in portfolio choice.","theory","UK commercial real estate: marketing-period risk materially raises ex ante risk and reduces optimal allocations.","Supports treating time to sale as a priced risk, as in WP19; WP19 endogenises its distribution.","No equilibrium or seller heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 11 | +"burdett1983equilibrium","Burdett, Kenneth and Judd, Kenneth L.","1983","Equilibrium Price Dispersion","Econometrica","51(4): 955-969","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912045","Noisy search (consumers observe one or several prices) sustains equilibrium price dispersion for a homogeneous good.","theory","Price dispersion is an equilibrium outcome of search frictions even with identical sellers and buyers.","Benchmark for WP19's dispersion result, which instead derives dispersion from seller heterogeneity in urgency under bargaining.","Posted prices by sellers with no holding-cost heterogeneity; no dynamics or hazard.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A" | |
| 12 | +"caplin2011trading","Caplin, Andrew and Leahy, John","2011","Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 283-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x","Liquidity modelled through a trading-friction process linking prices, sales and inventory.","theory","Model generates large price changes and positive price-sales correlation but counterfactual negative autocorrelation; informational frictions help.","Shares the goal of a joint characterisation of prices, sales and inventory; WP19 provides a micro-founded stationary version with seller heterogeneity.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 13 | +"carrillo2012empirical","Carrillo, Paul E.","2012","An Empirical Stationary Equilibrium Search Model Of The Housing Market","International Economic Review","53(1): 203-234","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x","Stationary equilibrium with two-sided search, heterogeneous motivation to trade, posting and bargaining, and endogenous matching via advertising.","structural","Estimated model fits MLS data; more listing information and lower commissions change prices and time on market.","Shares heterogeneous seller motivation and a stationary equilibrium with posting plus bargaining; WP19 is analytical, adds financing and derives propositions and index bias.","No explicit liquidity-discount definition, no mortgage/cash contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 14 | +"cheng2010illiquidity","Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2010","Illiquidity, transaction cost, and optimal holding period for real estate: Theory and application","Journal of Housing Economics","19(2): 109-118","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002","Illiquidity and transaction costs determine an optimal holding period for real estate.","theory","Optimal holding period increases with transaction costs and marketing-period uncertainty.","Relates holding cost and illiquidity to timing decisions; WP19 treats the holding cost as the seller's urgency type.","Partial equilibrium; no market feedback.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 15 | +"diamond1982aggregate","Diamond, Peter A.","1982","Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","90(5): 881-894","https://doi.org/10.1086/261099","Trading externalities in a search economy produce multiple equilibria and inefficiently low activity.","theory","Thick-market externalities can sustain low-activity equilibria; aggregate demand management can be welfare-improving.","Origin of the matching externalities WP19 invokes when matching efficiency falls; WP19 keeps a unique stationary equilibrium under stated conditions.","No housing, prices by bargaining absent, no heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 16 | +"diaz2013house","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén","2013","House Prices, Sales, And Time On The Market: A Search-Theoretic Framework","International Economic Review","54(3): 837-872","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12019","Random matching with Nash bargaining and endogenous entry; aggregate demand/supply shocks propagate through vacancies, sales and time on market.","theory","Search frictions reproduce positive price-sales and negative price-TOM comovement; trading delays amplify price volatility and propagate shocks.","WP19 shares the matching-function, bargaining and free-entry architecture; it adds urgency heterogeneity, financing contingency and a selection-corrected index, and studies non-fundamental shocks.","Representative seller; no cross-sectional price dispersion from urgency; shocks are to fundamentals rather than to matching efficiency or buyer qualification.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 17 | +"diaz2024housing","Díaz, Antonia and Jerez, Belén and Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo","2024","Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search","The Economic Journal","134(657): 220-270","https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead054","Competitive search with credit constraints: wealthier, risk-averse buyers pay more to transact faster; block recursivity via intermediaries.","theory","Credit availability raises long-run prices and debt more than a Walrasian model, especially with inelastic supply.","Links buyers' financial position to transaction speed and price, the mirror image of WP19's cash discount on the seller side.","No seller urgency distribution, no pending-approval stage, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 18 | +"duffie2005over","Duffie, Darrell and Garleanu, Nicolae and Pedersen, Lasse Heje","2005","Over-the-Counter Markets","Econometrica","73(6): 1815-1847","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x","Search and bargaining in OTC asset markets; prices depend on search intensity and bargaining power through outside options.","theory","Bid-ask spreads and liquidity premia are decreasing in search intensity and depend on bargaining power; marketmakers' role derived.","Finance analogue of WP19's endogenous liquidity discount: price departs from the frictionless value because of search and bargaining.","Homogeneous asset units, no housing-specific match value or financing stage.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 19 | +"eerola2018borrowing","Eerola, Essi and Määttänen, Niku","2018","Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity","Review of Economic Dynamics","27: 184-204","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003","Matching plus credit frictions with risk-averse households; tighter borrowing constraints change who can buy and bargain.","theory","Moderate tightening of borrowing constraints substantially increases time on market and idiosyncratic price dispersion.","Very close to WP19's qualification channel: credit tightening raises TOM and dispersion; WP19 adds explicit seller urgency types and a pending-approval stage with cash buyers.","No cash discount, no decomposition of dispersion into urgency vs buyer wealth, no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 20 | +"fisher2003controlling","Fisher, Jeffrey and Gatzlaff, Dean and Geltner, David and Haurin, Donald","2003","Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices","Real Estate Economics","31(2): 269-303","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00066","Constant-liquidity value concept: transaction indices embed time-varying ease of sale; procyclical volume.","empirical","Constant-liquidity indices lead transaction and appraisal indices and show greater amplitude.","Closest antecedent to WP19's dynamic selection bias proposition; WP19 derives the sign of the bias from heterogeneous hazard elasticities (both/theory-informed econometrics). | B: Operationalises WP19's distinction between a liquidity-adjusted price and the observed transaction index","No structural model of seller heterogeneity; residential application and financing absent.","high","crossref+doi","A+B" | |
| 21 | +"gabrovski2019beveridge","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2019","The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market","Journal of Economic Theory","181: 361-381","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003","Free entry of both buyers and sellers in a housing search model generates an upward-sloping Beveridge curve.","theory","Baseline housing search models imply a downward-sloping Beveridge curve; two-sided entry restores the positive vacancy-buyer correlation in data.","WP19 uses free entry of buyers only (listing inflow exogenous); this paper warns that seller entry can reverse tightness comparative statics.","No urgency heterogeneity, financing or index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 22 | +"gabrovski2021search","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2021","Search and credit frictions in the housing market","European Economic Review","134: 103699","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699","Interaction of search and credit frictions: credit conditions shift buyer entry and liquidity, with multiple equilibria.","theory","Credit shocks affect mortgage debt and liquidity more than prices; combined frictions produce multiple equilibria.","Closest to WP19's financing extension: both route credit into buyer arrival/qualification; WP19 models an explicit pending-approval stage and the cash discount.","No cash-versus-mortgage buyers, no seller urgency distribution, no selection correction.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 23 | +"gabrovski2025note","Gabrovski, Miroslav and Ortego-Marti, Victor","2025","A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions","Macroeconomic Dynamics","29","https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100525100692","Congestion and participation externalities with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers; equilibrium inefficient even under Hosios condition.","theory","With two-sided entry the Hosios-Mortensen-Pissarides condition no longer delivers efficiency in the housing market; externalities quantified for the US.","Direct benchmark for WP19's welfare/Hosios proposition; WP19 has one-sided (buyer) entry, so the standard Hosios logic applies but urgency heterogeneity adds a composition wedge.","No seller heterogeneity in holding cost and no financing stage in the welfare analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 24 | +"garriga2020mortgage","Garriga, Carlos and Hedlund, Aaron","2020","Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession","American Economic Review","110(6): 1603-1634","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170772","Endogenously illiquid housing from search frictions plus long-term defaultable mortgages transmit the bust to consumption.","structural","Deterioration in house prices and liquidity, transmitted via balance sheets, explains aggregate and cross-sectional patterns of the Great Recession.","Establishes that housing liquidity is a distinct state variable in macro-housing models; WP19 provides the microfoundation of the liquidity discount they embed.","No cash discount, no urgency dispersion or index-selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 25 | +"genesove2012search","Genesove, David and Han, Lu","2012","Search and matching in the housing market","Journal of Urban Economics","72(1): 31-45","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002","Search intensity and matching in a housing market with buyers and sellers; tests of increasing returns in matching and strategic search behaviour.","empirical","Evidence on the matching technology and on buyer search behaviour consistent with search-theoretic predictions (both/empirical with theory motivation).","Informs WP19's assumption of a CRS matching function and the interpretation of theta; WP19 does not estimate the matching function. | B: Direct calibration target for WP19's matching elasticity and tightness response; stronger response to demand growth than levels","Does not model seller urgency, financing or price discounts.","high","crossref+doi","A+B" | |
| 26 | +"glower1998motivation","Glower, Michel and Haurin, Donald R. and Hendershott, Patric H.","1998","Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation","Real Estate Economics","26(4): 719-740","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00763","Seller motivation (planned moving date) shifts reservation price and selling time.","empirical","Motivated sellers sell faster and at lower prices; motivation affects sale price but not list-price markup; models should allow heterogeneous sellers.","Empirical motivation for WP19's heterogeneous carrying cost; WP19 supplies the theory they call for (also relevant to Part B). | B: Closest empirical counterpart to WP19's carrying-cost heterogeneity: urgency raises hazard and lowers price; WP19 formalises and adds market-level feedback","No formal equilibrium model, no index-selection or financing analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A+B" | |
| 27 | +"guren2018house","Guren, Adam M.","2018","House Price Momentum and Strategic Complementarity","Journal of Political Economy","126(3): 1172-1218","https://doi.org/10.1086/697207","Concave demand in relative list price generates strategic complementarity among sellers, amplifying momentum.","structural","Sellers adjust prices gradually toward the average; concave demand amplifies price momentum two- to threefold.","Both link the sale hazard to the seller's price; WP19 derives the hazard from match-value acceptance under log-concavity rather than estimated demand curvature.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; momentum rather than stationary dispersion and selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 28 | +"guren2020foreclosures","Guren, Adam M and McQuade, Timothy J","2020","How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?","The Review of Economic Studies","87(3): 1331-1364","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa001","Foreclosures freeze the non-foreclosure market: choosier buyers, ruined credit and lender losses create price-default spirals.","structural","Foreclosure amplification accounts for a large share of the non-distressed price decline; principal reduction is more effective than payment reduction.","Distressed sellers are an extreme urgency type; WP19 generalises urgency to a continuum and derives the composition effect on observed prices.","No explicit cash/mortgage stage; selection in observed indices not the focus.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 29 | +"han2015microstructure","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2015","The Microstructure of Housing Markets","Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics","vol. 5: 813-886","https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2","Survey of search (one-sided, random, directed), bargaining and auctions, and brokerage in housing markets.","survey","Organises the microstructure literature and identifies open questions on matching, bargaining and intermediaries.","WP19's positioning follows this taxonomy (random matching plus Nash bargaining with posted-price robustness).","Identifies but does not resolve the interaction of seller heterogeneity, financing and observed price indices.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)","A" | |
| 30 | +"han2024cash","Han, Lu and Hong, Seung-Hyun","2024","Cash is king? Understanding financing risk in housing markets","Review of Finance","28(6): 2083-2118","https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae025","Financing risk: a mortgage contingency may fail, returning the house to the market; cash offers avoid this risk.","empirical","Cash offers close 29% faster and carry a 2-3.9% discount; closing risk alone is insufficient, the risk of failing to resell is key (both/empirical with calibrated model).","WP19's pending-approval stage with success probability phi and relisting is the formal version of their mechanism; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness feedback. | B: Nearly identical mechanism to WP19's financing contingency and relisting; WP19 adds heterogeneous urgency and general-equilibrium tightness","No analytical propositions on dispersion or index selection; no urgency heterogeneity.","high","crossref+doi","A+B" | |
| 31 | +"head2012housing","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw","2012","Housing Liquidity, Mobility, and the Labour Market","The Review of Economic Studies","79(4): 1559-1589","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds004","Homeowners' acceptance of out-of-town jobs depends on how fast they can sell; housing liquidity links labour and housing search.","theory","Housing illiquidity lowers mobility of owners relative to renters; the aggregate unemployment effect is small except in high-unemployment states.","Introduces 'liquidity as time to sell' as a state variable for owners, which WP19 adopts, but WP19 does not model labour markets.","No seller urgency distribution or financing; liquidity measured by selling speed only, not by a price discount.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 32 | +"head2014search","Head, Allen and Lloyd-Ellis, Huw and Sun, Hongfei","2014","Search, Liquidity, and the Dynamics of House Prices and Construction","American Economic Review","104(4): 1172-1210","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1172","City-level search with construction and buyer entry; variation in time to sell induces serially correlated price growth.","theory","Search plus endogenous construction and entry explains momentum in house prices and the joint dynamics of sales, prices and population after income shocks.","Free entry of buyers and the role of time to sell in prices are shared; WP19 is a local stationary model focused on microstructure rather than dynamics with construction.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing; the liquidity concept is aggregate time to sell rather than a decomposed discount.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 33 | +"head2023default","Head, Allen and Sun, Hongfei and Zhou, Chenggang","2023","Indebted sellers, liquidity and mortgage standards","European Economic Review","151: 104321","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104321","Indebted sellers set higher asking prices and take longer to sell; asking prices and time-to-sell determine liquidity and default risk.","structural","Higher LTV sellers ask more and sell slower; policies reducing default can loosen lending standards and lower welfare.","Debt-driven heterogeneity in reservation prices is the mirror of WP19's holding-cost heterogeneity: debt lowers urgency to accept, carrying cost raises it.","No cash/mortgage buyer contingency, no selection correction of indices.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 34 | +"hedlund2016cyclical","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing, debt, and foreclosures","Quantitative Economics","7(1): 289-328","https://doi.org/10.3982/qe483","Liquidity spirals from search frictions and endogenous credit constraints; longer selling times raise foreclosure risk and tighten credit.","structural","Search-based housing illiquidity with equilibrium default matches cyclical housing and mortgage dynamics; full-recourse reform reduces foreclosures.","Dynamic macro analogue of WP19's liquidity shock propagation; WP19 is stationary and analytical with explicit hazard and discount decompositions.","No urgency heterogeneity among sellers beyond debt; no selection-corrected index.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 35 | +"hedlund2016illiquidity","Hedlund, Aaron","2016","Illiquidity and its discontents: Trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market","Journal of Monetary Economics","83: 1-13","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005","Search frictions make housing illiquid; trading delays interact with mortgage default to produce foreclosures.","theory","Trading delays raise foreclosure risk and endogenously tighten credit; illiquidity amplifies downturns.","Shares endogenous illiquidity from search and its credit feedback; WP19 isolates the microstructure and adds a pending-financing stage and urgency.","No cash/mortgage buyer distinction, no price dispersion, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 36 | +"horowitz1992role","Horowitz, Joel L.","1992","The role of the list price in housing markets: Theory and an econometric model","Journal of Applied Econometrics","7(2): 115-129","https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.3950070202","List price is a ceiling distinct from the reservation price; sellers optimally hold list prices even when unsold for long periods.","theory","Sale prices fall below but not above list; structural model predicts sale and reservation prices and explains sticky list prices.","Reservation price as the operative state variable, as in WP19; WP19 derives it from carrying cost and tightness.","No urgency heterogeneity or equilibrium feedback.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 37 | +"hosios1990efficiency","Hosios, Arthur J.","1990","On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","57(2): 279-298","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297382","Efficiency of search equilibria requires bargaining shares to equal matching elasticities.","theory","Hosios condition: Nash bargaining power equal to the elasticity of matching w.r.t. the agent's side internalises congestion externalities.","WP19's welfare proposition uses the Hosios condition and shows how urgency heterogeneity creates a composition wedge.","Homogeneous agents; no financing stage or price-index issues.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A" | |
| 38 | +"krainer2001theory","Krainer, John","2001","A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets","Journal of Urban Economics","49(1): 32-53","https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.2000.2180","Buyers draw idiosyncratic match values; sellers set reservation prices anticipating future aggregate states; liquidity (time on market) varies with expected housing-service values.","theory","Sellers rationally hold out in downturns when expected future states improve, so time on market rises while prices adjust sluggishly: endogenous liquidity co-moves with prices.","WP19 uses the same idiosyncratic match-value draw and reservation logic and the definition of liquidity through expected selling time; WP19 differs by holding fundamentals fixed and shocking matching efficiency/qualification instead.","Homogeneous sellers; the liquidity shock is itself a shock to future dividends, so it cannot separate a pure liquidity shock from a fundamental shock, which is WP19's central question.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 39 | +"krainer2002equilibrium","Krainer, John and LeRoy, Stephen F.","2002","Equilibrium valuation of illiquid assets","Economic Theory","19(2): 223-242","https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004214","Illiquid asset valued by an owner who can only sell when a stochastic buyer arrives; equilibrium price reflects expected search delay and the owner-specific dividend.","theory","Equilibrium valuation of an illiquid asset: the price discount relative to a liquid benchmark depends on arrival intensity and the cross-section of dividends.","Provides the cleanest frictionless-benchmark comparison that WP19 formalises as D=(p*-p)/p*; WP19 endogenises the arrival rate through tightness and makes the discount depend on seller urgency.","Exogenous arrival intensity, no tightness, no bargaining-vs-selection decomposition and no implications for observed hazard distributions.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 40 | +"lagos2009liquidity","Lagos, Ricardo and Rocheteau, Guillaume","2009","Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions","Econometrica","77(2): 403-426","https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7250","Unrestricted asset holdings in an OTC search model; trading frictions shape asset demands, volume, spreads and delays.","theory","Investors offset frictions by adjusting positions; frictions affect liquidity measures and asset prices through this margin.","Clarifies what a liquidity premium means in search markets; WP19's indivisible housing unit removes the holdings margin and emphasises seller urgency instead.","Divisible assets; no housing.","high","crossref+doi; authors from https://ideas.repec.org (evidence file)","A" | |
| 41 | +"leung2017flipping","Leung, Charles Ka Yui and Tse, Chung-Yi","2017","Flipping in the housing market","Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control","76: 232-263","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2017.01.003","Arbitrage middlemen (flippers) enter a housing search model; multiple equilibria in turnover, vacancy and prices.","theory","Flipping arises in sluggish and tight markets; it is socially useful in illiquid markets and wasteful in liquid ones.","Flippers act as liquidity providers to urgent sellers, a role WP19 attributes to cash buyers; both find liquidity provision changes prices and turnover.","No explicit seller urgency distribution or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 42 | +"lin2007illiquidity","Lin, Zhenguo and Vandell, Kerry D.","2007","Illiquidity and Pricing Biases in the Real Estate Market","Real Estate Economics","35(3): 291-330","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00191.x","Uncertain marketing period and time to sale bias transaction-based return and risk estimates that assume immediate execution.","theory","Estimated returns are biased upward and risks downward when marketing-period uncertainty is ignored; biases can be large.","Shares the view that transaction-price measures understate illiquidity; WP19 derives the bias from equilibrium selection on seller urgency.","No equilibrium pricing or hazards; no urgency heterogeneity; no financing.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 43 | +"lin2008real","Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2008","Real Estate Returns and Risk with Heterogeneous Investors","Real Estate Economics","36(4): 753-776","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00229.x","Sellers with different degrees of financial distress face different TOM risk and return distributions.","theory","Return and risk are investor-specific; ignoring TOM uncertainty and financial circumstances understates risk.","Explicitly ties seller financial distress to marketing-period risk and realised prices, close to WP19's urgency gradient but without equilibrium.","No equilibrium tightness, no bargaining, no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 44 | +"lippman1976economics","Lippman, Steven A. and McCall, John J.","1976","The Economics Of Job Search: A Survey","Economic Inquiry","14(2): 155-189","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x","Sequential search with reservation values; comparative statics of the reservation value in offer distribution and search costs.","survey","Reservation-value characterisation of optimal stopping; higher search costs lower the reservation value.","WP19's result that the reservation price decreases in holding cost c is a direct application of this classical comparative static.","Partial equilibrium; no two-sided market.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 45 | +"maury2014search","Maury, Tristan-Pierre and Tripier, Fabien","2014","Search strategies on the housing market and their implications on price dispersion","Journal of Housing Economics","26: 55-80","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2014.09.001","Buyers' choice of search strategy generates equilibrium price dispersion in a housing market.","theory","Heterogeneous search strategies produce price dispersion for identical houses; dispersion responds to search costs.","Dispersion from buyer-side heterogeneity complements WP19's dispersion from seller urgency.","No seller urgency, financing or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 46 | +"merlo2015home","Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François and Rust, John","2015","The Home Selling Problem: Theory And Evidence","International Economic Review","56(2): 457-484","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12111","Single seller's optimal stopping with list-price menu costs and stochastic offer arrivals.","structural","Tiny menu costs rationalise sticky list prices; the model fits list-price and sale dynamics for English properties.","Partial-equilibrium seller problem that WP19 embeds in a market equilibrium; both treat the sale as optimal stopping with offer arrivals.","No equilibrium feedback on arrival rates, no urgency cross-section or selection analysis.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 47 | +"moen1997competitive","Moen, Espen R.","1997","Competitive Search Equilibrium","Journal of Political Economy","105(2): 385-411","https://doi.org/10.1086/262077","Competitive (directed) search: posted terms direct searchers; equilibrium is constrained efficient.","theory","Competitive search equilibrium decentralises the Hosios condition; submarkets price time to trade.","WP19's posted-price robustness check uses this benchmark.","No seller urgency continuum with private information in the housing sense; no financing.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 48 | +"moen2021buying","Moen, Espen R and Nenov, Plamen T and Sniekers, Florian","2021","Buying First or Selling First in Housing Markets","Journal of the European Economic Association","19(1): 38-81","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz069","Moving owners choose to buy first or sell first; strategic complementarity in that choice generates multiple steady states.","theory","Buy-first incentives congest the buyer side and raise the buyer-seller ratio, producing multiplicity and large fluctuations consistent with housing cycles.","Both make tightness endogenous through participation decisions; WP19 keeps a single seller population and studies urgency within it.","No urgency distribution, financing contingency or price-index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 49 | +"mortensen1994job","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1994","Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment","The Review of Economic Studies","61(3): 397-415","https://doi.org/10.2307/2297896","Matching function with free entry of vacancies and Nash wage bargaining; endogenous job destruction.","theory","Canonical DMP equilibrium: tightness pinned by free entry; surplus split by Nash bargaining; comparative statics of shocks on flows.","WP19's free-entry condition for buyers and Nash split are direct transplants; sellers play the role of vacancies.","Labour market; no heterogeneous holding costs of the posting side or financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 50 | +"mortensen1999new","Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A.","1999","Chapter 39 New developments in models of search in the labor market","Handbook of Labor Economics","vol. 3B: 2567-2627","https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30025-0","Survey of search and matching models in labour markets including endogenous destruction and efficiency.","survey","Summarises the DMP class and its comparative statics.","Reference for WP19's standard results that are not new.","Labour framing.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 51 | +"nash1950bargaining","Nash, John F.","1950","The Bargaining Problem","Econometrica","18(2): 155-162","https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266","Axiomatic bargaining solution maximising the product of surpluses.","theory","The Nash solution is the unique split satisfying the stated axioms.","WP19's baseline price-setting rule.","No frictions or dynamics.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A" | |
| 52 | +"ngai2014hot","Ngai, L. Rachel and Tenreyro, Silvana","2014","Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market","American Economic Review","104(12): 3991-4026","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3991","Thick-market externality in match quality: more participants raise expected match quality, raising willingness to pay and transaction rates.","theory","Small deterministic seasonal drivers are amplified into large seasonal swings in prices and volumes through thick-market effects.","Both models let matching efficiency affect prices and volume with unchanged housing-service values; WP19 shocks efficiency A directly and studies seller urgency rather than seasonality.","Homogeneous sellers; no financing stage; no selection bias in indices.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 53 | +"ngai2020decision","Ngai, L Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D","2020","The Decision to Move House and Aggregate Housing-Market Dynamics","Journal of the European Economic Association","18(5): 2487-2531","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa001","Moving is an investment in match quality; the decision to list (inflows) rather than selling speed drives transactions.","theory","Transactions are driven mainly by listings; a model with endogenous moving explains the 1995-2003 boom and has welfare implications through mismatch.","Shares search-and-matching with idiosyncratic match quality; WP19 keeps listing inflow exogenous and focuses on hazards and prices conditional on listing.","No urgency heterogeneity, no financing, no observed-index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 54 | +"ngai2024ins","Ngai, L. Rachel and Sheedy, Kevin D.","2024","The Ins And Outs Of Selling Houses: Understanding Housing-Market Volatility","International Economic Review","65(3): 1415-1440","https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12693","Inflows (new listings) and outflows (sales) jointly determine housing-market volatility; correlations with inventory depend on shock source and persistence.","theory","Both listing inflows and sales outflows matter quantitatively; signs of inventory correlations are time-varying and depend on the nature of shocks.","WP19's exogenous withdrawal rate delta and matching-efficiency shocks are the stationary analogue of their outflow margins; WP19 adds urgency and financing.","No seller heterogeneity in holding costs, no cash/mortgage distinction, no composition correction of price indices.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 55 | +"novymarx2009hot","Novy-Marx, Robert","2009","Hot and Cold Markets","Real Estate Economics","37(1): 1-22","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x","Feedback between buyer-seller ratio and bargaining positions amplifies demand shocks: sellers sell faster, inventory falls, tightness rises further.","theory","Equilibrium tightness, expected time to sale and prices are highly sensitive to fundamentals because of endogenous stock feedback.","WP19 shares the tightness-feedback mechanism through free entry; it isolates shocks to matching efficiency and qualification and adds urgency heterogeneity.","Homogeneous agents; no decomposition of the price response into bargaining and composition; no financing.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 56 | +"ortalomagne2006housing","Ortalo-Magné, François and Rady, Sven","2006","Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints","Review of Economic Studies","73(2): 459-485","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.383_1.x","Life-cycle credit constraints and the property ladder transmit income shocks into price overshooting and volume dynamics.","theory","Credit-constrained young buyers make prices overreact to income shocks; prices and transactions comove without search frictions.","Provides the frictionless-with-credit benchmark; WP19 isolates the search channel holding credit constant except through qualification.","No search, no time on market, no dispersion.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 57 | +"petrongolo2001looking","Petrongolo, Barbara and Pissarides, Christopher A","2001","Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function","Journal of Economic Literature","39(2): 390-431","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.390","Survey of the aggregate matching function: microfoundations, CRS Cobb-Douglas estimates, aggregation issues.","survey","CRS Cobb-Douglas matching function fits many markets; microfoundations remain debated.","Justifies WP19's CRS matching assumption and the interpretation of A as matching efficiency.","Labour market focus.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 58 | +"piazzesi2009momentum","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin","2009","Momentum Traders in the Housing Market: Survey Evidence and a Search Model","American Economic Review","99(2): 406-411","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.406","Survey-based heterogeneity in beliefs; a search model where a small share of momentum traders can move prices because trading is frictional.","theory","In a search market a minority of optimistic traders raises transaction prices substantially because they are overrepresented among marginal buyers.","Illustrates how composition of transacting agents, not fundamentals, moves transaction prices; WP19 formalises an analogous composition effect for sellers after a liquidity shock.","Belief heterogeneity on the buyer side only; no seller urgency, hazards or selection correction.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 59 | +"piazzesi2020segmented","Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin and Stroebel, Johannes","2020","Segmented Housing Search","American Economic Review","110(3): 720-759","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141772","Heterogeneous clienteles search across overlapping market segments; broad searchers flow toward high-inventory segments.","structural","Within-city inventory and search activity covary positively because broad searchers spread localized shocks across segments.","WP19 is a single-segment local market; segmentation is a natural extension and the paper's treatment of inventory and search intensity informs theta. | B: WP19's single-segment matching abstracts from segment spillovers that dampen local liquidity shocks","No seller urgency distribution, financing contingency or liquidity-discount decomposition.","high","crossref+doi","A+B" | |
| 60 | +"pissarides2000equilibrium","Pissarides, Christopher A.","2000","Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd edition","MIT Press (book)","Cambridge, MA","https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html","Textbook treatment of matching, free entry, Nash bargaining, efficiency and endogenous destruction.","theory","Standard reference for equilibrium search with matching functions and the Hosios efficiency condition.","Source of WP19's modelling conventions (CRS matching, tightness, Bellman equations in continuous time).","Labour framing; no asset-price discount or transaction-index implications.","medium","publisher page https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262161877.html","A" | |
| 61 | +"reher2024mortgage","Reher, Michael and Valkanov, Rossen","2024","The Mortgage-Cash Premium Puzzle","The Journal of Finance","79(5): 3149-3201","https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13373","Mortgage transaction frictions make sellers demand a premium from mortgaged buyers; representative-seller model yields a small premium.","empirical","Mortgaged buyers pay about 11% more than cash buyers; a rational model implies 3%; heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half the gap.","WP19's cash discount = bargaining term + selection term speaks directly to their puzzle by adding seller urgency heterogeneity (both/empirical with model). | B: WP19's financing-contingency block generates an endogenous cash discount; Reher-Valkanov's 'puzzle' is the gap WP19's urgency heterogeneity should narrow","No equilibrium tightness feedback or hazard-based selection decomposition.","high","crossref+doi","A+B" | |
| 62 | +"rocheteau2011liquidity","Rocheteau, Guillaume and Weill, Pierre-Olivier","2011","Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets","Journal of Money, Credit and Banking","43(s2): 261-282","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00435.x","Review of frictional asset markets in finance and monetary theory with a simple search model.","survey","Unifies the literature on liquidity in search markets, including housing and credit market dynamics.","Places WP19 in the search-based liquidity literature.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 63 | +"rogerson2005search","Rogerson, Richard and Shimer, Robert and Wright, Randall","2005","Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey","Journal of Economic Literature","43(4): 959-988","https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362014","Survey of search-theoretic models: reservation strategies, matching, bargaining, directed search, wage dispersion.","survey","Unifies partial and equilibrium search; explains coexistence of unmatched agents on both sides and dispersion.","Reference for WP19's reservation-value and dispersion results that are standard.","Labour framing; no financing contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 64 | +"rubinstein1982perfect","Rubinstein, Ariel","1982","Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model","Econometrica","50(1): 97-109","https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531","Alternating-offers bargaining; impatience determines the unique perfect-equilibrium split.","theory","Unique subgame-perfect division; the more patient party obtains more; limit approximates Nash bargaining.","Justifies WP19's Nash split with bargaining weight beta and links seller urgency (impatience) to lower bargained prices.","No market equilibrium or search.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A" | |
| 65 | +"sagi2021asset","Sagi, Jacob S","2021","Asset-Level Risk and Return in Real Estate Investments","The Review of Financial Studies","34(8): 3647-3694","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa122","Search-based asset pricing with transaction risk explains why idiosyncratic real estate returns do not scale with holding period.","structural","Equilibrium search model fits commercial real estate transactions; transaction risk is crucial for price dynamics.","Shares search-generated idiosyncratic price dispersion; WP19 focuses on residential sellers' urgency and financing.","No seller urgency types or cash/mortgage contingency.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 66 | +"salant1991sale","Salant, Stephen W.","1991","For sale by owner: When to use a broker and how to price the house","The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","4(2): 157-173","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00173122","Finite-horizon seller with a deadline chooses between selling by owner and using a broker and sets a declining price path.","theory","A seller facing a moving deadline optimally lowers price over time and may switch to a broker; urgency is a deadline.","Early treatment of seller urgency (deadline) and declining reservation prices; WP19 models urgency as a flow cost in stationary equilibrium.","No market equilibrium, no dispersion or index-selection.","high","crossref+doi (Crossref record gives first page only; end page from journal table of contents, not Crossref-verified)","A" | |
| 67 | +"shimer2005cyclical","Shimer, Robert","2005","The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies","American Economic Review","95(1): 25-49","https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828572","Standard matching model cannot generate observed volatility of tightness from productivity shocks.","theory","Vacancy-unemployment ratio is far more volatile than productivity; the textbook model lacks amplification.","Benchmark for elasticities of tightness to shocks used in WP19's numerical calibration discussion.","Labour market.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 68 | +"stein1995prices","Stein, Jeremy C.","1995","Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A Model with Down-Payment Effects","The Quarterly Journal of Economics","110(2): 379-406","https://doi.org/10.2307/2118444","Down-payment constraints make repeat buyers' demand depend on equity; price declines reduce volume and amplify themselves.","theory","Price-volume comovement and amplification arise from down-payment constraints without search frictions.","Alternative, non-search channel for volume-price comovement; WP19 shares the role of financing in sellers' ability to transact but routes it through buyer qualification.","No search frictions, hazards or price dispersion.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 69 | +"taylor1999time","Taylor, Curtis R.","1999","Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality","Review of Economic Studies","66(3): 555-578","https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00098","Time on the market signals unobserved quality when inspections are informative, creating stigma for stale listings.","theory","Long TOM lowers buyers' beliefs and reduces subsequent sale probability and price.","Competing explanation of declining hazard with duration; WP19 obtains duration dependence from urgency composition instead.","No urgency heterogeneity or financing.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 70 | +"wheaton1990vacancy","Wheaton, William C.","1990","Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model","Journal of Political Economy","98(6): 1270-1292","https://doi.org/10.1086/261734","Owner-occupiers mismatched with their house search while holding two units; vacancy and matching rate pin down reservation prices and equilibrium price via Nash bargaining.","theory","First housing matching model: higher vacancy lowers prices; price depends on expected time to sell and the cost of carrying two units.","WP19 keeps the stationary matching structure and carrying cost of unsold housing, but makes carrying cost heterogeneous across sellers and derives the hazard and discount jointly with free entry of buyers.","No seller heterogeneity in urgency, no financing contingency, no selection correction for transaction indices; liquidity is vacancy-driven rather than a defined discount relative to a frictionless price.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 71 | +"williams1995pricing","Williams, Joseph T.","1995","Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search","Review of Financial Studies","8(1): 55-90","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/8.1.55","Owners of heterogeneous real assets search costly for buyers; the asset price is an optimal-stopping value under Poisson arrivals and dispersed offers.","theory","Equilibrium prices of real assets embed a search discount; time to sale and prices respond to arrival rates and the dispersion of buyer offers.","Shares the Poisson-arrival/optimal-stopping core and the idea of a price below the frictionless value; WP19 adds two-sided tightness, free entry, urgency heterogeneity and a financing stage.","Partial-equilibrium arrival rate; no matching function or tightness feedback, no composition effects in observed transaction prices.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 72 | +"wright2021directed","Wright, Randall and Kircher, Philipp and Julien, Benoît and Guerrieri, Veronica","2021","Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour","Journal of Economic Literature","59(1): 90-148","https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191505","Survey of directed and competitive search: efficiency, private information, sorting with heterogeneity.","survey","Directed search prices goods plus time to obtain them; equilibria are often efficient; technical results collected.","Guides WP19's posted-price robustness section and the efficiency comparison.","Survey.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 73 | +"yavas1992simple","Yavaş, Abdullah","1992","A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets","Real Estate Economics","20(4): 533-548","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00595","Buyers and sellers choose search intensities; price by Nash bargaining; brokers change incentives to search.","theory","Brokers reduce own search; price rises by less than the commission; the split depends on bargaining powers (half under Nash).","Nash bargaining over the match surplus with endogenous search intensity is a direct antecedent of WP19's bargaining block.","No seller urgency distribution, financing, liquidity shock or index selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 74 | +"yavas1995strategic","Yavas, Abdullah and Yang, Shiawee","1995","The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence","Real Estate Economics","23(3): 347-368","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00668","Listing price trades off arrival rate (TOM) against bargained transaction price.","theory","Theory and evidence that higher list prices lengthen TOM and raise sale price; optimal list price balances the two.","WP19's reservation-price/hazard trade-off is the bargaining analogue of the list-price/TOM trade-off here.","Homogeneous seller urgency; no financing; no index-selection.","high","crossref+doi","A" | |
| 75 | +"zuehlke1987duration","Zuehlke, Thomas W.","1987","Duration Dependence in the Housing Market","Review of Economics and Statistics","69(4), 701-704","https://doi.org/10.2307/1935966","Sale hazard as a function of elapsed marketing time; vacancy as proxy for seller carrying cost/urgency","empirical; Weibull hazard on MLS listings (New Orleans, Tallahassee)","Early parametric duration evidence; vacant houses display stronger (positive) duration dependence than occupied ones [magnitudes not abstract-verified]","WP19 derives observed duration dependence from unobserved urgency heterogeneity; Zuehlke's vacancy split is a direct empirical analogue of carrying-cost heterogeneity","No control for unobserved heterogeneity vs true duration dependence; no price outcome; small samples","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_zuehlke1987duration.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 76 | +"haurin1988duration","Haurin, Donald","1988","The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing","Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal)","16(4), 396-410","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00463","Optimal stopping: atypical houses face higher offer variance, so sellers wait longer","empirical; failure-time model on resale houses","Marketing time rises with house atypicality (offer dispersion), confirming reservation-price search behaviour by sellers","WP19's idiosyncratic match-value dispersion plays the role of Haurin's offer variance; WP19 adds seller urgency and tightness","Seller heterogeneity in holding costs ignored; no equilibrium tightness","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin1988duration.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 77 | +"springer1996motivation","Springer, Thomas M.","1996","Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","13(3), 237-254","https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00217393","Motivated/relocated/foreclosed/vacant sellers accept lower prices; list price is the main selling instrument","empirical; hedonic price and marketing-time equations (Arlington, Texas 1991-1993)","Eager/motivated, relocated, vacant and foreclosure sellers sell at lower prices; only foreclosures sell faster; lower list price speeds sale at the cost of price","Supports WP19's prediction that urgency lowers transaction price; mixed evidence on hazard is a caution for the hazard-urgency prediction","Motivation flags from listing remarks; endogeneity of TOM and price not fully addressed","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_springer1996motivation.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 78 | +"anglin2003tradeoff","Anglin, Paul M. and Rutherford, Ronald and Springer, Thomas M.","2003","The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","26(1), 95-111","https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021526332732","Higher list price (degree of overpricing) lengthens expected TOM; buyers infer information from price","empirical; hazard model of TOM with withdrawn listings (Arlington, Texas)","Higher list-price premium raises expected TOM, more strongly where list prices have low predicted variance; withdrawn homes have higher, more variable list prices","Price-TOM tradeoff is WP19's core comparative static; withdrawal selection matches WP19's listing-withdrawal margin","Reduced-form; no structural mapping to reservation prices or urgency","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2003tradeoff.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 79 | +"haurin2010listprices","Haurin, Donald R. and Haurin, Jessica L. and Nadauld, Taylor and Sanders, Anthony","2010","List Prices, Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets","Real Estate Economics","38(4), 659-685","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00279.x","List price trades off slower offer arrival against higher maximal offer; set jointly with reservation price","theory + empirical; numerical comparative statics and Columbus, Ohio data","Greater dispersion of buyer offers raises list-to-expected-sale ratio; atypical dwellings have higher list markups and longer TOM","WP19's posted-price robustness case; dispersion of match values driving markups and TOM","No seller urgency heterogeneity; no financing contingency","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_haurin2010listprices.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 80 | +"genesove1997equity","Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher J.","1997","Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market","American Economic Review","87(3), 255-269","https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v87y1997i3p255-69.html","Down-payment constraint raises high-LTV sellers' reservation prices: higher asking price, longer TOM, higher price if sold","empirical; Boston condominiums, early 1990s; list price, TOM hazard and sale price regressions","Owners with high loan-to-value ratios set higher asking prices, have longer expected time on market and obtain higher prices conditional on sale","Opposite sign to urgency: equity constraints raise effective reservation values; WP19 should allow carrying-cost distribution to include 'patient/locked' sellers","Owner-occupants only; cannot separate liquidity constraints from loss aversion (addressed in 2001 paper)","high","IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_genesove1997equity.evidence.txt)","B" | |
| 81 | +"genesove2001lossaversion","Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher","2001","Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market","Quarterly Journal of Economics","116(4), 1233-1260","https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265561","Sellers facing nominal losses set higher asking prices, sell at higher prices and with much lower hazard","empirical; Boston condominiums 1990s; asking price, sale price and hazard regressions","Sellers facing a prospective nominal loss set asking prices roughly 25-35% of the loss higher, achieve higher prices and sell much less often per period; effect about twice as large for owner-occupants as investors","Behavioural source of reservation-price heterogeneity and price-volume comovement; WP19 is rational but can nest reference-dependent carrying costs","No equilibrium feedback; identification relies on purchase-price proxy for reference point","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_genesove2001lossaversion.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 82 | +"levitt2008agents","Levitt, Steven D. and Syverson, Chad","2008","Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions","Review of Economics and Statistics","90(4), 599-611","https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.90.4.599","Agent incentives push clients to accept early low offers; agents' own homes wait longer for better offers","empirical; MLS data, agent-owned vs client-owned homes with controls","Agent-owned homes sell for about 3.7% more and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer; distortion larger when information asymmetry is greater","Quantifies the price gain from a longer optimal stopping horizon, i.e. the slope of the TOM-price tradeoff at the margin","Agency friction rather than seller carrying cost; no tightness variation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_levitt2008agents.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 83 | +"hendel2009fsbo","Hendel, Igal and Nevo, Aviv and Ortalo-Magné, François","2009","The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com","American Economic Review","99(5), 1878-1898","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1878","Platform choice sorts patient sellers to FSBO; buyer arrival rate differs across platforms","empirical; Madison, Wisconsin FSBO vs MLS sales, prices, TOM, sale probability","FSBO pre-commission prices are no lower, but FSBO has longer time to sell and lower probability of sale; patient sellers select into FSBO","Endogenous sorting by seller patience is exactly WP19's heterogeneous-urgency selection mechanism, here across platforms","Single market; network size effects not identified","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hendel2009fsbo.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 84 | +"knight2002listing","Knight, John R.","2002","Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects of Listing Price Changes","Real Estate Economics","30(2), 213-237","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00038","List-price revisions under demand uncertainty; initial overpricing is costly in time and money","empirical; probit for list-price changes plus price/TOM equations","Homes with high initial markups and vacant homes most likely to cut list price; large percentage list-price changes imply longer TOM and lower final prices","Supports WP19's reservation-price updating and vacancy (carrying cost) channel; stale-listing penalty","Missing revision data in most datasets; no equilibrium interpretation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_knight2002listing.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 85 | +"merlo2004bargaining","Merlo, Antonio and Ortalo-Magné, François","2004","Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England","Journal of Urban Economics","56(2), 192-216","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004","Full listing histories: list-price changes, offers, visits; strategic buyer-seller interaction","empirical; novel English transaction-history dataset; stylized facts","Documents timing and terms of agreement from listing to sale, every list-price change and offer; argues existing theories fit poorly and proposes a strategic framework","Micro facts on offers and revisions that WP19's bargaining-with-outside-option structure must match","Descriptive; no structural estimation of urgency or arrival rates","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_merlo2004bargaining.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 86 | +"carrillo2013heat","Carrillo, Paul E.","2013","To Sell or Not to Sell: Measuring the Heat of the Housing Market","Real Estate Economics","41(2), 310-346","https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12003","Seller bargaining power index from structural home-seller search model combining list price, sale price and TOM","structural; Washington DC transactions; mapping from hedonic/TOM reduced forms to structural parameters","Index of seller bargaining power tracks up- and downturns in appreciation and popular perceptions of market 'heat'","Shows WP19's objects (bargaining power, sale probability) are identifiable from listings data; WP19 adds urgency heterogeneity and financing","Homogeneous sellers; partial equilibrium","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2013heat.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 87 | +"carrillo2015tightness","Carrillo, Paul E. and de Wit, Eric R. and Larson, William","2015","Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands","Real Estate Economics","43(3), 609-651","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12082","Market tightness (sale probabilities, seller bargaining power) leads price appreciation","empirical; listings data, Netherlands and US regions; time-series forecasting","Current sale probabilities and bargaining-power index significantly reduce appreciation forecast errors and predict turning points","Supports WP19's claim that liquidity (hazard, tightness) moves before and separately from transaction prices","Reduced-form forecasting; no decomposition into selection vs bargaining","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2015tightness.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 88 | +"han2016askingprice","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2016","What is the role of the asking price for a house?","Journal of Urban Economics","93, 115-130","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.008","Asking price directs buyer search without being a ceiling or commitment","theory + empirical; survey data on buyer search and sale-at-list incidence","Mass of sales exactly at asking price; asking price steers buyer visits, more so for atypical houses and in weak-demand markets","Informs WP19's posted-price robustness: list price as a directing device rather than a ceiling","No welfare or urgency analysis","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2016askingprice.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 89 | +"han2014biddingwars","Han, Lu and Strange, William C.","2014","Bidding Wars for Houses","Real Estate Economics","42(1), 1-32","https://doi.org/10.1111/reec.12015","Above-list sales as a measure of tightness; list price not a ceiling in hot markets","empirical; time-series and cross-section of sales above list price","Bidding wars rose from a stable 3-4% of transactions to over 30% in some markets by 2005, fell in the bust but remained about twice historical levels","Regime where WP19's buyer-side competition dominates; tightness changes bargaining split","Descriptive; mechanism not structurally identified","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_han2014biddingwars.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 90 | +"jud1996brokerage","Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G. and Winkler, Daniel T.","1996","Time on the Market: The Impact of Residential Brokerage","Journal of Real Estate Research","12(3), 447-458","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1996.12090852","Duration model of TOM with brokerage, pricing strategy and duration dependence","empirical; duration model on MLS data","Positive duration dependence (sale probability rises with TOM); pricing-related strategies strongly affect TOM; agent/firm characteristics insignificant","Positive duration dependence contrasts with WP19's heterogeneity-induced negative dependence; useful discipline on the mixing distribution","No correction for unobserved heterogeneity; no price outcome","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1996brokerage.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 91 | +"huang2001withdrawal","Huang, Ju-Chin and Palmquist, Raymond B.","2001","Environmental Conditions, Reservation Prices, and Time on the Market for Housing","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","22(2-3), 203-219","https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007891430162","Joint estimation of seller reservation price and marketing duration; reservation price declines with elapsed time","empirical; structural duration/reservation-price estimator applied to highway noise","Noise lowers reservation and predicted sale prices but not TOM significantly; longer TOM is associated with lower reservation prices (sellers revise down)","Provides an estimator of the reservation price WP19 models; downward revision consistent with learning or rising carrying cost","Withdrawals treated as censoring; no urgency heterogeneity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_huang2001withdrawal.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 92 | +"campbell2011forced","Campbell, John Y. and Giglio, Stefano and Pathak, Parag","2011","Forced Sales and House Prices","American Economic Review","101(5), 2108-2131","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.2108","Forced sales (foreclosure, death, bankruptcy) sell at discounts; nearby foreclosures depress prices","empirical; all Massachusetts transactions over 20 years; hedonic with forced-sale indicators and spatial spillovers","Foreclosure discount averages about 27% of house value; a foreclosure within 0.05 miles lowers a house's price by about 1%; death and bankruptcy sales also discounted","Canonical magnitude for WP19's urgency-driven discount; WP19 explains why discount exceeds pure selection via bargaining under high carrying cost","Cannot fully separate quality deterioration from liquidity discount; no TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_campbell2011forced.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 93 | +"mayer1998auctions","Mayer, Christopher J.","1998","Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions","Real Estate Economics","26(1), 41-66","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00737","Auction trades immediate sale against expected waiting in a search market; discount larger in downturns","empirical; repeat-sales comparison of auction vs negotiated sales, Los Angeles and Dallas","Auction discounts 0-9% in the 1980s Los Angeles boom vs 9-21% in Dallas after the oil bust; consistent with discount rising when expected TOM is long","Cleanest early estimate of the price of immediacy and its dependence on market liquidity, central to WP19's state-dependent discount","Auctioned properties may differ in unobservables despite repeat-sales control","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mayer1998auctions.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 94 | +"harding2009contagion","Harding, John P. and Rosenblatt, Eric and Yao, Vincent W.","2009","The contagion effect of foreclosed properties","Journal of Urban Economics","66(3), 164-178","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2009.07.003","Nearby foreclosures lower sale prices via visual externality/neglect, growing through the distress process","empirical; repeat-sales with local trend and distance rings","Peak contagion discount roughly 1% per nearby foreclosed property, decaying quickly with distance, growing from distress onset to foreclosure sale then levelling off","Externality channel distinct from WP19's competition/selection channel; WP19 abstracts from neighbourhood spillovers","Cannot cleanly separate supply competition from disamenity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2009contagion.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 95 | +"anenberg2014foreclosures","Anenberg, Elliot and Kung, Edward","2014","Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures","American Economic Review","104(8), 2527-2551","https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2527","REO listings depress nearby prices through competition (supply) and, in dense low-price areas, disamenity","empirical; weekly listings data; timing of seller response to new REO listings","Sellers respond in the exact week an REO is listed; competition effects matter everywhere, disamenity only in high-density low-price neighbourhoods","Competition from urgent (REO) sellers lowering prices of non-urgent sellers is a market-level implication WP19 can generate through tightness","Local partial-equilibrium; no hazard estimates","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2014foreclosures.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 96 | +"mian2015foreclosures","Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir and Trebbi, Francesco","2015","Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy","Journal of Finance","70(6), 2587-2634","https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12310","Judicial-foreclosure laws as instrument: forced sales cause price declines and real effects","empirical; state-border discontinuity, IV, 2007-2013","Nonjudicial states were twice as likely to foreclose in 2007-2009; foreclosures caused large declines in house prices, residential investment and consumer demand","Macro-level evidence that an increase in the mass of urgent sellers moves prices without a fundamentals change, as in WP19's liquidity-shock proposition","Aggregate; no micro TOM or discount decomposition","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_mian2015foreclosures.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 97 | +"penningtoncross2006reo","Pennington-Cross, Anthony","2006","The Value of Foreclosed Property","Journal of Real Estate Research","28(2), 193-214","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2006.12091177","REO properties appreciate less than their metro area; gap depends on loan traits, legal regime, market conditions and marketing time","empirical; loan-level REO sales vs metro appreciation","Foreclosed properties appreciate below the area average; the gap varies with legal restrictions, housing-market conditions and marketing time","State-dependence of the forced-sale discount matches WP19's prediction that the liquidity discount widens in slow markets","Magnitudes depend on specification; condition of property unobserved","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_penningtoncross2006reo.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 98 | +"clauretie2009foreclosure","Clauretie, Terrence M. and Daneshvary, Nasser","2009","Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time","Real Estate Economics","37(1), 43-67","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00234.x","Foreclosure discount overstated when property condition and endogenous TOM are ignored","empirical; spatial hedonic with endogenous marketing time (Las Vegas)","Previous >20% foreclosure discounts are about one-third too high once condition, TOM-price relationship and spatial dependence are controlled","Highlights WP19's identification point: part of the observed discount is quality/selection, part is a genuine liquidity (urgency) discount","Single market; condition proxies imperfect","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clauretie2009foreclosure.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 99 | +"andersen2017firesales","Andersen, Steffen and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner","2017","Fire Sales and House Prices: Evidence from Estate Sales Due to Sudden Death","Management Science","63(1), 201-212","https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2292","Exogenous forced sales (sudden death) isolate supply-side urgency from demand shocks","empirical; Danish registry natural experiment","Forced estate sales carry fire-sale discounts that increase with urgency, poor market conditions and seller financial constraints; fire sales occur without demand shocks","Closest causal evidence for WP19's urgency-discount interaction with market liquidity; demand held fixed","Danish institutional setting; discount magnitudes not reported in abstract","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andersen2017firesales.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 100 | +"asabere1992cash","Asabere, Paul K. and Huffman, Forrest E. and Mehdian, Seyed","1992","The Price Effects of Cash versus Mortgage Transactions","Real Estate Economics (AREUEA Journal)","20(1), 141-154","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00576","All-cash transactions trade at a discount relative to typically financed sales","empirical; hedonic on comparable row homes","All-cash transactions associated with roughly a 13% price discount relative to market-typical financing","Earliest cash-discount magnitude; WP19 predicts a smaller equilibrium discount unless urgency is high, so the 13% invites a selection interpretation","Small, dated sample; buyer/seller selection uncontrolled","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_asabere1992cash.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 101 | +"jauregui2019fundingprice","Jauregui, Andres and Tidwell, Alan and Sah, Vivek","2019","Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating and Allocating House Transaction Funding Price Differentials","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","58(3), 366-407","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-018-9661-4","Price differentials across cash, conventional, FHA and VA funding reflect selection plus a financing premium","empirical; sample-selection and spatial corrections, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition","Selection and spatial bias detected; conventional sales have stronger characteristics than cash sales, FHA/VA weaker; unexplained component interpreted as a financing premium","Decomposition of observed cash differential into composition vs premium parallels WP19's selection-vs-bargaining decomposition","Magnitudes not in abstract; no time-to-close data","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jauregui2019fundingprice.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 102 | +"aroul2023cashdiscount","Aroul, Ramya R. and Hansz, J. Andrew","2023","The impact of cash financing on housing prices: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from a volatile United States market cycle","Journal of Property Research","40(1), 25-52","https://doi.org/10.1080/09599916.2022.2119878","Mortgage-contingency pricing effect measured as a cash discount that varies with market distress and property traits","theory + empirical; 12-year US cycle around 2008","Cash discounts are larger in distressed markets, at lower price levels and for smaller/poorer-condition improvements; no single rule of thumb","State-dependence of the cash discount is a WP19 prediction (discount widens as qualification risk and seller urgency rise)","No magnitudes in abstract; selection of cash buyers into distressed properties","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_aroul2023cashdiscount.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 103 | +"lin2025contingencies","Lin, Zhenguo and Seiler, Michael J. and Siebert, Ralph B. and Winkler, Daniel T.","2025","Selling price, time on the market, and contractual contingencies","Journal of Housing Economics","68, 102062","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102062","Contingency clauses lengthen TOM and reduce closing certainty; buyers compensate with price","empirical; Miami-Dade transactions (CESifo WP 9947 version: Gordon, Seiler, Siebert, Winkler 2022)","Contingency clauses relate to market conditions, TOM, list premiums and distressed sales; price premia range from -3.7% to +2.2% (-3.3% to +2.4% conditioning on TOM)","Direct evidence on WP19's contingency margin: contingent offers trade price for closing risk, sign depending on clause and market state","Clause types pooled in abstract; identification of contingency choice is endogenous","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_lin2025contingencies.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 104 | +"anenberg2019creditavailability","Anenberg, Elliot and Hizmo, Aurel and Kung, Edward and Molloy, Raven","2019","Measuring mortgage credit availability: A frontier estimation approach","Journal of Applied Econometrics","34(6), 865-882","https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2720","Loan frontier measures maximum obtainable mortgage; shifts in frontier proxy buyer qualification","empirical; stochastic frontier on originations 2001-2014","Credit expanded for all borrowers in the boom and contracted most for low-score borrowers; frontier variation across metros shows borrowing constraints mattered for the cycle","Provides an empirical counterpart to WP19's qualification probability phi and its cross-market variation","Frontier is an upper bound; approval delays and failures not measured","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anenberg2019creditavailability.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 105 | +"bhutta2021insurance","Bhutta, Neil and Ringo, Daniel","2021","The effect of interest rates on home buying: Evidence from a shock to mortgage insurance premiums","Journal of Monetary Economics","118, 195-211","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.10.001","Binding DTI thresholds make buyer qualification sensitive to small rate changes (extensive margin)","empirical; regression discontinuity around FHA premium cut","A surprise 50bp effective rate cut raised home buying among FHA-reliant households by 14% immediately, via DTI qualification thresholds","Quantifies how qualification (phi) responds to financing conditions, the input to WP19's buyer-arrival shock","Effect on prices and TOM not the focus","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bhutta2021insurance.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 106 | +"fuster2019technology","Fuster, Andreas and Plosser, Matthew and Schnabl, Philipp and Vickery, James","2019","The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending","Review of Financial Studies","32(5), 1854-1899","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz018","Technology shortens mortgage processing time without raising defaults","empirical; loan-level application and origination data 2010-2016","FinTech lenders grew from 2% to 8% of lending and process applications about 20% faster with no higher defaults; more elastic supply to demand shocks","Approval delay is a structural parameter in WP19's financing contingency; this gives its empirical scale and variability","Refinance-heavy; purchase-closing failures not studied","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fuster2019technology.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 107 | +"defusco2020leverage","DeFusco, Anthony A. and Johnson, Stephanie and Mondragon, John","2020","Regulating Household Leverage","Review of Economic Studies","87(2), 914-958","https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz040","Leverage regulation removes marginal borrowers (quantity) more than it raises price","empirical; discontinuity in Ability-to-Repay rule","Rates on affected loans rose 10-15bp but 15% of the affected market was eliminated and leverage reduced for another 20%; lenders exited the regulated segment","Credit tightening as a qualification shock reducing effective buyer arrival, a key WP19 counterfactual","Housing-market price/TOM consequences not traced","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_defusco2020leverage.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 108 | +"allen2019searchfrictions","Allen, Jason and Clark, Robert and Houde, Jean-François","2019","Search Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated-Price Markets","Journal of Political Economy","127(4), 1550-1598","https://doi.org/10.1086/701684","Search and negotiation frictions in the Canadian mortgage market generate dispersion and market power","structural; Canadian insured-mortgage contract data; search-and-bargaining model","Frictions cost about $12/month/consumer (50% search costs, 28% price discrimination, 22% inefficient matching); large banks' margins about 70% higher","Only verified Canadian structural evidence on housing-finance search frictions; shows the financing side itself is a negotiated search market","Mortgage pricing, not house transactions or TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_allen2019searchfrictions.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 109 | +"buchak2026ibuyers","Buchak, Greg and Matvos, Gregor and Piskorski, Tomasz and Seru, Amit","2026","Why Is Intermediating Houses So Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers","Journal of Political Economy","forthcoming (NBER WP 28252, 2020, rev. 2025)","https://doi.org/10.1086/742710","Dealers supply immediacy; speed trades off against valuation accuracy and adverse selection","empirical + structural search model with adverse selection; iBuyer transactions","iBuyers sell quickly and earn about a 5% spread; they intermediate only in liquid, easy-to-value markets; low underlying liquidity exacerbates adverse selection","Market price of immediacy (spread) is a benchmark for WP19's liquidity discount; adverse selection is a channel WP19 abstracts from","Recent, narrow set of markets","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_buchak2026ibuyers.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 110 | +"gatzlaff1997selection","Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.","1997","Sample Selection Bias and Repeat-Sales Index Estimates","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","14(1-2), 33-50","https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007763816289","Homes that sell are a nonrandom sample; repeat-sales index bias correlated with economic conditions","empirical; censored-sample correction of repeat-sales index, Dade County FL","Index built from homes selling more than once is biased, and the bias is strongly correlated with changes in economic conditions","Empirical basis for WP19's proposition that transaction indices mix liquidity-driven selection with value changes","Selection equation relies on observables; no link to seller urgency","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1997selection.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 111 | +"gatzlaff1998selection","Gatzlaff, Dean H. and Haurin, Donald R.","1998","Sample Selection and Biases in Local House Value Indices","Journal of Urban Economics","43(2), 199-222","https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1997.2045","Selection into sale biases hedonic local value indices; bias varies with market state","empirical; selection-corrected hedonic indices [abstract not retrievable]","Extends selection correction to local hedonic indices; selection bias varies systematically with local economic conditions [details unconfirmed]","Same identification problem as WP19's index-selection proposition at the local-market level","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_gatzlaff1998selection.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 112 | +"hwang2004selectivity","Hwang, Min and Quigley, John M.","2004","Selectivity, Quality Adjustment and Mean Reversion in the Measurement of House Values","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","28(2-3), 161-178","https://doi.org/10.1023/b:real.0000011152.40485.12","Joint model of sale selection, quality change and mean reversion in individual house prices","empirical; all sales in Sweden's largest metro 1982-1999 vs repeat-sales","Repeat-sales method yields systematically biased estimates of the value of the housing stock once selectivity and quality change are modelled","Supports WP19's distinction between index movements and fundamental value when sale selection is endogenous","Selection not linked to seller motives or liquidity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hwang2004selectivity.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 113 | +"goetzmann2006reservation","Goetzmann, William and Peng, Liang","2006","Estimating House Price Indexes in the Presence of Seller Reservation Prices","Review of Economics and Statistics","88(1), 100-112","https://doi.org/10.1162/003465306775565783","Reservation-price-to-value ratio drives both volume and selection bias in transaction indices","theory + econometric correction; simulations and Los Angeles repeat sales","Falling volume biases index returns upward and rising volume biases them downward; reserve-conditional unbiased index differs substantially from standard repeat-sales","Formalises exactly WP19's selection proposition: with heterogeneous reservation prices, observed prices are a truncated sample tied to volume","Reservation prices exogenous; no search/bargaining microfoundation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_goetzmann2006reservation.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 114 | +"jud1994selection","Jud, G. Donald and Seaks, Terry G.","1994","Sample Selection Bias in Estimating Housing Sales Prices","Journal of Real Estate Research","9(3), 289-298","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1994.12090753","Appreciation estimates from sold homes suffer Heckman-type selection","empirical; Heckman two-step on sold vs all houses","Housing sample-selection problem is statistically significant for appreciation estimates","Early confirmation of the selection problem WP19 models","Direction and magnitude of bias not reported in abstract","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_jud1994selection.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 115 | +"case1989efficiency","Case, Karl E. and Shiller, Robert J.","1989","The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes","American Economic Review","79(1), 125-137","https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v79y1989i1p125-37.html","Repeat-sales indices reveal positive serial correlation inconsistent with efficiency","empirical; weighted repeat-sales on 39,210 homes in four cities 1970-1986","Market does not appear efficient: annual price changes are followed by same-direction changes; individual house price changes largely unforecastable","Momentum benchmark; WP19 argues part of index persistence can arise from slow-moving liquidity and sale selection","No volume or liquidity in the test","high","IDEAS/RePEc page, no Crossref journal record (verification/B_case1989efficiency.evidence.txt)","B" | |
| 116 | +"bailey1963repeatsales","Bailey, Martin J. and Muth, Richard F. and Nourse, Hugh O.","1963","A Regression Method for Real Estate Price Index Construction","Journal of the American Statistical Association","58(304), 933-942","https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10480679","Repeat-sales regression as a constant-quality price index","econometric method","Introduces the repeat-sales regression index later generalised by Case-Shiller","Baseline index whose selection properties WP19 characterises","Assumes sales are random draws from the stock","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_bailey1963repeatsales.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 117 | +"clapp1992assessed","Clapp, John M. and Giaccotto, Carmelo","1992","Estimating Price Indices for Residential Property: A Comparison of Repeat Sales and Assessed Value Methods","Journal of the American Statistical Association","87(418), 300-306","https://doi.org/10.2307/2290260","Assessed-value method uses the full stock, mitigating repeat-sales selection","econometric method + empirical comparison","Assessed-value index avoids the small, possibly unrepresentative repeat-sales sample and compares favourably","Alternative index design that WP19 can use as a less selection-prone benchmark","Assessment quality varies across jurisdictions","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clapp1992assessed.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 118 | +"harding2003bargainingpower","Harding, John P. and Rosenthal, Stuart S. and Sirmans, C. F.","2003","Estimating Bargaining Power in the Market for Existing Homes","Review of Economics and Statistics","85(1), 178-188","https://doi.org/10.1162/003465303762687794","Buyer and seller characteristics shift bargaining power within hedonic prices","empirical; American Housing Survey with both parties' traits","Wealth, gender and demographics affect bargaining power; bargaining variation tied to school-age children explains seasonal anomalies in quality-adjusted indices","Empirical identification of the Nash bargaining weight WP19 treats as a parameter; shows it varies across parties and seasons","Cross-section; no urgency or TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingpower.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 119 | +"harding2003bargainingeffects","Harding, John P. and Knight, John R. and Sirmans, C. F.","2003","Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market","Real Estate Economics","31(4), 601-622","https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1080-8620.2003.00078.x","Vacancy weakens seller bargaining power, shifting the hedonic constant and attribute prices","empirical; hedonic with vacant-at-sale indicator across markets","Vacant (weak-bargaining) sellers receive lower prices; bargaining alters attribute shadow prices without a consistent cross-market pattern","Vacancy = high carrying cost in WP19; confirms urgency lowers negotiated price","Vacancy may also proxy quality/condition","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_harding2003bargainingeffects.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 120 | +"kurlat2015asymmetries","Kurlat, Pablo and Stroebel, Johannes","2015","Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets","Review of Financial Studies","28(8), 2429-2461","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv028","Better-informed sellers (about neighbourhood) sell ahead of price declines","empirical; seller-pool composition and subsequent price changes","When the seller pool shifts toward better-informed and high-supply-elasticity sellers, prices subsequently fall; stronger for neighbourhood-exposed houses","Adverse-selection explanation of volume-price dynamics that WP19 rules out by assumption; useful for the novelty audit","Information not directly observed","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_kurlat2015asymmetries.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 121 | +"garmaise2004asymmetries","Garmaise, Mark J. and Moskowitz, Tobias J.","2004","Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real Estate Markets","Review of Financial Studies","17(2), 405-437","https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg037","Asymmetric information measured by assessment quality shapes who trades and how","empirical; US commercial real estate","Strong evidence information considerations matter: buyers favour nearby properties and long income histories, avoid informed brokers; financing-choice evidence weak","Information asymmetry is a competing friction; WP19 isolates search/urgency with symmetric information","Commercial, not residential","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_garmaise2004asymmetries.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 122 | +"cheng2013liquidityrisk","Cheng, Ping and Lin, Zhenguo and Liu, Yingchun","2013","Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets","Financial Review","48(4), 671-696","https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12020","Uncertain marketing period adds liquidity risk to ex ante returns of private assets","analytical + empirical calibration on commercial real estate","Liquidity risk is too large to ignore, especially in down markets","Return-based framing of the liquidity premium that WP19 derives at the transaction level","Assumes exogenous TOM distribution","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_cheng2013liquidityrisk.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 123 | +"fisher2007tbi","Fisher, Jeff and Geltner, David and Pollakowski, Henry","2007","A Quarterly Transactions-based Index of Institutional Real Estate Investment Performance and Movements in Supply and Demand","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","34(1), 5-33","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9001-6","Transaction-based index with separate supply-side and demand-side (constant-liquidity) indices","econometric index construction; NCREIF, assessed-value hedonic","Produces variable-liquidity, demand-side (constant-liquidity) and supply-side quarterly indices from transaction prices, avoiding appraisal smoothing","Shows how buyer- and seller-side reservation movements can be separately tracked, as WP19's model implies","Institutional commercial assets","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_fisher2007tbi.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 124 | +"clayton2008liquidity","Clayton, Jim and MacKinnon, Greg and Peng, Liang","2008","Time Variation of Liquidity in the Private Real Estate Market: An Empirical Investigation","Journal of Real Estate Research","30(2), 125-160","https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2008.12091217","Time-varying liquidity from noisy signals, option value of waiting, or sentiment","empirical; tests of competing explanations on private real estate","Results broadly consistent with rational updating and support the opportunity-cost-of-waiting (option value) explanation of liquidity variation","Supports WP19's waiting-option microfoundation for countercyclical illiquidity","Commercial; aggregate liquidity measures","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2008liquidity.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 125 | +"clayton2010pricevolume","Clayton, Jim and Miller, Norman and Peng, Liang","2010","Price-volume Correlation in the Housing Market: Causality and Co-movements","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","40(1), 14-40","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-008-9128-0","Prices and volume jointly endogenous; asymmetric causality and common shocks","empirical; panel VAR/Granger tests, 114 US MSAs 1990-2002","Price declines reduce volume but increases do not; volume Granger-causes prices only in inelastic-supply markets; correlation mostly co-movement from common shocks","WP19's liquidity shock generates common movement of price and volume without a fundamental shock, consistent with co-movement dominance","Reduced-form; no TOM","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_clayton2010pricevolume.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 126 | +"berkovec1996turnover","Berkovec, James A. and Goodman, John L.","1996","Turnover as a Measure of Demand for Existing Homes","Real Estate Economics","24(4), 421-440","https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00698","Search model: demand shocks move turnover before prices","theory + empirical; aggregate turnover and demand indicators","Positive correlation between changes in turnover and housing demand; at high frequency turnover is a better demand indicator than price","Same ordering as WP19's dynamics: hazard/volume respond first, prices adjust through bargaining and selection","No seller heterogeneity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_berkovec1996turnover.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 127 | +"hort2000turnover","Hort, Katinka","2000","Prices and turnover in the market for owner-occupied homes","Regional Science and Urban Economics","30(1), 99-119","https://doi.org/10.1016/s0166-0462(99)00028-9","Price-turnover comovement in a search framework with sluggish reservation prices","empirical; Swedish regional data [abstract not retrievable]","Documents positive price-turnover relationship in Sweden with turnover responding ahead of prices [details unconfirmed]","Non-US evidence on the volume-price fact WP19 targets","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_hort2000turnover.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 128 | +"andrew2003transactions","Andrew, Mark and Meen, Geoffrey","2003","House Price Appreciation, Transactions and Structural Change in the British Housing Market: A Macroeconomic Perspective","Real Estate Economics","31(1), 99-116","https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1080-8620.2003.00059.x","Aggregate price-transactions relationship with structural break","empirical; British aggregate time series","Strong price-transactions relationship in Britain that changed in the 1990s, with transactions becoming much lower","Reminds that the volume-price mapping is regime-dependent, as WP19's tightness feedback implies","Macro; no micro liquidity measures","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_andrew2003transactions.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 129 | +"leamer2007businesscycle","Leamer, Edward E.","2007","Housing IS the Business Cycle","NBER Working Paper 13428 (also Proceedings, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 149-233)","NBER WP 13428","https://doi.org/10.3386/w13428","Housing volumes (residential investment) lead recessions; volume adjusts before prices","descriptive macro; postwar US cycles","Residential investment is the best early warning of recession; eight postwar recessions were preceded by housing/durables problems","Macro motivation for a volume-first liquidity channel; WP19 provides the microstructure","No formal liquidity model","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_leamer2007businesscycle.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 130 | +"dachis2012transfertax","Dachis, Ben and Duranton, Gilles and Turner, Matthew A.","2012","The effects of land transfer taxes on real estate markets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto","Journal of Economic Geography","12(2), 327-354","https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbr007","Transaction tax raises trading cost, reduces volume and lowers prices","empirical; Toronto land transfer tax natural experiment 2008","A 1.1% transfer tax reduced sales by about 15% and lowered prices by roughly the tax; welfare loss about $1 per $8 raised","Only verified Canadian evidence on how a transaction cost shifts volume and prices, useful for WP19's transaction-cost calibration","No TOM or seller heterogeneity","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_dachis2012transfertax.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 131 | +"carrillo2012potatoes","Carrillo, Paul E. and Pope, Jaren C.","2012","Are homes hot or cold potatoes? The distribution of marketing time in the housing market","Regional Science and Urban Economics","42(1-2), 189-197","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.08.010","Shape of the marketing-time distribution: quick 'hot' sales vs long 'cold' spells","empirical; MLS listings [abstract not retrievable]","Characterises the empirical distribution of marketing time and its heterogeneity across homes and market states [details unconfirmed]","WP19 derives the TOM distribution as a mixture over urgency types; this paper is the natural empirical target","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_carrillo2012potatoes.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 132 | +"benefield2015measurement","Benefield, Justin D. and Hardin, William G.","2015","Does Time-on-Market Measurement Matter?","Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics","50(1), 52-73","https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9450-z","TOM definitions and relisting treatment change estimated TOM relationships","empirical; five TOM measures in one MLS, relisting in another","Choice of TOM definition and treatment of relisted properties substantially change model results and significance; much TOM literature needs re-evaluation","Relisting/withdrawal is WP19's withdrawal margin; measurement of observed hazards must account for it","No structural interpretation","high","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_benefield2015measurement.crossref.json)","B" | |
| 133 | +"anglin2006liquidity","Anglin, Paul M.","2006","Value and liquidity under changing market conditions","Journal of Housing Economics","15(4), 293-304","https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2006.10.003","Joint response of price and liquidity (TOM, sale probability) to changing market conditions","empirical [abstract not retrievable]","Studies how value and liquidity of listed homes co-move as market conditions change [details unconfirmed]","Same price-liquidity duality as WP19's discount-hazard pair","Content beyond bibliographic record not verified here","medium","Crossref DOI record (verification/B_anglin2006liquidity.crossref.json)","B" | |
added
research/literature_merge_report.md
+9 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# Literature merge report | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +132 references (66 A, 59 B, 7 both; aliases {'fisher2003liquidity': 'fisher2003controlling', 'glower1998selling': 'glower1998motivation', 'han2024cashisking': 'han2024cash', 'reher2024mortgagecash': 'reher2024mortgage'}). | |
| 4 | + | |
| 5 | +## Cross-check issues (CSV vs raw Crossref JSON) | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +- `pissarides2000equilibrium`: no crossref json (evidence file only) | |
| 8 | +- `genesove1997equity`: no crossref json (evidence file only) | |
| 9 | +- `case1989efficiency`: doi 10.3386/w2506 vs https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v79y1989i1p125-37.html | |
added
research/literature_review.md
+155 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Literature review and novelty audit (Phase 1) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Date: 2026-10-20. Basis: 132 references verified against Crossref (129 with a DOI resolved; 3 with a publisher/RePEc evidence | |
| 4 | +file), merged from two independent searches (`lit_part_A.csv`, theory, 73 rows; `lit_part_B.csv`, evidence and measurement, 66 | |
| 5 | +rows; 7 papers in both; 4 duplicate keys reconciled, see `literature_merge_report.md`). Raw Crossref records are in | |
| 6 | +`verification/`. Unverified or deliberately excluded candidates are listed in `lit_unverified_A.md` and `lit_unverified_B.md` | |
| 7 | +(notably: no formal theory of financing contingencies beyond `bian2018bargaining`; no verified Québec or Canadian time-on-market | |
| 8 | +study). Detailed thematic notes: `lit_notes_A.md`, `lit_notes_B.md`. Model-design implications are collected in §8. | |
| 9 | + | |
| 10 | +## 1. Housing search theory: from vacancies to liquidity | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +The matching approach to housing starts with `arnott1989housing` (idiosyncratic tastes generate equilibrium vacancies) and | |
| 13 | +`wheaton1990vacancy` (a mismatched owner searches while carrying a vacant unit; the Nash-bargained price depends on the vacancy | |
| 14 | +rate through expected time to sell and the cost of holding two houses). `yavas1992simple` adds two-sided search intensity; | |
| 15 | +`williams1995pricing` prices heterogeneous real assets as optimal-stopping values under Poisson buyer arrivals, giving the | |
| 16 | +first explicit search-induced discount. `krainer2001theory` is the reference theory of residential *liquidity*: buyers draw | |
| 17 | +match values, sellers set reservation prices anticipating the aggregate state, and time on market lengthens in downturns because | |
| 18 | +waiting is rational; `krainer2002equilibrium` values an illiquid asset relative to a liquid benchmark as a function of arrival | |
| 19 | +intensity. `han2015microstructure` organises the field (one-sided search, random matching, directed search, bargaining and | |
| 20 | +auctions, brokerage). WP19 is a random-matching, Nash-bargaining model with a posted-price robustness check and inherits from | |
| 21 | +this strand the two objects it formalises: the sale hazard and a discount against a frictionless benchmark. | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +The important distinction for WP19 is that the "liquidity shock" of `krainer2001theory` is a shock to the dividend (housing | |
| 24 | +services), whereas WP19 studies shocks to matching efficiency and buyer qualification with the dividend distribution fixed. | |
| 25 | +`ngai2014hot` is the closest precedent for a non-fundamental driver: thick-market effects on match quality turn small seasonal | |
| 26 | +drivers into large price and volume swings. `novymarx2009hot` shows that feedback between the buyer–seller ratio and bargaining | |
| 27 | +positions amplifies demand shocks; `diaz2013house` (random matching, bargaining, entry) and `head2014search` (search with | |
| 28 | +construction and buyer entry, momentum from time-varying time to sell) reproduce the cyclical comovements; `ngai2020decision`, | |
| 29 | +`ngai2024ins`, `moen2021buying`, `gabrovski2019beveridge`, `caplin2011trading`, `guren2018house`, `anenberg2016information`, | |
| 30 | +`leung2017flipping` and `piazzesi2020segmented` complete the aggregate-dynamics branch. WP19 is stationary and local in scope: it | |
| 31 | +asks what a fall in $A$ or $\phi$ does to the *cross-section* of hazards and prices and to the composition of transactions. | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | +## 2. Seller urgency and heterogeneity | |
| 34 | + | |
| 35 | +The nearest antecedent of WP19's central device is `albrecht2007opportunistic`: buyers and sellers switch from a "relaxed" to a | |
| 36 | +"desperate" flow value at a Poisson rate, and the bargained price depends on the pair's states; the expected price conditional on | |
| 37 | +time on market falls with duration while its variance is hump-shaped. Other treatments of urgency are deadlines | |
| 38 | +(`salant1991sale`), the seller's discount rate (`arnold1999search`), the endogenous cost of holding two homes | |
| 39 | +(`anenberg2020endogenous`), debt overhang that *raises* asking prices (`head2023default`), and an estimated motivation parameter | |
| 40 | +(`carrillo2012empirical`). The empirical call for heterogeneous-seller theory is explicit in `glower1998motivation`: planned-move | |
| 41 | +sellers sell faster and motivation lowers the sale price but not the list markup; `springer1996motivation` finds lower prices for | |
| 42 | +eager, relocated, vacant and foreclosed sellers; `harding2003bargainingeffects` finds weaker bargaining power for vacant sellers; | |
| 43 | +`levitt2008agents` provides the marginal value of waiting (about 3.7% for about 9.5 extra days). Equity and reference dependence | |
| 44 | +work in the opposite direction: high-LTV and loss-facing sellers set higher asking prices and sell more slowly | |
| 45 | +(`genesove1997equity`, `genesove2001lossaversion`), and patient sellers sort into FSBO platforms (`hendel2009fsbo`). | |
| 46 | + | |
| 47 | +In all theoretical treatments urgency is a two-state process, a deadline, a debt position or a nuisance parameter. None models a | |
| 48 | +continuous, permanent carrying-cost type whose cross-sectional distribution determines the stock of listings, the composition of | |
| 49 | +transactions and, through free entry, market tightness. That is WP19's modelling choice. The evidence on constrained sellers | |
| 50 | +implies that the carrying-cost distribution should admit very patient types (low $c$) and that the model's predictions for | |
| 51 | +"locked" sellers are limited to the case $c\ge0$ (Limitations). | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +## 3. Forced sales and the size of liquidity discounts | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +`campbell2011forced` (foreclosure discount about 27% in Massachusetts, smaller discounts for death and bankruptcy sales, about | |
| 56 | +1% spillover per nearby foreclosure), `clauretie2009foreclosure` (naive discounts above 20% overstated by about one third once | |
| 57 | +condition, endogenous marketing time and spatial dependence are controlled), `penningtoncross2006reo`, `mayer1998auctions` (price | |
| 58 | +of immediacy 0–9% in a boom versus 9–21% in a bust) and `andersen2017firesales` (sudden-death forced sales: discounts rising with | |
| 59 | +urgency, poor market conditions and seller constraints, with demand held fixed) establish the empirical range of the urgency | |
| 60 | +discount and its state dependence. Spillovers (`harding2009contagion`, `anenberg2014foreclosures`, `mian2015foreclosures`) show | |
| 61 | +that a larger mass of urgent sellers lowers prices for all sellers without a change in fundamentals, the empirical content of | |
| 62 | +WP19's liquidity-shock proposition. What this literature does not provide is the decomposition the model delivers: how much of | |
| 63 | +the discount is bargaining under high carrying cost and how much is selection of which houses transact. | |
| 64 | + | |
| 65 | +## 4. Credit, qualification and the cash–mortgage gap | |
| 66 | + | |
| 67 | +On the theory side, `hedlund2016illiquidity`, `hedlund2016cyclical` and `garriga2020mortgage` make search-based illiquidity a | |
| 68 | +state variable interacting with long-term defaultable mortgages; `guren2020foreclosures` show how foreclosures freeze the | |
| 69 | +non-distressed market; `eerola2018borrowing` find that a moderate credit tightening raises time on market and idiosyncratic | |
| 70 | +price dispersion; `gabrovski2021search` open a channel from credit to liquidity with multiplicity; `diaz2024housing` has wealthier | |
| 71 | +buyers paying to transact faster under competitive search; `stein1995prices` and `ortalomagne2006housing` are the | |
| 72 | +frictionless-with-credit benchmarks. On the evidence side, qualification is elastic and delays are measurable | |
| 73 | +(`anenberg2019creditavailability`, `bhutta2021insurance`, `defusco2020leverage`, `fuster2019technology`); `allen2019searchfrictions` | |
| 74 | +is the only verified Canadian structural evidence (insured mortgages as a search market). | |
| 75 | + | |
| 76 | +The cash–mortgage gap is the empirical object WP19's financing extension speaks to. `reher2024mortgage` estimate an 11% mortgage | |
| 77 | +premium (1980–2017) against about 3% from a representative-seller model and find that heterogeneity in selling conditions closes | |
| 78 | +half of the gap; `han2024cash` estimate a 2–3.9% cash discount with 29% faster closing and show, with a calibrated search model, | |
| 79 | +that closing risk alone is insufficient — the risk that a relisted property fails to sell is needed, so the discount is smaller | |
| 80 | +in booms and larger markets. `asabere1992cash`, `jauregui2019fundingprice`, `aroul2023cashdiscount`, `lin2025contingencies` and | |
| 81 | +`buchak2026ibuyers` (about 5% immediacy spread) add magnitudes and selection caveats. The only formal bargaining theory with | |
| 82 | +financing is `bian2018bargaining`. No verified paper decomposes the measured gap into a bargaining component (compensation for | |
| 83 | +delay and failure risk, which depends on seller urgency) and a selection component (mortgage deals require a better match), with | |
| 84 | +the buyer's outside option differing by financing type. That decomposition is WP19's Proposition 7. | |
| 85 | + | |
| 86 | +## 5. Selection, indices and volume–price comovement | |
| 87 | + | |
| 88 | +The measurement literature establishes that sold houses are not a random sample of the stock and that the bias co-moves with the | |
| 89 | +cycle: `jud1994selection`, `gatzlaff1997selection`, `gatzlaff1998selection`, `hwang2004selectivity`, and above all | |
| 90 | +`goetzmann2006reservation`, where heterogeneous reservation prices make falling volume bias index returns upward and rising volume | |
| 91 | +bias them downward. In commercial real estate, `fisher2003controlling`, `fisher2007tbi` and `clayton2008liquidity` build | |
| 92 | +constant-liquidity indices that lead transaction indices and are more volatile; `lin2007illiquidity`, `bond2007marketing`, | |
| 93 | +`cheng2010illiquidity`, `lin2008real` and `cheng2013liquidityrisk` show that ignoring the uncertain marketing period biases | |
| 94 | +returns upward and risk downward, and that risk is seller-specific. The classical index tools (`bailey1963repeatsales`, | |
| 95 | +`case1989efficiency`, `clapp1992assessed`) assume random sampling. Bargaining and information confounders are documented by | |
| 96 | +`harding2003bargainingpower`, `kurlat2015asymmetries`, `garmaise2004asymmetries`; volume leads prices in `berkovec1996turnover`, | |
| 97 | +`hort2000turnover`, `clayton2010pricevolume`, `andrew2003transactions`, `leamer2007businesscycle`; `dachis2012transfertax` is the | |
| 98 | +Canadian transfer-tax experiment. | |
| 99 | + | |
| 100 | +The literature recognises the bias but no verified paper derives its *sign* from primitives in a search equilibrium. WP19's | |
| 101 | +Proposition 6 does so and finds that the sign is not a general law: it depends on whether the elasticity of the sale hazard to | |
| 102 | +the arrival rate rises or falls with urgency, which is governed by the product of the hazard function and the mean residual | |
| 103 | +valuation of the match-value distribution. This nuance is new relative to `goetzmann2006reservation` and `fisher2003controlling`. | |
| 104 | + | |
| 105 | +## 6. Duration dependence, censoring and withdrawals | |
| 106 | + | |
| 107 | +`zuehlke1987duration`, `haurin1988duration`, `jud1996brokerage`, `anglin2003tradeoff`, `knight2002listing`, | |
| 108 | +`haurin2010listprices`, `huang2001withdrawal`, `benefield2015measurement`, `carrillo2012potatoes` and `anglin2006liquidity` | |
| 109 | +document the price–time tradeoff, positive duration dependence in parametric hazards without heterogeneity, and the sensitivity | |
| 110 | +of results to withdrawals and relistings. `taylor1999time` (stigma) and `anenberg2016information` (learning) are competing | |
| 111 | +explanations of duration effects. WP19's observed hazard is a mixture over urgency types with a competing withdrawal risk | |
| 112 | +(Lemma 3), which predicts spurious negative duration dependence; the paper must state that positive dependence in the data | |
| 113 | +requires list-price revisions, learning or stigma, which are outside the model. | |
| 114 | + | |
| 115 | +## 7. Foundations and tools | |
| 116 | + | |
| 117 | +Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides architecture (`diamond1982aggregate`, `mortensen1994job`, `pissarides2000equilibrium`, | |
| 118 | +`mortensen1999new`, `rogerson2005search`, `petrongolo2001looking`, `shimer2005cyclical`); efficiency (`hosios1990efficiency`, | |
| 119 | +with the two-sided-entry caveat of `gabrovski2025note`); reservation values (`lippman1976economics`); log-concavity | |
| 120 | +(`bagnoli2005logconcave`); bargaining (`nash1950bargaining`, `rubinstein1982perfect`); directed search (`moen1997competitive`, | |
| 121 | +`wright2021directed`, `albrecht2016directed`); price dispersion (`burdett1983equilibrium`, `maury2014search`, `sagi2021asset`); | |
| 122 | +OTC asset-market liquidity premia (`duffie2005over`, `lagos2009liquidity`, `rocheteau2011liquidity`), from which WP19 differs by | |
| 123 | +the indivisibility and match-specificity of the housing unit; matching evidence (`genesove2012search`: contact-hazard elasticity | |
| 124 | +0.84 with respect to the buyer–seller ratio under CRS; `carrillo2013heat`, `carrillo2015tightness`, `han2014biddingwars`, | |
| 125 | +`han2016askingprice`, `merlo2004bargaining`, `merlo2015home`, `horowitz1992role`, `yavas1995strategic`). | |
| 126 | + | |
| 127 | +## 8. What is known, what is open, and the model-design implications | |
| 128 | + | |
| 129 | +Known: urgency lowers reservation and transaction prices and shortens duration; liquidity is state dependent; credit tightening | |
| 130 | +lengthens time on market and raises dispersion; cash buyers obtain discounts; transaction indices are selection-biased; tightness | |
| 131 | +amplifies shocks. Open: (i) a stationary equilibrium with a continuous urgency distribution, free entry and an explicit | |
| 132 | +frictionless benchmark; (ii) analytical conditions under which a lower arrival or qualification rate lengthens time on market | |
| 133 | +(monotone hazard) and widens dispersion; (iii) the sign and size of the index selection bias from primitives; (iv) the | |
| 134 | +decomposition of the cash–mortgage gap into bargaining, outside-option and selection terms; (v) the welfare role of bargaining | |
| 135 | +power with heterogeneous sellers and one-sided entry. | |
| 136 | + | |
| 137 | +Design implications adopted in `model_specification.md`: carrying cost $c$ is a continuous permanent type with a right-skewed | |
| 138 | +distribution (most sellers patient, a minority urgent, as in the motivation and forced-sale evidence); an exogenous withdrawal | |
| 139 | +hazard with a positive own-use value $w_0$ (withdrawals and relistings matter empirically); free entry of buyers pins the buyer | |
| 140 | +value, which both isolates the seller-side comparative statics and generates tightness feedback; the baseline qualification | |
| 141 | +screen is nested in a financing-contingency extension with a pending state, cash and mortgage buyers, so that $A$ and $\phi$ are | |
| 142 | +observationally distinct only in the extension; the frictionless benchmark is defined as the Walrasian free-entry price and the | |
| 143 | +urgency discount relative to the most patient seller is the primary liquidity-discount object, because the forced-sale | |
| 144 | +literature measures exactly that comparison; match-value distributions include IFR cases (truncated normal, Weibull), the | |
| 145 | +exponential boundary and a heavy-tailed Pareto case to display the conditions of Propositions 2 and 6; listing inflow is | |
| 146 | +exogenous (one-sided entry) so that the Hosios benchmark applies in the homogeneous case and heterogeneity is the only wedge. | |
| 147 | + | |
| 148 | +## 9. Novelty gate decision | |
| 149 | + | |
| 150 | +Propositions 1 and the directional content of 2–4 restate known comparative statics in a new setting and are labelled as | |
| 151 | +benchmarks in the manuscript, with `albrecht2007opportunistic`, `krainer2001theory`, `lippman1976economics`, | |
| 152 | +`eerola2018borrowing`, `ngai2014hot` and `novymarx2009hot` credited as antecedents. The contributions that survive the audit are | |
| 153 | +the joint treatment (continuous urgency × free entry × pending financing), the Pareto counterexample to monotone hazards with | |
| 154 | +its exact condition, the index-selection proposition with its sign condition, the three-term decomposition of the cash–mortgage | |
| 155 | +gap, and the numerical welfare analysis with heterogeneous sellers. The gate is passed with these labels; see `novelty_matrix.csv`. | |
added
research/model_specification.md
+162 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Model specification (Phase 2) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Date: 2026-10-20. Status: formal environment, value functions, equilibrium definition, benchmark objects and the list of | |
| 4 | +candidate propositions. Proofs are in `research/proofs.md`. Nothing here is a result until proved there or computed in Phase 4. | |
| 5 | + | |
| 6 | +## 1. Environment | |
| 7 | + | |
| 8 | +Continuous time, infinite horizon, discount rate $r>0$. A *local market* for houses of a single quality segment $q>0$ | |
| 9 | +(Lemma 1 shows $q$ is a scale factor; all quantities below are expressed in units of $q$, i.e. $q=1$). | |
| 10 | + | |
| 11 | +**Sellers.** New listings arrive at the exogenous flow $s>0$ per unit time. Each listing is owned by a seller with a permanent | |
| 12 | +*carrying cost* (urgency) $c$ drawn at listing from a distribution $F$ with support $[c_L,c_H]$, $0\le c_L<c_H<\infty$ | |
| 13 | +(mortgage interest, maintenance, double housing, relocation and psychic costs of an unsold house). The seller pays $c$ per unit time | |
| 14 | +while listed. Listings are withdrawn at the exogenous rate $\delta\ge0$ (the seller keeps the house; the value of this outside | |
| 15 | +option is normalised to zero, so $V(c)$ below is the *net* value of being listed). | |
| 16 | + | |
| 17 | +**Buyers.** A buyer enters the market at sunk cost $k>0$, pays the flow search cost $\kappa_b\ge0$ while active, and exits upon | |
| 18 | +purchase. Upon meeting a listing a buyer draws a match-specific valuation $w\sim G$ — the present value of the housing-service flow | |
| 19 | +to that buyer, in units of $q$ — with continuous density $g$ on $[w_L,w_H]$, $0\le w_L<w_H\le\infty$. A buyer who purchases at price | |
| 20 | +$p$ obtains $w-p$ (resale is abstracted from; Remark 1). | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | +**Matching.** With $B$ active buyers and $S$ listed sellers, meetings occur at the rate $m(B,S)=A\,B^{\alpha}S^{1-\alpha}$, | |
| 23 | +$\alpha\in(0,1)$, $A>0$. Tightness is $\theta=B/S$; a seller meets buyers at rate $\lambda_s(\theta)=A\theta^{\alpha}$ and a buyer meets | |
| 24 | +listings at rate $\lambda_b(\theta)=A\theta^{\alpha-1}$. Meetings are random across the stock of listings: a buyer meets a type-$c$ | |
| 25 | +seller with probability $n(c)/S$ where $n(\cdot)$ is the stock density of listed sellers. | |
| 26 | + | |
| 27 | +**Financing (baseline).** A meeting is with a *qualified* buyer with probability $\phi\in(0,1]$ (mortgage pre-approval); an | |
| 28 | +unqualified meeting is wasted. Effective contact rates: $\Lambda_s=\phi\lambda_s(\theta)$, $\Lambda_b=\phi\lambda_b(\theta)$. | |
| 29 | +Section 6 replaces this screen by a financing contingency with cash and mortgage buyers. | |
| 30 | + | |
| 31 | +**Bargaining.** Complete information about $(w,c)$ within a match; generalised Nash bargaining with seller share $\beta\in(0,1)$; | |
| 32 | +trade occurs iff the match surplus is nonnegative. Section 7 replaces Nash by posted prices. | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +**Liquidity shock.** $z\in\{A,\phi\}$: an unanticipated change in matching efficiency $A$ or qualification $\phi$ with $G$, $F$, | |
| 35 | +$r$, $k$, $\kappa_b$, $s$ unchanged ("fundamental housing-service values unchanged"). | |
| 36 | + | |
| 37 | +**Timing (continuous).** Listing → repeated meetings at rate $\Lambda_s$ → within a meeting: draw $w$, bargain, trade or part → | |
| 38 | +exogenous withdrawal at rate $\delta$. Listing duration $\tau$ is the time from listing to sale or withdrawal. | |
| 39 | + | |
| 40 | +## 2. Value functions (stationary) | |
| 41 | + | |
| 42 | +Seller of type $c$, listed: | |
| 43 | +$$(r+\delta)V(c) = -c + \Lambda_s\,\beta\,H\big(V(c)+U\big), \qquad H(v)\equiv\int (w-v)^+\,dG(w)=\int_v^{w_H}(1-G(w))\,dw. \tag{S}$$ | |
| 44 | +Active buyer: | |
| 45 | +$$rU = -\kappa_b + \Lambda_b\,(1-\beta)\int H\big(V(c)+U\big)\,dN(c),\qquad N(c)=n(c)/S. \tag{B}$$ | |
| 46 | +$H$ is continuous, nonincreasing, convex, $H'(v)=-(1-G(v))$, $H''=g$. The *mean residual valuation* is | |
| 47 | +$M(v)\equiv H(v)/(1-G(v))=E[w-v\mid w\ge v]$. | |
| 48 | + | |
| 49 | +**Match surplus and trade.** $\Sigma(w,c)=w-V(c)-U$. Trade iff $w\ge v^*(c)\equiv V(c)+U$ (the *reservation valuation*). | |
| 50 | +The seller's reservation price is $V(c)$ (the least price the seller accepts); the buyer's is $w-U$. | |
| 51 | + | |
| 52 | +**Price.** Nash: $p(w,c)=V(c)+\beta\,\Sigma(w,c)=(1-\beta)V(c)-\beta U+\beta w$. | |
| 53 | + | |
| 54 | +**Hazards.** Meeting hazard $\Lambda_s$; conditional sale probability $1-G(v^*(c))$; *sale hazard* $\eta(c)=\Lambda_s[1-G(v^*(c))]$; | |
| 55 | +*exit hazard* $\eta(c)+\delta$; survival of a listing $\mathcal S(\tau\mid c)=e^{-(\eta(c)+\delta)\tau}$; expected listing duration | |
| 56 | +$E[\tau\mid c]=1/(\eta(c)+\delta)$; probability of eventual sale $\eta(c)/(\eta(c)+\delta)$; population survival | |
| 57 | +$\bar{\mathcal S}(\tau)=\int e^{-(\eta(c)+\delta)\tau}dF(c)$ (a mixture; its hazard is decreasing in $\tau$ — Lemma 3). | |
| 58 | + | |
| 59 | +**Expected transaction price by type.** $\bar p(c)\equiv E[p\mid \text{sale},c]=V(c)+\beta M(v^*(c))$. | |
| 60 | + | |
| 61 | +## 3. Stationary equilibrium | |
| 62 | + | |
| 63 | +Stocks: inflow $sf(c)$ = outflow $(\eta(c)+\delta)n(c)$, so $n(c)=sf(c)/(\eta(c)+\delta)$, $S=\int n$, $B=\theta S$. | |
| 64 | +Sales flow $Q=\int\eta(c)n(c)\,dc$; withdrawals $\delta S$; transaction composition $\omega(c)=\eta(c)n(c)/Q$. | |
| 65 | +Buyer entry flow $b=Q$ (buyers exit only by purchase). | |
| 66 | + | |
| 67 | +**Definition (stationary equilibrium with free entry).** Given $(r,\delta,s,F,G,A,\alpha,\phi,\beta,k,\kappa_b)$, a stationary | |
| 68 | +equilibrium is $(\theta,U,V(\cdot),n(\cdot))$ such that (S) holds for every $c$ (with the withdrawal term $\delta w_0$ added to the right-hand side: $(r+\delta)V(c)=-c+\delta w_0+\Lambda_s\beta H(V(c)+U)$, where $w_0\ge0$ is the seller's own-use value upon withdrawal), (B) holds, free entry $U=k$, and the stock | |
| 69 | +equation holds. *Partial equilibrium* fixes $\theta$ and $U=k$ and drops (B). | |
| 70 | + | |
| 71 | +**Participation.** Listing dominates keeping the house ($V(c)\ge w_0$) iff $c\le\bar c\equiv\Lambda_s\beta H(w_0+k)-rw_0$ (Proposition 1(iv)); types above $\bar c$ would not | |
| 72 | +list. Parameter restriction: $c_H\le\bar c$ in every reported equilibrium (checked numerically, reported if violated). | |
| 73 | + | |
| 74 | +## 4. Benchmarks and liquidity-premium definitions (sign conventions) | |
| 75 | + | |
| 76 | +1. **Urgency (forced-sale) discount.** $D(c)\equiv[\bar p(c_L)-\bar p(c)]/\bar p(c_L)$, the expected price concession of a | |
| 77 | + type-$c$ seller relative to the most patient seller in the *same* market; $D(c)\ge0$ (Proposition 1). Transaction-weighted | |
| 78 | + market discount $\bar D=\int D(c)\,\omega(c)\,dc$. This is the model counterpart of the forced-sale discount of the empirical | |
| 79 | + literature. | |
| 80 | +2. **Frictionless (Walrasian, free-entry) benchmark.** $p^*$ solves $H(p^*)=rk$: buyers enter until the expected gain from an | |
| 81 | + immediate purchase at a uniform price equals the entry cost; sellers trade immediately at $p^*$ and pay no carrying cost. | |
| 82 | + $p^*$ depends only on $(G,r,k)$. The *market liquidity gap* $\Gamma\equiv(p^*-\bar p_T)/p^*$ with $\bar p_T=\int\bar p(c)\omega(c)dc$ | |
| 83 | + can take either sign (Proposition 2(iv)): search delay and carrying costs push transaction prices below $p^*$, while the | |
| 84 | + seller's option to wait for a high-valuation buyer (rent extraction through bargaining) pushes them above. $\Gamma$ is therefore | |
| 85 | + reported as a decomposition, never called "the liquidity premium". | |
| 86 | +3. **Seller's liquidity cost.** $L(c)\equiv c/(r+\delta+\eta(c))$, the expected discounted carrying cost paid over the listing | |
| 87 | + spell; and $V(c_L)-V(c)$, the *reservation-value gap*. | |
| 88 | +4. **Buyer's liquidity premium** (what a buyer would pay to skip search) is $U$-based and distinct from the seller's objects; it | |
| 89 | + is not reported as a price discount. | |
| 90 | + | |
| 91 | +## 5. Dynamic (transition) version — Experiment 9 | |
| 92 | + | |
| 93 | +$U_t=k$ for all $t$ (free entry at every instant). Backward HJB | |
| 94 | +$\dot V_t(c)=(r+\delta)V_t(c)+c-\Lambda_s(\theta_t)\beta H(V_t(c)+k)$; static free entry | |
| 95 | +$rk=-\kappa_b+\Lambda_b(\theta_t)(1-\beta)\int H(V_t(c)+k)\,dN_t(c)$; forward KFE $\dot n_t(c)=sf(c)-(\eta_t(c)+\delta)n_t(c)$. | |
| 96 | +Observed index $P_t=\int\bar p_t(c)\,\omega_t(c)\,dc$ with $\omega_t(c)=\eta_t(c)n_t(c)/Q_t$; fixed-composition index | |
| 97 | +$P^{fix}_t=\int\bar p_t(c)\,\omega_0(c)\,dc$; fundamentals ($G$) constant, so the fundamental index is flat. | |
| 98 | +Decomposition: $\ln P_t-\ln P_0=[\ln P^{fix}_t-\ln P_0]+[\ln P_t-\ln P^{fix}_t]$ = within-type (liquidity) + composition (selection). | |
| 99 | + | |
| 100 | +## 6. Financing-contingency extension — Experiment 4 (cash vs mortgage buyers) | |
| 101 | + | |
| 102 | +A buyer is a cash buyer with probability $\pi$ (type drawn at entry) and a mortgage buyer otherwise. A cash agreement closes | |
| 103 | +immediately. A mortgage agreement at price $p$ enters a *pending* state: approval arrives at rate $\nu$ and succeeds with probability | |
| 104 | +$\phi$; on failure the house returns to the market and the buyer to search. Pending values: | |
| 105 | +$P_s(c,p)=\dfrac{-c+\nu\phi p+\nu(1-\phi)V(c)}{r+\nu}$, $P_b(w,p)=\dfrac{-\kappa_b+\nu\phi(w-p)+\nu(1-\phi)U_m}{r+\nu}$. | |
| 106 | +Joint surplus $\Sigma_m(w,c)=\dfrac{\nu\phi\,(w-V-U_m)-c-\kappa_b-r(V+U_m)}{r+\nu}$; | |
| 107 | +threshold $v^*_m(c)=V(c)+U_m+\dfrac{c+\kappa_b+r(V(c)+U_m)}{\nu\phi}$; Nash price | |
| 108 | +$p_m(w,c)=p_{cash}(w,c)+\Delta_b(c)$ with $\Delta_b(c)=\dfrac{(1-\beta)\,[c+rV(c)]-\beta\,[\kappa_b+rU_m]}{\nu\phi}$ evaluated at the | |
| 109 | +cash price $p_{cash}(w,c)=V+\beta(w-V-U_m)$. | |
| 110 | +Seller: $(r+\delta)V=-c+\lambda_s\beta\big[\tilde\pi H(V+U_c)+(1-\tilde\pi)\tfrac{\nu\phi}{r+\nu}H(v^*_m)\big]$, $\tilde\pi$ = share of | |
| 111 | +meetings with cash buyers (stock-consistent). Buyers: $rU_c=-\kappa_b+\lambda_b(1-\beta)\int H(V+U_c)dN$, | |
| 112 | +$rU_m=-\kappa_b+\lambda_b(1-\beta)\tfrac{\nu\phi}{r+\nu}\int H(v^*_m)dN$; free entry $\pi U_c+(1-\pi)U_m=k$. | |
| 113 | +Stocks: $n(c)=sf(c)/[\eta_c(c)+\phi\eta_m(c)+\delta]$ with $\eta_c=\lambda_s\tilde\pi(1-G(V+U_c))$, $\eta_m=\lambda_s(1-\tilde\pi)(1-G(v^*_m))$; | |
| 114 | +pending $m(c)=\eta_m n/\nu$; cash buyers $B_c=\pi b/\xi_c$, searching mortgage buyers $B_m=(1-\pi)b/(\phi\xi_m)$ with | |
| 115 | +$\xi_c=\lambda_b\int(1-G(V+U_c))dN$, $\xi_m=\lambda_b\int(1-G(v^*_m))dN$; $\tilde\pi=B_c/(B_c+B_m)$; $\theta=(B_c+B_m)/S$; | |
| 116 | +$b=Q=\int(\eta_c+\phi\eta_m)n$. The baseline is the limit $\nu\to\infty$ (then $v^*_m\to V+U$, $\Delta_b\to0$ and the seller's | |
| 117 | +effective contact rate is $\lambda_s[\tilde\pi+(1-\tilde\pi)\phi]$). | |
| 118 | +Observed mortgage–cash price gap by type: $E[p_m\mid c]-E[p_c\mid c]=\Delta_b(c)+\beta\{E[w\mid w\ge v^*_m]-E[w\mid w\ge v^*_c]\}$ = | |
| 119 | +bargaining term + selection term (Proposition 6). | |
| 120 | + | |
| 121 | +## 7. Posted-price protocol — Experiment 11 | |
| 122 | + | |
| 123 | +The seller commits to a price $p$ before the buyer's $w$ is drawn; the buyer accepts iff $w-p\ge U$. Seller: | |
| 124 | +$(r+\delta)V(c)=-c+\Lambda_s\max_y\,[1-G(y)]\,(y-U-V(c))$ with $y=p+U$; interior optimum $y(c)-U-V(c)=[1-G(y(c))]/g(y(c))$ | |
| 125 | +(unique under log-concave $g$). Prices are deterministic within type: all dispersion among identical houses comes from $c$. | |
| 126 | + | |
| 127 | +## 8. Welfare (steady-state flow) | |
| 128 | + | |
| 129 | +$\Omega=\int\eta(c)n(c)\,E[w\mid w\ge v^*(c)]\,dc-\int c\,n(c)\,dc-\kappa_b B-k\,Q$ (value created by sales, net of carrying costs, | |
| 130 | +search costs and entry costs, per unit time). Seller surplus $s\int V(c)dF(c)$; buyer surplus is zero net of entry under free entry. | |
| 131 | +The Hosios benchmark $\beta=1-\alpha$ is tested numerically (homogeneous and heterogeneous sellers). | |
| 132 | + | |
| 133 | +## 9. Candidate propositions (to be proved in `proofs.md`) | |
| 134 | + | |
| 135 | +- **Lemma 1 (scale).** With $w=q\varepsilon$, $c=q\kappa$, $k=q\tilde k$, $\kappa_b=q\tilde\kappa_b$, all values and prices are | |
| 136 | + homogeneous of degree one in $q$; hazards and $\theta$ are invariant. | |
| 137 | +- **Lemma 2 (existence, uniqueness of $V$).** For any $U$, $\Lambda_s>0$: (S) has a unique solution; $V$ is $C^1$ in $c$ and in the | |
| 138 | + parameters. | |
| 139 | +- **Lemma 3 (spurious duration dependence).** The population exit hazard $-\,d\ln\bar{\mathcal S}/d\tau$ is decreasing in $\tau$ | |
| 140 | + whenever $F$ is non-degenerate. | |
| 141 | +- **Proposition 1 (urgency).** $V'(c)=-1/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))]\in(-1/(r+\delta),0)$; $\eta'(c)>0$ where $g(v^*)>0$; | |
| 142 | + $\bar p'(c)=V'(c)[1+\beta M'(v^*)]<0$ (no log-concavity needed); participation threshold $\bar c=\Lambda_s\beta H(k)$ under $U=k$. | |
| 143 | +- **Proposition 2 (arrival and qualification, partial equilibrium).** (i) $\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s>0$, $\partial\bar p/\partial\Lambda_s>0$; | |
| 144 | + (ii) $\partial\eta/\partial\Lambda_s>0$ if $G$ is IFR (log-concave survival), and a Pareto counterexample where | |
| 145 | + $\partial\eta/\partial\Lambda_s<0$; (iii) the reservation-value gap $V(c_L)-V(c)$ is decreasing in $\Lambda_s$ under IFR; | |
| 146 | + (iv) sign of $\Gamma$: $\bar p(c)\to$ depends on $\Lambda_s$ with limits $-c/(r+\delta)$ as $\Lambda_s\to0$ and $w_H-k$ as $\Lambda_s\to\infty$, | |
| 147 | + so $\Gamma$ changes sign. | |
| 148 | +- **Proposition 3 (free entry, homogeneous sellers).** Unique $\theta$; $d\theta/d\phi>0$, $d\theta/dA$ (sign determined), | |
| 149 | + amplification of a $\phi$ shock through $\theta$; heterogeneous case: existence and a numerical uniqueness check. | |
| 150 | +- **Proposition 4 (liquidity shock without fundamentals).** A fall in $A$ or $\phi$ lowers $V(c)$, $\bar p(c)$ for all $c$, lowers | |
| 151 | + the sales flow on impact and (if $\delta>0$) in steady state, raises inventory $S$ and mean duration. | |
| 152 | +- **Proposition 5 (dispersion).** Between-type variance $\mathrm{Var}_\omega[\bar p(c)]>0$ iff $F$ non-degenerate; with $\beta=0$ | |
| 153 | + all dispersion among identical houses is urgency-driven and bounded by $\mathrm{Var}_\omega(c)/(r+\delta)^2$; the between-type | |
| 154 | + reservation gap widens when $\Lambda_s$ falls (IFR). | |
| 155 | +- **Proposition 6 (selection in indices).** (i) $\delta=0$: steady-state transaction composition equals $f$ for any $\Lambda_s$; | |
| 156 | + (ii) impact effect of a permanent $\Lambda_s$ shock: composition shifts toward types with smaller hazard elasticity | |
| 157 | + $\epsilon(c)=\partial\ln\eta/\partial\ln\Lambda_s$; for exponential $G$, $\epsilon(c)=(r+\delta)/(r+\delta+\beta\eta(c))$ is decreasing | |
| 158 | + in $c$, so the index falls (rises) by more than every within-type price after a negative (positive) shock. | |
| 159 | +- **Proposition 7 (financing contingency).** Bargaining term $\Delta_b(c)$ has the sign of $(1-\beta)[c+rV]-\beta[\kappa_b+rU_m]$ and is | |
| 160 | + increasing in $c$; the selection term is strictly positive; the baseline screen is the $\nu\to\infty$ limit. | |
| 161 | +- **Proposition 8 (posted prices).** Under log-concave $g$, $y(c)$ is unique, decreasing in $c$, and $y(c)>v^*_{Nash}(c)$ at equal | |
| 162 | + $(V,U)$: posted-price sellers are pickier. | |
added
research/novelty_matrix.csv
+10 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ | ||
| 1 | +"proposition","content","closest_prior_work","overlap_assessment","duplication_risk","differentiation_strategy" | |
| 2 | +"P1","Reservation price, hazard and expected price monotone in carrying cost c; participation threshold","albrecht2007opportunistic; lippman1976economics; arnold1999search; glower1998motivation","Established as a comparative static (two-state urgency / reservation theory); WP19 adds continuous types, the |pbar'|<=|V'| bound and the explicit threshold","high","Present as benchmark; credit antecedents; emphasise the price-vs-reservation attenuation and the free-entry threshold" | |
| 3 | +"P2","Arrival/qualification rate: prices increase, hazard increases under IFR, reservation gap narrows; Pareto counterexample with exact condition c > delta w0 + (r+delta)U","krainer2001theory; krainer2002equilibrium; williams1995pricing; eerola2018borrowing; bagnoli2005logconcave","Direction known; the log-concavity condition, the dispersion result and the exact DFR counterexample are not in the housing literature","medium","State the IFR condition explicitly; report the Pareto case as a theorem-level caveat; connect to eerola2018borrowing dispersion finding" | |
| 4 | +"P3","Free entry: unique tightness with homogeneous sellers, amplification of phi/A shocks, observational equivalence of A and phi in the baseline","diaz2013house; novymarx2009hot; head2014search; pissarides2000equilibrium; gabrovski2019beveridge","Standard DMP result; the observational-equivalence remark motivates the contingency extension","low","Keep short; cite DMP; stress the A-phi equivalence as a motivation for Experiment 4" | |
| 5 | +"P4","Liquidity shock with fundamentals fixed moves prices, volume, inventory and TOM jointly","ngai2014hot; novymarx2009hot; krainer2001theory (dividend shock, contrast); andersen2017firesales; campbell2011forced","Qualitatively present; the stationary cross-sectional statement with delta>0 vs delta=0 volume distinction is new in form","medium","Contrast explicitly with Krainer's dividend shock; use the delta=0 volume invariance as a diagnostic" | |
| 6 | +"P5","Price dispersion among identical houses from urgency; bounds; widening when liquidity falls","albrecht2007opportunistic; eerola2018borrowing; maury2014search; burdett1983equilibrium; harding2003bargainingpower","Dispersion from two-state urgency exists; the continuous-type variance decomposition and bounds are new; widening under IFR follows from P2","medium","Report the between/within decomposition in the posted-price and Nash cases; note that beta=0 isolates urgency dispersion" | |
| 7 | +"P6","Sale selection in transaction indices: impact decomposition, sign governed by d/dv [h_G M]; exponential/Pareto amplify, light tails dampen; delta=0 long-run neutrality","goetzmann2006reservation; fisher2003controlling; gatzlaff1997selection; hwang2004selectivity; lin2007illiquidity","Bias recognised empirically and econometrically; sign from primitives in a search equilibrium is open; the non-generality of the sign is new","low (duplication) / main contribution","Headline theoretical contribution; present with the distribution-dependence caveat and the numerical magnitudes of Experiment 10" | |
| 8 | +"P7","Cash vs mortgage: price gap = delay-bargaining term + outside-option term + selection term; bargaining term increasing in c","reher2024mortgage; han2024cash; bian2018bargaining; aroul2023cashdiscount; jauregui2019fundingprice","Bargaining compensation established and quantified; the three-term decomposition with urgency-dependent sign and the selection term are open","low (duplication)","Map to the Han-Hong (2-4%) vs Reher-Valkanov (11%) gap; stress that measured gaps are conditional on sale" | |
| 9 | +"P8","Posted prices: unique threshold, decreasing in c, pickier than Nash; all dispersion urgency-driven","yavas1995strategic; horowitz1992role; merlo2015home; han2016askingprice; albrecht2016directed","Standard monopoly-pricing-in-search result; used only as robustness","low","Robustness section only; no novelty claim" | |
| 10 | +"W","Welfare: Hosios benchmark with heterogeneous sellers and one-sided entry (numerical)","hosios1990efficiency; mortensen1994job; gabrovski2025note; albrecht2016directed","Hosios efficiency known for homogeneous case; the heterogeneity wedge is a numerical illustration, not a theorem","low","Label as numerical result; cite gabrovski2025note for the two-sided-entry caveat" | |
added
research/progress.md
+29 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# Progress — WP19 (The Endogenous Housing Liquidity Premium) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +## 2026-10-20 — Phase 0 (setup) | |
| 4 | +- Repository created at `~/Desktop/Recherche-UQO/immobilier/endogenous-housing-liquidity-premium` from `_modele-working-paper/` | |
| 5 | + (HARMONISATION.md standard); CLAUDE.md = research brief; local git initialised (`main`). | |
| 6 | +- Toolchain checked: latexmk/pdflatex/bibtex (TeX Live), Python 3.14.4, numpy 2.4.4, scipy 1.17.1, pandas 3.0.2, | |
| 7 | + matplotlib 3.10.9, pyyaml 6.0.3, pytest 9.1.1. Crossref API reachable (test query resolved Krainer 2001 → 10.1006/juec.2000.2180). | |
| 8 | +- BLOCKER (logged): SSH to the MacLustr cluster (`gitsrv` = M1M32 via ProxyJump m4mn) fails from the laptop at 07:25 | |
| 9 | + (`kex_exchange_identification: Connection closed`). The spbgit remote `wp19_uqo.git` cannot be created yet; work continues | |
| 10 | + in local git, push deferred. OpenAlex MCP server failed to connect (CONNECTION_CLOSED); Crossref used instead. | |
| 11 | +- Raw endpoint check: `https://git.spboucher.ai/raw/wp2_uqo/main/paper/main.pdf` → 200; `wp18_uqo` → 404 (WP18 has no PDF yet). | |
| 12 | + Local copies of all 17 compiled WPs are available in `Recherche-UQO/{immobilier,finance}`; they are the primary style source. | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +## 2026-10-20 — Phase 1 (literature) : DONE | |
| 15 | +- Two parallel verified searches (theory 73 refs, evidence 66 refs) merged into `literature_matrix.csv` (132 refs, 129 DOIs, 3 evidence | |
| 16 | + files), `paper/references.bib` generated and cross-checked against raw Crossref JSON (`literature_merge_report.md`), | |
| 17 | + `literature_review.md`, `novelty_matrix.csv`, `inaccessible_sources.md`. Novelty gate passed with explicit labels (P1 and the | |
| 18 | + directions of P2–P4 are benchmarks; new: joint model, Pareto condition, index-selection sign condition, cash-gap decomposition). | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +## 2026-10-20 — Phase 2 (theory) : DONE — `model_specification.md`, `proofs.md` (3 lemmas, 8 propositions) | |
| 21 | +- Corrections during Phase 3: Pareto counterexample condition sharpened to $c>\delta w_0+(r+\delta)U$ (the initial statement | |
| 22 | + $\beta\eta>(a-1)(r+\delta)$ is equivalent but was wrongly believed reachable for all $c$); Prop. 6(iii) sign condition made | |
| 23 | + distribution-dependent after the truncated-normal baseline showed dampening; Prop. 7(ii) made conditional on $v^*_m>v^*_c$. | |
| 24 | + | |
| 25 | +## 2026-10-20 — Phases 3–5 : DONE | |
| 26 | +- Solvers, 24 tests passing (`results/logs/pytest_full.log`), Monte Carlo validation (0.39 %), 12 experiments (38 result files), | |
| 27 | + 14 figures, 21 table fragments + `numbers.tex`. Financing solver rewritten (fixed point diverged → 3-equation root). | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +## 2026-10-20 — Phase 6 : DONE — `results_audit.md` (24 claims mapped, 6 weakened/removed), `limitations.md`, `validation.md`. | |
added
research/proofs.md
+177 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Formal results and proofs (Phase 2) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Notation as in `model_specification.md`. Throughout, $U$ is treated as given (partial equilibrium) unless stated; under free entry | |
| 4 | +$U=k$. $h_G(v)=g(v)/(1-G(v))$ is the hazard function of $G$, $M(v)=H(v)/(1-G(v))$ its mean residual valuation. | |
| 5 | +"IFR" = increasing failure rate = $1-G$ log-concave; a log-concave density implies IFR (Bagnoli–Bergstrom 2005). | |
| 6 | + | |
| 7 | +Two elementary facts used repeatedly: | |
| 8 | +(F1) $H'(v)=-(1-G(v))$, $M'(v)=-1+h_G(v)M(v)$, hence $M'(v)>-1$ wherever $g(v)>0$ and $M'(v)\le0$ under IFR | |
| 9 | +(because under IFR $M(v)=\int_v^{w_H}\exp(-\int_v^w h_G)\,dw\le\int_v^{\infty}e^{-h_G(v)(w-v)}dw=1/h_G(v)$). | |
| 10 | +(F2) $\frac{d}{dv}E[w\mid w\ge v]=1+M'(v)=h_G(v)M(v)>0$ wherever $g(v)>0$; under IFR, $gH=g(1-G)M\le(1-G)^2$. | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +## Lemma 1 (scale invariance in quality) | |
| 13 | +*Statement.* Let $w=q\varepsilon$ with $\varepsilon\sim G_\varepsilon$, $c=q\kappa$, $k=q\tilde k$, $\kappa_b=q\tilde\kappa_b$. If | |
| 14 | +$(\theta,U,V(\cdot),n(\cdot))$ is a stationary equilibrium of the economy with $q=1$ and primitives $(G_\varepsilon,\kappa,\tilde k,\tilde\kappa_b)$, | |
| 15 | +then $(\theta,qU,qV(\cdot),n(\cdot))$ is a stationary equilibrium of the economy with quality $q$; prices scale by $q$; hazards, | |
| 16 | +durations, $\theta$, $\omega$ and $D(c)$ are invariant. | |
| 17 | +*Proof.* $H_q(qv)=\int(q\varepsilon-qv)^+dG_\varepsilon=qH_1(v)$. Substituting $V_q=qV$, $U_q=qU$ into (S): $(r+\delta)qV=-q\kappa+\Lambda_s\beta qH_1(V+U)$, | |
| 18 | +which is (S) for $q=1$ divided by $q$; same for (B) and $1-G_q(q v)=1-G_\varepsilon(v)$ so hazards and stocks coincide; free entry | |
| 19 | +$qU=q\tilde k$. Prices $p=(1-\beta)qV-\beta qU+\beta q\varepsilon$. $\square$ | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +## Lemma 2 (seller value: existence, uniqueness, smoothness) | |
| 22 | +*Statement.* For any $U\in\mathbb R$, $\Lambda_s>0$, $c\ge0$, equation (S) has a unique solution $V(c)$; $V$ is continuously | |
| 23 | +differentiable in $(c,\Lambda_s,U)$ with | |
| 24 | +$$\partial_cV=\frac{-1}{(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))},\quad | |
| 25 | +\partial_{\Lambda_s}V=\frac{\beta H(v^*)}{(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))},\quad | |
| 26 | +\partial_UV=\frac{-\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))}{(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))}\in(-1,0].$$ | |
| 27 | +*Proof.* $\Phi(V)\equiv-c+\Lambda_s\beta H(V+U)-(r+\delta)V$ is continuous, strictly decreasing ($\Phi'=-\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)-(r+\delta)\le-(r+\delta)<0$), | |
| 28 | +$\Phi(V)\to+\infty$ as $V\to-\infty$ (since $H(v)=E[w]-v$ for $v\le w_L$) and $\Phi(V)\to-\infty$ as $V\to+\infty$ ($H\ge0$). Hence a unique | |
| 29 | +root. $\Phi$ is $C^1$ in all arguments ($H'=-(1-G)$ continuous), and $\Phi_V<0$, so the implicit function theorem gives the derivatives: | |
| 30 | +$\partial_xV=-\Phi_x/\Phi_V$ with $\Phi_c=-1$, $\Phi_{\Lambda_s}=\beta H(v^*)$, $\Phi_U=-\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*))$. $\square$ | |
| 31 | + | |
| 32 | +## Lemma 3 (spurious negative duration dependence) | |
| 33 | +*Statement.* If $\mu(c)\equiv\eta(c)+\delta$ is non-degenerate under $F$, the population exit hazard | |
| 34 | +$\bar h(\tau)=-\frac{d}{d\tau}\ln\bar{\mathcal S}(\tau)$, $\bar{\mathcal S}(\tau)=\int e^{-\mu(c)\tau}dF(c)$, is strictly decreasing in $\tau$, | |
| 35 | +although every individual hazard is constant. | |
| 36 | +*Proof.* $\bar h(\tau)=\int\mu e^{-\mu\tau}dF/\int e^{-\mu\tau}dF=E_\tau[\mu]$ where $E_\tau$ is the expectation under the tilted | |
| 37 | +measure $dF_\tau\propto e^{-\mu\tau}dF$. Differentiating, $\bar h'(\tau)=-\mathrm{Var}_\tau(\mu)<0$. (Classical mixture result; | |
| 38 | +cf. Lancaster 1979.) $\square$ | |
| 39 | + | |
| 40 | +## Proposition 1 (seller urgency) | |
| 41 | +*Statement.* Fix $U$ and $\Lambda_s>0$. (i) $V'(c)=-1/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G(v^*(c)))]\in(-1/(r+\delta),0)$: the reservation | |
| 42 | +price falls with the carrying cost, by less than one-for-one in present-value terms. (ii) The sale hazard $\eta(c)$ is nondecreasing in $c$ | |
| 43 | +and strictly increasing wherever $g(v^*(c))>0$; expected listing duration is nonincreasing. (iii) The expected transaction price | |
| 44 | +$\bar p(c)=V(c)+\beta M(v^*(c))$ is strictly decreasing in $c$, with $\bar p'(c)=V'(c)[1+\beta M'(v^*(c))]$ and $1+\beta M'>1-\beta>0$; under | |
| 45 | +IFR, $|\bar p'(c)|\le|V'(c)|$ (the price falls by less than the reservation price). Hence the urgency discount $D(c)$ is zero at $c_L$, | |
| 46 | +strictly increasing in $c$ and nonnegative. (iv) Under free entry ($U=k$), a type-$c$ seller has $V(c)\ge0$ iff $c\le\bar c\equiv\Lambda_s\beta H(k)$. | |
| 47 | +*Proof.* (i) is Lemma 2. (ii) $\eta(c)=\Lambda_s[1-G(V(c)+U)]$, so $\eta'(c)=-\Lambda_sg(v^*)V'(c)\ge0$, strict iff $g(v^*)>0$. (iii) Conditional on | |
| 48 | +sale, $w\ge v^*$ and $p=V+\beta(w-v^*)$, so $\bar p=V+\beta E[w-v^*\mid w\ge v^*]=V+\beta M(v^*)$. Differentiate: $\bar p'=V'+\beta M'(v^*)v^{*\prime}=V'[1+\beta M']$ | |
| 49 | +because $v^{*\prime}=V'$ ($U$ fixed). By (F1) $M'>-1$ so $1+\beta M'>1-\beta>0$, and $V'<0$ gives $\bar p'<0$. Under IFR $M'\le0$ so | |
| 50 | +$0<1+\beta M'\le1$. $D(c)=1-\bar p(c)/\bar p(c_L)$ inherits monotonicity provided $\bar p(c_L)>0$ (true when $V(c_L)\ge0$). | |
| 51 | +(iv) $\Phi$ is decreasing, so the root is $\ge0$ iff $\Phi(0)\ge0$, i.e. $-c+\Lambda_s\beta H(k)\ge0$. $\square$ | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +## Proposition 2 (effective arrival rate: partial equilibrium) | |
| 54 | +*Statement.* Fix $U$. Let $\Lambda_s=\phi\lambda_s$ (so $A$, $\phi$ and $\theta$ act only through $\Lambda_s$). | |
| 55 | +(i) $\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s>0$ and $\partial\bar p/\partial\Lambda_s>0$ whenever $v^*<w_H$. | |
| 56 | +(ii) If $G$ is IFR, $\partial\eta/\partial\Lambda_s>0$: a decline in arrivals or in qualification lengthens expected time on market. | |
| 57 | +Without IFR the sign can reverse: for Pareto $G(w)=1-(w_L/w)^a$, $a>1$, $\partial\eta/\partial\Lambda_s<0$ iff $\beta\eta(c)>(a-1)(r+\delta)$, | |
| 58 | +which, using (S), is equivalent to $c>\delta w_0+(r+\delta)U$ — a condition independent of $\Lambda_s$: for a sufficiently urgent seller | |
| 59 | +facing heavy-tailed valuations, a more liquid market *lengthens* time on market because the seller becomes pickier faster than | |
| 60 | +buyers arrive. | |
| 61 | +(iii) Under IFR, the reservation-value gap $V(c_L)-V(c)$, $c>c_L$, is strictly decreasing in $\Lambda_s$: lower liquidity widens the | |
| 62 | +cross-sectional dispersion of reservation prices. | |
| 63 | +(iv) Limits (patient type $c=0$, $U=k\le w_L$, $w_H<\infty$): $\lim_{\Lambda_s\to0}\bar p=\beta(E[w]-k)$ and | |
| 64 | +$\lim_{\Lambda_s\to\infty}\bar p=w_H-k$. If $\beta(E[w]-k)<p^*<w_H-k$ (the second inequality holds iff $H(w_H-k)<rk$), the market | |
| 65 | +liquidity gap $\Gamma$ of the patient type is positive in thin markets and negative in thick markets. | |
| 66 | +*Proof.* (i) Lemma 2 gives $\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s=\beta H(v^*)/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)]>0$ when $H(v^*)>0$; and | |
| 67 | +$\partial\bar p/\partial\Lambda_s=\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s\,[1+\beta M'(v^*)]>0$ by (F1). | |
| 68 | +(ii) $\partial\eta/\partial\Lambda_s=(1-G)-\Lambda_sg\,\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s$. Multiplying by the positive denominator, the sign equals that of | |
| 69 | +$(1-G)(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta[(1-G)^2-gH]$, which is positive under IFR by (F2). Pareto: $1-G=(w_L/v)^a$, $g=a w_L^av^{-a-1}$, | |
| 70 | +$M=v/(a-1)$, so $gH=\frac{a}{a-1}(w_L/v)^{2a}$ and $(1-G)^2-gH=-\frac{(1-G)^2}{a-1}$; the sign becomes that of | |
| 71 | +$(1-G)\{(r+\delta)-\beta\Lambda_s(1-G)/(a-1)\}=(1-G)\{(r+\delta)-\beta\eta/(a-1)\}$. For Pareto, $H(v^*)=(1-G(v^*))v^*/(a-1)$, so | |
| 72 | +(S) reads $(r+\delta)V+c-\delta w_0=\beta\eta\,v^*/(a-1)$ with $v^*=V+U$, i.e. $\beta\eta=(a-1)(r+\delta)+(a-1)[c-\delta w_0-(r+\delta)U]/v^*$, | |
| 73 | +whence $\beta\eta>(a-1)(r+\delta)$ iff $c>\delta w_0+(r+\delta)U$. | |
| 74 | +(iii) $V(c_L)-V(c)=\int_{c_L}^{c}\frac{du}{(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(u)}$ by (i) of Proposition 1, and $\eta(u)$ is increasing in $\Lambda_s$ by (ii). | |
| 75 | +(iv) As $\Lambda_s\to0$, (S) gives $V\to-c/(r+\delta)=0$ for $c=0$, so $v^*\to k\le w_L$, $M(k)=E[w]-k$ and $\bar p\to\beta(E[w]-k)$. As | |
| 76 | +$\Lambda_s\to\infty$, $H(v^*)=[(r+\delta)V+c]/(\Lambda_s\beta)\to0$ forces $v^*\to w_H$, so $V\to w_H-k$ and $M(v^*)\to0$. $p^*<w_H-k$ iff | |
| 77 | +$H(p^*)=rk>H(w_H-k)$ since $H$ is decreasing. $\square$ | |
| 78 | + | |
| 79 | +## Proposition 3 (free entry and tightness) | |
| 80 | +*Statement.* (a) Homogeneous sellers ($F$ degenerate at $c$). The free-entry residual | |
| 81 | +$R(\theta)\equiv-\kappa_b+\phi\lambda_b(\theta)(1-\beta)H(V(\theta)+k)-rk$ is continuous and strictly decreasing with $R(0^+)=+\infty$, | |
| 82 | +$R(\infty)=-\kappa_b-rk<0$; hence a unique equilibrium tightness $\theta^*$. Moreover $d\theta^*/d\phi>0$ and $d\theta^*/dA>0$, and | |
| 83 | +$\frac{d\ln\Lambda_s}{d\ln\phi}=1+\alpha\frac{d\ln\theta^*}{d\ln\phi}>1$ (tightness amplifies a qualification shock). In the baseline, $A$ | |
| 84 | +and $\phi$ enter all equilibrium conditions only through the product $\phi A$ (observational equivalence). | |
| 85 | +(b) Heterogeneous sellers: an equilibrium exists; uniqueness is not guaranteed (the stock composition $N$ depends on $\theta$) and is | |
| 86 | +verified numerically by checking the sign pattern of $R$ on a fine grid. | |
| 87 | +*Proof.* (a) $\lambda_b=A\theta^{\alpha-1}$ is strictly decreasing; $V(\theta)$ is increasing in $\theta$ through $\Lambda_s=\phi A\theta^\alpha$ | |
| 88 | +(Proposition 2(i)), so $H(V+k)$ is nonincreasing; the product of a strictly decreasing positive function and a nonincreasing positive | |
| 89 | +function is strictly decreasing. Limits: $\theta\to\infty$ gives $\lambda_b\to0$; $\theta\to0$ gives $\lambda_b\to\infty$ and | |
| 90 | +$H(V+k)\to H(k-c/(r+\delta))>0$. Comparative statics: $\partial R/\partial\phi=(1-\beta)\lambda_b[H-\phi(1-G)\partial V/\partial\phi]$ with | |
| 91 | +$\partial V/\partial\phi=\lambda_s\beta H/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)]$, so $\partial R/\partial\phi=(1-\beta)\lambda_bH\,(r+\delta)/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)]>0$ | |
| 92 | +and $d\theta^*/d\phi=-R_\phi/R_\theta>0$; identical algebra for $A$. Observational equivalence: $\Lambda_s=\phi A\theta^\alpha$, | |
| 93 | +$\Lambda_b=\phi A\theta^{\alpha-1}$. (b) $R$ is continuous in $\theta$ because $V(c;\theta)$, $\eta$, $n$ and $N$ are; the limits are as | |
| 94 | +in (a) (bounded $H$, positive weights), so the intermediate value theorem applies. $\square$ | |
| 95 | + | |
| 96 | +## Proposition 4 (a liquidity shock without a fundamental shock) | |
| 97 | +*Statement.* Let $G$ be IFR. A fall in $A$ or in $\phi$ with $(G,F,r,k,\kappa_b,s)$ unchanged: (i) lowers $V(c)$ and $\bar p(c)$ for every | |
| 98 | +$c$ (partial and, by Proposition 3(a), general equilibrium, where $\theta$ falls as well); (ii) lowers every sale hazard and the sales | |
| 99 | +flow on impact (stock of listings predetermined); (iii) raises the steady-state inventory $S$ and mean listing duration; (iv) lowers the | |
| 100 | +steady-state sales flow iff $\delta>0$ (with $\delta=0$ the steady-state sales flow equals the listing inflow $s$ regardless of liquidity). | |
| 101 | +Transaction prices and volume therefore co-move, and inventory and time on market move inversely, with no change in $G$. | |
| 102 | +*Proof.* (i) Proposition 2(i); in general equilibrium $\theta^*$ falls (Proposition 3(a)), reinforcing the fall in $\Lambda_s$. (ii) | |
| 103 | +Proposition 2(ii); $Q=\int\eta(c)n(c)dc$ with $n$ fixed on impact. (iii) $n(c)=sf(c)/(\eta(c)+\delta)$ rises for every $c$; | |
| 104 | +$E[\tau\mid c]=1/(\eta+\delta)$ rises. (iv) $Q_{ss}=s\int\frac{\eta(c)}{\eta(c)+\delta}dF(c)$, strictly increasing in each $\eta$ iff $\delta>0$. $\square$ | |
| 105 | + | |
| 106 | +## Proposition 5 (price dispersion among identical houses) | |
| 107 | +*Statement.* Conditional on a sale, $\mathrm{Var}_\omega(p)=\beta^2E_\omega[\mathrm{Var}(w\mid w\ge v^*(c))]+\mathrm{Var}_\omega[\bar p(c)]$. | |
| 108 | +(i) The between-type component is strictly positive iff the transaction composition $\omega$ is non-degenerate. | |
| 109 | +(ii) With $\beta=0$ all dispersion is urgency-driven: $p=V(c)$ and $\mathrm{Var}_\omega(p)\le\mathrm{Var}_\omega(c)/(r+\delta)^2$; | |
| 110 | +more generally, under IFR, the range of expected prices satisfies $\bar p(c_L)-\bar p(c_H)\le(c_H-c_L)/(r+\delta)$. | |
| 111 | +(iii) Under IFR the between-type reservation-value gap widens when $\Lambda_s$ falls (Proposition 2(iii)). | |
| 112 | +*Proof.* Law of total variance with $p=(1-\beta)V(c)-\beta U+\beta w$ and $\mathrm{Var}(p\mid c)=\beta^2\mathrm{Var}(w\mid w\ge v^*(c))$. (i) | |
| 113 | +$\bar p$ is strictly monotone (Proposition 1(iii)). (ii) $V$ is Lipschitz with constant $1/(r+\delta)$ (Proposition 1(i)); for any | |
| 114 | +Lipschitz $f$ with constant $L$, $\mathrm{Var}f(X)=\tfrac12E[(f(X)-f(X'))^2]\le L^2\mathrm{Var}X$. Under IFR $|\bar p'|\le|V'|\le1/(r+\delta)$. $\square$ | |
| 115 | + | |
| 116 | +## Proposition 6 (sale selection and transaction-price indices) | |
| 117 | +*Statement.* (i) If $\delta=0$, the steady-state transaction composition is $\omega(c)=f(c)$ for every $\Lambda_s$: comparisons across | |
| 118 | +steady states contain no composition effect, and the entire cross-steady-state price change is a within-type liquidity effect. | |
| 119 | +(ii) *Impact effect.* Consider an unanticipated permanent change $d\ln\Lambda_s$ with the stock $n(\cdot)$ predetermined. Let | |
| 120 | +$\epsilon(c)\equiv\partial\ln\eta(c)/\partial\ln\Lambda_s=1-\beta\eta(c)\,h_G(v^*)M(v^*)/[(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(c)]$. Then | |
| 121 | +$d\ln\omega(c)=[\epsilon(c)-E_\omega\epsilon]\,d\ln\Lambda_s$ and | |
| 122 | +$$d\ln P=\underbrace{E_\omega[d\ln\bar p(c)]}_{\text{within-type (liquidity)}}+\underbrace{\mathrm{Cov}_\omega\big(\bar p(c),\epsilon(c)\big)\,d\ln\Lambda_s/P}_{\text{composition (selection)}}.$$ | |
| 123 | +If $\epsilon(c)$ is decreasing in $c$, the covariance is positive (both $\bar p$ and $\epsilon$ decrease in $c$), so the index falls by | |
| 124 | +more than every within-type price after a negative liquidity shock and rises by more after a positive one: sale selection amplifies | |
| 125 | +measured price responses to liquidity. (iii) For exponential $G$, $\epsilon(c)=(r+\delta)/[(r+\delta)+\beta\eta(c)]\in(0,1)$, strictly | |
| 126 | +decreasing in $c$ (amplification). For Pareto $G$, $h_GM=a/(a-1)$ is constant and $\epsilon(c)$ is again decreasing in $c$. In general, | |
| 127 | +a sufficient condition for amplification is that $v\mapsto h_G(v)M(v)$ be nonincreasing; when $h_GM$ is *increasing* in $v$ (light-tailed | |
| 128 | +$G$ such as the truncated normal, where $h_GM\uparrow1$ in the upper tail) the two factors in $\epsilon$ move in opposite directions and | |
| 129 | +$\epsilon(c)$ can be increasing in $c$, in which case $\mathrm{Cov}_\omega(\bar p,\epsilon)<0$ and selection *dampens* the measured response. The | |
| 130 | +sign of the selection term is therefore a property of the match-value distribution, not a general law; it is reported numerically in | |
| 131 | +Experiment 10 for the truncated normal, exponential, Weibull and Pareto cases. | |
| 132 | +(iv) With $\delta=0$ the composition returns to $f$ in the new steady state, so the impact composition effect is transitory: the observed | |
| 133 | +index overshoots its long-run response. | |
| 134 | +*Proof.* (i) $\omega(c)=\eta(c)n(c)/Q$ with $n=sf/\eta$ and $Q=s$. (ii) $\omega^+\propto\eta^+n$ with $n$ fixed, so | |
| 135 | +$d\ln\omega=d\ln\eta-d\ln Q=(\epsilon-E_\omega\epsilon)d\ln\Lambda_s$. Then $dP=\int\bar p\,d\omega+\int\omega\,d\bar p$ and | |
| 136 | +$\int\bar p\,d\omega=\int\bar p\,\omega(\epsilon-E_\omega\epsilon)\,d\ln\Lambda_s=\mathrm{Cov}_\omega(\bar p,\epsilon)d\ln\Lambda_s$. Two functions | |
| 137 | +that are both decreasing in $c$ are comonotone, hence positively correlated under any $\omega$ (Chebyshev's sum inequality), strictly | |
| 138 | +if both are strictly monotone and $\omega$ non-degenerate. Formula for $\epsilon$: $\eta=\Lambda_s(1-G(v^*))$, | |
| 139 | +$\partial\ln\eta/\partial\ln\Lambda_s=1-h_G(v^*)\Lambda_s\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s=1-h_G\Lambda_s\beta H/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s\beta(1-G)]$ and | |
| 140 | +$\Lambda_sH=\eta M$. (iii) Exponential: $h_GM=1$. If $h_GM$ is nonincreasing in $v$, then as $c$ rises $v^*$ falls, $h_GM$ rises and | |
| 141 | +$\beta\eta/(r+\delta+\beta\eta)$ rises, so $\epsilon$ falls. (iv) is (i). $\square$ | |
| 142 | + | |
| 143 | +## Proposition 7 (financing contingency: cash versus mortgage buyers) | |
| 144 | +*Statement.* In the extension of §6, for a seller of type $c$ and a given match $w$ acceptable to both buyer types, | |
| 145 | +$$p_m(w,c)-p_c(w,c)=\underbrace{\frac{(1-\beta)[c+rV(c)]-\beta[\kappa_b+rU_m]}{\nu\phi}}_{\Delta_b(c)\ \text{(delay-bargaining term)}} | |
| 146 | ++\underbrace{\beta(U_c-U_m)}_{\text{outside-option term}}.$$ | |
| 147 | +(i) $\Delta_b(c)$ is positive iff the seller's bargaining-weighted flow cost of waiting, $(1-\beta)[c+rV(c)]$, exceeds the buyer's, | |
| 148 | +$\beta[\kappa_b+rU_m]$; it is nondecreasing in $c$ ($d\Delta_b/dc=(1-\beta)(1+rV')/(\nu\phi)\ge0$) and vanishes as $\nu\to\infty$. | |
| 149 | +(ii) The acceptance thresholds differ by $v^*_m(c)-v^*_c(c)=\underbrace{[c+\kappa_b+r(V+U_m)]/(\nu\phi)}_{\text{pending wedge}}-(U_c-U_m)$: | |
| 150 | +mortgage agreements require a better match than cash agreements iff the pending wedge exceeds the cash buyers' outside-option | |
| 151 | +advantage $U_c-U_m$ (the wedge is increasing in $c$, so this is more likely for urgent sellers). The observed mean price gap conditional | |
| 152 | +on sale adds the selection term $\beta\{E[w\mid w\ge v^*_m]-E[w\mid w\ge v^*_c]\}$, which has the sign of $v^*_m-v^*_c$ (by (F2)) and can | |
| 153 | +therefore be negative for patient sellers when cash buyers have a sufficiently better outside option. | |
| 154 | +(iii) The baseline screen is the limit $\nu\to\infty$: $v^*_m\to V+U_m$, $\Delta_b\to0$, and the seller's effective contact rate is | |
| 155 | +$\lambda_s[\tilde\pi+(1-\tilde\pi)\phi]$. | |
| 156 | +*Proof.* Pending values are linear in $p$ with slopes $\pm\nu\phi/(r+\nu)$, so the Nash product is maximised where | |
| 157 | +$P_s-V=\beta\Sigma_m$. Writing $\Sigma_m=[\nu\phi(w-V-U_m)-c-\kappa_b-r(V+U_m)]/(r+\nu)$ and solving $P_s-V=\beta\Sigma_m$ for $p$ gives | |
| 158 | +$p_m=V+\beta(w-V-U_m)+\{(1-\beta)[c+rV]-\beta[\kappa_b+rU_m]\}/(\nu\phi)$; subtracting $p_c=V+\beta(w-V-U_c)$ yields the display. | |
| 159 | +(i) $1+rV'=[\delta+\lambda_s\beta(\cdot)]/[(r+\delta)+\lambda_s\beta(\cdot)]\ge0$ where $(\cdot)$ is the positive acceptance mass. (ii) | |
| 160 | +$\Sigma_m\ge0$ iff $w\ge v^*_m$; subtract $v^*_c=V+U_c$; $E[w\mid w\ge v]$ is strictly increasing by (F2). (iii) Direct from the formulas. $\square$ | |
| 161 | + | |
| 162 | +## Proposition 8 (posted prices) | |
| 163 | +*Statement.* Let $g$ be log-concave. (i) The seller's problem $\max_y[1-G(y)](y-U-V)$ has a unique interior solution $y(c)$ characterised by | |
| 164 | +$y-U-V(c)=1/h_G(y)$; (ii) $V(c)$ is unique, with $V'(c)=-1/[(r+\delta)+\Lambda_s(1-G(y(c)))]<0$, and the posted price $p(c)=y(c)-U$ and the | |
| 165 | +threshold $y(c)$ are strictly decreasing in $c$; the hazard is increasing in $c$; (iii) at equal $(V,U)$, $y(c)>v^*_{Nash}(c)=V+U$: posted-price | |
| 166 | +sellers hold out for better matches, and all price dispersion among identical houses is urgency-driven. | |
| 167 | +*Proof.* (i) $\ln[(1-G(y))(y-a)]$ is strictly concave on $(a,w_H)$ (log-concave $g$ implies log-concave $1-G$), zero at both ends; the FOC | |
| 168 | +$-g(y)(y-a)+(1-G(y))=0$ gives the characterisation. (ii) By the envelope theorem the maximised value is decreasing in $V$ with slope | |
| 169 | +$-(1-G(y))$, so $\Phi_P(V)=-c+\Lambda_s\max_y(\cdot)-(r+\delta)V$ is strictly decreasing and has a unique root; the implicit function theorem gives | |
| 170 | +$V'$. $\psi(y)\equiv y-1/h_G(y)$ is strictly increasing under IFR, so $y(c)=\psi^{-1}(U+V(c))$ is strictly increasing in $V$, hence decreasing in $c$. | |
| 171 | +(iii) $1/h_G(y)>0$. $\square$ | |
| 172 | + | |
| 173 | +## Results stated as numerical (no proof attempted) | |
| 174 | +- Uniqueness of $\theta^*$ with heterogeneous sellers (checked on a grid; reported in `validation.md`). | |
| 175 | +- Efficiency: the welfare-maximising $\beta$ relative to the Hosios value $1-\alpha$, with and without heterogeneity. | |
| 176 | +- Monotonicity of $h_GM$ for the truncated normal (checked numerically to justify Proposition 6(iii) in the baseline calibration). | |
| 177 | +- Full transition paths and the size of the index overshoot (Experiment 9–10). | |
added
research/results_audit.md
+68 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Results audit before drafting (Phase 6) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Date: 2026-10-20. Every claim intended for the abstract, results and conclusion is mapped to (a) a proposition in `proofs.md`, | |
| 4 | +(b) an exact result file / figure / table, or (c) a verified citation (`literature_matrix.csv`). Classification: **P** = proved, | |
| 5 | +**N** = numerically illustrated (baseline parameterisation, illustrative), **E** = empirically documented in the literature | |
| 6 | +(cited, not estimated here), **S** = speculative (must be labelled as such or dropped). Numbers quoted in the manuscript are injected | |
| 7 | +through the macros of `paper/tables/numbers.tex`, generated by `src/tables.py` from `results/processed/*.csv`; the values below were | |
| 8 | +read from the same files on 2026-10-20. | |
| 9 | + | |
| 10 | +## A. Claims and their support | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +| # | Claim | Class | Support | | |
| 13 | +|---|---|---|---| | |
| 14 | +| A1 | For given $U$ and $\Lambda_s$, the seller value has a unique solution, $C^1$ in parameters | P | Lemma 2 | | |
| 15 | +| A2 | Reservation price and expected transaction price fall with carrying cost, the sale hazard rises; price falls less than the reservation price under IFR; participation threshold $\bar c=\Lambda_s\beta H(w_0+k)-rw_0$ | P + N | Prop. 1; `exp02_urgency_gradient.csv`, Fig. 2–3, Table 2b; test `test_prop1_monotonicity` | | |
| 16 | +| A3 | Baseline: $\theta^*=4.39$, TOM of sales 2.23 months, buyer duration 10.8 months, price s.d. 3.47\% with between-type share 13.1\%, urgency discount 5.59\% (most urgent) / 1.98\% (weighted), 90.7\% of listings sold | N | `exp01_baseline_moments.csv`, Table 2 | | |
| 17 | +| A4 | Population exit hazard decreases with duration although individual hazards are constant | P + N | Lemma 3; `exp01_baseline_survival.csv`, Fig. 7; analytic decline 5.42→5.30 over 0.6 y; MC inconclusive (validation.md §3) | | |
| 18 | +| A5 | Lower effective arrival rate lowers $V$ and $\bar p$ for every type; under IFR it lowers the hazard and widens the reservation gap | P + N | Prop. 2(i)–(iii); `exp02_urgency_gradient.csv` (five $A$ multiples), `exp03_arrival_shock.csv`, Fig. 2–4 | | |
| 19 | +| A6 | Pareto counterexample: hazard decreasing in $\Lambda_s$ iff $c>\delta w_0+(r+\delta)U$ | P + N | Prop. 2(ii); test `test_prop2_pareto_counterexample` (both signs verified) | | |
| 20 | +| A7 | Market liquidity gap $\Gamma$ relative to the Walrasian free-entry price changes sign: +43\% at $\Lambda_s=0.05$, zero near $\Lambda_s\approx135$, negative beyond | P (limits) + N | Prop. 2(iv); `exp03_gamma_sign_change.csv`, Fig. 4c; baseline $\Gamma=16.6\%$ with $p^*=1.19$ | | |
| 21 | +| A8 | Homogeneous sellers: unique $\theta^*$, $d\theta/d\phi>0$, $d\theta/dA>0$, $A$ and $\phi$ observationally equivalent, amplification elasticity $d\ln\Lambda_s/d\ln\phi=1.10>1$ | P + N | Prop. 3(a); `exp07_amplification.csv` (GE 1.10 vs PE 1.00), test `test_prop3_*` | | |
| 22 | +| A9 | Heterogeneous sellers: equilibrium exists; uniqueness verified numerically (single root in baseline, 60 random draws, 150 global draws) | P (existence) + N (uniqueness) | Prop. 3(b); `exp07_uniqueness_draws.csv`, `exp12_global_sensitivity.csv`, `exp01_free_entry_curve.csv`, Fig. 1a | | |
| 23 | +| A10 | A 50\% fall in $A$ lowers the mean price by 4.8\% (GE) vs 4.3\% (PE), raises TOM from 2.2 to 3.4 months, inventory from 0.186 to 0.284, $\theta$ from 4.39 to 3.73, urgency discount from 5.6\% to 7.6\% | N | `exp03_arrival_shock.csv`, Table 3, Fig. 4, 6 | | |
| 24 | +| A11 | Steady-state sales volume falls with liquidity iff $\delta>0$; with $\delta=0$ volume equals inflow and composition equals $f$ | P + N | Prop. 4(iv), Prop. 6(i); test `test_prop4_liquidity_shock` | | |
| 25 | +| A12 | Between-type variance is positive iff the transaction composition is non-degenerate; $\beta=0$ bound; range bound | P + N | Prop. 5; `exp08_dispersion_vs_beta.csv`, `exp08_heterogeneity_spread.csv`, Table 5, 5b; between share rises from 13.1\% ($c_H=0.3$) to 26.5\% ($c_H=0.6$); and from 13.1\% to 14.0\% when $A\times0.7$ | | |
| 26 | +| A13 | Impact decomposition of the index into within-type and composition terms; sign of the composition term = sign of $\mathrm{Cov}_\omega(\bar p,\epsilon)\,d\ln\Lambda_s$; exponential/Pareto amplify, light-tailed (truncated normal, Weibull shape 2) dampen | P + N | Prop. 6(ii)–(iii); `exp10_selection_decomposition.csv`, `exp10_hazard_times_mrl.csv`, Table 6, Fig. 9; test `test_prop6_impact_composition` | | |
| 27 | +| A14 | Composition term is quantitatively small: at most 0.15 log-\% (Pareto, $c_H=0.6$, $A\times0.7$) against within-type changes of 2–10\%; amplification ratio between 0.979 and 1.023 | N | `exp10_selection_decomposition.csv`, Table 6 | | |
| 28 | +| A15 | Transition after a permanent 20\% fall in $A$: price index jumps by −1.46\% on impact and stays; sales fall 13.1\% on impact and recover to −1.4\%; inventory rises 13.2\% with a half-life of 1.9 months; composition term ≤ 1 bp; temporary shock produces a 27.9\% rebound of sales when liquidity returns | N | `exp09_transition_*.csv`, Table 6b, Fig. 10 | | |
| 29 | +| A16 | Welfare: steady-state flow welfare maximised at $\beta=0.55$ for both homogeneous and heterogeneous sellers (Hosios value 0.50); loss at $\beta=0.5$ is 0.1\%; loss at $\beta=0.2$ is 14.1\%; planner's flow optimum exceeds the decentralised one by 0.30\% (het.) / 0.24\% (hom.) with lower tightness (3.80 vs 4.39) | N (not a theorem; flow criterion, see limitations) | `exp05_bargaining_power.csv`, `exp05_welfare_surface.csv`, `exp05_planner_benchmark.csv`, Table 8, 8b, Fig. 11; cites hosios1990efficiency, gabrovski2025note | | |
| 30 | +| A17 | Financing extension: mortgage–cash gap = delay-bargaining + outside-option + selection; $\Delta_b$ increasing in $c$; selection term has the sign of $v^*_m-v^*_c$ | P | Prop. 7; test `test_financing_extension` (closed form of $\Delta_b$ verified) | | |
| 31 | +| A18 | Baseline extension: weighted gap 1.73\% (patient 1.12\%, urgent 2.96\%) = $\Delta_b$ 0.49\% + outside option 1.61\% + selection −0.37\%; gap rises to 2.42\% at $\phi_m=0.70$ and to 6.0\% with a four-month approval delay; $U_c=0.0426>U_m=0.0103$ | N | `exp04_financing_phi.csv`, `exp04_financing_nu.csv`, Table 4b–4c, Fig. 5 | | |
| 32 | +| A19 | With $\phi_m\le0.60$ mortgage buyers' value is negative (participation violated); results reported only for $\phi_m\ge0.70$ | N (failure region) | Table 4b column $U_m\ge0$ | | |
| 33 | +| A20 | Matching-efficiency vs approval shocks are distinct in the extension: a 30\% fall in $A$ lowers prices by 2.34\% and raises time to closing from 2.97 to 3.44 months; a fall of $\phi_m$ to 0.70 lowers prices by 0.94\%, raises time to closing to 3.31 months and widens the gap to 2.41\% (vs 1.81\%) | N | `exp06_matching_vs_approval.csv`, Table 4e | | |
| 34 | +| A21 | Posted prices: pickier sellers (TOM 4.38 vs 2.23 months), higher prices conditional on sale (1.0195 vs 0.996), lower tightness (2.91), all dispersion between-type by construction (within-type s.d. zero; total s.d. 2.80\%), welfare 11.2\% lower, urgency gradient preserved | P (Prop. 8) + N | `exp11_protocol_comparison.csv`, `exp11_types_*.csv`, Table 9, Fig. 14 | | |
| 35 | +| A22 | Signs robust: in 150 random parameter draws, $D_{urg}>0$ in 100\%, $\bar p$ decreasing in 100\%, $\eta$ increasing in 98.7\% (the exceptions are flat-hazard draws at the discretisation noise level, not reversals); TOM ranges 0.6–10.7 months, $D_{urg}$ 2.9–20.3\% | N | `exp12_global_sensitivity.csv`, `exp12_sensitivity_oat.csv`, Table 7, Fig. 12 | | |
| 36 | +| A23 | Monte Carlo listing simulation reproduces analytic moments within 0.39\% (100,000 listings) | N (validation) | `val_montecarlo.csv`, `validation.json` | | |
| 37 | +| A24 | Empirical magnitudes used for comparison (forced-sale discount ≈27\%; cash discount 2–3.9\%; mortgage premium 11\%; contact-hazard elasticity 0.84) | E | campbell2011forced, han2024cash, reher2024mortgage, genesove2012search | | |
| 38 | + | |
| 39 | +## B. Claims removed or weakened after the audit | |
| 40 | + | |
| 41 | +- "Selection bias amplifies measured price responses" — **weakened**: the sign depends on $G$ (Prop. 6(iii)); for the light-tailed | |
| 42 | + baseline it dampens; magnitudes are second-order (A14). The manuscript states the sign condition and the magnitudes. | |
| 43 | +- "Mortgage deals require better matches" — **weakened** to the conditional statement of Prop. 7(ii); in the baseline the selection | |
| 44 | + term is negative for patient sellers because cash buyers' outside option is better. | |
| 45 | +- "Hosios efficiency with heterogeneous sellers" — **not claimed**; the welfare criterion is the steady-state flow surplus, the optimum | |
| 46 | + is found numerically at $\beta=0.55$ for both economies, and the heterogeneity wedge is negligible (0.01 pp). Presented as a | |
| 47 | + numerical result with the caveat on the flow criterion. | |
| 48 | +- "Prices and volume co-move" — stated with the $\delta>0$ qualification (A11). | |
| 49 | +- Any statement about Québec or Canada — **removed**; no data. | |
| 50 | +- "Liquidity premium $D=(p^*-p)/p^*$ is positive" — **replaced** by the two-object convention (urgency discount $D(c)\ge0$; market gap | |
| 51 | + $\Gamma$ of either sign, A7). | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +## C. Failed experiments and regions without equilibrium | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +- Financing extension, first solver (damped fixed point): divergent; replaced (validation.md §1). | |
| 56 | +- Financing extension with $\phi_m\le0.60$: equilibrium exists but violates buyer participation ($U_m<0$); excluded from the text. | |
| 57 | +- No parameter draw without an equilibrium; no multiple roots detected. | |
| 58 | +- Heavy-tailed match values: equilibria exist but are empirically implausible (prices above the mean valuation); used only as | |
| 59 | + theoretical illustrations. | |
| 60 | + | |
| 61 | +## D. Sign conventions, units, sample selection — checked | |
| 62 | + | |
| 63 | +- All prices and values in units of the mean buyer valuation $q=1$; time in years; hazards per year; months = 12 × years. | |
| 64 | +- $D(c)=1-\bar p(c)/\bar p(c_L)\ge0$; $\Gamma=1-\bar p_T/p^*$ of either sign; composition term $\ln(P^{obs}/P^{fix})$ relative to the | |
| 65 | + pre-shock transaction weights. | |
| 66 | +- Transaction-weighted moments use $\omega(c)=\eta(c)n(c)/Q$; listing-cohort moments use $f(c)$; the stock uses $N(c)$. Each table | |
| 67 | + states which weighting is used. | |
| 68 | +- JEL: R31, R21, D83, C63, G51 (G51 retained because of the financing extension; G12 dropped: no asset-pricing content). | |
added
research/validation.md
+74 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# WP19 — Numerical validation (Phase 3) | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +Date: 2026-10-20. Code: `src/model.py`, `src/solver.py`, `src/diagnostics.py`; tests: `tests/` (pytest 9.1.1, Python 3.14.4, | |
| 4 | +NumPy 2.4.4, SciPy 1.17.1). Logs: `results/logs/pytest_full.log` (**24 passed**), `results/logs/validation.json`, | |
| 5 | +`results/processed/val_montecarlo*.csv`. Configuration hash of the baseline: `0a165f317815d76c` (`Params.config_hash()`), | |
| 6 | +seed 20261020 (recorded in every `results/raw/*.json`). | |
| 7 | + | |
| 8 | +## 1. Solvers | |
| 9 | + | |
| 10 | +| Object | Method | Tolerance | Check | | |
| 11 | +|---|---|---|---| | |
| 12 | +| Seller value $V(c)$ | Brent root of the strictly decreasing $\Phi(V)$ (Lemma 2); bracket widened automatically for unbounded supports | `xtol` 1e-12 | max residual of (S) 3.9e-13 | | |
| 13 | +| Tightness $\theta^*$ | sign scan of the free-entry residual on a 60-point log grid in [0.02, 60], Brent on each sign change; multiplicity reported | 1e-12 | residual 1.6e-17; one root in the baseline and in all 60 random parameter draws (`exp07_uniqueness_draws.csv`) | | |
| 14 | +| Posted prices | seller FOC root (unique under log-concavity) nested in the value root | 1e-12 | FOC residual < 1e-7; posted threshold > Nash threshold for every type | | |
| 15 | +| Financing extension | 3-equation root in $(\ln\theta, U_c, \mathrm{logit}\,\tilde\pi)$ with $U_m$ from ex-ante free entry (hybr, lm fallback) | 1e-12 | residuals < 1e-15; identical solution from three starting points; nests the baseline when $\nu\to\infty$, $\pi\to1$ (relative $\theta$ error 3e-5) | | |
| 16 | +| Planner optimum | Nelder–Mead then Powell on $(\ln\theta, v^*(c_i))$ | 1e-9 | success flag true; welfare ≥ decentralised | | |
| 17 | +| Transition | backward semi-implicit HJB, forward implicit KFE, pointwise free entry, damped iteration on the $\theta$ path | 1e-7 on $\max_t|\Delta\theta_t|$ | 27–46 iterations; terminal stocks match the new steady state to 6e-13; impact composition term equals the static decomposition | | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | +The first implementation of the financing extension used a damped fixed-point iteration on $(U_c,U_m,\tilde\pi)$; it did **not** | |
| 20 | +converge (the buyer map has slope of order $\lambda_b/r\gg1$) and was replaced by the root formulation above. This failure is | |
| 21 | +recorded here rather than hidden. | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +## 2. Unit tests (`tests/`, 24 tests) | |
| 24 | + | |
| 25 | +- Distributions: closed-form $H(v)$ equals $\int_v(1-G)$ by quadrature (truncated normal, exponential, Pareto, Weibull); probability | |
| 26 | + mass one; means; IFR inequality $gH\le(1-G)^2$ for the truncated normal and its violation for Pareto; sample moments vs CDF; | |
| 27 | + discretisation of $F$ (mass one, ordered, mean). | |
| 28 | +- Seller block: residual and uniqueness (sign change of $\Phi$ around the root); Proposition 1 monotonicity and the analytic slope | |
| 29 | + $V'(c)$ against finite differences (5\%); $|\bar p'|\le|V'|$; participation threshold; Proposition 2 (monotonicity in $\Lambda_s$, | |
| 30 | + analytic $\partial V/\partial\Lambda_s$ vs finite difference to 1e-4, hazard increasing under IFR, reservation gap narrowing); the | |
| 31 | + Pareto counterexample with its exact condition $c>\delta w_0+(r+\delta)U$ (both signs); the exponential elasticity formula of | |
| 32 | + Proposition 6; boundary cases (zero urgency and no withdrawal, frozen market $\Lambda_s\to0$, very liquid market $\Lambda_s=10^7$ with | |
| 33 | + $v^*\to w_H$ and $\bar p\to w_H-k$); nonnegative hazards, acceptance probabilities in [0,1], monotone survival; Lemma 3 (population | |
| 34 | + hazard decreasing). | |
| 35 | +- Equilibrium: residuals, stock equation, probability sums, participation, monotone free-entry residual around the root; Proposition 3 | |
| 36 | + (homogeneous sellers: strictly decreasing residual on a 40-point grid, $d\theta/d\phi>0$, $d\theta/dA>0$, $A$–$\phi$ observational | |
| 37 | + equivalence to 1e-8, amplification elasticity > 1); Proposition 4 (prices, hazards, volume, inventory; $\delta=0$ volume invariance and | |
| 38 | + composition $=f$); Proposition 5 bounds (range $\le(c_H-c_L)/(r+\delta)$; $\beta\to0$ variance bound); Proposition 6 impact | |
| 39 | + decomposition (sign of the composition term equals the sign of $\mathrm{Cov}_\omega(\bar p,\epsilon)\,d\ln\Lambda_s$ for the truncated | |
| 40 | + normal and the exponential; analytic $\epsilon(c)$ within 0.02 of the finite-difference elasticity); posted prices; financing | |
| 41 | + extension (residuals, sign of the selection term, closed form of $\Delta_b$, uniqueness from different starts, sales composition $=\pi$); | |
| 42 | + transition (convergence, initial and terminal stocks, sign and size of the impact composition term, slow adjustment of $Q$ and $S$, | |
| 43 | + exponential case amplifying); Walrasian benchmark $H(p^*)=rk$; welfare positivity; grid and tolerance convergence (9 vs 25 types | |
| 44 | + within 1\%; $\theta$ invariant to `xtol` 1e-8 vs 1e-12 within 1e-6). | |
| 45 | + | |
| 46 | +## 3. Monte Carlo cross-check of the analytic solution (`src/diagnostics.py`) | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +Listings are simulated one by one (type draw, Poisson meetings at rate $\Lambda_s$, exponential withdrawal at rate $\delta$, match draw | |
| 49 | +$w\sim G$, acceptance $w\ge v^*(c)$, Nash price) for $n\in\{2{,}000, 20{,}000, 100{,}000\}$ listings and three seeds. | |
| 50 | +At $n=100{,}000$ the maximum absolute relative error between simulated and analytic moments is **0.39\%** (sold share 0.11\%, mean | |
| 51 | +duration 0.35\%, mean price 0.01\%, price s.d. 0.39\%, meetings per listing 0.24\%, mean time on market of sales 0.32\%); per-type mean | |
| 52 | +prices agree within 0.50\% (`val_montecarlo_types.csv`). Identical seeds reproduce identical samples. Errors shrink with $n$ as expected | |
| 53 | +(e.g. mean duration: 4.5\% at $n=2{,}000$, 0.6\% at $n=20{,}000$, 0.35\% at $n=100{,}000$). | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | +Duration dependence: the analytic mixture hazard declines monotonically from 5.42 to 5.30 per year over the first 0.6 years (Lemma 3); | |
| 56 | +the exposure-based empirical hazard tracks it within 4\% but the decline (2.3\%) is below the Monte Carlo noise at long durations, so | |
| 57 | +the empirical first-vs-last comparison is inconclusive at $n=100{,}000$; this is reported as such. | |
| 58 | + | |
| 59 | +## 4. Convergence (Experiment 12) | |
| 60 | + | |
| 61 | +- Seller-type grid: 1, 3, 5, 9, 15, 25, 41, 81 types. With 9 types the mean price differs from the 81-type solution by 2.2e-4 \%; | |
| 62 | + $\theta$, time on market and the mean discount converge monotonically (`exp12_convergence_types.csv`, Figure 13). | |
| 63 | +- Root tolerance 1e-6…1e-12 and 20…120 grid points: $\theta$ identical to 1e-6. | |
| 64 | +- Transition time step 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, 0.01 years: impact and one-year objects converge at first order (`exp12_convergence_dt.csv`). | |
| 65 | + | |
| 66 | +## 5. Boundary and failure regions | |
| 67 | + | |
| 68 | +- Participation: all baseline types satisfy $V(c)\ge w_0$; the threshold $\bar c=\Lambda_s\beta H(w_0+k)-rw_0$ is far above $c_H$. | |
| 69 | + Experiment 2 reports the carrying cost at which participation fails for each arrival rate. | |
| 70 | +- Buyer participation in the financing extension: $U_m<0$ for $\phi_m\le0.60$ (Table 4b): mortgage buyers would prefer to exit, which | |
| 71 | + the model does not allow; these rows are flagged and excluded from the text. | |
| 72 | +- No equilibrium was found in none of the 150 global-sensitivity draws or the 60 uniqueness draws (all converged, single root). | |
| 73 | +- Heavy-tailed $G$ (Pareto $a=4$, Weibull shape 0.8): equilibria exist but prices exceed the mean valuation and the between-type share of | |
| 74 | + dispersion exceeds 90\%, outside the empirically relevant region; used only to illustrate the sign conditions of Propositions 2 and 6. | |
added
research/verification/A_albrecht2007opportunistic.crossref.json
+302 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 6 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-06T02:07:23Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1791252443021, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.1.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 15, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2007, | |
| 23 | + 4, | |
| 24 | + 6 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2007-04-06T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1175817600000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Int Economic Review" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2007, | |
| 46 | + 5 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>We construct a model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow values while searching. Agents enter the market relaxed (with high flow values) but move to a desperate state (low flow values) at a Poisson rate if they have not already transacted. We characterize the equilibrium steady‐state matching pattern and the joint distribution of price and time to sale (for sellers). The expected price conditional on time to sale falls with time spent on the market, whereas the conditional variance of price first rises and then falls with time on the market.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2007, | |
| 57 | + 4, | |
| 58 | + 23 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2007-04-23T01:22:01Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1177291321000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "641-664", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 126, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "OPPORTUNISTIC MATCHING IN THE HOUSING MARKET*" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "48", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "James", | |
| 75 | + "family": "Albrecht", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 78 | + "role": [ | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 81 | + "role": "author" | |
| 82 | + } | |
| 83 | + ] | |
| 84 | + }, | |
| 85 | + { | |
| 86 | + "given": "Axel", | |
| 87 | + "family": "Anderson", | |
| 88 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 89 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 90 | + "role": [ | |
| 91 | + { | |
| 92 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 93 | + "role": "author" | |
| 94 | + } | |
| 95 | + ] | |
| 96 | + }, | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "given": "Eric", | |
| 99 | + "family": "Smith", | |
| 100 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 101 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 102 | + "role": [ | |
| 103 | + { | |
| 104 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 105 | + "role": "author" | |
| 106 | + } | |
| 107 | + ] | |
| 108 | + }, | |
| 109 | + { | |
| 110 | + "given": "Susan", | |
| 111 | + "family": "Vroman", | |
| 112 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 113 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 114 | + "role": [ | |
| 115 | + { | |
| 116 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 117 | + "role": "author" | |
| 118 | + } | |
| 119 | + ] | |
| 120 | + } | |
| 121 | + ], | |
| 122 | + "member": "311", | |
| 123 | + "published-online": { | |
| 124 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 125 | + [ | |
| 126 | + 2007, | |
| 127 | + 4, | |
| 128 | + 6 | |
| 129 | + ] | |
| 130 | + ] | |
| 131 | + }, | |
| 132 | + "reference": [ | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_2_1", | |
| 135 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 136 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00780" | |
| 137 | + }, | |
| 138 | + { | |
| 139 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_3_1", | |
| 140 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 141 | + "DOI": "10.1086/260084" | |
| 142 | + }, | |
| 143 | + { | |
| 144 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_4_1", | |
| 145 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 146 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355397555154" | |
| 147 | + }, | |
| 148 | + { | |
| 149 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_5_1", | |
| 150 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 151 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297410" | |
| 152 | + }, | |
| 153 | + { | |
| 154 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_6_1", | |
| 155 | + "volume-title": "Existence of Independent Random Matching", | |
| 156 | + "author": "Duffie D.", | |
| 157 | + "year": "2004" | |
| 158 | + }, | |
| 159 | + { | |
| 160 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_7_1", | |
| 161 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 162 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00763" | |
| 163 | + }, | |
| 164 | + { | |
| 165 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_8_1", | |
| 166 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 167 | + "DOI": "10.1002/jae.3950070202" | |
| 168 | + }, | |
| 169 | + { | |
| 170 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_9_1", | |
| 171 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 172 | + "DOI": "10.1007/PL00004214" | |
| 173 | + }, | |
| 174 | + { | |
| 175 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_10_1", | |
| 176 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 177 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004" | |
| 178 | + }, | |
| 179 | + { | |
| 180 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_11_1", | |
| 181 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 182 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 183 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1987.12090529", | |
| 184 | + "article-title": "Pricing Strategies and Residential Property Selling Strategies", | |
| 185 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 186 | + "author": "Miller N. F.", | |
| 187 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 188 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 189 | + }, | |
| 190 | + { | |
| 191 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_12_1", | |
| 192 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 193 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1468-0262.00112" | |
| 194 | + }, | |
| 195 | + { | |
| 196 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_13_1", | |
| 197 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 198 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297381" | |
| 199 | + }, | |
| 200 | + { | |
| 201 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_14_1", | |
| 202 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 203 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 204 | + }, | |
| 205 | + { | |
| 206 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_15_1", | |
| 207 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 208 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/8.1.55" | |
| 209 | + }, | |
| 210 | + { | |
| 211 | + "key": "e_1_2_8_16_1", | |
| 212 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 213 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1935966" | |
| 214 | + } | |
| 215 | + ], | |
| 216 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 217 | + "International Economic Review" | |
| 218 | + ], | |
| 219 | + "language": "en", | |
| 220 | + "link": [ | |
| 221 | + { | |
| 222 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fj.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 223 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 224 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 225 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 226 | + }, | |
| 227 | + { | |
| 228 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 229 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 230 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 231 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 232 | + } | |
| 233 | + ], | |
| 234 | + "deposited": { | |
| 235 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 236 | + [ | |
| 237 | + 2023, | |
| 238 | + 10, | |
| 239 | + 10 | |
| 240 | + ] | |
| 241 | + ], | |
| 242 | + "date-time": "2023-10-10T01:52:07Z", | |
| 243 | + "timestamp": 1696902727000 | |
| 244 | + }, | |
| 245 | + "score": 69.31217, | |
| 246 | + "resource": { | |
| 247 | + "primary": { | |
| 248 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x" | |
| 249 | + } | |
| 250 | + }, | |
| 251 | + "issued": { | |
| 252 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 253 | + [ | |
| 254 | + 2007, | |
| 255 | + 4, | |
| 256 | + 6 | |
| 257 | + ] | |
| 258 | + ] | |
| 259 | + }, | |
| 260 | + "references-count": 15, | |
| 261 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 262 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 263 | + "published-print": { | |
| 264 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 265 | + [ | |
| 266 | + 2007, | |
| 267 | + 5 | |
| 268 | + ] | |
| 269 | + ] | |
| 270 | + } | |
| 271 | + }, | |
| 272 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 273 | + "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x" | |
| 274 | + ], | |
| 275 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 276 | + "archive": [ | |
| 277 | + "Portico" | |
| 278 | + ], | |
| 279 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 280 | + "0020-6598", | |
| 281 | + "1468-2354" | |
| 282 | + ], | |
| 283 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 284 | + { | |
| 285 | + "value": "0020-6598", | |
| 286 | + "type": "print" | |
| 287 | + }, | |
| 288 | + { | |
| 289 | + "value": "1468-2354", | |
| 290 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 291 | + } | |
| 292 | + ], | |
| 293 | + "published": { | |
| 294 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 295 | + [ | |
| 296 | + 2007, | |
| 297 | + 4, | |
| 298 | + 6 | |
| 299 | + ] | |
| 300 | + ] | |
| 301 | + } | |
| 302 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_albrecht2016directed.crossref.json
+521 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 6 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-06T02:08:03Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1791252483292, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.1.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 30, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Elsevier BV", | |
| 16 | + "license": [ | |
| 17 | + { | |
| 18 | + "start": { | |
| 19 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 20 | + [ | |
| 21 | + 2016, | |
| 22 | + 1, | |
| 23 | + 1 | |
| 24 | + ] | |
| 25 | + ], | |
| 26 | + "date-time": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 27 | + "timestamp": 1451606400000 | |
| 28 | + }, | |
| 29 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 30 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 31 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/" | |
| 32 | + }, | |
| 33 | + { | |
| 34 | + "start": { | |
| 35 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 36 | + [ | |
| 37 | + 2016, | |
| 38 | + 1, | |
| 39 | + 1 | |
| 40 | + ] | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "date-time": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 43 | + "timestamp": 1451606400000 | |
| 44 | + }, | |
| 45 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 46 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 47 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license" | |
| 48 | + } | |
| 49 | + ], | |
| 50 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 51 | + "domain": [ | |
| 52 | + "elsevier.com", | |
| 53 | + "sciencedirect.com" | |
| 54 | + ], | |
| 55 | + "crossmark-restriction": true | |
| 56 | + }, | |
| 57 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 58 | + "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "published-print": { | |
| 61 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 62 | + [ | |
| 63 | + 2016, | |
| 64 | + 1 | |
| 65 | + ] | |
| 66 | + ] | |
| 67 | + }, | |
| 68 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002", | |
| 69 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 70 | + "created": { | |
| 71 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 72 | + [ | |
| 73 | + 2015, | |
| 74 | + 5, | |
| 75 | + 29 | |
| 76 | + ] | |
| 77 | + ], | |
| 78 | + "date-time": "2015-05-29T00:52:18Z", | |
| 79 | + "timestamp": 1432860738000 | |
| 80 | + }, | |
| 81 | + "page": "218-231", | |
| 82 | + "update-policy": "https://doi.org/10.1016/elsevier_cm_policy", | |
| 83 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 84 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 102, | |
| 85 | + "special_numbering": "C", | |
| 86 | + "title": [ | |
| 87 | + "Directed search in the housing market" | |
| 88 | + ], | |
| 89 | + "prefix": "10.1016", | |
| 90 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 91 | + "author": [ | |
| 92 | + { | |
| 93 | + "given": "James", | |
| 94 | + "family": "Albrecht", | |
| 95 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 96 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 97 | + "role": [ | |
| 98 | + { | |
| 99 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 100 | + "role": "author" | |
| 101 | + } | |
| 102 | + ] | |
| 103 | + }, | |
| 104 | + { | |
| 105 | + "given": "Pieter A.", | |
| 106 | + "family": "Gautier", | |
| 107 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 108 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 109 | + "role": [ | |
| 110 | + { | |
| 111 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 112 | + "role": "author" | |
| 113 | + } | |
| 114 | + ] | |
| 115 | + }, | |
| 116 | + { | |
| 117 | + "given": "Susan", | |
| 118 | + "family": "Vroman", | |
| 119 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 120 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 121 | + "role": [ | |
| 122 | + { | |
| 123 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 124 | + "role": "author" | |
| 125 | + } | |
| 126 | + ] | |
| 127 | + } | |
| 128 | + ], | |
| 129 | + "member": "78", | |
| 130 | + "reference": [ | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0010", | |
| 133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 134 | + "first-page": "641", | |
| 135 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 136 | + "article-title": "Opportunistic matching in the housing market", | |
| 137 | + "volume": "48", | |
| 138 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 139 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 140 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 141 | + }, | |
| 142 | + { | |
| 143 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0020", | |
| 144 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 145 | + "first-page": "389", | |
| 146 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.014", | |
| 147 | + "article-title": "A note on Peters and Severinov ‘Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices’", | |
| 148 | + "volume": "147", | |
| 149 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 150 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 151 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 152 | + }, | |
| 153 | + { | |
| 154 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0030", | |
| 155 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 156 | + "first-page": "3288", | |
| 157 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.10.3288", | |
| 158 | + "article-title": "Efficient entry in competing auctions", | |
| 159 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 160 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 161 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 162 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 163 | + }, | |
| 164 | + { | |
| 165 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0040", | |
| 166 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 167 | + "first-page": "647", | |
| 168 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1913604", | |
| 169 | + "article-title": "Equilibrium selection in signaling games", | |
| 170 | + "volume": "55", | |
| 171 | + "author": "Banks", | |
| 172 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 173 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 174 | + }, | |
| 175 | + { | |
| 176 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0050", | |
| 177 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 178 | + "first-page": "1060", | |
| 179 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261643", | |
| 180 | + "article-title": "The simple economics of optimal auctions", | |
| 181 | + "volume": "97", | |
| 182 | + "author": "Bulow", | |
| 183 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 184 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 185 | + }, | |
| 186 | + { | |
| 187 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0060", | |
| 188 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 189 | + "first-page": "1193", | |
| 190 | + "DOI": "10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.6.1193", | |
| 191 | + "article-title": "Price dispersion with directed search", | |
| 192 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 193 | + "author": "Camera", | |
| 194 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 195 | + "journal-title": "Journal of the European Economic Association" | |
| 196 | + }, | |
| 197 | + { | |
| 198 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0070", | |
| 199 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 200 | + "first-page": "203", | |
| 201 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x", | |
| 202 | + "article-title": "An empirical stationary equilibrium search model of the housing market", | |
| 203 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 204 | + "author": "Carrillo", | |
| 205 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 206 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0080", | |
| 210 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 211 | + "first-page": "299", | |
| 212 | + "DOI": "10.1353/eca.2004.0004", | |
| 213 | + "article-title": "Is there a bubble in the housing market?", | |
| 214 | + "volume": "2003", | |
| 215 | + "author": "Case", | |
| 216 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 217 | + "journal-title": "Brookings Papers on Economic Activity" | |
| 218 | + }, | |
| 219 | + { | |
| 220 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0090", | |
| 221 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 222 | + "first-page": "179", | |
| 223 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1885060", | |
| 224 | + "article-title": "Signaling games and stable equilibria", | |
| 225 | + "volume": "102", | |
| 226 | + "author": "Cho", | |
| 227 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 228 | + "journal-title": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 229 | + }, | |
| 230 | + { | |
| 231 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0100", | |
| 232 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 233 | + "first-page": "1301", | |
| 234 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.006", | |
| 235 | + "article-title": "Pricing and signaling with frictions", | |
| 236 | + "volume": "148", | |
| 237 | + "author": "Delacroix", | |
| 238 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 239 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 240 | + }, | |
| 241 | + { | |
| 242 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0110", | |
| 243 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 244 | + "first-page": "507", | |
| 245 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.03.001", | |
| 246 | + "article-title": "Asymmetric information and list-price reductions in the housing market", | |
| 247 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 248 | + "author": "De Wit", | |
| 249 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 250 | + "journal-title": "Regional Science and Urban Economics" | |
| 251 | + }, | |
| 252 | + { | |
| 253 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0120", | |
| 254 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 255 | + "first-page": "837", | |
| 256 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 257 | + "article-title": "House prices, sales and time on the market: a search-theoretic framework", | |
| 258 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 259 | + "author": "Díaz", | |
| 260 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 261 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 262 | + }, | |
| 263 | + { | |
| 264 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0130", | |
| 265 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 266 | + "first-page": "1354", | |
| 267 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005", | |
| 268 | + "article-title": "Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms", | |
| 269 | + "volume": "145", | |
| 270 | + "author": "Eeckhout", | |
| 271 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 272 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 273 | + }, | |
| 274 | + { | |
| 275 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0140", | |
| 276 | + "series-title": "Game Theory", | |
| 277 | + "author": "Fudenberg", | |
| 278 | + "year": "1992" | |
| 279 | + }, | |
| 280 | + { | |
| 281 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0150", | |
| 282 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 283 | + "first-page": "1823", | |
| 284 | + "DOI": "10.3982/ECTA8535", | |
| 285 | + "article-title": "Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium", | |
| 286 | + "volume": "78", | |
| 287 | + "author": "Guerrieri", | |
| 288 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 289 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 290 | + }, | |
| 291 | + { | |
| 292 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0160", | |
| 293 | + "unstructured": "Han, L., Strange, W., 2014. What is the role of the asking price for a house? Mimeo." | |
| 294 | + }, | |
| 295 | + { | |
| 296 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0170", | |
| 297 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 298 | + "first-page": "35", | |
| 299 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0165-1765(90)90197-9", | |
| 300 | + "article-title": "Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of buyers", | |
| 301 | + "volume": "33", | |
| 302 | + "author": "Harstad", | |
| 303 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 304 | + "journal-title": "Economics Letters" | |
| 305 | + }, | |
| 306 | + { | |
| 307 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0180", | |
| 308 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 309 | + "first-page": "619", | |
| 310 | + "DOI": "10.1006/redy.1999.0089", | |
| 311 | + "article-title": "Bidding for labor", | |
| 312 | + "volume": "3", | |
| 313 | + "author": "Julien", | |
| 314 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 315 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 316 | + }, | |
| 317 | + { | |
| 318 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0190", | |
| 319 | + "unstructured": "Kim, K., Kircher, P., 2013. Efficient competition through cheap talk: competing auctions and competitive search without ex ante price commitment. Mimeo." | |
| 320 | + }, | |
| 321 | + { | |
| 322 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0200", | |
| 323 | + "series-title": "Auction Theory", | |
| 324 | + "author": "Krishna", | |
| 325 | + "year": "2010" | |
| 326 | + }, | |
| 327 | + { | |
| 328 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0210", | |
| 329 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 330 | + "unstructured": "Lester, B., Visschers, L., Wolthoff, R., 2013. Competing with asking prices, Mimeo.", | |
| 331 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.2212945" | |
| 332 | + }, | |
| 333 | + { | |
| 334 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0220", | |
| 335 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 336 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 337 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.001", | |
| 338 | + "article-title": "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets", | |
| 339 | + "volume": "155", | |
| 340 | + "author": "Lester", | |
| 341 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 342 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 343 | + }, | |
| 344 | + { | |
| 345 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0230", | |
| 346 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 347 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 348 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0022-0531(87)90113-X", | |
| 349 | + "article-title": "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders", | |
| 350 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 351 | + "author": "McAfee", | |
| 352 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 353 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 354 | + }, | |
| 355 | + { | |
| 356 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0250", | |
| 357 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 358 | + "first-page": "748", | |
| 359 | + "DOI": "10.1086/525544", | |
| 360 | + "article-title": "A theory of partially directed search", | |
| 361 | + "volume": "115", | |
| 362 | + "author": "Menzio", | |
| 363 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 364 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 365 | + }, | |
| 366 | + { | |
| 367 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0240", | |
| 368 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 369 | + "first-page": "192", | |
| 370 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004", | |
| 371 | + "article-title": "Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England", | |
| 372 | + "volume": "56", | |
| 373 | + "author": "Merlo", | |
| 374 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 375 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 376 | + }, | |
| 377 | + { | |
| 378 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0260", | |
| 379 | + "first-page": "968", | |
| 380 | + "article-title": "Property rights and efficiency in mating, racing and related games", | |
| 381 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 382 | + "author": "Mortensen", | |
| 383 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 384 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 385 | + }, | |
| 386 | + { | |
| 387 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0270", | |
| 388 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 389 | + "first-page": "141", | |
| 390 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jeth.1997.2278", | |
| 391 | + "article-title": "Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices", | |
| 392 | + "volume": "75", | |
| 393 | + "author": "Peters", | |
| 394 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 395 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 396 | + }, | |
| 397 | + { | |
| 398 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0280", | |
| 399 | + "unstructured": "Stacey, D., 2013. Information, commitment, and separation in illiquid housing markets. Mimeo." | |
| 400 | + }, | |
| 401 | + { | |
| 402 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0290", | |
| 403 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 404 | + "first-page": "1270", | |
| 405 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734", | |
| 406 | + "article-title": "Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market model", | |
| 407 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 408 | + "author": "Wheaton", | |
| 409 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 410 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 411 | + }, | |
| 412 | + { | |
| 413 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002_br0300", | |
| 414 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 415 | + "first-page": "71", | |
| 416 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297530", | |
| 417 | + "article-title": "Dynamic markets with competitive bidding", | |
| 418 | + "volume": "55", | |
| 419 | + "author": "Wolinsky", | |
| 420 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 421 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 422 | + } | |
| 423 | + ], | |
| 424 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 425 | + "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 426 | + ], | |
| 427 | + "language": "en", | |
| 428 | + "link": [ | |
| 429 | + { | |
| 430 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S1094202515000368?httpAccept=text/xml", | |
| 431 | + "content-type": "text/xml", | |
| 432 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 433 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 434 | + }, | |
| 435 | + { | |
| 436 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S1094202515000368?httpAccept=text/plain", | |
| 437 | + "content-type": "text/plain", | |
| 438 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 439 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 440 | + } | |
| 441 | + ], | |
| 442 | + "deposited": { | |
| 443 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 444 | + [ | |
| 445 | + 2025, | |
| 446 | + 10, | |
| 447 | + 21 | |
| 448 | + ] | |
| 449 | + ], | |
| 450 | + "date-time": "2025-10-21T21:22:30Z", | |
| 451 | + "timestamp": 1761081750000 | |
| 452 | + }, | |
| 453 | + "score": 83.79876, | |
| 454 | + "resource": { | |
| 455 | + "primary": { | |
| 456 | + "URL": "https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1094202515000368" | |
| 457 | + } | |
| 458 | + }, | |
| 459 | + "issued": { | |
| 460 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 461 | + [ | |
| 462 | + 2016, | |
| 463 | + 1 | |
| 464 | + ] | |
| 465 | + ] | |
| 466 | + }, | |
| 467 | + "references-count": 30, | |
| 468 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 469 | + "S1094202515000368" | |
| 470 | + ], | |
| 471 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002", | |
| 472 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 473 | + "1094-2025" | |
| 474 | + ], | |
| 475 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 476 | + { | |
| 477 | + "value": "1094-2025", | |
| 478 | + "type": "print" | |
| 479 | + } | |
| 480 | + ], | |
| 481 | + "published": { | |
| 482 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 483 | + [ | |
| 484 | + 2016, | |
| 485 | + 1 | |
| 486 | + ] | |
| 487 | + ] | |
| 488 | + }, | |
| 489 | + "assertion": [ | |
| 490 | + { | |
| 491 | + "value": "Elsevier", | |
| 492 | + "name": "publisher", | |
| 493 | + "label": "This article is maintained by" | |
| 494 | + }, | |
| 495 | + { | |
| 496 | + "value": "Directed search in the housing market", | |
| 497 | + "name": "articletitle", | |
| 498 | + "label": "Article Title" | |
| 499 | + }, | |
| 500 | + { | |
| 501 | + "value": "Review of Economic Dynamics", | |
| 502 | + "name": "journaltitle", | |
| 503 | + "label": "Journal Title" | |
| 504 | + }, | |
| 505 | + { | |
| 506 | + "value": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002", | |
| 507 | + "name": "articlelink", | |
| 508 | + "label": "CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version" | |
| 509 | + }, | |
| 510 | + { | |
| 511 | + "value": "article", | |
| 512 | + "name": "content_type", | |
| 513 | + "label": "Content Type" | |
| 514 | + }, | |
| 515 | + { | |
| 516 | + "value": "Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.", | |
| 517 | + "name": "copyright", | |
| 518 | + "label": "Copyright" | |
| 519 | + } | |
| 520 | + ] | |
| 521 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_anenberg2016information.crossref.json
+438 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T01:22:11Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792372931096, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 44, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2016, | |
| 23 | + 11, | |
| 24 | + 10 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2016-11-10T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1478736000000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 9, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Int Economic Review" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2016, | |
| 46 | + 11 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>I examine the effects of seller uncertainty over their home value on the housing market. Using evidence from home listings and transactions data, I first show that sellers do not have full information about current period demand conditions for their homes. I incorporate this type of uncertainty into a dynamic microsearch model of the home selling problem with Bayesian learning. The estimated model highlights how information frictions help to explain the microdecisions of sellers and how these microdecisions affect aggregate market dynamics. The model generates a significant microfounded momentum effect in short‐run aggregate price appreciation rates.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12204", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2016, | |
| 57 | + 11, | |
| 58 | + 16 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2016-11-16T21:13:02Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1479330782000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "1449-1479", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 82, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "INFORMATION FRICTIONS AND HOUSING MARKET DYNAMICS" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "Elliot", | |
| 75 | + "family": "Anenberg", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 78 | + { | |
| 79 | + "name": "Federal Reserve Board U.S.A." | |
| 80 | + } | |
| 81 | + ], | |
| 82 | + "role": [ | |
| 83 | + { | |
| 84 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 85 | + "role": "author" | |
| 86 | + } | |
| 87 | + ] | |
| 88 | + } | |
| 89 | + ], | |
| 90 | + "member": "311", | |
| 91 | + "published-online": { | |
| 92 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 93 | + [ | |
| 94 | + 2016, | |
| 95 | + 11, | |
| 96 | + 10 | |
| 97 | + ] | |
| 98 | + ] | |
| 99 | + }, | |
| 100 | + "reference": [ | |
| 101 | + { | |
| 102 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_2_1", | |
| 103 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 104 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1468-2354.t01-2-00098" | |
| 105 | + }, | |
| 106 | + { | |
| 107 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_3_1", | |
| 108 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 109 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2010.08.003" | |
| 110 | + }, | |
| 111 | + { | |
| 112 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_4_1", | |
| 113 | + "unstructured": "Anenberg E. “Uncertainty Learning and the Value of Information in the Residential Real Estate Market ” Mimeo Duke University 2011b." | |
| 114 | + }, | |
| 115 | + { | |
| 116 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_5_1", | |
| 117 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 118 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.ejor.2006.08.035" | |
| 119 | + }, | |
| 120 | + { | |
| 121 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_6_1", | |
| 122 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 123 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00698" | |
| 124 | + }, | |
| 125 | + { | |
| 126 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_7_1", | |
| 127 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 128 | + "unstructured": "Burnside C. M.Eichenbaum andS.Rebelo “Understanding Booms and Busts in Housing Markets ” Working Paper 16734 National Bureau of Economic Research January2011.", | |
| 129 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w16734" | |
| 130 | + }, | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_8_1", | |
| 133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 134 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.101.5.2108" | |
| 135 | + }, | |
| 136 | + { | |
| 137 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_9_1", | |
| 138 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 139 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x" | |
| 140 | + }, | |
| 141 | + { | |
| 142 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 143 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_10_1", | |
| 144 | + "first-page": "125", | |
| 145 | + "article-title": "The Efficiency of the Market for Single‐Family Homes", | |
| 146 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 147 | + "author": "Case K. E.", | |
| 148 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 149 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 150 | + }, | |
| 151 | + { | |
| 152 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_11_1", | |
| 153 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 154 | + "unstructured": "Chatterjee S. andB.Eyigungor “A Quantitative Analysis of the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis ” Working Paper 11‐26 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia July2011.", | |
| 155 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.1908843" | |
| 156 | + }, | |
| 157 | + { | |
| 158 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_12_1", | |
| 159 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 160 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2527250" | |
| 161 | + }, | |
| 162 | + { | |
| 163 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 164 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_13_1", | |
| 165 | + "first-page": "145", | |
| 166 | + "article-title": "House Price Dynamics: A Survey of Theoretical and Empirical Issues", | |
| 167 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 168 | + "author": "Cho M.", | |
| 169 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 170 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Housing Research" | |
| 171 | + }, | |
| 172 | + { | |
| 173 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_14_1", | |
| 174 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 175 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00612.x" | |
| 176 | + }, | |
| 177 | + { | |
| 178 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_15_1", | |
| 179 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 180 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2298010" | |
| 181 | + }, | |
| 182 | + { | |
| 183 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_16_1", | |
| 184 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 185 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.03.001" | |
| 186 | + }, | |
| 187 | + { | |
| 188 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_17_1", | |
| 189 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 190 | + "DOI": "10.1287/mksc.15.1.1" | |
| 191 | + }, | |
| 192 | + { | |
| 193 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 194 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_18_1", | |
| 195 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 196 | + "article-title": "Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market", | |
| 197 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 198 | + "author": "Genesove D.", | |
| 199 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 200 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 201 | + }, | |
| 202 | + { | |
| 203 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_19_1", | |
| 204 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 205 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355301753265561" | |
| 206 | + }, | |
| 207 | + { | |
| 208 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_20_1", | |
| 209 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 210 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2014.02.003" | |
| 211 | + }, | |
| 212 | + { | |
| 213 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_21_1", | |
| 214 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 215 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00763" | |
| 216 | + }, | |
| 217 | + { | |
| 218 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_22_1", | |
| 219 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 220 | + "DOI": "10.1016/1051-1377(92)90008-E" | |
| 221 | + }, | |
| 222 | + { | |
| 223 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 224 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_23_1", | |
| 225 | + "first-page": "246", | |
| 226 | + "article-title": "Information and Competitive Price Systems", | |
| 227 | + "volume": "66", | |
| 228 | + "author": "Grossman S. J.", | |
| 229 | + "year": "1976", | |
| 230 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 231 | + }, | |
| 232 | + { | |
| 233 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_24_1", | |
| 234 | + "unstructured": "Guren A. andT.McQuade “How Do Foreclosures Exacerabate Housing Downturns?” Mimeo Harvard University 2013." | |
| 235 | + }, | |
| 236 | + { | |
| 237 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_25_1", | |
| 238 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 239 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172" | |
| 240 | + }, | |
| 241 | + { | |
| 242 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_26_1", | |
| 243 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 244 | + "DOI": "10.1287/mksc.1050.0140" | |
| 245 | + }, | |
| 246 | + { | |
| 247 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_27_1", | |
| 248 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 249 | + "DOI": "10.1002/jae.3950070202" | |
| 250 | + }, | |
| 251 | + { | |
| 252 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_28_1", | |
| 253 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 254 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2109768" | |
| 255 | + }, | |
| 256 | + { | |
| 257 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_29_1", | |
| 258 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 259 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00774" | |
| 260 | + }, | |
| 261 | + { | |
| 262 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_30_1", | |
| 263 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 264 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180" | |
| 265 | + }, | |
| 266 | + { | |
| 267 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 268 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_31_1", | |
| 269 | + "first-page": "14", | |
| 270 | + "article-title": "Retail Pricing and Clearance Sales", | |
| 271 | + "volume": "76", | |
| 272 | + "author": "Lazear E. P.", | |
| 273 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 274 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 275 | + }, | |
| 276 | + { | |
| 277 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_32_1", | |
| 278 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 279 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jeconom.2009.09.008" | |
| 280 | + }, | |
| 281 | + { | |
| 282 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_33_1", | |
| 283 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 284 | + "DOI": "10.1162/rest.90.4.599" | |
| 285 | + }, | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_34_1", | |
| 288 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 289 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004" | |
| 290 | + }, | |
| 291 | + { | |
| 292 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_35_1", | |
| 293 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 294 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12111" | |
| 295 | + }, | |
| 296 | + { | |
| 297 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_36_1", | |
| 298 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 299 | + "unstructured": "Mian A. R. A.Sufi andF.Trebbi “Foreclosures House Prices and the Real Economy ” NBER Working Paper w16685 2012.", | |
| 300 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.1722195" | |
| 301 | + }, | |
| 302 | + { | |
| 303 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_37_1", | |
| 304 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 305 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11129-006-9015-z" | |
| 306 | + }, | |
| 307 | + { | |
| 308 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_38_1", | |
| 309 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 310 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991" | |
| 311 | + }, | |
| 312 | + { | |
| 313 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_39_1", | |
| 314 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 315 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x" | |
| 316 | + }, | |
| 317 | + { | |
| 318 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_40_1", | |
| 319 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 320 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.383_1.x" | |
| 321 | + }, | |
| 322 | + { | |
| 323 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_41_1", | |
| 324 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 325 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00173122" | |
| 326 | + }, | |
| 327 | + { | |
| 328 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_42_1", | |
| 329 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 330 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1051-1377(05)80028-2" | |
| 331 | + }, | |
| 332 | + { | |
| 333 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_43_1", | |
| 334 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 335 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444" | |
| 336 | + }, | |
| 337 | + { | |
| 338 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_44_1", | |
| 339 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 340 | + "DOI": "10.1086/258464" | |
| 341 | + }, | |
| 342 | + { | |
| 343 | + "key": "e_1_2_12_45_1", | |
| 344 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 345 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1467-937X.00098" | |
| 346 | + } | |
| 347 | + ], | |
| 348 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 349 | + "International Economic Review" | |
| 350 | + ], | |
| 351 | + "language": "en", | |
| 352 | + "link": [ | |
| 353 | + { | |
| 354 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fiere.12204", | |
| 355 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 356 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 357 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 358 | + }, | |
| 359 | + { | |
| 360 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fiere.12204", | |
| 361 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 362 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 363 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 364 | + }, | |
| 365 | + { | |
| 366 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/iere.12204", | |
| 367 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 368 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 369 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 370 | + } | |
| 371 | + ], | |
| 372 | + "deposited": { | |
| 373 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 374 | + [ | |
| 375 | + 2023, | |
| 376 | + 10, | |
| 377 | + 3 | |
| 378 | + ] | |
| 379 | + ], | |
| 380 | + "date-time": "2023-10-03T13:20:16Z", | |
| 381 | + "timestamp": 1696339216000 | |
| 382 | + }, | |
| 383 | + "score": 71.51917, | |
| 384 | + "resource": { | |
| 385 | + "primary": { | |
| 386 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12204" | |
| 387 | + } | |
| 388 | + }, | |
| 389 | + "issued": { | |
| 390 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 391 | + [ | |
| 392 | + 2016, | |
| 393 | + 11 | |
| 394 | + ] | |
| 395 | + ] | |
| 396 | + }, | |
| 397 | + "references-count": 44, | |
| 398 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 399 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 400 | + "published-print": { | |
| 401 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 402 | + [ | |
| 403 | + 2016, | |
| 404 | + 11 | |
| 405 | + ] | |
| 406 | + ] | |
| 407 | + } | |
| 408 | + }, | |
| 409 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 410 | + "10.1111/iere.12204" | |
| 411 | + ], | |
| 412 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12204", | |
| 413 | + "archive": [ | |
| 414 | + "Portico" | |
| 415 | + ], | |
| 416 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 417 | + "0020-6598", | |
| 418 | + "1468-2354" | |
| 419 | + ], | |
| 420 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 421 | + { | |
| 422 | + "value": "0020-6598", | |
| 423 | + "type": "print" | |
| 424 | + }, | |
| 425 | + { | |
| 426 | + "value": "1468-2354", | |
| 427 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 428 | + } | |
| 429 | + ], | |
| 430 | + "published": { | |
| 431 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 432 | + [ | |
| 433 | + 2016, | |
| 434 | + 11 | |
| 435 | + ] | |
| 436 | + ] | |
| 437 | + } | |
| 438 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_anenberg2020endogenous.crossref.json
+422 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 15 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-15T19:33:56Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792092836504, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 34, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2020, | |
| 23 | + 5, | |
| 24 | + 23 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2020-05-23T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1590192000000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [ | |
| 37 | + "onlinelibrary.wiley.com" | |
| 38 | + ], | |
| 39 | + "crossmark-restriction": true | |
| 40 | + }, | |
| 41 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 42 | + "Int Economic Review" | |
| 43 | + ], | |
| 44 | + "published-print": { | |
| 45 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 46 | + [ | |
| 47 | + 2020, | |
| 48 | + 8 | |
| 49 | + ] | |
| 50 | + ] | |
| 51 | + }, | |
| 52 | + "abstract": "<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>\n <jats:p>This article presents new empirical evidence that internal movement—selling one home and buying another—by existing homeowners within a metropolitan housing market is especially volatile and a substantial driver of fluctuations in transaction volume over the housing market cycle. We develop a search model that shows that the strong procyclicality of internal movement is driven by the cost of simultaneously holding two homes, which varies endogenously over the cycle. The estimated model shows that frictions related to this joint buyer–seller problem substantially amplify cyclical price volatility in housing markets.</jats:p>", | |
| 53 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12454", | |
| 54 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 55 | + "created": { | |
| 56 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 57 | + [ | |
| 58 | + 2020, | |
| 59 | + 3, | |
| 60 | + 20 | |
| 61 | + ] | |
| 62 | + ], | |
| 63 | + "date-time": "2020-03-20T14:35:05Z", | |
| 64 | + "timestamp": 1584714905000 | |
| 65 | + }, | |
| 66 | + "page": "1195-1228", | |
| 67 | + "update-policy": "https://doi.org/10.1002/crossmark_policy", | |
| 68 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 69 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 57, | |
| 70 | + "title": [ | |
| 71 | + "ENDOGENOUS SOURCES OF VOLATILITY IN HOUSING MARKETS: THE JOINT BUYER–SELLER PROBLEM" | |
| 72 | + ], | |
| 73 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 74 | + "volume": "61", | |
| 75 | + "author": [ | |
| 76 | + { | |
| 77 | + "given": "Elliot", | |
| 78 | + "family": "Anenberg", | |
| 79 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 80 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 81 | + { | |
| 82 | + "name": "Federal Reserve Board Washington D.C. U.S.A." | |
| 83 | + } | |
| 84 | + ], | |
| 85 | + "role": [ | |
| 86 | + { | |
| 87 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 88 | + "role": "author" | |
| 89 | + } | |
| 90 | + ] | |
| 91 | + }, | |
| 92 | + { | |
| 93 | + "given": "Patrick", | |
| 94 | + "family": "Bayer", | |
| 95 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 96 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "name": "Duke University" | |
| 99 | + }, | |
| 100 | + { | |
| 101 | + "name": "NBER U.S.A." | |
| 102 | + } | |
| 103 | + ], | |
| 104 | + "role": [ | |
| 105 | + { | |
| 106 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 107 | + "role": "author" | |
| 108 | + } | |
| 109 | + ] | |
| 110 | + } | |
| 111 | + ], | |
| 112 | + "member": "311", | |
| 113 | + "published-online": { | |
| 114 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 115 | + [ | |
| 116 | + 2020, | |
| 117 | + 5, | |
| 118 | + 23 | |
| 119 | + ] | |
| 120 | + ] | |
| 121 | + }, | |
| 122 | + "reference": [ | |
| 123 | + { | |
| 124 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_2_1", | |
| 125 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 126 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x" | |
| 127 | + }, | |
| 128 | + { | |
| 129 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_3_1", | |
| 130 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 131 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2010.08.003" | |
| 132 | + }, | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_4_1", | |
| 135 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 136 | + "unstructured": "Bayer P. C.Geissler andJ. W.Roberts “Speculators and Middlemen: The Role of Flippers in the Housing Market ” Working Paper 16784 National Bureau of Economic Research February 2011.", | |
| 137 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.1754003" | |
| 138 | + }, | |
| 139 | + { | |
| 140 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_5_1", | |
| 141 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 142 | + "DOI": "10.1086/686732" | |
| 143 | + }, | |
| 144 | + { | |
| 145 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_6_1", | |
| 146 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 147 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x" | |
| 148 | + }, | |
| 149 | + { | |
| 150 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_7_1", | |
| 151 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 152 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x" | |
| 153 | + }, | |
| 154 | + { | |
| 155 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_8_1", | |
| 156 | + "first-page": "125", | |
| 157 | + "article-title": "The Efficiency of the Market for Single‐Family Homes", | |
| 158 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 159 | + "author": "Case K. E.", | |
| 160 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 161 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 162 | + }, | |
| 163 | + { | |
| 164 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_9_1", | |
| 165 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 166 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2205" | |
| 167 | + }, | |
| 168 | + { | |
| 169 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_10_1", | |
| 170 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 171 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2012.10.004" | |
| 172 | + }, | |
| 173 | + { | |
| 174 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_11_1", | |
| 175 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 176 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019" | |
| 177 | + }, | |
| 178 | + { | |
| 179 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_12_1", | |
| 180 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 181 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0094-1190(02)00511-9" | |
| 182 | + }, | |
| 183 | + { | |
| 184 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_13_1", | |
| 185 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 186 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2009.10.007" | |
| 187 | + }, | |
| 188 | + { | |
| 189 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_14_1", | |
| 190 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 191 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002" | |
| 192 | + }, | |
| 193 | + { | |
| 194 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_15_1", | |
| 195 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 196 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355301753265561" | |
| 197 | + }, | |
| 198 | + { | |
| 199 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_16_1", | |
| 200 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 201 | + "DOI": "10.1257/000282805774669961" | |
| 202 | + }, | |
| 203 | + { | |
| 204 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_17_1", | |
| 205 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 206 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_18_1", | |
| 210 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 211 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180" | |
| 212 | + }, | |
| 213 | + { | |
| 214 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_19_1", | |
| 215 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 216 | + "unstructured": "Lee D. andW.Van der Klaauw “An Introduction to the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel ” Working Paper 479 FRB of New York Staff November2010.", | |
| 217 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.1719116" | |
| 218 | + }, | |
| 219 | + { | |
| 220 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_20_1", | |
| 221 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 222 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jeconom.2009.09.008" | |
| 223 | + }, | |
| 224 | + { | |
| 225 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_21_1", | |
| 226 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 227 | + "DOI": "10.1162/rest.90.4.599" | |
| 228 | + }, | |
| 229 | + { | |
| 230 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_22_1", | |
| 231 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 232 | + "DOI": "10.1093/jeea/jvz069" | |
| 233 | + }, | |
| 234 | + { | |
| 235 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_23_1", | |
| 236 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 237 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2012.00344.x" | |
| 238 | + }, | |
| 239 | + { | |
| 240 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_24_1", | |
| 241 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 242 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297896" | |
| 243 | + }, | |
| 244 | + { | |
| 245 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_25_1", | |
| 246 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 247 | + "DOI": "10.1093/jeea/jvaa001" | |
| 248 | + }, | |
| 249 | + { | |
| 250 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_26_1", | |
| 251 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 252 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991" | |
| 253 | + }, | |
| 254 | + { | |
| 255 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_27_1", | |
| 256 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 257 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x" | |
| 258 | + }, | |
| 259 | + { | |
| 260 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_28_1", | |
| 261 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 262 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.383_1.x" | |
| 263 | + }, | |
| 264 | + { | |
| 265 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_29_1", | |
| 266 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 267 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406" | |
| 268 | + }, | |
| 269 | + { | |
| 270 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_30_1", | |
| 271 | + "volume-title": "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory", | |
| 272 | + "author": "Pissarides C.", | |
| 273 | + "year": "2000" | |
| 274 | + }, | |
| 275 | + { | |
| 276 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_31_1", | |
| 277 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 278 | + "DOI": "10.1257/000282805774670293" | |
| 279 | + }, | |
| 280 | + { | |
| 281 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_32_1", | |
| 282 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 283 | + "unstructured": "Schulhofer‐Wohl S. “Negative Equity Does Not Reduce Homeowners' Mobility ” Technical Report National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.", | |
| 284 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w16701" | |
| 285 | + }, | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_33_1", | |
| 288 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 289 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1051-1377(05)80028-2" | |
| 290 | + }, | |
| 291 | + { | |
| 292 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_34_1", | |
| 293 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 294 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444" | |
| 295 | + }, | |
| 296 | + { | |
| 297 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_35_1", | |
| 298 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 299 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 300 | + } | |
| 301 | + ], | |
| 302 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 303 | + "International Economic Review" | |
| 304 | + ], | |
| 305 | + "language": "en", | |
| 306 | + "link": [ | |
| 307 | + { | |
| 308 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fiere.12454", | |
| 309 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 310 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 311 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 312 | + }, | |
| 313 | + { | |
| 314 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/iere.12454", | |
| 315 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 316 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 317 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 318 | + }, | |
| 319 | + { | |
| 320 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full-xml/10.1111/iere.12454", | |
| 321 | + "content-type": "application/xml", | |
| 322 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 323 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 324 | + }, | |
| 325 | + { | |
| 326 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/iere.12454", | |
| 327 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 328 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 329 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 330 | + } | |
| 331 | + ], | |
| 332 | + "deposited": { | |
| 333 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 334 | + [ | |
| 335 | + 2023, | |
| 336 | + 9, | |
| 337 | + 5 | |
| 338 | + ] | |
| 339 | + ], | |
| 340 | + "date-time": "2023-09-05T01:27:34Z", | |
| 341 | + "timestamp": 1693877254000 | |
| 342 | + }, | |
| 343 | + "score": 95.38982, | |
| 344 | + "resource": { | |
| 345 | + "primary": { | |
| 346 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12454" | |
| 347 | + } | |
| 348 | + }, | |
| 349 | + "issued": { | |
| 350 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 351 | + [ | |
| 352 | + 2020, | |
| 353 | + 5, | |
| 354 | + 23 | |
| 355 | + ] | |
| 356 | + ] | |
| 357 | + }, | |
| 358 | + "references-count": 34, | |
| 359 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 360 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 361 | + "published-print": { | |
| 362 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 363 | + [ | |
| 364 | + 2020, | |
| 365 | + 8 | |
| 366 | + ] | |
| 367 | + ] | |
| 368 | + } | |
| 369 | + }, | |
| 370 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 371 | + "10.1111/iere.12454" | |
| 372 | + ], | |
| 373 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12454", | |
| 374 | + "archive": [ | |
| 375 | + "Portico" | |
| 376 | + ], | |
| 377 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 378 | + "0020-6598", | |
| 379 | + "1468-2354" | |
| 380 | + ], | |
| 381 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 382 | + { | |
| 383 | + "value": "0020-6598", | |
| 384 | + "type": "print" | |
| 385 | + }, | |
| 386 | + { | |
| 387 | + "value": "1468-2354", | |
| 388 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 389 | + } | |
| 390 | + ], | |
| 391 | + "published": { | |
| 392 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 393 | + [ | |
| 394 | + 2020, | |
| 395 | + 5, | |
| 396 | + 23 | |
| 397 | + ] | |
| 398 | + ] | |
| 399 | + }, | |
| 400 | + "assertion": [ | |
| 401 | + { | |
| 402 | + "value": "2018-03-15", | |
| 403 | + "order": 0, | |
| 404 | + "name": "received", | |
| 405 | + "label": "Received", | |
| 406 | + "group": { | |
| 407 | + "name": "publication_history", | |
| 408 | + "label": "Publication History" | |
| 409 | + } | |
| 410 | + }, | |
| 411 | + { | |
| 412 | + "value": "2020-05-23", | |
| 413 | + "order": 2, | |
| 414 | + "name": "published", | |
| 415 | + "label": "Published", | |
| 416 | + "group": { | |
| 417 | + "name": "publication_history", | |
| 418 | + "label": "Publication History" | |
| 419 | + } | |
| 420 | + } | |
| 421 | + ] | |
| 422 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_arnold1999search.crossref.json
+251 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 9, | |
| 7 | + 24 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-09-24T15:40:57Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1790264457228, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.1.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 13, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2003, | |
| 23 | + 9, | |
| 24 | + 22 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2003-09-22T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1064188800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 1482, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 1999, | |
| 46 | + 9 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>This paper analyzes a search‐and‐bargaining model in which the asking price influences the rate at which potential customers arrive to inspect the seller's house, and the buyer's valuation of the asset is not learned until after the seller makes his initial offer (the asking price). The optimal asking and reservation prices are characterized, and the existence of a subgame‐perfect equilibrium asking‐price—reservation‐price strategy is established. Comparative‐statics analysis illustrates how seller and buyer discount rates and the buyer's outside opportunity affect the optimal reservation and asking prices.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00780", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2003, | |
| 57 | + 9, | |
| 58 | + 22 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2003-09-22T11:34:20Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1064230460000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "453-481", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 134, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "Michael A.", | |
| 75 | + "family": "Arnold", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 78 | + "role": [ | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 81 | + "role": "author" | |
| 82 | + } | |
| 83 | + ] | |
| 84 | + } | |
| 85 | + ], | |
| 86 | + "member": "311", | |
| 87 | + "published-online": { | |
| 88 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 89 | + [ | |
| 90 | + 2003, | |
| 91 | + 9, | |
| 92 | + 22 | |
| 93 | + ] | |
| 94 | + ] | |
| 95 | + }, | |
| 96 | + "reference": [ | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_2_1", | |
| 99 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 100 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297510" | |
| 101 | + }, | |
| 102 | + { | |
| 103 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_3_1", | |
| 104 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 105 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2555923" | |
| 106 | + }, | |
| 107 | + { | |
| 108 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_4_1", | |
| 109 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 110 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297780" | |
| 111 | + }, | |
| 112 | + { | |
| 113 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_5_1", | |
| 114 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 115 | + "DOI": "10.1017/CBO9780511528309.006" | |
| 116 | + }, | |
| 117 | + { | |
| 118 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_6_1", | |
| 119 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 120 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1884679" | |
| 121 | + }, | |
| 122 | + { | |
| 123 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_7_1", | |
| 124 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 125 | + "article-title": "Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market", | |
| 126 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 127 | + "author": "Genesove D.", | |
| 128 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 129 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 130 | + }, | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_8_1", | |
| 133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 134 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00463" | |
| 135 | + }, | |
| 136 | + { | |
| 137 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_9_1", | |
| 138 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 139 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x" | |
| 140 | + }, | |
| 141 | + { | |
| 142 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_10_1", | |
| 143 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 144 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912531" | |
| 145 | + }, | |
| 146 | + { | |
| 147 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_11_1", | |
| 148 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 149 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1913509" | |
| 150 | + }, | |
| 151 | + { | |
| 152 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_12_1", | |
| 153 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 154 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0022-0531(87)90090-1" | |
| 155 | + }, | |
| 156 | + { | |
| 157 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_13_1", | |
| 158 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 159 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00595" | |
| 160 | + }, | |
| 161 | + { | |
| 162 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_14_1", | |
| 163 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 164 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00668" | |
| 165 | + } | |
| 166 | + ], | |
| 167 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 168 | + "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 169 | + ], | |
| 170 | + "language": "en", | |
| 171 | + "link": [ | |
| 172 | + { | |
| 173 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2F1540-6229.00780", | |
| 174 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 175 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 176 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 177 | + }, | |
| 178 | + { | |
| 179 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1540-6229.00780", | |
| 180 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 181 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 182 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 183 | + } | |
| 184 | + ], | |
| 185 | + "deposited": { | |
| 186 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 187 | + [ | |
| 188 | + 2023, | |
| 189 | + 10, | |
| 190 | + 29 | |
| 191 | + ] | |
| 192 | + ], | |
| 193 | + "date-time": "2023-10-29T13:01:25Z", | |
| 194 | + "timestamp": 1698584485000 | |
| 195 | + }, | |
| 196 | + "score": 86.420364, | |
| 197 | + "resource": { | |
| 198 | + "primary": { | |
| 199 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1540-6229.00780" | |
| 200 | + } | |
| 201 | + }, | |
| 202 | + "issued": { | |
| 203 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 204 | + [ | |
| 205 | + 1999, | |
| 206 | + 9 | |
| 207 | + ] | |
| 208 | + ] | |
| 209 | + }, | |
| 210 | + "references-count": 13, | |
| 211 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 212 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 213 | + "published-print": { | |
| 214 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 215 | + [ | |
| 216 | + 1999, | |
| 217 | + 9 | |
| 218 | + ] | |
| 219 | + ] | |
| 220 | + } | |
| 221 | + }, | |
| 222 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 223 | + "10.1111/1540-6229.00780" | |
| 224 | + ], | |
| 225 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00780", | |
| 226 | + "archive": [ | |
| 227 | + "Portico" | |
| 228 | + ], | |
| 229 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 230 | + "1080-8620", | |
| 231 | + "1540-6229" | |
| 232 | + ], | |
| 233 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 234 | + { | |
| 235 | + "value": "1080-8620", | |
| 236 | + "type": "print" | |
| 237 | + }, | |
| 238 | + { | |
| 239 | + "value": "1540-6229", | |
| 240 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 241 | + } | |
| 242 | + ], | |
| 243 | + "published": { | |
| 244 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 245 | + [ | |
| 246 | + 1999, | |
| 247 | + 9 | |
| 248 | + ] | |
| 249 | + ] | |
| 250 | + } | |
| 251 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_arnott1989housing.crossref.json
+256 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 5, | |
| 7 | + 29 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-05-29T14:42:35Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1780065755772, | |
| 12 | + "version": "3.54.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 11, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Springer Science and Business Media LLC", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 1989, | |
| 23 | + 2, | |
| 24 | + 1 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "1989-02-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 602294400000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://www.springer.com/tdm" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "J Real Estate Finan Econ" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 1989, | |
| 46 | + 2 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "DOI": "10.1007/bf00161714", | |
| 51 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 52 | + "created": { | |
| 53 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 54 | + [ | |
| 55 | + 2004, | |
| 56 | + 11, | |
| 57 | + 6 | |
| 58 | + ] | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "date-time": "2004-11-06T13:27:09Z", | |
| 61 | + "timestamp": 1099747629000 | |
| 62 | + }, | |
| 63 | + "page": "5-30", | |
| 64 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 65 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 99, | |
| 66 | + "title": [ | |
| 67 | + "Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes" | |
| 68 | + ], | |
| 69 | + "prefix": "10.1007", | |
| 70 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 71 | + "author": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "given": "Richard", | |
| 74 | + "family": "Arnott", | |
| 75 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 76 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 77 | + "role": [ | |
| 78 | + { | |
| 79 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 80 | + "role": "author" | |
| 81 | + } | |
| 82 | + ] | |
| 83 | + } | |
| 84 | + ], | |
| 85 | + "member": "297", | |
| 86 | + "reference": [ | |
| 87 | + { | |
| 88 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR1", | |
| 89 | + "volume-title": "Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics", | |
| 90 | + "author": "R. Arnott", | |
| 91 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 92 | + "unstructured": "Arnott, R. “Economic Theory and Housing.” In E.S. Mills, ed., Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987a." | |
| 93 | + }, | |
| 94 | + { | |
| 95 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR2", | |
| 96 | + "unstructured": "Arnott, R. “Alternative Explanations of Housing Vacancies.” Mimeo, 1987b." | |
| 97 | + }, | |
| 98 | + { | |
| 99 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR3", | |
| 100 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 101 | + "first-page": "767", | |
| 102 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912653", | |
| 103 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 104 | + "author": "A. Palma de", | |
| 105 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 106 | + "unstructured": "de Palma, A.; Ginsburgh, V.; Papageorgiou, Y.; and Thisse, J. “The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity.” Econometrica 53 (1985), 767–781.", | |
| 107 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 108 | + }, | |
| 109 | + { | |
| 110 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR4", | |
| 111 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 112 | + "first-page": "282", | |
| 113 | + "DOI": "10.2307/3003332", | |
| 114 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 115 | + "author": "P. Diamond", | |
| 116 | + "year": "1979", | |
| 117 | + "unstructured": "Diamond, P. and Maskin, E. “An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract. I. Steady States.” Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1979), 282–316.", | |
| 118 | + "journal-title": "Bell Journal of Economics" | |
| 119 | + }, | |
| 120 | + { | |
| 121 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR5", | |
| 122 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 123 | + "first-page": "208", | |
| 124 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0094-1190(85)90047-6", | |
| 125 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 126 | + "author": "J. Guasch", | |
| 127 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 128 | + "unstructured": "Guasch, J. and Marshall, R. “An Analysis of Vacancy Patterns in Rental Housing Markets.” Journal of Urban Economics 17 (1985), 208–229.", | |
| 129 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 130 | + }, | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR6", | |
| 133 | + "volume-title": "Inequalities", | |
| 134 | + "author": "G. Hardy", | |
| 135 | + "year": "1934", | |
| 136 | + "unstructured": "Hardy, G.; Littlewood, J.; and Polya, G. Inequalities. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1934." | |
| 137 | + }, | |
| 138 | + { | |
| 139 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR7", | |
| 140 | + "unstructured": "Hosios, A. “On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment.” Mimeo, 1986." | |
| 141 | + }, | |
| 142 | + { | |
| 143 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR8", | |
| 144 | + "volume-title": "Cities and Housing", | |
| 145 | + "author": "R. Muth", | |
| 146 | + "year": "1969", | |
| 147 | + "unstructured": "Muth, R. Cities and Housing Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969." | |
| 148 | + }, | |
| 149 | + { | |
| 150 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR9", | |
| 151 | + "unstructured": "Read, C. “Three Essays on Vacancies in Rental Housing Markets.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University, 1987." | |
| 152 | + }, | |
| 153 | + { | |
| 154 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR10", | |
| 155 | + "unstructured": "Rosen, K. and Smith, L. “The Price Adjustment Process for Rental Housing and the Natural Vacancy Rate.” American Economic Review (1983), 779–786." | |
| 156 | + }, | |
| 157 | + { | |
| 158 | + "key": "BF00161714_CR11", | |
| 159 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 160 | + "first-page": "407", | |
| 161 | + "DOI": "10.1080/00420988420080791", | |
| 162 | + "volume": "21", | |
| 163 | + "author": "L. Smith", | |
| 164 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 165 | + "unstructured": "Smith, L., et al. “The Demand for Housing, Household Headship Rates, and Household Formation.” Urban Studies 21 (1985), 407–414.", | |
| 166 | + "journal-title": "Urban Studies" | |
| 167 | + } | |
| 168 | + ], | |
| 169 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 170 | + "The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 171 | + ], | |
| 172 | + "language": "en", | |
| 173 | + "link": [ | |
| 174 | + { | |
| 175 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00161714.pdf", | |
| 176 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 177 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 178 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 179 | + }, | |
| 180 | + { | |
| 181 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00161714/fulltext.html", | |
| 182 | + "content-type": "text/html", | |
| 183 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 184 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 185 | + }, | |
| 186 | + { | |
| 187 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00161714", | |
| 188 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 189 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 190 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 191 | + } | |
| 192 | + ], | |
| 193 | + "deposited": { | |
| 194 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 195 | + [ | |
| 196 | + 2019, | |
| 197 | + 4, | |
| 198 | + 8 | |
| 199 | + ] | |
| 200 | + ], | |
| 201 | + "date-time": "2019-04-08T16:28:16Z", | |
| 202 | + "timestamp": 1554740896000 | |
| 203 | + }, | |
| 204 | + "score": 68.797035, | |
| 205 | + "resource": { | |
| 206 | + "primary": { | |
| 207 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00161714" | |
| 208 | + } | |
| 209 | + }, | |
| 210 | + "issued": { | |
| 211 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 212 | + [ | |
| 213 | + 1989, | |
| 214 | + 2 | |
| 215 | + ] | |
| 216 | + ] | |
| 217 | + }, | |
| 218 | + "references-count": 11, | |
| 219 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 220 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 221 | + "published-print": { | |
| 222 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 223 | + [ | |
| 224 | + 1989, | |
| 225 | + 2 | |
| 226 | + ] | |
| 227 | + ] | |
| 228 | + } | |
| 229 | + }, | |
| 230 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 231 | + "BF00161714" | |
| 232 | + ], | |
| 233 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00161714", | |
| 234 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 235 | + "0895-5638", | |
| 236 | + "1573-045X" | |
| 237 | + ], | |
| 238 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 239 | + { | |
| 240 | + "value": "0895-5638", | |
| 241 | + "type": "print" | |
| 242 | + }, | |
| 243 | + { | |
| 244 | + "value": "1573-045X", | |
| 245 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 246 | + } | |
| 247 | + ], | |
| 248 | + "published": { | |
| 249 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 250 | + [ | |
| 251 | + 1989, | |
| 252 | + 2 | |
| 253 | + ] | |
| 254 | + ] | |
| 255 | + } | |
| 256 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_bagnoli2005logconcave.crossref.json
+185 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T15:47:49Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792424869977, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.5.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 0, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Springer Science and Business Media LLC", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2005, | |
| 23 | + 8, | |
| 24 | + 1 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2005-08-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1122854400000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://www.springer.com/tdm" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Economic Theory" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2005, | |
| 46 | + 8 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4", | |
| 51 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 52 | + "created": { | |
| 53 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 54 | + [ | |
| 55 | + 2004, | |
| 56 | + 12, | |
| 57 | + 7 | |
| 58 | + ] | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "date-time": "2004-12-07T09:07:08Z", | |
| 61 | + "timestamp": 1102410428000 | |
| 62 | + }, | |
| 63 | + "page": "445-469", | |
| 64 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 65 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 1088, | |
| 66 | + "title": [ | |
| 67 | + "Log-concave probability and its applications" | |
| 68 | + ], | |
| 69 | + "prefix": "10.1007", | |
| 70 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 71 | + "author": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "given": "Mark", | |
| 74 | + "family": "Bagnoli", | |
| 75 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 76 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 77 | + "role": [ | |
| 78 | + { | |
| 79 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 80 | + "role": "author" | |
| 81 | + } | |
| 82 | + ] | |
| 83 | + }, | |
| 84 | + { | |
| 85 | + "given": "Ted", | |
| 86 | + "family": "Bergstrom", | |
| 87 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 88 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 89 | + "role": [ | |
| 90 | + { | |
| 91 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 92 | + "role": "author" | |
| 93 | + } | |
| 94 | + ] | |
| 95 | + } | |
| 96 | + ], | |
| 97 | + "member": "297", | |
| 98 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 99 | + "Economic Theory" | |
| 100 | + ], | |
| 101 | + "language": "en", | |
| 102 | + "link": [ | |
| 103 | + { | |
| 104 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4.pdf", | |
| 105 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 106 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 107 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 108 | + }, | |
| 109 | + { | |
| 110 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4/fulltext.html", | |
| 111 | + "content-type": "text/html", | |
| 112 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 113 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 114 | + }, | |
| 115 | + { | |
| 116 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4", | |
| 117 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 118 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 119 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 120 | + } | |
| 121 | + ], | |
| 122 | + "deposited": { | |
| 123 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 124 | + [ | |
| 125 | + 2019, | |
| 126 | + 5, | |
| 127 | + 23 | |
| 128 | + ] | |
| 129 | + ], | |
| 130 | + "date-time": "2019-05-23T15:09:40Z", | |
| 131 | + "timestamp": 1558624180000 | |
| 132 | + }, | |
| 133 | + "score": 81.72279, | |
| 134 | + "resource": { | |
| 135 | + "primary": { | |
| 136 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4" | |
| 137 | + } | |
| 138 | + }, | |
| 139 | + "issued": { | |
| 140 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 141 | + [ | |
| 142 | + 2005, | |
| 143 | + 8 | |
| 144 | + ] | |
| 145 | + ] | |
| 146 | + }, | |
| 147 | + "references-count": 0, | |
| 148 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 149 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 150 | + "published-print": { | |
| 151 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 152 | + [ | |
| 153 | + 2005, | |
| 154 | + 8 | |
| 155 | + ] | |
| 156 | + ] | |
| 157 | + } | |
| 158 | + }, | |
| 159 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 160 | + "514" | |
| 161 | + ], | |
| 162 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4", | |
| 163 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 164 | + "0938-2259", | |
| 165 | + "1432-0479" | |
| 166 | + ], | |
| 167 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 168 | + { | |
| 169 | + "value": "0938-2259", | |
| 170 | + "type": "print" | |
| 171 | + }, | |
| 172 | + { | |
| 173 | + "value": "1432-0479", | |
| 174 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 175 | + } | |
| 176 | + ], | |
| 177 | + "published": { | |
| 178 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 179 | + [ | |
| 180 | + 2005, | |
| 181 | + 8 | |
| 182 | + ] | |
| 183 | + ] | |
| 184 | + } | |
| 185 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_bian2018bargaining.crossref.json
+212 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2025, | |
| 6 | + 11, | |
| 7 | + 14 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2025-11-14T07:36:22Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1763105782128 | |
| 12 | + }, | |
| 13 | + "reference-count": 0, | |
| 14 | + "publisher": "Informa UK Limited", | |
| 15 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 16 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 17 | + "domain": [ | |
| 18 | + "www.tandfonline.com" | |
| 19 | + ], | |
| 20 | + "crossmark-restriction": true | |
| 21 | + }, | |
| 22 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 23 | + "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 24 | + ], | |
| 25 | + "published-print": { | |
| 26 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 27 | + [ | |
| 28 | + 2018, | |
| 29 | + 7, | |
| 30 | + 1 | |
| 31 | + ] | |
| 32 | + ] | |
| 33 | + }, | |
| 34 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506", | |
| 35 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 36 | + "created": { | |
| 37 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 38 | + [ | |
| 39 | + 2021, | |
| 40 | + 3, | |
| 41 | + 3 | |
| 42 | + ] | |
| 43 | + ], | |
| 44 | + "date-time": "2021-03-03T15:28:49Z", | |
| 45 | + "timestamp": 1614785329000 | |
| 46 | + }, | |
| 47 | + "page": "419-452", | |
| 48 | + "update-policy": "http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/tandf_crossmark_01", | |
| 49 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 50 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 11, | |
| 51 | + "title": [ | |
| 52 | + "Bargaining, Mortgage Financing, and Housing Prices" | |
| 53 | + ], | |
| 54 | + "prefix": "10.1080", | |
| 55 | + "volume": "40", | |
| 56 | + "author": [ | |
| 57 | + { | |
| 58 | + "given": "Xun", | |
| 59 | + "family": "Bian", | |
| 60 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 61 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 62 | + "role": [ | |
| 63 | + { | |
| 64 | + "role": "author", | |
| 65 | + "vocabulary": "crossref" | |
| 66 | + } | |
| 67 | + ] | |
| 68 | + }, | |
| 69 | + { | |
| 70 | + "given": "Zhenguo", | |
| 71 | + "family": "Lin", | |
| 72 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 73 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 74 | + "role": [ | |
| 75 | + { | |
| 76 | + "role": "author", | |
| 77 | + "vocabulary": "crossref" | |
| 78 | + } | |
| 79 | + ] | |
| 80 | + }, | |
| 81 | + { | |
| 82 | + "given": "Yingchun", | |
| 83 | + "family": "Liu", | |
| 84 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 85 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 86 | + "role": [ | |
| 87 | + { | |
| 88 | + "role": "author", | |
| 89 | + "vocabulary": "crossref" | |
| 90 | + } | |
| 91 | + ] | |
| 92 | + } | |
| 93 | + ], | |
| 94 | + "member": "301", | |
| 95 | + "published-online": { | |
| 96 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 97 | + [ | |
| 98 | + 2020, | |
| 99 | + 6, | |
| 100 | + 17 | |
| 101 | + ] | |
| 102 | + ] | |
| 103 | + }, | |
| 104 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 105 | + "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 106 | + ], | |
| 107 | + "original-title": [], | |
| 108 | + "language": "en", | |
| 109 | + "link": [ | |
| 110 | + { | |
| 111 | + "URL": "https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506", | |
| 112 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 113 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 114 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 115 | + } | |
| 116 | + ], | |
| 117 | + "deposited": { | |
| 118 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 119 | + [ | |
| 120 | + 2021, | |
| 121 | + 3, | |
| 122 | + 3 | |
| 123 | + ] | |
| 124 | + ], | |
| 125 | + "date-time": "2021-03-03T19:11:20Z", | |
| 126 | + "timestamp": 1614798680000 | |
| 127 | + }, | |
| 128 | + "score": 1, | |
| 129 | + "resource": { | |
| 130 | + "primary": { | |
| 131 | + "URL": "https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506" | |
| 132 | + } | |
| 133 | + }, | |
| 134 | + "subtitle": [], | |
| 135 | + "short-title": [], | |
| 136 | + "issued": { | |
| 137 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 138 | + [ | |
| 139 | + 2018, | |
| 140 | + 7, | |
| 141 | + 1 | |
| 142 | + ] | |
| 143 | + ] | |
| 144 | + }, | |
| 145 | + "references-count": 0, | |
| 146 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 147 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 148 | + "published-print": { | |
| 149 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 150 | + [ | |
| 151 | + 2018, | |
| 152 | + 7, | |
| 153 | + 1 | |
| 154 | + ] | |
| 155 | + ] | |
| 156 | + } | |
| 157 | + }, | |
| 158 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 159 | + "10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506" | |
| 160 | + ], | |
| 161 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091506", | |
| 162 | + "relation": {}, | |
| 163 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 164 | + "0896-5803", | |
| 165 | + "2691-1175" | |
| 166 | + ], | |
| 167 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 168 | + { | |
| 169 | + "value": "0896-5803", | |
| 170 | + "type": "print" | |
| 171 | + }, | |
| 172 | + { | |
| 173 | + "value": "2691-1175", | |
| 174 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 175 | + } | |
| 176 | + ], | |
| 177 | + "subject": [], | |
| 178 | + "published": { | |
| 179 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 180 | + [ | |
| 181 | + 2018, | |
| 182 | + 7, | |
| 183 | + 1 | |
| 184 | + ] | |
| 185 | + ] | |
| 186 | + }, | |
| 187 | + "assertion": [ | |
| 188 | + { | |
| 189 | + "value": "The publishing and review policy for this title is described in its Aims & Scope.", | |
| 190 | + "order": 1, | |
| 191 | + "name": "peerreview_statement", | |
| 192 | + "label": "Peer Review Statement" | |
| 193 | + }, | |
| 194 | + { | |
| 195 | + "value": "http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=rjer20", | |
| 196 | + "URL": "http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=rjer20", | |
| 197 | + "order": 2, | |
| 198 | + "name": "aims_and_scope_url", | |
| 199 | + "label": "Aim & Scope" | |
| 200 | + }, | |
| 201 | + { | |
| 202 | + "value": "2020-06-17", | |
| 203 | + "order": 3, | |
| 204 | + "name": "published", | |
| 205 | + "label": "Published", | |
| 206 | + "group": { | |
| 207 | + "name": "publication_history", | |
| 208 | + "label": "Publication History" | |
| 209 | + } | |
| 210 | + } | |
| 211 | + ] | |
| 212 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_bond2007marketing.crossref.json
+396 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 14 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-14T23:46:46Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792021606149, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 17, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Springer Science and Business Media LLC", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2007, | |
| 23 | + 3, | |
| 24 | + 30 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2007-03-30T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1175212800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "https://www.springer.com/tdm" | |
| 33 | + }, | |
| 34 | + { | |
| 35 | + "start": { | |
| 36 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 37 | + [ | |
| 38 | + 2007, | |
| 39 | + 3, | |
| 40 | + 30 | |
| 41 | + ] | |
| 42 | + ], | |
| 43 | + "date-time": "2007-03-30T00:00:00Z", | |
| 44 | + "timestamp": 1175212800000 | |
| 45 | + }, | |
| 46 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 47 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 48 | + "URL": "https://www.springer.com/tdm" | |
| 49 | + } | |
| 50 | + ], | |
| 51 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 52 | + "domain": [ | |
| 53 | + "link.springer.com" | |
| 54 | + ], | |
| 55 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 56 | + }, | |
| 57 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 58 | + "J Real Estate Finan Econ" | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "published-print": { | |
| 61 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 62 | + [ | |
| 63 | + 2007, | |
| 64 | + 5 | |
| 65 | + ] | |
| 66 | + ] | |
| 67 | + }, | |
| 68 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1", | |
| 69 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 70 | + "created": { | |
| 71 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 72 | + [ | |
| 73 | + 2007, | |
| 74 | + 3, | |
| 75 | + 29 | |
| 76 | + ] | |
| 77 | + ], | |
| 78 | + "date-time": "2007-03-29T18:44:57Z", | |
| 79 | + "timestamp": 1175193897000 | |
| 80 | + }, | |
| 81 | + "page": "447-461", | |
| 82 | + "update-policy": "https://doi.org/10.1007/springer_crossmark_policy", | |
| 83 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 84 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 53, | |
| 85 | + "title": [ | |
| 86 | + "Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Theory and Empirical Estimates from the UK Commercial Real Estate Market" | |
| 87 | + ], | |
| 88 | + "prefix": "10.1007", | |
| 89 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 90 | + "author": [ | |
| 91 | + { | |
| 92 | + "given": "Shaun A.", | |
| 93 | + "family": "Bond", | |
| 94 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 95 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 96 | + "role": [ | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 99 | + "role": "author" | |
| 100 | + } | |
| 101 | + ] | |
| 102 | + }, | |
| 103 | + { | |
| 104 | + "given": "Soosung", | |
| 105 | + "family": "Hwang", | |
| 106 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 107 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 108 | + "role": [ | |
| 109 | + { | |
| 110 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 111 | + "role": "author" | |
| 112 | + } | |
| 113 | + ] | |
| 114 | + }, | |
| 115 | + { | |
| 116 | + "given": "Zhenguo", | |
| 117 | + "family": "Lin", | |
| 118 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 119 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 120 | + "role": [ | |
| 121 | + { | |
| 122 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 123 | + "role": "author" | |
| 124 | + } | |
| 125 | + ] | |
| 126 | + }, | |
| 127 | + { | |
| 128 | + "given": "Kerry D.", | |
| 129 | + "family": "Vandell", | |
| 130 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 131 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 132 | + "role": [ | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 135 | + "role": "author" | |
| 136 | + } | |
| 137 | + ] | |
| 138 | + } | |
| 139 | + ], | |
| 140 | + "member": "297", | |
| 141 | + "published-online": { | |
| 142 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 143 | + [ | |
| 144 | + 2007, | |
| 145 | + 3, | |
| 146 | + 30 | |
| 147 | + ] | |
| 148 | + ] | |
| 149 | + }, | |
| 150 | + "reference": [ | |
| 151 | + { | |
| 152 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 153 | + "key": "9022_CR1", | |
| 154 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 155 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 156 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1386-4181(01)00024-6", | |
| 157 | + "volume": "5", | |
| 158 | + "author": "Y. Amihud", | |
| 159 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 160 | + "unstructured": "Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross section and time series effects. Journal of Financial Markets, 5(1), 31–56.", | |
| 161 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Financial Markets" | |
| 162 | + }, | |
| 163 | + { | |
| 164 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 165 | + "key": "9022_CR2", | |
| 166 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 167 | + "first-page": "223", | |
| 168 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-405X(86)90065-6", | |
| 169 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 170 | + "author": "Y. Amihud", | |
| 171 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 172 | + "unstructured": "Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and bid-ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics, 17(2), 223–249.", | |
| 173 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Financial Economics" | |
| 174 | + }, | |
| 175 | + { | |
| 176 | + "key": "9022_CR3", | |
| 177 | + "unstructured": "Anglin, P. M. (2003). The value and liquidity effects of a change in market conditions. Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Windsor." | |
| 178 | + }, | |
| 179 | + { | |
| 180 | + "key": "9022_CR4", | |
| 181 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 182 | + "first-page": "577", | |
| 183 | + "DOI": "10.1046/j.1080-8620.2003.00077.x", | |
| 184 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 185 | + "author": "S. A. Bond", | |
| 186 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 187 | + "unstructured": "Bond, S. A., & Hwang, S. (2003). A measure of fundamental volatility in the commercial property market. Real Estate Economics, 31, 577–600.", | |
| 188 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 189 | + }, | |
| 190 | + { | |
| 191 | + "key": "9022_CR5", | |
| 192 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 193 | + "unstructured": "Bond, S. A., & Hwang, S. (2005). Smoothing, nonsynchronous appraisal and cross-sectional aggregation in real estate price indices. Paper presented to the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Annual Conference, Philadelphia.", | |
| 194 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.556095" | |
| 195 | + }, | |
| 196 | + { | |
| 197 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 198 | + "key": "9022_CR6", | |
| 199 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 200 | + "first-page": "205", | |
| 201 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00063", | |
| 202 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 203 | + "author": "D. Collet", | |
| 204 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 205 | + "unstructured": "Collet, D., Lizieri, C. M., & Ward, C. W. R. (2003). Time and holding periods of institutional real estate. Real Estate Economics, 31(2), 205–222.", | |
| 206 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "9022_CR7", | |
| 210 | + "unstructured": "Crosby, N., & McAllister, P. (2004). Disconstructing the transaction process. Investment Property Forum Working Paper 2 in the series on Liquidity in Commercial Property Markets." | |
| 211 | + }, | |
| 212 | + { | |
| 213 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 214 | + "key": "9022_CR8", | |
| 215 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 216 | + "first-page": "2185", | |
| 217 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6261.00493", | |
| 218 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 219 | + "author": "D. Easley", | |
| 220 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 221 | + "unstructured": "Easley, D., Hvidkjaer, S., & O’Hara, M. (2002). Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance, 57(5), 2185–2221.", | |
| 222 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Finance" | |
| 223 | + }, | |
| 224 | + { | |
| 225 | + "key": "9022_CR9", | |
| 226 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 227 | + "unstructured": "Feldman, B. E. (2003). Investment policy for securitized and direct real estate: Correcting for liquidity. The Journal of Portfolio Management: Real Estate Issue, 112–121.", | |
| 228 | + "DOI": "10.3905/jpm.2003.319912" | |
| 229 | + }, | |
| 230 | + { | |
| 231 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 232 | + "key": "9022_CR10", | |
| 233 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 234 | + "first-page": "269", | |
| 235 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00066", | |
| 236 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 237 | + "author": "J. Fisher", | |
| 238 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 239 | + "unstructured": "Fisher, J., Gatzlaff, D., Geltner, D., & Haurin, D. R. (2003). Controlling for the impact of variable liquidity in commercial real estate price indicies. Real Estate Economics, 31(2), 269–303.", | |
| 240 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 241 | + }, | |
| 242 | + { | |
| 243 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 244 | + "key": "9022_CR11", | |
| 245 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 246 | + "first-page": "239", | |
| 247 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1080-8620.2004.00091.x", | |
| 248 | + "volume": "32", | |
| 249 | + "author": "J. Fisher", | |
| 250 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 251 | + "unstructured": "Fisher, J., Gatzlaff, D., Geltner, D., & Haurin, D. R. (2004). An analysis of the determinants of transaction frequency of institutional commercial real estate investment property. Real Estate Economics, 32(2), 239–264.", | |
| 252 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 253 | + }, | |
| 254 | + { | |
| 255 | + "key": "9022_CR12", | |
| 256 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 257 | + "unstructured": "Hudson-Wilson, S., Fabozzi, F. J., & Gordon, J. N. (2003). Why real estate. The Journal of Portfolio Management: Real Estate Issue, 12–24.", | |
| 258 | + "DOI": "10.3905/jpm.2003.319902" | |
| 259 | + }, | |
| 260 | + { | |
| 261 | + "key": "9022_CR13", | |
| 262 | + "unstructured": "Key, T. (2004). Defining liquidity in property. Investment Property Forum Working Paper 3 in the series on Liquidity in Commercial Property Markets." | |
| 263 | + }, | |
| 264 | + { | |
| 265 | + "key": "9022_CR14", | |
| 266 | + "unstructured": "Lin, Z. (2004). Essays on illiquidity and pricing bias in the real estate market, PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison." | |
| 267 | + }, | |
| 268 | + { | |
| 269 | + "key": "9022_CR15", | |
| 270 | + "unstructured": "Lin, Z., & Vandell, K. D. (2001). Illiquidity and real estate risk. Paper Presented to the Asian Real Estate Society Annual Conference, Tokyo." | |
| 271 | + }, | |
| 272 | + { | |
| 273 | + "key": "9022_CR16", | |
| 274 | + "unstructured": "Lin, Z., & Vandell, K. D. (2005). Illiquidity and pricing biases in the real estate market. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison." | |
| 275 | + }, | |
| 276 | + { | |
| 277 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 278 | + "key": "9022_CR17", | |
| 279 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 280 | + "first-page": "642", | |
| 281 | + "DOI": "10.1086/374184", | |
| 282 | + "volume": "111", | |
| 283 | + "author": "L. Pastor", | |
| 284 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 285 | + "unstructured": "Pastor, L., & Stambough, R. (2003). Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Journal of Political Economy, 111(3), 642–685.", | |
| 286 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 287 | + } | |
| 288 | + ], | |
| 289 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 290 | + "The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 291 | + ], | |
| 292 | + "language": "en", | |
| 293 | + "link": [ | |
| 294 | + { | |
| 295 | + "URL": "https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1.pdf", | |
| 296 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 297 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 298 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 299 | + }, | |
| 300 | + { | |
| 301 | + "URL": "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1/fulltext.html", | |
| 302 | + "content-type": "text/html", | |
| 303 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 304 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 305 | + }, | |
| 306 | + { | |
| 307 | + "URL": "http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1", | |
| 308 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 309 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 310 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 311 | + }, | |
| 312 | + { | |
| 313 | + "URL": "https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1.pdf", | |
| 314 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 315 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 316 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 317 | + } | |
| 318 | + ], | |
| 319 | + "deposited": { | |
| 320 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 321 | + [ | |
| 322 | + 2022, | |
| 323 | + 5, | |
| 324 | + 18 | |
| 325 | + ] | |
| 326 | + ], | |
| 327 | + "date-time": "2022-05-18T04:30:31Z", | |
| 328 | + "timestamp": 1652848231000 | |
| 329 | + }, | |
| 330 | + "score": 109.30115, | |
| 331 | + "resource": { | |
| 332 | + "primary": { | |
| 333 | + "URL": "https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1" | |
| 334 | + } | |
| 335 | + }, | |
| 336 | + "issued": { | |
| 337 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 338 | + [ | |
| 339 | + 2007, | |
| 340 | + 3, | |
| 341 | + 30 | |
| 342 | + ] | |
| 343 | + ] | |
| 344 | + }, | |
| 345 | + "references-count": 17, | |
| 346 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 347 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 348 | + "published-print": { | |
| 349 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 350 | + [ | |
| 351 | + 2007, | |
| 352 | + 5 | |
| 353 | + ] | |
| 354 | + ] | |
| 355 | + } | |
| 356 | + }, | |
| 357 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 358 | + "9022" | |
| 359 | + ], | |
| 360 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1", | |
| 361 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 362 | + "0895-5638", | |
| 363 | + "1573-045X" | |
| 364 | + ], | |
| 365 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 366 | + { | |
| 367 | + "value": "0895-5638", | |
| 368 | + "type": "print" | |
| 369 | + }, | |
| 370 | + { | |
| 371 | + "value": "1573-045X", | |
| 372 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 373 | + } | |
| 374 | + ], | |
| 375 | + "published": { | |
| 376 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 377 | + [ | |
| 378 | + 2007, | |
| 379 | + 3, | |
| 380 | + 30 | |
| 381 | + ] | |
| 382 | + ] | |
| 383 | + }, | |
| 384 | + "assertion": [ | |
| 385 | + { | |
| 386 | + "value": "30 March 2007", | |
| 387 | + "order": 1, | |
| 388 | + "name": "first_online", | |
| 389 | + "label": "First Online", | |
| 390 | + "group": { | |
| 391 | + "name": "ArticleHistory", | |
| 392 | + "label": "Article History" | |
| 393 | + } | |
| 394 | + } | |
| 395 | + ] | |
| 396 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_burdett1983equilibrium.crossref.json
+138 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 11 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-11T03:42:13Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1791690133095, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.3.4" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 0, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "JSTOR", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 17 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 18 | + "domain": [], | |
| 19 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 20 | + }, | |
| 21 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 22 | + "Econometrica" | |
| 23 | + ], | |
| 24 | + "published-print": { | |
| 25 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 26 | + [ | |
| 27 | + 1983, | |
| 28 | + 7 | |
| 29 | + ] | |
| 30 | + ] | |
| 31 | + }, | |
| 32 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912045", | |
| 33 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 34 | + "created": { | |
| 35 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 36 | + [ | |
| 37 | + 2006, | |
| 38 | + 7, | |
| 39 | + 5 | |
| 40 | + ] | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "date-time": "2006-07-05T17:18:33Z", | |
| 43 | + "timestamp": 1152119913000 | |
| 44 | + }, | |
| 45 | + "page": "955", | |
| 46 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 47 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 905, | |
| 48 | + "title": [ | |
| 49 | + "Equilibrium Price Dispersion" | |
| 50 | + ], | |
| 51 | + "prefix": "10.2307", | |
| 52 | + "volume": "51", | |
| 53 | + "author": [ | |
| 54 | + { | |
| 55 | + "given": "Kenneth", | |
| 56 | + "family": "Burdett", | |
| 57 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 58 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 59 | + "role": [ | |
| 60 | + { | |
| 61 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 62 | + "role": "author" | |
| 63 | + } | |
| 64 | + ] | |
| 65 | + }, | |
| 66 | + { | |
| 67 | + "given": "Kenneth L.", | |
| 68 | + "family": "Judd", | |
| 69 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 70 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 71 | + "role": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 74 | + "role": "author" | |
| 75 | + } | |
| 76 | + ] | |
| 77 | + } | |
| 78 | + ], | |
| 79 | + "member": "1121", | |
| 80 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 81 | + "Econometrica" | |
| 82 | + ], | |
| 83 | + "deposited": { | |
| 84 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 85 | + [ | |
| 86 | + 2018, | |
| 87 | + 5, | |
| 88 | + 9 | |
| 89 | + ] | |
| 90 | + ], | |
| 91 | + "date-time": "2018-05-09T08:53:15Z", | |
| 92 | + "timestamp": 1525855995000 | |
| 93 | + }, | |
| 94 | + "score": 75.38008, | |
| 95 | + "resource": { | |
| 96 | + "primary": { | |
| 97 | + "URL": "https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912045?origin=crossref" | |
| 98 | + } | |
| 99 | + }, | |
| 100 | + "issued": { | |
| 101 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 102 | + [ | |
| 103 | + 1983, | |
| 104 | + 7 | |
| 105 | + ] | |
| 106 | + ] | |
| 107 | + }, | |
| 108 | + "references-count": 0, | |
| 109 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 110 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 111 | + "published-print": { | |
| 112 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 113 | + [ | |
| 114 | + 1983, | |
| 115 | + 7 | |
| 116 | + ] | |
| 117 | + ] | |
| 118 | + } | |
| 119 | + }, | |
| 120 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.2307/1912045", | |
| 121 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 122 | + "0012-9682" | |
| 123 | + ], | |
| 124 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 125 | + { | |
| 126 | + "value": "0012-9682", | |
| 127 | + "type": "print" | |
| 128 | + } | |
| 129 | + ], | |
| 130 | + "published": { | |
| 131 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 132 | + [ | |
| 133 | + 1983, | |
| 134 | + 7 | |
| 135 | + ] | |
| 136 | + ] | |
| 137 | + } | |
| 138 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_caplin2011trading.crossref.json
+312 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 9, | |
| 7 | + 4 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-09-04T10:51:01Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1788519061027, | |
| 12 | + "version": "build-2803163510" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 22, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "s2", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2011, | |
| 23 | + 9, | |
| 24 | + 23 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2011-09-23T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1316736000000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "J of Money Credit Banking" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2011, | |
| 46 | + 10 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>We model liquidity in housing markets. The model provides a simple characterization for the joint process of prices, sales, and inventory. We compare the implications of the model to certain properties of housing markets. The model can generate the large price changes and the positive correlation between prices and sales that we see in the data. Unlike the data, prices are negatively autocorrelated and high inventory predicts price appreciation. We investigate several amendments to the model. Informational frictions show promise.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2011, | |
| 57 | + 9, | |
| 58 | + 27 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2011-09-27T15:29:29Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1317137369000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "283-303", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 81, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "ANDREW", | |
| 75 | + "family": "CAPLIN", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 78 | + "role": [ | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 81 | + "role": "author" | |
| 82 | + } | |
| 83 | + ] | |
| 84 | + }, | |
| 85 | + { | |
| 86 | + "given": "JOHN", | |
| 87 | + "family": "LEAHY", | |
| 88 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 89 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 90 | + "role": [ | |
| 91 | + { | |
| 92 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 93 | + "role": "author" | |
| 94 | + } | |
| 95 | + ] | |
| 96 | + } | |
| 97 | + ], | |
| 98 | + "member": "311", | |
| 99 | + "published-online": { | |
| 100 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 101 | + [ | |
| 102 | + 2011, | |
| 103 | + 9, | |
| 104 | + 23 | |
| 105 | + ] | |
| 106 | + ] | |
| 107 | + }, | |
| 108 | + "reference": [ | |
| 109 | + { | |
| 110 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_2_1", | |
| 111 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 112 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x" | |
| 113 | + }, | |
| 114 | + { | |
| 115 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_3_1", | |
| 116 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 117 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00790" | |
| 118 | + }, | |
| 119 | + { | |
| 120 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_4_1", | |
| 121 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 122 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261907" | |
| 123 | + }, | |
| 124 | + { | |
| 125 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_5_1", | |
| 126 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 127 | + "unstructured": "Caplin Andrew andJohnLeahy. (2008) “Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics.” NBER Working Paper No. 14605.", | |
| 128 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w14605" | |
| 129 | + }, | |
| 130 | + { | |
| 131 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_6_1", | |
| 132 | + "first-page": "125", | |
| 133 | + "article-title": "The Efficiency of the Market for Single‐Family Homes", | |
| 134 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 135 | + "author": "Case Karl", | |
| 136 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 137 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 138 | + }, | |
| 139 | + { | |
| 140 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_7_1", | |
| 141 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 142 | + "DOI": "10.1080/0042098002168" | |
| 143 | + }, | |
| 144 | + { | |
| 145 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_8_1", | |
| 146 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 147 | + "unstructured": "Glaeser Edward andJosephGyourko. (2006) “Housing Dynamics.” NBER Working Paper No. 12787.", | |
| 148 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w12787" | |
| 149 | + }, | |
| 150 | + { | |
| 151 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_9_1", | |
| 152 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 153 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.5.1878" | |
| 154 | + }, | |
| 155 | + { | |
| 156 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_10_1", | |
| 157 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 158 | + "DOI": "10.1086/254195" | |
| 159 | + }, | |
| 160 | + { | |
| 161 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_11_1", | |
| 162 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 163 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00038" | |
| 164 | + }, | |
| 165 | + { | |
| 166 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_12_1", | |
| 167 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 168 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180" | |
| 169 | + }, | |
| 170 | + { | |
| 171 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_13_1", | |
| 172 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 173 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1913837" | |
| 174 | + }, | |
| 175 | + { | |
| 176 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_14_1", | |
| 177 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 178 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0022-0531(74)90106-9" | |
| 179 | + }, | |
| 180 | + { | |
| 181 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_15_1", | |
| 182 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 183 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004" | |
| 184 | + }, | |
| 185 | + { | |
| 186 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_16_1", | |
| 187 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 188 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x" | |
| 189 | + }, | |
| 190 | + { | |
| 191 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_17_1", | |
| 192 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 193 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.383_1.x" | |
| 194 | + }, | |
| 195 | + { | |
| 196 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_18_1", | |
| 197 | + "unstructured": "Peach Richard. (1983) “An Econometric Model of Investment in Single Family Homes.” University of Maryland Dissertation ." | |
| 198 | + }, | |
| 199 | + { | |
| 200 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_19_1", | |
| 201 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 202 | + "DOI": "10.1086/260391" | |
| 203 | + }, | |
| 204 | + { | |
| 205 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_20_1", | |
| 206 | + "volume-title": "Recurisive Macroeconomic Theory", | |
| 207 | + "author": "Sargent Thomas", | |
| 208 | + "year": "2004" | |
| 209 | + }, | |
| 210 | + { | |
| 211 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_21_1", | |
| 212 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 213 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.97.4.1074" | |
| 214 | + }, | |
| 215 | + { | |
| 216 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_22_1", | |
| 217 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 218 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444" | |
| 219 | + }, | |
| 220 | + { | |
| 221 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_23_1", | |
| 222 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 223 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 224 | + } | |
| 225 | + ], | |
| 226 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 227 | + "Journal of Money, Credit and Banking" | |
| 228 | + ], | |
| 229 | + "language": "en", | |
| 230 | + "link": [ | |
| 231 | + { | |
| 232 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fj.1538-4616.2011.00436.x", | |
| 233 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 234 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 235 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 236 | + }, | |
| 237 | + { | |
| 238 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x", | |
| 239 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 240 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 241 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 242 | + } | |
| 243 | + ], | |
| 244 | + "deposited": { | |
| 245 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 246 | + [ | |
| 247 | + 2023, | |
| 248 | + 9, | |
| 249 | + 26 | |
| 250 | + ] | |
| 251 | + ], | |
| 252 | + "date-time": "2023-09-26T13:34:25Z", | |
| 253 | + "timestamp": 1695735265000 | |
| 254 | + }, | |
| 255 | + "score": 95.697, | |
| 256 | + "resource": { | |
| 257 | + "primary": { | |
| 258 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x" | |
| 259 | + } | |
| 260 | + }, | |
| 261 | + "issued": { | |
| 262 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 263 | + [ | |
| 264 | + 2011, | |
| 265 | + 9, | |
| 266 | + 23 | |
| 267 | + ] | |
| 268 | + ] | |
| 269 | + }, | |
| 270 | + "references-count": 22, | |
| 271 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 272 | + "issue": "s2", | |
| 273 | + "published-print": { | |
| 274 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 275 | + [ | |
| 276 | + 2011, | |
| 277 | + 10 | |
| 278 | + ] | |
| 279 | + ] | |
| 280 | + } | |
| 281 | + }, | |
| 282 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 283 | + "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x" | |
| 284 | + ], | |
| 285 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x", | |
| 286 | + "archive": [ | |
| 287 | + "Portico" | |
| 288 | + ], | |
| 289 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 290 | + "0022-2879", | |
| 291 | + "1538-4616" | |
| 292 | + ], | |
| 293 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 294 | + { | |
| 295 | + "value": "0022-2879", | |
| 296 | + "type": "print" | |
| 297 | + }, | |
| 298 | + { | |
| 299 | + "value": "1538-4616", | |
| 300 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 301 | + } | |
| 302 | + ], | |
| 303 | + "published": { | |
| 304 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 305 | + [ | |
| 306 | + 2011, | |
| 307 | + 9, | |
| 308 | + 23 | |
| 309 | + ] | |
| 310 | + ] | |
| 311 | + } | |
| 312 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_carrillo2012empirical.crossref.json
+397 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 2 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-02T12:12:21Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1790943141233, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.1.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 40, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2012, | |
| 23 | + 2, | |
| 24 | + 22 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2012-02-22T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1329868800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 21, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Int Economic Review" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2012, | |
| 46 | + 2 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>This article specifies and estimates a computationally tractable stationary equilibrium model of the housing market. The model is rich and incorporates many of its unique features: buyers’ and sellers’ simultaneous search behavior, heterogeneity in their motivation to trade, transaction costs, a trading mechanism with posting prices and bargaining, and the availability of an exogenous advertising technology that induces endogenous matching. Estimation uses Maximum Likelihood methods and Multiple Listing Services data. The estimated model is used to simulate housing market outcomes when (a) the amount of information displayed on housing listings increases and (b) real estate agent’s commission rates change.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2012, | |
| 57 | + 2, | |
| 58 | + 22 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2012-02-22T19:25:08Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1329938708000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "203-234", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 65, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "AN EMPIRICAL STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL OF THE HOUSING MARKET*" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "Paul E.", | |
| 75 | + "family": "Carrillo", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 78 | + "role": [ | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 81 | + "role": "author" | |
| 82 | + } | |
| 83 | + ] | |
| 84 | + } | |
| 85 | + ], | |
| 86 | + "member": "311", | |
| 87 | + "published-online": { | |
| 88 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 89 | + [ | |
| 90 | + 2012, | |
| 91 | + 2, | |
| 92 | + 22 | |
| 93 | + ] | |
| 94 | + ] | |
| 95 | + }, | |
| 96 | + "reference": [ | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_2_1", | |
| 99 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 100 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261260" | |
| 101 | + }, | |
| 102 | + { | |
| 103 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_3_1", | |
| 104 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 105 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x" | |
| 106 | + }, | |
| 107 | + { | |
| 108 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_4_1", | |
| 109 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 110 | + "DOI": "10.1257/000282806776157632" | |
| 111 | + }, | |
| 112 | + { | |
| 113 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_5_1", | |
| 114 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 115 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1021526332732" | |
| 116 | + }, | |
| 117 | + { | |
| 118 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_6_1", | |
| 119 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 120 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00780" | |
| 121 | + }, | |
| 122 | + { | |
| 123 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_7_1", | |
| 124 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 125 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4" | |
| 126 | + }, | |
| 127 | + { | |
| 128 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_8_1", | |
| 129 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 130 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2004.01.001" | |
| 131 | + }, | |
| 132 | + { | |
| 133 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_9_1", | |
| 134 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 135 | + "DOI": "10.1086/339714" | |
| 136 | + }, | |
| 137 | + { | |
| 138 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_10_1", | |
| 139 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 140 | + "DOI": "10.1006/redy.1999.0092" | |
| 141 | + }, | |
| 142 | + { | |
| 143 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_11_1", | |
| 144 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 145 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912045" | |
| 146 | + }, | |
| 147 | + { | |
| 148 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_12_1", | |
| 149 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 150 | + "DOI": "10.1007/978-94-010-0235-6_5" | |
| 151 | + }, | |
| 152 | + { | |
| 153 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_13_1", | |
| 154 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 155 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2527250" | |
| 156 | + }, | |
| 157 | + { | |
| 158 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_14_1", | |
| 159 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 160 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2555923" | |
| 161 | + }, | |
| 162 | + { | |
| 163 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_15_1", | |
| 164 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 165 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5" | |
| 166 | + }, | |
| 167 | + { | |
| 168 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_16_1", | |
| 169 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 170 | + "unstructured": "D’urso V. “Home Buyer Search Duration and the Internet ” Working Paper 4271‐02 MIT Sloan School of Management 2002.", | |
| 171 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.360460" | |
| 172 | + }, | |
| 173 | + { | |
| 174 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_17_1", | |
| 175 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 176 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2938350" | |
| 177 | + }, | |
| 178 | + { | |
| 179 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_18_1", | |
| 180 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 181 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00763" | |
| 182 | + }, | |
| 183 | + { | |
| 184 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_19_1", | |
| 185 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 186 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355300554854" | |
| 187 | + }, | |
| 188 | + { | |
| 189 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_20_1", | |
| 190 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 191 | + "DOI": "10.1002/jae.3950070202" | |
| 192 | + }, | |
| 193 | + { | |
| 194 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_21_1", | |
| 195 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 196 | + "first-page": "21", | |
| 197 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1989.12090570", | |
| 198 | + "article-title": "Selling Price and Marketing Time in Residential Real Estate Market", | |
| 199 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 200 | + "author": "Kang H.", | |
| 201 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 202 | + "journal-title": "The Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 203 | + }, | |
| 204 | + { | |
| 205 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_22_1", | |
| 206 | + "first-page": "57", | |
| 207 | + "volume-title": "Panel Data and Labor Market Dynamics", | |
| 208 | + "author": "Kiefer N.", | |
| 209 | + "year": "1993" | |
| 210 | + }, | |
| 211 | + { | |
| 212 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_23_1", | |
| 213 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 214 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00038" | |
| 215 | + }, | |
| 216 | + { | |
| 217 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_24_1", | |
| 218 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 219 | + "DOI": "10.1080/02673039608720863" | |
| 220 | + }, | |
| 221 | + { | |
| 222 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_25_1", | |
| 223 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 224 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007715917198" | |
| 225 | + }, | |
| 226 | + { | |
| 227 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_26_1", | |
| 228 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 229 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004" | |
| 230 | + }, | |
| 231 | + { | |
| 232 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_27_1", | |
| 233 | + "unstructured": "Merlo A. andJ.Rust “Models of Bargaining and Price Determination in the Residential Real Estate Market ” Unpublished manuscript University of Maryland 2006." | |
| 234 | + }, | |
| 235 | + { | |
| 236 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_28_1", | |
| 237 | + "first-page": "279", | |
| 238 | + "volume-title": "Panel Data and Labor Market Studies", | |
| 239 | + "author": "Mortensen D.", | |
| 240 | + "year": "1990" | |
| 241 | + }, | |
| 242 | + { | |
| 243 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_29_1", | |
| 244 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 245 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00001" | |
| 246 | + }, | |
| 247 | + { | |
| 248 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_30_1", | |
| 249 | + "volume-title": "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory", | |
| 250 | + "author": "Pissarides C. A.", | |
| 251 | + "year": "2000" | |
| 252 | + }, | |
| 253 | + { | |
| 254 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_31_1", | |
| 255 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 256 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912531" | |
| 257 | + }, | |
| 258 | + { | |
| 259 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_32_1", | |
| 260 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 261 | + "DOI": "10.1086/367684" | |
| 262 | + }, | |
| 263 | + { | |
| 264 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_33_1", | |
| 265 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 266 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00173122" | |
| 267 | + }, | |
| 268 | + { | |
| 269 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_34_1", | |
| 270 | + "unstructured": "Shimizu C. K.Nishimura andY.Asami “Measuring the Cost of Imperfect Information in the Tokio Housing Market ” Working Paper CIRJE‐F‐238 The University of Tokyo 2003." | |
| 271 | + }, | |
| 272 | + { | |
| 273 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_35_1", | |
| 274 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 275 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297793" | |
| 276 | + }, | |
| 277 | + { | |
| 278 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_36_1", | |
| 279 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 280 | + "DOI": "10.1086/298212" | |
| 281 | + }, | |
| 282 | + { | |
| 283 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_37_1", | |
| 284 | + "volume-title": "Forecasts for Higher Bandwidth Broadband Services", | |
| 285 | + "author": "Vanston L.", | |
| 286 | + "year": "2005" | |
| 287 | + }, | |
| 288 | + { | |
| 289 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_38_1", | |
| 290 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 291 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 292 | + }, | |
| 293 | + { | |
| 294 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_39_1", | |
| 295 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 296 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00595" | |
| 297 | + }, | |
| 298 | + { | |
| 299 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_40_1", | |
| 300 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 301 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00668" | |
| 302 | + }, | |
| 303 | + { | |
| 304 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_41_1", | |
| 305 | + "first-page": "591", | |
| 306 | + "article-title": "A Search Model of Real Estate Broker Behavior", | |
| 307 | + "volume": "71", | |
| 308 | + "author": "Yinger J.", | |
| 309 | + "year": "1981", | |
| 310 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 311 | + } | |
| 312 | + ], | |
| 313 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 314 | + "International Economic Review" | |
| 315 | + ], | |
| 316 | + "language": "en", | |
| 317 | + "link": [ | |
| 318 | + { | |
| 319 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fj.1468-2354.2011.00677.x", | |
| 320 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 321 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 322 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 323 | + }, | |
| 324 | + { | |
| 325 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x", | |
| 326 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 327 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 328 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 329 | + } | |
| 330 | + ], | |
| 331 | + "deposited": { | |
| 332 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 333 | + [ | |
| 334 | + 2023, | |
| 335 | + 10, | |
| 336 | + 30 | |
| 337 | + ] | |
| 338 | + ], | |
| 339 | + "date-time": "2023-10-30T05:38:48Z", | |
| 340 | + "timestamp": 1698644328000 | |
| 341 | + }, | |
| 342 | + "score": 61.412075, | |
| 343 | + "resource": { | |
| 344 | + "primary": { | |
| 345 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x" | |
| 346 | + } | |
| 347 | + }, | |
| 348 | + "issued": { | |
| 349 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 350 | + [ | |
| 351 | + 2012, | |
| 352 | + 2 | |
| 353 | + ] | |
| 354 | + ] | |
| 355 | + }, | |
| 356 | + "references-count": 40, | |
| 357 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 358 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 359 | + "published-print": { | |
| 360 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 361 | + [ | |
| 362 | + 2012, | |
| 363 | + 2 | |
| 364 | + ] | |
| 365 | + ] | |
| 366 | + } | |
| 367 | + }, | |
| 368 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 369 | + "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x" | |
| 370 | + ], | |
| 371 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x", | |
| 372 | + "archive": [ | |
| 373 | + "Portico" | |
| 374 | + ], | |
| 375 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 376 | + "0020-6598", | |
| 377 | + "1468-2354" | |
| 378 | + ], | |
| 379 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 380 | + { | |
| 381 | + "value": "0020-6598", | |
| 382 | + "type": "print" | |
| 383 | + }, | |
| 384 | + { | |
| 385 | + "value": "1468-2354", | |
| 386 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 387 | + } | |
| 388 | + ], | |
| 389 | + "published": { | |
| 390 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 391 | + [ | |
| 392 | + 2012, | |
| 393 | + 2 | |
| 394 | + ] | |
| 395 | + ] | |
| 396 | + } | |
| 397 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_cheng2010illiquidity.crossref.json
+504 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 18 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-18T01:10:47Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792285847569, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 30, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Elsevier BV", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2010, | |
| 23 | + 6, | |
| 24 | + 1 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2010-06-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1275350400000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2010, | |
| 46 | + 6 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002", | |
| 51 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 52 | + "created": { | |
| 53 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 54 | + [ | |
| 55 | + 2010, | |
| 56 | + 4, | |
| 57 | + 2 | |
| 58 | + ] | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "date-time": "2010-04-02T08:35:09Z", | |
| 61 | + "timestamp": 1270197309000 | |
| 62 | + }, | |
| 63 | + "page": "109-118", | |
| 64 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 65 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 32, | |
| 66 | + "title": [ | |
| 67 | + "Illiquidity, transaction cost, and optimal holding period for real estate: Theory and application" | |
| 68 | + ], | |
| 69 | + "prefix": "10.1016", | |
| 70 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 71 | + "author": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "given": "Ping", | |
| 74 | + "family": "Cheng", | |
| 75 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 76 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 77 | + "role": [ | |
| 78 | + { | |
| 79 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 80 | + "role": "author" | |
| 81 | + } | |
| 82 | + ] | |
| 83 | + }, | |
| 84 | + { | |
| 85 | + "given": "Zhenguo", | |
| 86 | + "family": "Lin", | |
| 87 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 88 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 89 | + "role": [ | |
| 90 | + { | |
| 91 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 92 | + "role": "author" | |
| 93 | + } | |
| 94 | + ] | |
| 95 | + }, | |
| 96 | + { | |
| 97 | + "given": "Yingchun", | |
| 98 | + "family": "Liu", | |
| 99 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 100 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 101 | + "role": [ | |
| 102 | + { | |
| 103 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 104 | + "role": "author" | |
| 105 | + } | |
| 106 | + ] | |
| 107 | + } | |
| 108 | + ], | |
| 109 | + "member": "78", | |
| 110 | + "reference": [ | |
| 111 | + { | |
| 112 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib1", | |
| 113 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 114 | + "first-page": "43", | |
| 115 | + "DOI": "10.1086/NTJ41862418", | |
| 116 | + "article-title": "The impact of changes in tax depreciation rates on holding periods for real estate investment", | |
| 117 | + "volume": "35", | |
| 118 | + "author": "Albert", | |
| 119 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 120 | + "journal-title": "National Tax Journal" | |
| 121 | + }, | |
| 122 | + { | |
| 123 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib2", | |
| 124 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 125 | + "first-page": "309", | |
| 126 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2329565", | |
| 127 | + "article-title": "Transactions costs and holding period for common stocks", | |
| 128 | + "volume": "52", | |
| 129 | + "author": "Atkins", | |
| 130 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 131 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Finance" | |
| 132 | + }, | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 135 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib3", | |
| 136 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 137 | + "first-page": "349", | |
| 138 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00193.x", | |
| 139 | + "article-title": "Smoothing, nonsynchronous appraisal and cross-sectional aggregation in real estate price indices", | |
| 140 | + "volume": "35", | |
| 141 | + "author": "Bond", | |
| 142 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 143 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 144 | + }, | |
| 145 | + { | |
| 146 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib4", | |
| 147 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 148 | + "first-page": "447", | |
| 149 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9022-1", | |
| 150 | + "article-title": "Marketing period risk in a portfolio context: theory and empirical estimates from the UK commercial real estate market?", | |
| 151 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 152 | + "author": "Bond", | |
| 153 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 154 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 155 | + }, | |
| 156 | + { | |
| 157 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib5", | |
| 158 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 159 | + "first-page": "483", | |
| 160 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2330492", | |
| 161 | + "article-title": "The optimal number of securities in a risky asset portfolio when there are fixed costs of transacting: theory and some empirical results", | |
| 162 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 163 | + "author": "Brennan", | |
| 164 | + "year": "1975", | |
| 165 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis" | |
| 166 | + }, | |
| 167 | + { | |
| 168 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib6", | |
| 169 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 170 | + "first-page": "93", | |
| 171 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2005.12089716", | |
| 172 | + "article-title": "Private investor holding period", | |
| 173 | + "volume": "11", | |
| 174 | + "author": "Brown", | |
| 175 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 176 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management" | |
| 177 | + }, | |
| 178 | + { | |
| 179 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib7", | |
| 180 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 181 | + "first-page": "148", | |
| 182 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00237", | |
| 183 | + "article-title": "Federal income taxes, inflation and holding periods for income-producing properties", | |
| 184 | + "volume": "9", | |
| 185 | + "author": "Brueggeman", | |
| 186 | + "year": "1981", | |
| 187 | + "journal-title": "AREUEA Journal" | |
| 188 | + }, | |
| 189 | + { | |
| 190 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib8", | |
| 191 | + "first-page": "125", | |
| 192 | + "article-title": "The efficiency of the market for single-family homes", | |
| 193 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 194 | + "author": "Case", | |
| 195 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 196 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 197 | + }, | |
| 198 | + { | |
| 199 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib9", | |
| 200 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 201 | + "first-page": "813", | |
| 202 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00231.x", | |
| 203 | + "article-title": "A model of time-on-market and real estate price under sequential search with recall", | |
| 204 | + "volume": "36", | |
| 205 | + "author": "Cheng", | |
| 206 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 207 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 208 | + }, | |
| 209 | + { | |
| 210 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib10", | |
| 211 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 212 | + "unstructured": "Cheng, P., Lin, Z., Liu, Y., 2009. Home price, time-on-market, and seller heterogeneity under changing market conditions. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. doi:10.1007/s11146-009-9167-1.", | |
| 213 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-009-9167-1" | |
| 214 | + }, | |
| 215 | + { | |
| 216 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 217 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib11", | |
| 218 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 219 | + "first-page": "126", | |
| 220 | + "DOI": "10.3905/JPM.2010.36.2.126", | |
| 221 | + "article-title": "Illiquidity and portfolio risk of thinly-traded assets", | |
| 222 | + "volume": "36", | |
| 223 | + "author": "Cheng", | |
| 224 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 225 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Portfolio Management" | |
| 226 | + }, | |
| 227 | + { | |
| 228 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib12", | |
| 229 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 230 | + "first-page": "205", | |
| 231 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00063", | |
| 232 | + "article-title": "Timing and the holding periods of institutional real estate", | |
| 233 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 234 | + "author": "Collett", | |
| 235 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 236 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 237 | + }, | |
| 238 | + { | |
| 239 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib13", | |
| 240 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 241 | + "first-page": "842", | |
| 242 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261410", | |
| 243 | + "article-title": "Capital market equilibrium with transaction costs", | |
| 244 | + "volume": "94", | |
| 245 | + "author": "Constantinides", | |
| 246 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 247 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 248 | + }, | |
| 249 | + { | |
| 250 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib14", | |
| 251 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 252 | + "first-page": "205", | |
| 253 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jhec.1999.0250", | |
| 254 | + "article-title": "The valuation of real capital: a random walk down Kungsgatan", | |
| 255 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 256 | + "author": "Englund", | |
| 257 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 258 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 259 | + }, | |
| 260 | + { | |
| 261 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib15", | |
| 262 | + "first-page": "27", | |
| 263 | + "article-title": "Holding periods for institutional real estate in the NCREIF database", | |
| 264 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 265 | + "author": "Fisher", | |
| 266 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 267 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Finance" | |
| 268 | + }, | |
| 269 | + { | |
| 270 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib16", | |
| 271 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 272 | + "first-page": "273", | |
| 273 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00355", | |
| 274 | + "article-title": "FHA terminations: a prelude to rational mortgage pricing", | |
| 275 | + "volume": "13", | |
| 276 | + "author": "Foster", | |
| 277 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 278 | + "journal-title": "AREUEA Journal" | |
| 279 | + }, | |
| 280 | + { | |
| 281 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib17", | |
| 282 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 283 | + "first-page": "256", | |
| 284 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2009.07.003", | |
| 285 | + "article-title": "Housing market dynamics: evidence of mean reversion and downward rigidity", | |
| 286 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 287 | + "author": "Gao", | |
| 288 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 289 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 290 | + }, | |
| 291 | + { | |
| 292 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib18", | |
| 293 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 294 | + "first-page": "501", | |
| 295 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00534", | |
| 296 | + "article-title": "Capital structure decisions in real estate investment", | |
| 297 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 298 | + "author": "Gau", | |
| 299 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 300 | + "journal-title": "AREUEA Journal" | |
| 301 | + }, | |
| 302 | + { | |
| 303 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib19", | |
| 304 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 305 | + "unstructured": "Giliberto, M., 2003. Assessing real estate volatility. Journal of Portfolio Management, Special Real Estate Issue, September, 122–128.", | |
| 306 | + "DOI": "10.3905/jpm.2003.319913" | |
| 307 | + }, | |
| 308 | + { | |
| 309 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib20", | |
| 310 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 311 | + "first-page": "213", | |
| 312 | + "DOI": "10.1086/NTJ41791947", | |
| 313 | + "article-title": "Trading and the tax shelter value of depreciable real estate", | |
| 314 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 315 | + "author": "Hendershott", | |
| 316 | + "year": "1984", | |
| 317 | + "journal-title": "National Tax Journal" | |
| 318 | + }, | |
| 319 | + { | |
| 320 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib21", | |
| 321 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 322 | + "first-page": "753", | |
| 323 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00229.x", | |
| 324 | + "article-title": "Real estate returns and risk with heterogeneous investors", | |
| 325 | + "volume": "36", | |
| 326 | + "author": "Lin", | |
| 327 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 328 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 329 | + }, | |
| 330 | + { | |
| 331 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib22", | |
| 332 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 333 | + "first-page": "291", | |
| 334 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00191.x", | |
| 335 | + "article-title": "Illiquidity and pricing biases in the real estate market", | |
| 336 | + "volume": "35", | |
| 337 | + "author": "Lin", | |
| 338 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 339 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 340 | + }, | |
| 341 | + { | |
| 342 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib23", | |
| 343 | + "first-page": "43", | |
| 344 | + "article-title": "An operational measure of liquidity", | |
| 345 | + "volume": "76", | |
| 346 | + "author": "Lippman", | |
| 347 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 348 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 349 | + }, | |
| 350 | + { | |
| 351 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib24", | |
| 352 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 353 | + "first-page": "97", | |
| 354 | + "DOI": "10.1086/NTJ41788712", | |
| 355 | + "article-title": "Taxation, rental income, and optimal holding periods for real property", | |
| 356 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 357 | + "author": "Pellechio", | |
| 358 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 359 | + "journal-title": "National Tax Journal" | |
| 360 | + }, | |
| 361 | + { | |
| 362 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib25", | |
| 363 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 364 | + "first-page": "1005", | |
| 365 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2325576", | |
| 366 | + "article-title": "An extension of the Markowitz portfolio selection model to include variable transactions’ costs, short sales, leverage policies and taxes", | |
| 367 | + "volume": "30", | |
| 368 | + "author": "Pogue", | |
| 369 | + "year": "1970", | |
| 370 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Finance" | |
| 371 | + }, | |
| 372 | + { | |
| 373 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib26", | |
| 374 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 375 | + "first-page": "277", | |
| 376 | + "DOI": "10.1287/mnsc.9.2.277", | |
| 377 | + "article-title": "A simplified model for portfolio analysis", | |
| 378 | + "volume": "9", | |
| 379 | + "author": "Sharpe", | |
| 380 | + "year": "1963", | |
| 381 | + "journal-title": "Management Science" | |
| 382 | + }, | |
| 383 | + { | |
| 384 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib27", | |
| 385 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 386 | + "first-page": "292", | |
| 387 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00356", | |
| 388 | + "article-title": "Estimation of mortgage defaults using disaggregate loan history data", | |
| 389 | + "volume": "13", | |
| 390 | + "author": "Vandell", | |
| 391 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 392 | + "journal-title": "AREUEA Journal" | |
| 393 | + }, | |
| 394 | + { | |
| 395 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib28", | |
| 396 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 397 | + "first-page": "495", | |
| 398 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00335", | |
| 399 | + "article-title": "Real estate investment acquisition rules for life insurance companies and pension funds: a survey", | |
| 400 | + "volume": "12", | |
| 401 | + "author": "Webb", | |
| 402 | + "year": "1984", | |
| 403 | + "journal-title": "AREUEA Journal" | |
| 404 | + }, | |
| 405 | + { | |
| 406 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib29", | |
| 407 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 408 | + "first-page": "77", | |
| 409 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1986.12090515", | |
| 410 | + "article-title": "Real estate investment acquisition rules for REITs: a survey", | |
| 411 | + "volume": "1", | |
| 412 | + "author": "Webb", | |
| 413 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 414 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research (Fall)" | |
| 415 | + }, | |
| 416 | + { | |
| 417 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002_bib30", | |
| 418 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 419 | + "first-page": "225", | |
| 420 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF01096940", | |
| 421 | + "article-title": "Real estate is not normal: a fresh look at real estate return distributions", | |
| 422 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 423 | + "author": "Young", | |
| 424 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 425 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 426 | + } | |
| 427 | + ], | |
| 428 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 429 | + "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 430 | + ], | |
| 431 | + "language": "en", | |
| 432 | + "link": [ | |
| 433 | + { | |
| 434 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S1051137710000136?httpAccept=text/xml", | |
| 435 | + "content-type": "text/xml", | |
| 436 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 437 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 438 | + }, | |
| 439 | + { | |
| 440 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S1051137710000136?httpAccept=text/plain", | |
| 441 | + "content-type": "text/plain", | |
| 442 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 443 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 444 | + } | |
| 445 | + ], | |
| 446 | + "deposited": { | |
| 447 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 448 | + [ | |
| 449 | + 2021, | |
| 450 | + 10, | |
| 451 | + 25 | |
| 452 | + ] | |
| 453 | + ], | |
| 454 | + "date-time": "2021-10-25T13:16:46Z", | |
| 455 | + "timestamp": 1635167806000 | |
| 456 | + }, | |
| 457 | + "score": 89.1287, | |
| 458 | + "resource": { | |
| 459 | + "primary": { | |
| 460 | + "URL": "https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1051137710000136" | |
| 461 | + } | |
| 462 | + }, | |
| 463 | + "issued": { | |
| 464 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 465 | + [ | |
| 466 | + 2010, | |
| 467 | + 6 | |
| 468 | + ] | |
| 469 | + ] | |
| 470 | + }, | |
| 471 | + "references-count": 30, | |
| 472 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 473 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 474 | + "published-print": { | |
| 475 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 476 | + [ | |
| 477 | + 2010, | |
| 478 | + 6 | |
| 479 | + ] | |
| 480 | + ] | |
| 481 | + } | |
| 482 | + }, | |
| 483 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 484 | + "S1051137710000136" | |
| 485 | + ], | |
| 486 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2010.03.002", | |
| 487 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 488 | + "1051-1377" | |
| 489 | + ], | |
| 490 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 491 | + { | |
| 492 | + "value": "1051-1377", | |
| 493 | + "type": "print" | |
| 494 | + } | |
| 495 | + ], | |
| 496 | + "published": { | |
| 497 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 498 | + [ | |
| 499 | + 2010, | |
| 500 | + 6 | |
| 501 | + ] | |
| 502 | + ] | |
| 503 | + } | |
| 504 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_diamond1982aggregate.crossref.json
+143 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T08:22:40Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792398160625, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 0, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "University of Chicago Press", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 17 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 18 | + "domain": [], | |
| 19 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 20 | + }, | |
| 21 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 22 | + "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 23 | + ], | |
| 24 | + "published-print": { | |
| 25 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 26 | + [ | |
| 27 | + 1982, | |
| 28 | + 10 | |
| 29 | + ] | |
| 30 | + ] | |
| 31 | + }, | |
| 32 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261099", | |
| 33 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 34 | + "created": { | |
| 35 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 36 | + [ | |
| 37 | + 2002, | |
| 38 | + 7, | |
| 39 | + 26 | |
| 40 | + ] | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "date-time": "2002-07-26T15:44:15Z", | |
| 43 | + "timestamp": 1027698255000 | |
| 44 | + }, | |
| 45 | + "page": "881-894", | |
| 46 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 47 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 1109, | |
| 48 | + "title": [ | |
| 49 | + "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium" | |
| 50 | + ], | |
| 51 | + "prefix": "10.1086", | |
| 52 | + "volume": "90", | |
| 53 | + "author": [ | |
| 54 | + { | |
| 55 | + "given": "Peter A.", | |
| 56 | + "family": "Diamond", | |
| 57 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 58 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 59 | + "role": [ | |
| 60 | + { | |
| 61 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 62 | + "role": "author" | |
| 63 | + } | |
| 64 | + ] | |
| 65 | + } | |
| 66 | + ], | |
| 67 | + "member": "200", | |
| 68 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 69 | + "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 70 | + ], | |
| 71 | + "language": "en", | |
| 72 | + "link": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "URL": "http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/261099", | |
| 75 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 76 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 77 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 78 | + } | |
| 79 | + ], | |
| 80 | + "deposited": { | |
| 81 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 82 | + [ | |
| 83 | + 2018, | |
| 84 | + 4, | |
| 85 | + 7 | |
| 86 | + ] | |
| 87 | + ], | |
| 88 | + "date-time": "2018-04-07T01:14:39Z", | |
| 89 | + "timestamp": 1523063679000 | |
| 90 | + }, | |
| 91 | + "score": 66.45374, | |
| 92 | + "resource": { | |
| 93 | + "primary": { | |
| 94 | + "URL": "https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/261099" | |
| 95 | + } | |
| 96 | + }, | |
| 97 | + "issued": { | |
| 98 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 99 | + [ | |
| 100 | + 1982, | |
| 101 | + 10 | |
| 102 | + ] | |
| 103 | + ] | |
| 104 | + }, | |
| 105 | + "references-count": 0, | |
| 106 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 107 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 108 | + "published-print": { | |
| 109 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 110 | + [ | |
| 111 | + 1982, | |
| 112 | + 10 | |
| 113 | + ] | |
| 114 | + ] | |
| 115 | + } | |
| 116 | + }, | |
| 117 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 118 | + "10.1086/261099" | |
| 119 | + ], | |
| 120 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1086/261099", | |
| 121 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 122 | + "0022-3808", | |
| 123 | + "1537-534X" | |
| 124 | + ], | |
| 125 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 126 | + { | |
| 127 | + "value": "0022-3808", | |
| 128 | + "type": "print" | |
| 129 | + }, | |
| 130 | + { | |
| 131 | + "value": "1537-534X", | |
| 132 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 133 | + } | |
| 134 | + ], | |
| 135 | + "published": { | |
| 136 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 137 | + [ | |
| 138 | + 1982, | |
| 139 | + 10 | |
| 140 | + ] | |
| 141 | + ] | |
| 142 | + } | |
| 143 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_diaz2013house.crossref.json
+367 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 17 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-17T04:36:33Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792211793780, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 32, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2013, | |
| 23 | + 7, | |
| 24 | + 17 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2013-07-17T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1374019200000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Int Economic Review" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2013, | |
| 46 | + 8 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>We assess the ability of a standard search and matching framework to account for the cyclical properties of key macroeconomic time series of the housing market. We calibrate a model with aggregate demand and supply shocks to match selected business cycle properties of vacancies and sales in the United States. Our model reproduces the cyclical time series properties of house prices and the positive and negative comovement of prices with sales and time on the market, respectively. Search and matching frictions produce trading delays that augment the volatility of prices and propagate the effect of aggregate shocks to future periods.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2013, | |
| 57 | + 7, | |
| 58 | + 17 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2013-07-17T06:41:05Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1374043265000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "837-872", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 136, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "HOUSE PRICES, SALES, AND TIME ON THE MARKET: A SEARCH‐THEORETIC FRAMEWORK" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "ANTONIA", | |
| 75 | + "family": "DÍAZ", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 78 | + { | |
| 79 | + "name": "Universidad Carlos III Spain" | |
| 80 | + } | |
| 81 | + ], | |
| 82 | + "role": [ | |
| 83 | + { | |
| 84 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 85 | + "role": "author" | |
| 86 | + } | |
| 87 | + ] | |
| 88 | + }, | |
| 89 | + { | |
| 90 | + "given": "BELÉN", | |
| 91 | + "family": "JEREZ", | |
| 92 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 93 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 94 | + { | |
| 95 | + "name": "Universidad Carlos III Spain" | |
| 96 | + } | |
| 97 | + ], | |
| 98 | + "role": [ | |
| 99 | + { | |
| 100 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 101 | + "role": "author" | |
| 102 | + } | |
| 103 | + ] | |
| 104 | + } | |
| 105 | + ], | |
| 106 | + "member": "311", | |
| 107 | + "published-online": { | |
| 108 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 109 | + [ | |
| 110 | + 2013, | |
| 111 | + 7, | |
| 112 | + 17 | |
| 113 | + ] | |
| 114 | + ] | |
| 115 | + }, | |
| 116 | + "reference": [ | |
| 117 | + { | |
| 118 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_2_1", | |
| 119 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 120 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x" | |
| 121 | + }, | |
| 122 | + { | |
| 123 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_3_1", | |
| 124 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 125 | + "unstructured": "Albrecht J. P. A.Gautier andS.Vroman “Directed Search in the Housing Market ” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10‐005/3 Tinbergen Institute 2010.", | |
| 126 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.1535269" | |
| 127 | + }, | |
| 128 | + { | |
| 129 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_4_1", | |
| 130 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 131 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x" | |
| 132 | + }, | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_5_1", | |
| 135 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 136 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00345.x" | |
| 137 | + }, | |
| 138 | + { | |
| 139 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_6_1", | |
| 140 | + "unstructured": "Díaz A. andB.Jerez “House Prices Sales and Time on the Market : A Search‐Theoretic Framework ” Economics Working Papers we1033 Universidad Carlos III Departamento de Economía 2010a." | |
| 141 | + }, | |
| 142 | + { | |
| 143 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_7_1", | |
| 144 | + "unstructured": "Díaz A. “House Prices Sales and Time on the Market : A Search‐Theoretic Framework (Supplementary Material) ” Economics Working Papers we1034 Universidad Carlos III Departamento de Economía 2010b." | |
| 145 | + }, | |
| 146 | + { | |
| 147 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_8_1", | |
| 148 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 149 | + "article-title": "Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market", | |
| 150 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 151 | + "author": "Genesove D.", | |
| 152 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 153 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 154 | + }, | |
| 155 | + { | |
| 156 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_9_1", | |
| 157 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 158 | + "unstructured": "Glaeser E. L. andJ. E.Gyourko “Housing Dynamics ” NBER Working Papers 12787 National Bureau of Economic Research Inc 2006.", | |
| 159 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w12787" | |
| 160 | + }, | |
| 161 | + { | |
| 162 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_10_1", | |
| 163 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 164 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF01213255" | |
| 165 | + }, | |
| 166 | + { | |
| 167 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_11_1", | |
| 168 | + "unstructured": "Head A. H.Lloyd‐Ellis andH.Sun “Search Liquidity and the Dynamics of House Prices and Construction ” Working Paper 1276 Department of Economics Queen's University 2011." | |
| 169 | + }, | |
| 170 | + { | |
| 171 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_12_1", | |
| 172 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 173 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.5.1878" | |
| 174 | + }, | |
| 175 | + { | |
| 176 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_13_1", | |
| 177 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 178 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297382" | |
| 179 | + }, | |
| 180 | + { | |
| 181 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_14_1", | |
| 182 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 183 | + "unstructured": "Iacoviello M. “Housing Wealth and Consumption ” International Finance Discussion Papers 1027 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 2011.", | |
| 184 | + "DOI": "10.17016/IFDP.2011.1027" | |
| 185 | + }, | |
| 186 | + { | |
| 187 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_15_1", | |
| 188 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 189 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00374.x" | |
| 190 | + }, | |
| 191 | + { | |
| 192 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_16_1", | |
| 193 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 194 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180" | |
| 195 | + }, | |
| 196 | + { | |
| 197 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_17_1", | |
| 198 | + "article-title": "Falling House Prices and Rising Time on the Market", | |
| 199 | + "author": "Krainer J.", | |
| 200 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 201 | + "journal-title": "FRBSF Economic Letter" | |
| 202 | + }, | |
| 203 | + { | |
| 204 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_18_1", | |
| 205 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 206 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.383_1.x" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_19_1", | |
| 210 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 211 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004" | |
| 212 | + }, | |
| 213 | + { | |
| 214 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_20_1", | |
| 215 | + "unstructured": "Merlo A. F.Ortalo‐Magne andJ.Rust “Bargaining and Price Determination in the Residential Real Estate Market ” Mimeo 2007." | |
| 216 | + }, | |
| 217 | + { | |
| 218 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_21_1", | |
| 219 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 220 | + "DOI": "10.1086/262077" | |
| 221 | + }, | |
| 222 | + { | |
| 223 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_22_1", | |
| 224 | + "unstructured": "Ngai L. R. andS.Tenreyro “Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market ” CEP Discussion Papers dp0922 Centre for Economic Performance LSE 2009." | |
| 225 | + }, | |
| 226 | + { | |
| 227 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_23_1", | |
| 228 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 229 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00611.x" | |
| 230 | + }, | |
| 231 | + { | |
| 232 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_24_1", | |
| 233 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 234 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x" | |
| 235 | + }, | |
| 236 | + { | |
| 237 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_25_1", | |
| 238 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 239 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2938374" | |
| 240 | + }, | |
| 241 | + { | |
| 242 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_26_1", | |
| 243 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 244 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406" | |
| 245 | + }, | |
| 246 | + { | |
| 247 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_27_1", | |
| 248 | + "unstructured": "Ríos‐Rull J. andV.Sánchez‐Marcos “Aggregate Shocks and House Prices Fluctuations ” Mimeo 2009." | |
| 249 | + }, | |
| 250 | + { | |
| 251 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_28_1", | |
| 252 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 253 | + "unstructured": "Shiller R. J. “Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Home Ownership ” NBER Working Paper 13553 National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.", | |
| 254 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w13553" | |
| 255 | + }, | |
| 256 | + { | |
| 257 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_29_1", | |
| 258 | + "unstructured": "Shimer R. “Contracts in a Frictional Labor Market ” Mimeo 1996." | |
| 259 | + }, | |
| 260 | + { | |
| 261 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_30_1", | |
| 262 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 263 | + "DOI": "10.1257/0002828053828572" | |
| 264 | + }, | |
| 265 | + { | |
| 266 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_31_1", | |
| 267 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 268 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444" | |
| 269 | + }, | |
| 270 | + { | |
| 271 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_32_1", | |
| 272 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 273 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2938261" | |
| 274 | + }, | |
| 275 | + { | |
| 276 | + "key": "e_1_2_10_33_1", | |
| 277 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 278 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 279 | + } | |
| 280 | + ], | |
| 281 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 282 | + "International Economic Review" | |
| 283 | + ], | |
| 284 | + "language": "en", | |
| 285 | + "link": [ | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fiere.12019", | |
| 288 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 289 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 290 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 291 | + }, | |
| 292 | + { | |
| 293 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 294 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 295 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 296 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 297 | + } | |
| 298 | + ], | |
| 299 | + "deposited": { | |
| 300 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 301 | + [ | |
| 302 | + 2023, | |
| 303 | + 10, | |
| 304 | + 30 | |
| 305 | + ] | |
| 306 | + ], | |
| 307 | + "date-time": "2023-10-30T01:02:18Z", | |
| 308 | + "timestamp": 1698627738000 | |
| 309 | + }, | |
| 310 | + "score": 69.14381, | |
| 311 | + "resource": { | |
| 312 | + "primary": { | |
| 313 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12019" | |
| 314 | + } | |
| 315 | + }, | |
| 316 | + "issued": { | |
| 317 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 318 | + [ | |
| 319 | + 2013, | |
| 320 | + 7, | |
| 321 | + 17 | |
| 322 | + ] | |
| 323 | + ] | |
| 324 | + }, | |
| 325 | + "references-count": 32, | |
| 326 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 327 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 328 | + "published-print": { | |
| 329 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 330 | + [ | |
| 331 | + 2013, | |
| 332 | + 8 | |
| 333 | + ] | |
| 334 | + ] | |
| 335 | + } | |
| 336 | + }, | |
| 337 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 338 | + "10.1111/iere.12019" | |
| 339 | + ], | |
| 340 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 341 | + "archive": [ | |
| 342 | + "Portico" | |
| 343 | + ], | |
| 344 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 345 | + "0020-6598", | |
| 346 | + "1468-2354" | |
| 347 | + ], | |
| 348 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 349 | + { | |
| 350 | + "value": "0020-6598", | |
| 351 | + "type": "print" | |
| 352 | + }, | |
| 353 | + { | |
| 354 | + "value": "1468-2354", | |
| 355 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 356 | + } | |
| 357 | + ], | |
| 358 | + "published": { | |
| 359 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 360 | + [ | |
| 361 | + 2013, | |
| 362 | + 7, | |
| 363 | + 17 | |
| 364 | + ] | |
| 365 | + ] | |
| 366 | + } | |
| 367 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_diaz2024housing.crossref.json
+1025 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,1025 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 6, | |
| 7 | + 27 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-06-27T02:23:37Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1782527017640, | |
| 12 | + "version": "3.54.5" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 59, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Oxford University Press (OUP)", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "657", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2023, | |
| 23 | + 7, | |
| 24 | + 24 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2023-07-24T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1690156800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "funder": [ | |
| 36 | + { | |
| 37 | + "DOI": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 38 | + "name": "Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad", | |
| 39 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 40 | + "award": [ | |
| 41 | + "MDM 2014-043" | |
| 42 | + ], | |
| 43 | + "award-info": [ | |
| 44 | + { | |
| 45 | + "award-number": [ | |
| 46 | + "MDM 2014-043" | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + } | |
| 49 | + ], | |
| 50 | + "id": [ | |
| 51 | + { | |
| 52 | + "id": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 53 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 54 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 55 | + } | |
| 56 | + ] | |
| 57 | + }, | |
| 58 | + { | |
| 59 | + "DOI": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 60 | + "name": "Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad", | |
| 61 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 62 | + "award": [ | |
| 63 | + "ECO2016-76818-C3-1-P" | |
| 64 | + ], | |
| 65 | + "award-info": [ | |
| 66 | + { | |
| 67 | + "award-number": [ | |
| 68 | + "ECO2016-76818-C3-1-P" | |
| 69 | + ] | |
| 70 | + } | |
| 71 | + ], | |
| 72 | + "id": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "id": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 75 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 76 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 77 | + } | |
| 78 | + ] | |
| 79 | + }, | |
| 80 | + { | |
| 81 | + "DOI": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 82 | + "name": "Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad", | |
| 83 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 84 | + "award": [ | |
| 85 | + "PID2019-107161GB-C3" | |
| 86 | + ], | |
| 87 | + "award-info": [ | |
| 88 | + { | |
| 89 | + "award-number": [ | |
| 90 | + "PID2019-107161GB-C3" | |
| 91 | + ] | |
| 92 | + } | |
| 93 | + ], | |
| 94 | + "id": [ | |
| 95 | + { | |
| 96 | + "id": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 97 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 98 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 99 | + } | |
| 100 | + ] | |
| 101 | + }, | |
| 102 | + { | |
| 103 | + "DOI": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 104 | + "name": "Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad", | |
| 105 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 106 | + "award": [ | |
| 107 | + "PID2020-117354GB-I00" | |
| 108 | + ], | |
| 109 | + "award-info": [ | |
| 110 | + { | |
| 111 | + "award-number": [ | |
| 112 | + "PID2020-117354GB-I00" | |
| 113 | + ] | |
| 114 | + } | |
| 115 | + ], | |
| 116 | + "id": [ | |
| 117 | + { | |
| 118 | + "id": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 119 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 120 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 121 | + } | |
| 122 | + ] | |
| 123 | + }, | |
| 124 | + { | |
| 125 | + "DOI": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 126 | + "name": "Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad", | |
| 127 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 128 | + "award": [ | |
| 129 | + "CEX2021-001181-M" | |
| 130 | + ], | |
| 131 | + "award-info": [ | |
| 132 | + { | |
| 133 | + "award-number": [ | |
| 134 | + "CEX2021-001181-M" | |
| 135 | + ] | |
| 136 | + } | |
| 137 | + ], | |
| 138 | + "id": [ | |
| 139 | + { | |
| 140 | + "id": "10.13039/501100003329", | |
| 141 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 142 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 143 | + } | |
| 144 | + ] | |
| 145 | + }, | |
| 146 | + { | |
| 147 | + "DOI": "10.13039/100012818", | |
| 148 | + "name": "Comunidad de Madrid", | |
| 149 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 150 | + "award": [ | |
| 151 | + "EPUC3M11" | |
| 152 | + ], | |
| 153 | + "award-info": [ | |
| 154 | + { | |
| 155 | + "award-number": [ | |
| 156 | + "EPUC3M11" | |
| 157 | + ] | |
| 158 | + } | |
| 159 | + ], | |
| 160 | + "id": [ | |
| 161 | + { | |
| 162 | + "id": "10.13039/100012818", | |
| 163 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 164 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 165 | + } | |
| 166 | + ] | |
| 167 | + } | |
| 168 | + ], | |
| 169 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 170 | + "domain": [], | |
| 171 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 172 | + }, | |
| 173 | + "short-container-title": [], | |
| 174 | + "published-print": { | |
| 175 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 176 | + [ | |
| 177 | + 2023, | |
| 178 | + 12, | |
| 179 | + 7 | |
| 180 | + ] | |
| 181 | + ] | |
| 182 | + }, | |
| 183 | + "abstract": "<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>\n <jats:p>Wealthier, risk-averse buyers pay more to speed up transactions in competitive search markets. This result is established in a dynamic housing model where households save to smooth consumption and build a down payment. ‘Block recursivity’ is ensured by the existence of risk-neutral housing intermediaries. In the long run, the calibrated benchmark features higher indebtedness and house prices than a Walrasian model, especially when housing supply elasticity is low. The long-run price effects of greater credit availability are much larger if rental and owner-occupied stocks are segmented, but even without segmentation they can be substantial when supply elasticity is low.</jats:p>", | |
| 184 | + "DOI": "10.1093/ej/uead054", | |
| 185 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 186 | + "created": { | |
| 187 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 188 | + [ | |
| 189 | + 2023, | |
| 190 | + 7, | |
| 191 | + 25 | |
| 192 | + ] | |
| 193 | + ], | |
| 194 | + "date-time": "2023-07-25T04:16:36Z", | |
| 195 | + "timestamp": 1690258596000 | |
| 196 | + }, | |
| 197 | + "page": "220-270", | |
| 198 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 199 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 2, | |
| 200 | + "title": [ | |
| 201 | + "Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search" | |
| 202 | + ], | |
| 203 | + "prefix": "10.1093", | |
| 204 | + "volume": "134", | |
| 205 | + "author": [ | |
| 206 | + { | |
| 207 | + "given": "Antonia", | |
| 208 | + "family": "Díaz", | |
| 209 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 210 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 211 | + { | |
| 212 | + "name": "ICAE (Complutense Institute of Economic Analysis) , Spain" | |
| 213 | + } | |
| 214 | + ], | |
| 215 | + "role": [ | |
| 216 | + { | |
| 217 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 218 | + "role": "author" | |
| 219 | + } | |
| 220 | + ] | |
| 221 | + }, | |
| 222 | + { | |
| 223 | + "given": "Belén", | |
| 224 | + "family": "Jerez", | |
| 225 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 226 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 227 | + { | |
| 228 | + "name": "Universidad Carlos III de Madrid , Spain" | |
| 229 | + } | |
| 230 | + ], | |
| 231 | + "role": [ | |
| 232 | + { | |
| 233 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 234 | + "role": "author" | |
| 235 | + } | |
| 236 | + ] | |
| 237 | + }, | |
| 238 | + { | |
| 239 | + "given": "Juan Pablo", | |
| 240 | + "family": "Rincón-Zapatero", | |
| 241 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 242 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 243 | + { | |
| 244 | + "name": "Universidad Carlos III de Madrid , Spain" | |
| 245 | + } | |
| 246 | + ], | |
| 247 | + "role": [ | |
| 248 | + { | |
| 249 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 250 | + "role": "author" | |
| 251 | + } | |
| 252 | + ] | |
| 253 | + } | |
| 254 | + ], | |
| 255 | + "member": "286", | |
| 256 | + "published-online": { | |
| 257 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 258 | + [ | |
| 259 | + 2023, | |
| 260 | + 7, | |
| 261 | + 24 | |
| 262 | + ] | |
| 263 | + ] | |
| 264 | + }, | |
| 265 | + "reference": [ | |
| 266 | + { | |
| 267 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 268 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib1", | |
| 269 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 270 | + "first-page": "893", | |
| 271 | + "DOI": "10.1086/250084", | |
| 272 | + "article-title": "Efficient unemployment insurance", | |
| 273 | + "volume": "107", | |
| 274 | + "author": "Acemoglu", | |
| 275 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 276 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 277 | + }, | |
| 278 | + { | |
| 279 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 280 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib2", | |
| 281 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 282 | + "first-page": "1195", | |
| 283 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12454", | |
| 284 | + "article-title": "Endogenous sources of volatility in housing markets: The joint buyer–seller problem", | |
| 285 | + "volume": "61", | |
| 286 | + "author": "Anenberg", | |
| 287 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 288 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 289 | + }, | |
| 290 | + { | |
| 291 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib3", | |
| 292 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 293 | + "DOI": "10.1007/978-0-8176-4755-1", | |
| 294 | + "volume-title": "Optimal Control and Viscosity Solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations", | |
| 295 | + "author": "Bardi", | |
| 296 | + "year": "1997" | |
| 297 | + }, | |
| 298 | + { | |
| 299 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 300 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib4", | |
| 301 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 302 | + "first-page": "351", | |
| 303 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007737102125", | |
| 304 | + "article-title": "Buyer search intensity and the role of the residential real estate broker", | |
| 305 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 306 | + "author": "Baryla", | |
| 307 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 308 | + "journal-title": "The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 309 | + }, | |
| 310 | + { | |
| 311 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 312 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib5", | |
| 313 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 314 | + "first-page": "75", | |
| 315 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2000.12091036", | |
| 316 | + "article-title": "An investigation of buyer search in the residential real estate market under different market conditions", | |
| 317 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 318 | + "author": "Baryla", | |
| 319 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 320 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 321 | + }, | |
| 322 | + { | |
| 323 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib6", | |
| 324 | + "article-title": "The microgeography of housing supply", | |
| 325 | + "author": "Baum-Snow", | |
| 326 | + "year": "2019" | |
| 327 | + }, | |
| 328 | + { | |
| 329 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib7", | |
| 330 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 331 | + "first-page": "101875", | |
| 332 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2022.101875", | |
| 333 | + "article-title": "Price dispersion and time-on-market in the housing market", | |
| 334 | + "volume": "58", | |
| 335 | + "author": "Ben-Shahar", | |
| 336 | + "year": "2022", | |
| 337 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 338 | + }, | |
| 339 | + { | |
| 340 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib8", | |
| 341 | + "article-title": "Survey of consumer finances", | |
| 342 | + "author": "Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", | |
| 343 | + "year": "2019" | |
| 344 | + }, | |
| 345 | + { | |
| 346 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib9", | |
| 347 | + "article-title": "Information and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy", | |
| 348 | + "author": "Broer", | |
| 349 | + "year": "2021" | |
| 350 | + }, | |
| 351 | + { | |
| 352 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib10", | |
| 353 | + "first-page": "2", | |
| 354 | + "article-title": "New facts on the distribution of earnings, income and wealth in the US", | |
| 355 | + "volume": "21", | |
| 356 | + "author": "Budria", | |
| 357 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 358 | + "journal-title": "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review" | |
| 359 | + }, | |
| 360 | + { | |
| 361 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib11", | |
| 362 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 363 | + "first-page": "51", | |
| 364 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2022.03.009", | |
| 365 | + "article-title": "Wealth on-the-job search and inequality", | |
| 366 | + "volume": "128", | |
| 367 | + "author": "Chaumont", | |
| 368 | + "year": "2022", | |
| 369 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 370 | + }, | |
| 371 | + { | |
| 372 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib12", | |
| 373 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 374 | + "first-page": "105019", | |
| 375 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2020.105019", | |
| 376 | + "article-title": "Reverse calculus and nested optimization", | |
| 377 | + "volume": "187", | |
| 378 | + "author": "Clausen", | |
| 379 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 380 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 381 | + }, | |
| 382 | + { | |
| 383 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 384 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib14", | |
| 385 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 386 | + "first-page": "332", | |
| 387 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0022-0531(83)90081-9", | |
| 388 | + "article-title": "A complete characterization of optimal growth paths in an aggregated model with a non-concave production function", | |
| 389 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 390 | + "author": "Dechert", | |
| 391 | + "year": "1983", | |
| 392 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 393 | + }, | |
| 394 | + { | |
| 395 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 396 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib13", | |
| 397 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 398 | + "first-page": "507", | |
| 399 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.03.001", | |
| 400 | + "article-title": "Asymmetric information and list-price reductions in the housing market", | |
| 401 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 402 | + "author": "De Wit", | |
| 403 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 404 | + "journal-title": "Regional Science and Urban Economics" | |
| 405 | + }, | |
| 406 | + { | |
| 407 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib15", | |
| 408 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 409 | + "first-page": "837", | |
| 410 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 411 | + "article-title": "House prices, sales, and time on the market: A search-theoretic framework", | |
| 412 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 413 | + "author": "Díaz", | |
| 414 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 415 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 416 | + }, | |
| 417 | + { | |
| 418 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 419 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib16", | |
| 420 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 421 | + "first-page": "584", | |
| 422 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2007.12.002", | |
| 423 | + "article-title": "On the user cost and homeownership", | |
| 424 | + "volume": "11", | |
| 425 | + "author": "Díaz", | |
| 426 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 427 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 428 | + }, | |
| 429 | + { | |
| 430 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 431 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib17", | |
| 432 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 433 | + "first-page": "143", | |
| 434 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00574.x", | |
| 435 | + "article-title": "The wealth distribution with durable goods", | |
| 436 | + "volume": "51", | |
| 437 | + "author": "Díaz", | |
| 438 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 439 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 440 | + }, | |
| 441 | + { | |
| 442 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib18", | |
| 443 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 444 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rdad059", | |
| 445 | + "article-title": "The effect of wealth on worker productivity", | |
| 446 | + "author": "Eeckhout", | |
| 447 | + "year": "2023", | |
| 448 | + "journal-title": "The Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 449 | + }, | |
| 450 | + { | |
| 451 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib19", | |
| 452 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 453 | + "first-page": "184", | |
| 454 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003", | |
| 455 | + "article-title": "Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity", | |
| 456 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 457 | + "author": "Eerola", | |
| 458 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 459 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 460 | + }, | |
| 461 | + { | |
| 462 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 463 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib20", | |
| 464 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 465 | + "first-page": "140", | |
| 466 | + "DOI": "10.1086/689606", | |
| 467 | + "article-title": "The macroeconomic effects of housing wealth, housing finance, and limited risk sharing in general equilibrium", | |
| 468 | + "volume": "125", | |
| 469 | + "author": "Favilukis", | |
| 470 | + "year": "2017", | |
| 471 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 472 | + }, | |
| 473 | + { | |
| 474 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 475 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib21", | |
| 476 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 477 | + "first-page": "329", | |
| 478 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2013.07.001", | |
| 479 | + "article-title": "A generalized endogenous grid method for non-smooth and non-concave problems", | |
| 480 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 481 | + "author": "Fella", | |
| 482 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 483 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 484 | + }, | |
| 485 | + { | |
| 486 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 487 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib22", | |
| 488 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 489 | + "first-page": "229", | |
| 490 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rdaa034", | |
| 491 | + "article-title": "Cross-sectional patterns of mortgage debt during the housing boom: Evidence and implications", | |
| 492 | + "volume": "88", | |
| 493 | + "author": "Foote", | |
| 494 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 495 | + "journal-title": "The Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 496 | + }, | |
| 497 | + { | |
| 498 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 499 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib23", | |
| 500 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 501 | + "first-page": "1603", | |
| 502 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20170772", | |
| 503 | + "article-title": "Mortgage debt, consumption, and illiquid housing markets in the great recession", | |
| 504 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 505 | + "author": "Garriga", | |
| 506 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 507 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 508 | + }, | |
| 509 | + { | |
| 510 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib24", | |
| 511 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 512 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w29391", | |
| 513 | + "article-title": "Do credit conditions move house prices?", | |
| 514 | + "author": "Greenwald", | |
| 515 | + "year": "2021" | |
| 516 | + }, | |
| 517 | + { | |
| 518 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 519 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib25", | |
| 520 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 521 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 522 | + "DOI": "10.1086/697207", | |
| 523 | + "article-title": "House price momentum and strategic complementarity", | |
| 524 | + "volume": "126", | |
| 525 | + "author": "Guren", | |
| 526 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 527 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 528 | + }, | |
| 529 | + { | |
| 530 | + "issue": "8", | |
| 531 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib26", | |
| 532 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 533 | + "first-page": "3742", | |
| 534 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/hhab047", | |
| 535 | + "article-title": "The effects of a targeted financial constraint on the housing market", | |
| 536 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 537 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 538 | + "year": "2021", | |
| 539 | + "journal-title": "Review of Financial Studies" | |
| 540 | + }, | |
| 541 | + { | |
| 542 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 543 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib27", | |
| 544 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 545 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 546 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172", | |
| 547 | + "article-title": "Search, liquidity, and the dynamics of house prices and construction", | |
| 548 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 549 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 550 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 551 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 552 | + }, | |
| 553 | + { | |
| 554 | + "issue": "C", | |
| 555 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib28", | |
| 556 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 557 | + "first-page": "104321", | |
| 558 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104321", | |
| 559 | + "article-title": "Indebted sellers, liquidity and mortgage standards", | |
| 560 | + "volume": "151", | |
| 561 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 562 | + "year": "2023", | |
| 563 | + "journal-title": "European Economic Review" | |
| 564 | + }, | |
| 565 | + { | |
| 566 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib29", | |
| 567 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 568 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 569 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005", | |
| 570 | + "article-title": "Illiquidity and its discontents: Trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market", | |
| 571 | + "volume": "83", | |
| 572 | + "author": "Hedlund", | |
| 573 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 574 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 575 | + }, | |
| 576 | + { | |
| 577 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 578 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib30", | |
| 579 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 580 | + "first-page": "289", | |
| 581 | + "DOI": "10.3982/QE483", | |
| 582 | + "article-title": "The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing, debt, and foreclosures", | |
| 583 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 584 | + "author": "Hedlund", | |
| 585 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 586 | + "journal-title": "Quantitative Economics" | |
| 587 | + }, | |
| 588 | + { | |
| 589 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 590 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib31", | |
| 591 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 592 | + "first-page": "279", | |
| 593 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297382", | |
| 594 | + "article-title": "On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment", | |
| 595 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 596 | + "author": "Hosios", | |
| 597 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 598 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 599 | + }, | |
| 600 | + { | |
| 601 | + "issue": "5–6", | |
| 602 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib32", | |
| 603 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 604 | + "first-page": "953", | |
| 605 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0165-1889(93)90024-M", | |
| 606 | + "article-title": "The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies", | |
| 607 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 608 | + "author": "Huggett", | |
| 609 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 610 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control" | |
| 611 | + }, | |
| 612 | + { | |
| 613 | + "issue": "C", | |
| 614 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib33", | |
| 615 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 616 | + "first-page": "252", | |
| 617 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.008", | |
| 618 | + "article-title": "Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: A general equilibrium approach", | |
| 619 | + "volume": "153", | |
| 620 | + "author": "Jerez", | |
| 621 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 622 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 623 | + }, | |
| 624 | + { | |
| 625 | + "issue": "9", | |
| 626 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib34", | |
| 627 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 628 | + "first-page": "3285", | |
| 629 | + "DOI": "10.1086/708816", | |
| 630 | + "article-title": "The housing boom and bust: Model meets evidence", | |
| 631 | + "volume": "128", | |
| 632 | + "author": "Kaplan", | |
| 633 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 634 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 635 | + }, | |
| 636 | + { | |
| 637 | + "issue": "C", | |
| 638 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib35", | |
| 639 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 640 | + "first-page": "47", | |
| 641 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jedc.2018.12.007", | |
| 642 | + "article-title": "Geographic reallocation and unemployment during the Great Recession: The role of the housing bust", | |
| 643 | + "volume": "100", | |
| 644 | + "author": "Karahan", | |
| 645 | + "year": "2019", | |
| 646 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control" | |
| 647 | + }, | |
| 648 | + { | |
| 649 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 650 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib36", | |
| 651 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 652 | + "first-page": "211", | |
| 653 | + "DOI": "10.1086/262072", | |
| 654 | + "article-title": "Credit cycles", | |
| 655 | + "volume": "105", | |
| 656 | + "author": "Kiyotaki", | |
| 657 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 658 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 659 | + }, | |
| 660 | + { | |
| 661 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib37", | |
| 662 | + "article-title": "Liquidity in residential real estate markets", | |
| 663 | + "author": "Kotova", | |
| 664 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 665 | + }, | |
| 666 | + { | |
| 667 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 668 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib38", | |
| 669 | + "first-page": "61", | |
| 670 | + "article-title": "Real estate appraisals, hedonic models and the measurement of house price dispersion", | |
| 671 | + "volume": "56", | |
| 672 | + "author": "Lisi", | |
| 673 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 674 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economics and Econometrics" | |
| 675 | + }, | |
| 676 | + { | |
| 677 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 678 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib39", | |
| 679 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 680 | + "first-page": "1453", | |
| 681 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.016", | |
| 682 | + "article-title": "Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job", | |
| 683 | + "volume": "145", | |
| 684 | + "author": "Menzio", | |
| 685 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 686 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 687 | + }, | |
| 688 | + { | |
| 689 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 690 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib40", | |
| 691 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 692 | + "first-page": "468", | |
| 693 | + "DOI": "10.1086/660864", | |
| 694 | + "article-title": "Efficient search on the job and the business cycle", | |
| 695 | + "volume": "119", | |
| 696 | + "author": "Menzio", | |
| 697 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 698 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 699 | + }, | |
| 700 | + { | |
| 701 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 702 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib41", | |
| 703 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 704 | + "first-page": "2266", | |
| 705 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.020", | |
| 706 | + "article-title": "A monetary theory with non-degenerate distributions", | |
| 707 | + "volume": "148", | |
| 708 | + "author": "Menzio", | |
| 709 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 710 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 711 | + }, | |
| 712 | + { | |
| 713 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 714 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib42", | |
| 715 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 716 | + "first-page": "192", | |
| 717 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004", | |
| 718 | + "article-title": "Bargaining over residential real estate: Evidence from England", | |
| 719 | + "volume": "56", | |
| 720 | + "author": "Merlo", | |
| 721 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 722 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 723 | + }, | |
| 724 | + { | |
| 725 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 726 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib43", | |
| 727 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 728 | + "first-page": "583", | |
| 729 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1468-0262.00296", | |
| 730 | + "article-title": "Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets", | |
| 731 | + "volume": "70", | |
| 732 | + "author": "Milgrom", | |
| 733 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 734 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 735 | + }, | |
| 736 | + { | |
| 737 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 738 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib44", | |
| 739 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 740 | + "first-page": "385", | |
| 741 | + "DOI": "10.1086/262077", | |
| 742 | + "article-title": "Competitive search equilibrium", | |
| 743 | + "volume": "105", | |
| 744 | + "author": "Moen", | |
| 745 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 746 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 747 | + }, | |
| 748 | + { | |
| 749 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 750 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib45", | |
| 751 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 752 | + "first-page": "38", | |
| 753 | + "DOI": "10.1093/jeea/jvz069", | |
| 754 | + "article-title": "Buying first or selling first in housing markets", | |
| 755 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 756 | + "author": "Moen", | |
| 757 | + "year": "2019", | |
| 758 | + "journal-title": "Journal of the European Economic Association" | |
| 759 | + }, | |
| 760 | + { | |
| 761 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 762 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib46", | |
| 763 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 764 | + "first-page": "2487", | |
| 765 | + "DOI": "10.1093/jeea/jvaa001", | |
| 766 | + "article-title": "The decision to move house and aggregate housing-market dynamics", | |
| 767 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 768 | + "author": "Ngai", | |
| 769 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 770 | + "journal-title": "Journal of the European Economic Association" | |
| 771 | + }, | |
| 772 | + { | |
| 773 | + "issue": "12", | |
| 774 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib47", | |
| 775 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 776 | + "first-page": "3991", | |
| 777 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991", | |
| 778 | + "article-title": "Hot and cold seasons in the housing market", | |
| 779 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 780 | + "author": "Ngai", | |
| 781 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 782 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 783 | + }, | |
| 784 | + { | |
| 785 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 786 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib48", | |
| 787 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 788 | + "first-page": "459", | |
| 789 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.383_1.x", | |
| 790 | + "article-title": "Housing market dynamics: On the contribution of income shocks and credit constraints", | |
| 791 | + "volume": "73", | |
| 792 | + "author": "Ortalo-Magné", | |
| 793 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 794 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 795 | + }, | |
| 796 | + { | |
| 797 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 798 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib49", | |
| 799 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 800 | + "first-page": "720", | |
| 801 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20141772", | |
| 802 | + "article-title": "Segmented housing search", | |
| 803 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 804 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 805 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 806 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 807 | + }, | |
| 808 | + { | |
| 809 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib50", | |
| 810 | + "article-title": "Homebuyers’ heterogeneity and housing prices", | |
| 811 | + "author": "Qiu", | |
| 812 | + "year": "2018" | |
| 813 | + }, | |
| 814 | + { | |
| 815 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 816 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib51", | |
| 817 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 818 | + "first-page": "79", | |
| 819 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s40505-019-00166-4", | |
| 820 | + "article-title": "Differentiability of the value function and Euler equation in non-concave discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming", | |
| 821 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 822 | + "author": "Rincón-Zapatero", | |
| 823 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 824 | + "journal-title": "Economic Theory Bulletin" | |
| 825 | + }, | |
| 826 | + { | |
| 827 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 828 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib52", | |
| 829 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 830 | + "first-page": "1519", | |
| 831 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1468-0262.00457", | |
| 832 | + "article-title": "Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in the unbounded case", | |
| 833 | + "volume": "71", | |
| 834 | + "author": "Rincón-Zapatero", | |
| 835 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 836 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 837 | + }, | |
| 838 | + { | |
| 839 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib53", | |
| 840 | + "article-title": "Computation of equilibria in heterogeneous agent economies", | |
| 841 | + "author": "Ríos-Rull", | |
| 842 | + "year": "1997" | |
| 843 | + }, | |
| 844 | + { | |
| 845 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 846 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib54", | |
| 847 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 848 | + "first-page": "1253", | |
| 849 | + "DOI": "10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1253", | |
| 850 | + "article-title": "The geographic determinants of housing supply", | |
| 851 | + "volume": "125", | |
| 852 | + "author": "Saiz", | |
| 853 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 854 | + "journal-title": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 855 | + }, | |
| 856 | + { | |
| 857 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 858 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib55", | |
| 859 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 860 | + "first-page": "561", | |
| 861 | + "DOI": "10.3982/ECTA7870", | |
| 862 | + "article-title": "Directed search for equilibrium wage-tenure contracts", | |
| 863 | + "volume": "77", | |
| 864 | + "author": "Shi", | |
| 865 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 866 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 867 | + }, | |
| 868 | + { | |
| 869 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 870 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib56", | |
| 871 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 872 | + "first-page": "241", | |
| 873 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20141751", | |
| 874 | + "article-title": "Implications of US tax policy for house prices, rents, and homeownership", | |
| 875 | + "volume": "108", | |
| 876 | + "author": "Sommer", | |
| 877 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 878 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 879 | + }, | |
| 880 | + { | |
| 881 | + "issue": "7", | |
| 882 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib57", | |
| 883 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 884 | + "first-page": "854", | |
| 885 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.04.017", | |
| 886 | + "article-title": "The equilibrium effect of fundamentals on house prices and rents", | |
| 887 | + "volume": "60", | |
| 888 | + "author": "Sommer", | |
| 889 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 890 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 891 | + }, | |
| 892 | + { | |
| 893 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib58", | |
| 894 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 895 | + "first-page": "609", | |
| 896 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.06.005", | |
| 897 | + "article-title": "Consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle", | |
| 898 | + "volume": "51", | |
| 899 | + "author": "Storesletten", | |
| 900 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 901 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 902 | + }, | |
| 903 | + { | |
| 904 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 905 | + "key": "2023120715245739100_bib59", | |
| 906 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 907 | + "first-page": "90", | |
| 908 | + "DOI": "10.1257/jel.20191505", | |
| 909 | + "article-title": "Directed search and competitive search equilibrium: A guided tour", | |
| 910 | + "volume": "59", | |
| 911 | + "author": "Wright", | |
| 912 | + "year": "2021", | |
| 913 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Literature" | |
| 914 | + } | |
| 915 | + ], | |
| 916 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 917 | + "The Economic Journal" | |
| 918 | + ], | |
| 919 | + "original-title": [], | |
| 920 | + "language": "en", | |
| 921 | + "link": [ | |
| 922 | + { | |
| 923 | + "URL": "https://academic.oup.com/ej/advance-article-pdf/doi/10.1093/ej/uead054/51730727/uead054.pdf", | |
| 924 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 925 | + "content-version": "am", | |
| 926 | + "intended-application": "syndication" | |
| 927 | + }, | |
| 928 | + { | |
| 929 | + "URL": "https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-pdf/134/657/220/54042448/uead054.pdf", | |
| 930 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 931 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 932 | + "intended-application": "syndication" | |
| 933 | + }, | |
| 934 | + { | |
| 935 | + "URL": "https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-pdf/134/657/220/54042448/uead054.pdf", | |
| 936 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 937 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 938 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 939 | + } | |
| 940 | + ], | |
| 941 | + "deposited": { | |
| 942 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 943 | + [ | |
| 944 | + 2023, | |
| 945 | + 12, | |
| 946 | + 7 | |
| 947 | + ] | |
| 948 | + ], | |
| 949 | + "date-time": "2023-12-07T21:59:05Z", | |
| 950 | + "timestamp": 1701986345000 | |
| 951 | + }, | |
| 952 | + "score": 1, | |
| 953 | + "resource": { | |
| 954 | + "primary": { | |
| 955 | + "URL": "https://academic.oup.com/ej/article/134/657/220/7230361" | |
| 956 | + } | |
| 957 | + }, | |
| 958 | + "subtitle": [], | |
| 959 | + "short-title": [], | |
| 960 | + "issued": { | |
| 961 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 962 | + [ | |
| 963 | + 2023, | |
| 964 | + 7, | |
| 965 | + 24 | |
| 966 | + ] | |
| 967 | + ] | |
| 968 | + }, | |
| 969 | + "references-count": 59, | |
| 970 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 971 | + "issue": "657", | |
| 972 | + "published-online": { | |
| 973 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 974 | + [ | |
| 975 | + 2023, | |
| 976 | + 7, | |
| 977 | + 24 | |
| 978 | + ] | |
| 979 | + ] | |
| 980 | + }, | |
| 981 | + "published-print": { | |
| 982 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 983 | + [ | |
| 984 | + 2023, | |
| 985 | + 12, | |
| 986 | + 7 | |
| 987 | + ] | |
| 988 | + ] | |
| 989 | + } | |
| 990 | + }, | |
| 991 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead054", | |
| 992 | + "relation": {}, | |
| 993 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 994 | + "0013-0133", | |
| 995 | + "1468-0297" | |
| 996 | + ], | |
| 997 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 998 | + { | |
| 999 | + "value": "0013-0133", | |
| 1000 | + "type": "print" | |
| 1001 | + }, | |
| 1002 | + { | |
| 1003 | + "value": "1468-0297", | |
| 1004 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 1005 | + } | |
| 1006 | + ], | |
| 1007 | + "subject": [], | |
| 1008 | + "published-other": { | |
| 1009 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 1010 | + [ | |
| 1011 | + 2024, | |
| 1012 | + 1 | |
| 1013 | + ] | |
| 1014 | + ] | |
| 1015 | + }, | |
| 1016 | + "published": { | |
| 1017 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 1018 | + [ | |
| 1019 | + 2023, | |
| 1020 | + 7, | |
| 1021 | + 24 | |
| 1022 | + ] | |
| 1023 | + ] | |
| 1024 | + } | |
| 1025 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_duffie2005over.crossref.json
+556 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T19:45:37Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792439137260, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.5.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 52, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "The Econometric Society", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2015, | |
| 23 | + 9, | |
| 24 | + 1 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2015-09-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1441065600000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 3591, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Econometrica" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2005, | |
| 46 | + 11 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x", | |
| 51 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 52 | + "created": { | |
| 53 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 54 | + [ | |
| 55 | + 2005, | |
| 56 | + 10, | |
| 57 | + 11 | |
| 58 | + ] | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "date-time": "2005-10-11T11:25:20Z", | |
| 61 | + "timestamp": 1129029920000 | |
| 62 | + }, | |
| 63 | + "page": "1815-1847", | |
| 64 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 65 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 1032, | |
| 66 | + "title": [ | |
| 67 | + "Over-the-Counter Markets" | |
| 68 | + ], | |
| 69 | + "prefix": "10.3982", | |
| 70 | + "volume": "73", | |
| 71 | + "author": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "given": "Darrell", | |
| 74 | + "family": "Duffie", | |
| 75 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 76 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 77 | + "role": [ | |
| 78 | + { | |
| 79 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 80 | + "role": "author" | |
| 81 | + } | |
| 82 | + ] | |
| 83 | + }, | |
| 84 | + { | |
| 85 | + "given": "Nicolae", | |
| 86 | + "family": "Garleanu", | |
| 87 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 88 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 89 | + "role": [ | |
| 90 | + { | |
| 91 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 92 | + "role": "author" | |
| 93 | + } | |
| 94 | + ] | |
| 95 | + }, | |
| 96 | + { | |
| 97 | + "given": "Lasse Heje", | |
| 98 | + "family": "Pedersen", | |
| 99 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 100 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 101 | + "role": [ | |
| 102 | + { | |
| 103 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 104 | + "role": "author" | |
| 105 | + } | |
| 106 | + ] | |
| 107 | + } | |
| 108 | + ], | |
| 109 | + "member": "2359", | |
| 110 | + "reference": [ | |
| 111 | + { | |
| 112 | + "key": "b1_210", | |
| 113 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 114 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-405X(80)90020-3" | |
| 115 | + }, | |
| 116 | + { | |
| 117 | + "key": "b2_211", | |
| 118 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 119 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-405X(86)90065-6" | |
| 120 | + }, | |
| 121 | + { | |
| 122 | + "key": "b3_212", | |
| 123 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 124 | + "first-page": "12", | |
| 125 | + "DOI": "10.2469/faj.v27.n2.12", | |
| 126 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 127 | + "author": "Bagehot W.", | |
| 128 | + "year": "1971", | |
| 129 | + "journal-title": "The Financial Analysts Journal" | |
| 130 | + }, | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "key": "b4_213", | |
| 133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 134 | + "DOI": "10.1111/0022-1082.00097" | |
| 135 | + }, | |
| 136 | + { | |
| 137 | + "key": "b5_214", | |
| 138 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 139 | + "first-page": "201", | |
| 140 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297577", | |
| 141 | + "volume": "55", | |
| 142 | + "author": "Bester H.", | |
| 143 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 144 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 145 | + }, | |
| 146 | + { | |
| 147 | + "key": "b6_215", | |
| 148 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 149 | + "first-page": "97", | |
| 150 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912574", | |
| 151 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 152 | + "author": "Bester H.", | |
| 153 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 154 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 155 | + }, | |
| 156 | + { | |
| 157 | + "key": "b7_216", | |
| 158 | + "first-page": "81", | |
| 159 | + "volume-title": "Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade, Minnesota Studies in Macroeconomics Series", | |
| 160 | + "volume": "1", | |
| 161 | + "author": "Bhattacharya S.", | |
| 162 | + "year": "1987" | |
| 163 | + }, | |
| 164 | + { | |
| 165 | + "key": "b8_217", | |
| 166 | + "volume-title": "Probability and Measure", | |
| 167 | + "author": "Billingsley P.", | |
| 168 | + "year": "1986" | |
| 169 | + }, | |
| 170 | + { | |
| 171 | + "key": "b9_218", | |
| 172 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 173 | + "first-page": "17", | |
| 174 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297527", | |
| 175 | + "volume": "55", | |
| 176 | + "author": "Binmore K.G.", | |
| 177 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 178 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 179 | + }, | |
| 180 | + { | |
| 181 | + "key": "b10_219", | |
| 182 | + "volume-title": "Ordinary Differential Equations", | |
| 183 | + "author": "Birkhoff G.", | |
| 184 | + "year": "1969" | |
| 185 | + }, | |
| 186 | + { | |
| 187 | + "key": "b11_220", | |
| 188 | + "volume-title": "Endogenous Competitive Bargaining", | |
| 189 | + "author": "Board S.", | |
| 190 | + "year": "2003" | |
| 191 | + }, | |
| 192 | + { | |
| 193 | + "key": "b12_221", | |
| 194 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 195 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261410" | |
| 196 | + }, | |
| 197 | + { | |
| 198 | + "key": "b13_222", | |
| 199 | + "volume-title": "How Do Buyers and Sellers Divide the Surplus", | |
| 200 | + "author": "Dai Q.", | |
| 201 | + "year": "2003" | |
| 202 | + }, | |
| 203 | + { | |
| 204 | + "key": "b14_223", | |
| 205 | + "volume-title": "The Enforcement Policy of a Self-Regulatory Organization", | |
| 206 | + "author": "Demarzo P.", | |
| 207 | + "year": "2000" | |
| 208 | + }, | |
| 209 | + { | |
| 210 | + "key": "b15_224", | |
| 211 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 212 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261099" | |
| 213 | + }, | |
| 214 | + { | |
| 215 | + "key": "b16_225", | |
| 216 | + "volume-title": "Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets", | |
| 217 | + "author": "Duffie D.", | |
| 218 | + "year": "2003" | |
| 219 | + }, | |
| 220 | + { | |
| 221 | + "key": "b17_226", | |
| 222 | + "volume-title": "The Exact Law of Large Numbers for Pairwise Random Matching", | |
| 223 | + "author": "Duffie D.", | |
| 224 | + "year": "2004" | |
| 225 | + }, | |
| 226 | + { | |
| 227 | + "key": "b18_227", | |
| 228 | + "volume-title": "Une Approche Probabiliste des Marches Dynamiques", | |
| 229 | + "author": "Ferland R.", | |
| 230 | + "year": "2002" | |
| 231 | + }, | |
| 232 | + { | |
| 233 | + "key": "b19_228", | |
| 234 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 235 | + "first-page": "785", | |
| 236 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912836", | |
| 237 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 238 | + "author": "Gale D.", | |
| 239 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 240 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 241 | + }, | |
| 242 | + { | |
| 243 | + "key": "b20_229", | |
| 244 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 245 | + "first-page": "807", | |
| 246 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912837", | |
| 247 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 248 | + "author": "Gale D.", | |
| 249 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 250 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 251 | + }, | |
| 252 | + { | |
| 253 | + "key": "b21_230", | |
| 254 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 255 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0022-0531(87)90114-1" | |
| 256 | + }, | |
| 257 | + { | |
| 258 | + "key": "b22_231", | |
| 259 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 260 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-405X(76)90006-4" | |
| 261 | + }, | |
| 262 | + { | |
| 263 | + "key": "b23_232", | |
| 264 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 265 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00097.x" | |
| 266 | + }, | |
| 267 | + { | |
| 268 | + "key": "b24_233", | |
| 269 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 270 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-405X(85)90044-3" | |
| 271 | + }, | |
| 272 | + { | |
| 273 | + "key": "b25_234", | |
| 274 | + "volume-title": "Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market", | |
| 275 | + "author": "Green R. C.", | |
| 276 | + "year": "2004" | |
| 277 | + }, | |
| 278 | + { | |
| 279 | + "key": "b26_235", | |
| 280 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 281 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.503062", | |
| 282 | + "volume-title": "Municipal Bond Liquidity", | |
| 283 | + "author": "Harris L. E.", | |
| 284 | + "year": "2004" | |
| 285 | + }, | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "key": "b27_236", | |
| 288 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 289 | + "first-page": "1403", | |
| 290 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1914008", | |
| 291 | + "volume": "47", | |
| 292 | + "author": "Harris M.", | |
| 293 | + "year": "1979", | |
| 294 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 295 | + }, | |
| 296 | + { | |
| 297 | + "key": "b28_237", | |
| 298 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 299 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-405X(81)90020-9" | |
| 300 | + }, | |
| 301 | + { | |
| 302 | + "key": "b29_238", | |
| 303 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 304 | + "first-page": "279", | |
| 305 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297382", | |
| 306 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 307 | + "author": "Hosios A. J.", | |
| 308 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 309 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 310 | + }, | |
| 311 | + { | |
| 312 | + "key": "b30_239", | |
| 313 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 314 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-405X(95)00867-E" | |
| 315 | + }, | |
| 316 | + { | |
| 317 | + "key": "b31_240", | |
| 318 | + "first-page": "63", | |
| 319 | + "volume": "83", | |
| 320 | + "author": "Kiyotaki N.", | |
| 321 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 322 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 323 | + }, | |
| 324 | + { | |
| 325 | + "key": "b32_241", | |
| 326 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 327 | + "DOI": "10.1515/9780691215747", | |
| 328 | + "volume-title": "A Course in Microeconomic Theory", | |
| 329 | + "author": "Kreps D.", | |
| 330 | + "year": "1990" | |
| 331 | + }, | |
| 332 | + { | |
| 333 | + "key": "b33_242", | |
| 334 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 335 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00207-6" | |
| 336 | + }, | |
| 337 | + { | |
| 338 | + "key": "b34_243", | |
| 339 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 340 | + "first-page": "1315", | |
| 341 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1913210", | |
| 342 | + "volume": "6", | |
| 343 | + "author": "Kyle A. S.", | |
| 344 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 345 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 346 | + }, | |
| 347 | + { | |
| 348 | + "key": "b35_244", | |
| 349 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 350 | + "first-page": "683", | |
| 351 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04818.x", | |
| 352 | + "volume": "52", | |
| 353 | + "author": "Lamoureux C. G.", | |
| 354 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 355 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Finance" | |
| 356 | + }, | |
| 357 | + { | |
| 358 | + "key": "b36_245", | |
| 359 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 360 | + "first-page": "1395", | |
| 361 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2938373", | |
| 362 | + "volume": "59", | |
| 363 | + "author": "Mclennan A.", | |
| 364 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 365 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 366 | + }, | |
| 367 | + { | |
| 368 | + "key": "b37_246", | |
| 369 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 370 | + "DOI": "10.1086/262077" | |
| 371 | + }, | |
| 372 | + { | |
| 373 | + "key": "b38_247", | |
| 374 | + "volume-title": "Three Essays in Economic Theory", | |
| 375 | + "author": "Moresi S.", | |
| 376 | + "year": "1991" | |
| 377 | + }, | |
| 378 | + { | |
| 379 | + "key": "b39_248", | |
| 380 | + "first-page": "968", | |
| 381 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 382 | + "author": "Mortensen D. T.", | |
| 383 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 384 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 385 | + }, | |
| 386 | + { | |
| 387 | + "key": "b40_249", | |
| 388 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 389 | + "first-page": "155", | |
| 390 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1907266", | |
| 391 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 392 | + "author": "Nash J.", | |
| 393 | + "year": "1950", | |
| 394 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 395 | + }, | |
| 396 | + { | |
| 397 | + "key": "b41_250", | |
| 398 | + "unstructured": "NewYorkStockExchange(2001 ): Fact Book 2001." | |
| 399 | + }, | |
| 400 | + { | |
| 401 | + "key": "b42_251", | |
| 402 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 403 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 404 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2937847", | |
| 405 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 406 | + "author": "Pagano M.", | |
| 407 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 408 | + "journal-title": "Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 409 | + }, | |
| 410 | + { | |
| 411 | + "key": "b43_252", | |
| 412 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 413 | + "DOI": "10.1007/978-3-662-02619-9", | |
| 414 | + "volume-title": "Stochastic Integration and Differential Equations", | |
| 415 | + "author": "Protter P.", | |
| 416 | + "year": "1990" | |
| 417 | + }, | |
| 418 | + { | |
| 419 | + "key": "b44_253", | |
| 420 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 421 | + "first-page": "1133", | |
| 422 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1911015", | |
| 423 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 424 | + "author": "Rubinstein A.", | |
| 425 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 426 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 427 | + }, | |
| 428 | + { | |
| 429 | + "key": "b45_254", | |
| 430 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 431 | + "first-page": "581", | |
| 432 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1884218", | |
| 433 | + "volume": "102", | |
| 434 | + "author": "Rubinstein A.", | |
| 435 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 436 | + "journal-title": "Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 437 | + }, | |
| 438 | + { | |
| 439 | + "key": "b46_255", | |
| 440 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 441 | + "DOI": "10.1111/0022-1082.00341" | |
| 442 | + }, | |
| 443 | + { | |
| 444 | + "key": "b47_256", | |
| 445 | + "unstructured": "Y. Sun(2000 ): \"The Exact Law of Large Numbers via Fubini Extension and Characterization of Insurable Risks ,\"Working Paper, Singapore National University; forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory." | |
| 446 | + }, | |
| 447 | + { | |
| 448 | + "key": "b48_257", | |
| 449 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 450 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261978" | |
| 451 | + }, | |
| 452 | + { | |
| 453 | + "key": "b49_258", | |
| 454 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 455 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/11.1.1" | |
| 456 | + }, | |
| 457 | + { | |
| 458 | + "key": "b50_259", | |
| 459 | + "volume-title": "Search and Endogenous Concentration of Liquidity in Asset Markets", | |
| 460 | + "author": "Vayanos D.", | |
| 461 | + "year": "2002" | |
| 462 | + }, | |
| 463 | + { | |
| 464 | + "key": "b51_260", | |
| 465 | + "volume-title": "The Liquidity Premium in a Dynamic Bargaining Market", | |
| 466 | + "author": "Weill P.-O.", | |
| 467 | + "year": "2002" | |
| 468 | + }, | |
| 469 | + { | |
| 470 | + "key": "b52_261", | |
| 471 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 472 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00195.x" | |
| 473 | + } | |
| 474 | + ], | |
| 475 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 476 | + "Econometrica" | |
| 477 | + ], | |
| 478 | + "language": "en", | |
| 479 | + "link": [ | |
| 480 | + { | |
| 481 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fj.1468-0262.2005.00639.x", | |
| 482 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 483 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 484 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 485 | + }, | |
| 486 | + { | |
| 487 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x", | |
| 488 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 489 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 490 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 491 | + } | |
| 492 | + ], | |
| 493 | + "deposited": { | |
| 494 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 495 | + [ | |
| 496 | + 2021, | |
| 497 | + 7, | |
| 498 | + 18 | |
| 499 | + ] | |
| 500 | + ], | |
| 501 | + "date-time": "2021-07-18T13:38:48Z", | |
| 502 | + "timestamp": 1626615528000 | |
| 503 | + }, | |
| 504 | + "score": 82.96666, | |
| 505 | + "resource": { | |
| 506 | + "primary": { | |
| 507 | + "URL": "http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x" | |
| 508 | + } | |
| 509 | + }, | |
| 510 | + "issued": { | |
| 511 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 512 | + [ | |
| 513 | + 2005, | |
| 514 | + 11 | |
| 515 | + ] | |
| 516 | + ] | |
| 517 | + }, | |
| 518 | + "references-count": 52, | |
| 519 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 520 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 521 | + "published-print": { | |
| 522 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 523 | + [ | |
| 524 | + 2005, | |
| 525 | + 11 | |
| 526 | + ] | |
| 527 | + ] | |
| 528 | + } | |
| 529 | + }, | |
| 530 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 531 | + "10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x" | |
| 532 | + ], | |
| 533 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x", | |
| 534 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 535 | + "0012-9682", | |
| 536 | + "1468-0262" | |
| 537 | + ], | |
| 538 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 539 | + { | |
| 540 | + "value": "0012-9682", | |
| 541 | + "type": "print" | |
| 542 | + }, | |
| 543 | + { | |
| 544 | + "value": "1468-0262", | |
| 545 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 546 | + } | |
| 547 | + ], | |
| 548 | + "published": { | |
| 549 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 550 | + [ | |
| 551 | + 2005, | |
| 552 | + 11 | |
| 553 | + ] | |
| 554 | + ] | |
| 555 | + } | |
| 556 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_eerola2018borrowing.crossref.json
+623 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,623 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 9, | |
| 7 | + 27 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-09-27T22:40:01Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1790548801233, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.1.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 34, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Elsevier BV", | |
| 16 | + "license": [ | |
| 17 | + { | |
| 18 | + "start": { | |
| 19 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 20 | + [ | |
| 21 | + 2018, | |
| 22 | + 1, | |
| 23 | + 1 | |
| 24 | + ] | |
| 25 | + ], | |
| 26 | + "date-time": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 27 | + "timestamp": 1514764800000 | |
| 28 | + }, | |
| 29 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 30 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 31 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/" | |
| 32 | + }, | |
| 33 | + { | |
| 34 | + "start": { | |
| 35 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 36 | + [ | |
| 37 | + 2018, | |
| 38 | + 1, | |
| 39 | + 1 | |
| 40 | + ] | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "date-time": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 43 | + "timestamp": 1514764800000 | |
| 44 | + }, | |
| 45 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 46 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 47 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license" | |
| 48 | + }, | |
| 49 | + { | |
| 50 | + "start": { | |
| 51 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 52 | + [ | |
| 53 | + 2017, | |
| 54 | + 7, | |
| 55 | + 14 | |
| 56 | + ] | |
| 57 | + ], | |
| 58 | + "date-time": "2017-07-14T00:00:00Z", | |
| 59 | + "timestamp": 1499990400000 | |
| 60 | + }, | |
| 61 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 62 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 63 | + "URL": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/" | |
| 64 | + } | |
| 65 | + ], | |
| 66 | + "funder": [ | |
| 67 | + { | |
| 68 | + "DOI": "10.13039/501100021740", | |
| 69 | + "name": "Suomen Pankki", | |
| 70 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 71 | + "id": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "id": "10.13039/501100021740", | |
| 74 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 75 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 76 | + } | |
| 77 | + ] | |
| 78 | + }, | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "DOI": "10.13039/501100002341", | |
| 81 | + "name": "Academy of Finland", | |
| 82 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 83 | + "award": [ | |
| 84 | + "269071" | |
| 85 | + ], | |
| 86 | + "award-info": [ | |
| 87 | + { | |
| 88 | + "award-number": [ | |
| 89 | + "269071" | |
| 90 | + ] | |
| 91 | + } | |
| 92 | + ], | |
| 93 | + "id": [ | |
| 94 | + { | |
| 95 | + "id": "10.13039/501100002341", | |
| 96 | + "id-type": "DOI", | |
| 97 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 98 | + } | |
| 99 | + ] | |
| 100 | + } | |
| 101 | + ], | |
| 102 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 103 | + "domain": [ | |
| 104 | + "elsevier.com", | |
| 105 | + "sciencedirect.com" | |
| 106 | + ], | |
| 107 | + "crossmark-restriction": true | |
| 108 | + }, | |
| 109 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 110 | + "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 111 | + ], | |
| 112 | + "published-print": { | |
| 113 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 114 | + [ | |
| 115 | + 2018, | |
| 116 | + 1 | |
| 117 | + ] | |
| 118 | + ] | |
| 119 | + }, | |
| 120 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003", | |
| 121 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 122 | + "created": { | |
| 123 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 124 | + [ | |
| 125 | + 2017, | |
| 126 | + 7, | |
| 127 | + 15 | |
| 128 | + ] | |
| 129 | + ], | |
| 130 | + "date-time": "2017-07-15T02:46:55Z", | |
| 131 | + "timestamp": 1500086815000 | |
| 132 | + }, | |
| 133 | + "page": "184-204", | |
| 134 | + "update-policy": "https://doi.org/10.1016/elsevier_cm_policy", | |
| 135 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 136 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 8, | |
| 137 | + "special_numbering": "C", | |
| 138 | + "title": [ | |
| 139 | + "Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity" | |
| 140 | + ], | |
| 141 | + "prefix": "10.1016", | |
| 142 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 143 | + "author": [ | |
| 144 | + { | |
| 145 | + "given": "Essi", | |
| 146 | + "family": "Eerola", | |
| 147 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 148 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 149 | + "role": [ | |
| 150 | + { | |
| 151 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 152 | + "role": "author" | |
| 153 | + } | |
| 154 | + ] | |
| 155 | + }, | |
| 156 | + { | |
| 157 | + "ORCID": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4026-648X", | |
| 158 | + "authenticated-orcid": false, | |
| 159 | + "given": "Niku", | |
| 160 | + "family": "Määttänen", | |
| 161 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 162 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 163 | + "role": [ | |
| 164 | + { | |
| 165 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 166 | + "role": "author" | |
| 167 | + } | |
| 168 | + ] | |
| 169 | + } | |
| 170 | + ], | |
| 171 | + "member": "78", | |
| 172 | + "reference": [ | |
| 173 | + { | |
| 174 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 175 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0010", | |
| 176 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 177 | + "first-page": "659", | |
| 178 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118417", | |
| 179 | + "article-title": "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving", | |
| 180 | + "volume": "109", | |
| 181 | + "author": "Aiyagari", | |
| 182 | + "year": "1994", | |
| 183 | + "journal-title": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 184 | + }, | |
| 185 | + { | |
| 186 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 187 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0020", | |
| 188 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 189 | + "first-page": "641", | |
| 190 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 191 | + "article-title": "Opportunistic matching in the housing market", | |
| 192 | + "volume": "48", | |
| 193 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 194 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 195 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 196 | + }, | |
| 197 | + { | |
| 198 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0030", | |
| 199 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 200 | + "first-page": "218", | |
| 201 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002", | |
| 202 | + "article-title": "Directed search in the housing market", | |
| 203 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 204 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 205 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 206 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0040", | |
| 210 | + "series-title": "Endogenous Sources of Volatility in Housing Markets: The Joint Buyer–Seller Problem", | |
| 211 | + "author": "Anenberg", | |
| 212 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 213 | + }, | |
| 214 | + { | |
| 215 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 216 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0050", | |
| 217 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 218 | + "first-page": "42", | |
| 219 | + "DOI": "10.1093/oxrep/10.2.42", | |
| 220 | + "article-title": "Household savings and debts: the experience of the Nordic countries", | |
| 221 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 222 | + "author": "Berg", | |
| 223 | + "year": "1994", | |
| 224 | + "journal-title": "Oxford Review of Economic Policy" | |
| 225 | + }, | |
| 226 | + { | |
| 227 | + "issue": "s2", | |
| 228 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0060", | |
| 229 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 230 | + "first-page": "283", | |
| 231 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x", | |
| 232 | + "article-title": "Trading frictions and house price dynamics", | |
| 233 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 234 | + "author": "Caplin", | |
| 235 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 236 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking" | |
| 237 | + }, | |
| 238 | + { | |
| 239 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 240 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0070", | |
| 241 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 242 | + "first-page": "203", | |
| 243 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x", | |
| 244 | + "article-title": "An empirical stationary equilibrium search model of the housing market", | |
| 245 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 246 | + "author": "Carrillo", | |
| 247 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 248 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 249 | + }, | |
| 250 | + { | |
| 251 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0080", | |
| 252 | + "series-title": "Stabilization Versus Insurance: Welfare Effects of Procyclical Taxation Under Incomplete Markets", | |
| 253 | + "author": "Costain", | |
| 254 | + "year": "2005" | |
| 255 | + }, | |
| 256 | + { | |
| 257 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0090", | |
| 258 | + "article-title": "Accounting for cross-country differences in wealth inequality", | |
| 259 | + "author": "Cowell", | |
| 260 | + "year": "2017", | |
| 261 | + "journal-title": "The Review of Income and Wealth" | |
| 262 | + }, | |
| 263 | + { | |
| 264 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 265 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0100", | |
| 266 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 267 | + "first-page": "837", | |
| 268 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 269 | + "article-title": "House prices, sales, and time on the market: a search-theoretic framework", | |
| 270 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 271 | + "author": "Díaz", | |
| 272 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 273 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 274 | + }, | |
| 275 | + { | |
| 276 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 277 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0110", | |
| 278 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 279 | + "first-page": "143", | |
| 280 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00574.x", | |
| 281 | + "article-title": "The wealth distribution with durable goods", | |
| 282 | + "volume": "51", | |
| 283 | + "author": "Díaz", | |
| 284 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 285 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 286 | + }, | |
| 287 | + { | |
| 288 | + "issue": "552", | |
| 289 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0120", | |
| 290 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 291 | + "first-page": "533", | |
| 292 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02424.x", | |
| 293 | + "article-title": "House prices and credit constraints: making sense of the us experience", | |
| 294 | + "volume": "121", | |
| 295 | + "author": "Duca", | |
| 296 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 297 | + "journal-title": "The Economic Journal" | |
| 298 | + }, | |
| 299 | + { | |
| 300 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0130", | |
| 301 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 302 | + "first-page": "74", | |
| 303 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2015.05.006", | |
| 304 | + "article-title": "On the role of public price information in housing markets", | |
| 305 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 306 | + "author": "Eerola", | |
| 307 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 308 | + "journal-title": "Regional Science and Urban Economics" | |
| 309 | + }, | |
| 310 | + { | |
| 311 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0140", | |
| 312 | + "unstructured": "Financial Supervisory Authority 2011. A survey of housing loans granted to personal customers (in Finnish). Analyysiraportti." | |
| 313 | + }, | |
| 314 | + { | |
| 315 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 316 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0150", | |
| 317 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 318 | + "first-page": "345", | |
| 319 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2013.06.002", | |
| 320 | + "article-title": "Saving up or settling down: home ownership over the life cycle", | |
| 321 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 322 | + "author": "Halket", | |
| 323 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 324 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 325 | + }, | |
| 326 | + { | |
| 327 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 328 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0160", | |
| 329 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 330 | + "first-page": "1559", | |
| 331 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rds004", | |
| 332 | + "article-title": "Housing liquidity, mobility, and the labour market", | |
| 333 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 334 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 335 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 336 | + "journal-title": "The Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 337 | + }, | |
| 338 | + { | |
| 339 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 340 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0170", | |
| 341 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 342 | + "first-page": "289", | |
| 343 | + "DOI": "10.3982/QE483", | |
| 344 | + "article-title": "The cyclical dynamics of illiquid housing, debt, and foreclosures", | |
| 345 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 346 | + "author": "Hedlund", | |
| 347 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 348 | + "journal-title": "Quantitative Economics" | |
| 349 | + }, | |
| 350 | + { | |
| 351 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0180", | |
| 352 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 353 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 354 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005", | |
| 355 | + "article-title": "Illiquidity and its discontents: trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market", | |
| 356 | + "volume": "83", | |
| 357 | + "author": "Hedlund", | |
| 358 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 359 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 360 | + }, | |
| 361 | + { | |
| 362 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0190", | |
| 363 | + "series-title": "Dynamic General Equilibrium Modeling: Computational Methods and Applications", | |
| 364 | + "author": "Heer", | |
| 365 | + "year": "2010" | |
| 366 | + }, | |
| 367 | + { | |
| 368 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 369 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0200", | |
| 370 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 371 | + "first-page": "953", | |
| 372 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0165-1889(93)90024-M", | |
| 373 | + "article-title": "The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies", | |
| 374 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 375 | + "author": "Huggett", | |
| 376 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 377 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control" | |
| 378 | + }, | |
| 379 | + { | |
| 380 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 381 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0210", | |
| 382 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 383 | + "first-page": "221", | |
| 384 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.10.020", | |
| 385 | + "article-title": "Housing and debt over the life cycle and over the business cycle", | |
| 386 | + "volume": "60", | |
| 387 | + "author": "Iacoviello", | |
| 388 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 389 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 390 | + }, | |
| 391 | + { | |
| 392 | + "issue": "2–3", | |
| 393 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0220", | |
| 394 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 395 | + "first-page": "549", | |
| 396 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0014-2921(92)90112-A", | |
| 397 | + "article-title": "House prices, household saving and financial market liberalization in Finland", | |
| 398 | + "volume": "36", | |
| 399 | + "author": "Koskela", | |
| 400 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 401 | + "journal-title": "European Economic Review" | |
| 402 | + }, | |
| 403 | + { | |
| 404 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 405 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0230", | |
| 406 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 407 | + "first-page": "32", | |
| 408 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180", | |
| 409 | + "article-title": "A theory of liquidity in residential real estate markets", | |
| 410 | + "volume": "49", | |
| 411 | + "author": "Krainer", | |
| 412 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 413 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 414 | + }, | |
| 415 | + { | |
| 416 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 417 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0240", | |
| 418 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 419 | + "first-page": "1477", | |
| 420 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00700.x", | |
| 421 | + "article-title": "Labour-market matching with precautionary savings and aggregate fluctuations", | |
| 422 | + "volume": "77", | |
| 423 | + "author": "Krusell", | |
| 424 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 425 | + "journal-title": "The Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 426 | + }, | |
| 427 | + { | |
| 428 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 429 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0250", | |
| 430 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 431 | + "first-page": "357", | |
| 432 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-006-6806-7", | |
| 433 | + "article-title": "Housing price dispersion: an empirical investigation", | |
| 434 | + "volume": "32", | |
| 435 | + "author": "Leung", | |
| 436 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 437 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 438 | + }, | |
| 439 | + { | |
| 440 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 441 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0260", | |
| 442 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 443 | + "first-page": "192", | |
| 444 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004", | |
| 445 | + "article-title": "Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England", | |
| 446 | + "volume": "56", | |
| 447 | + "author": "Merlo", | |
| 448 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 449 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 450 | + }, | |
| 451 | + { | |
| 452 | + "issue": "8", | |
| 453 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0270", | |
| 454 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 455 | + "first-page": "2219", | |
| 456 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20120512", | |
| 457 | + "article-title": "Macroeconomic effects of bankruptcy and foreclosure policies", | |
| 458 | + "volume": "106", | |
| 459 | + "author": "Mitman", | |
| 460 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 461 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 462 | + }, | |
| 463 | + { | |
| 464 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0280", | |
| 465 | + "unstructured": "Ngai, L.R., Sheedy, K.D., et al., 2017. The decision to move house and aggregate housing-market dynamics. Manuscript." | |
| 466 | + }, | |
| 467 | + { | |
| 468 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 469 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0290", | |
| 470 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 471 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 472 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406", | |
| 473 | + "article-title": "Momentum traders in the housing market: survey evidence and a search model", | |
| 474 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 475 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 476 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 477 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 478 | + }, | |
| 479 | + { | |
| 480 | + "issue": "2–3", | |
| 481 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0300", | |
| 482 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 483 | + "first-page": "705", | |
| 484 | + "DOI": "10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.705", | |
| 485 | + "article-title": "An aggregate economy with different size houses", | |
| 486 | + "volume": "6", | |
| 487 | + "author": "Ríos-Rull", | |
| 488 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 489 | + "journal-title": "Journal of the European Economic Association" | |
| 490 | + }, | |
| 491 | + { | |
| 492 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0310", | |
| 493 | + "unstructured": "Vihriälä, V., 2005. Banks and the Finnish credit cycle 1986–95. Bank of Finland Studies E:7." | |
| 494 | + }, | |
| 495 | + { | |
| 496 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 497 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0320", | |
| 498 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 499 | + "first-page": "1270", | |
| 500 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734", | |
| 501 | + "article-title": "Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market matching model", | |
| 502 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 503 | + "author": "Wheaton", | |
| 504 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 505 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 506 | + }, | |
| 507 | + { | |
| 508 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0330", | |
| 509 | + "series-title": "The Co-Movement of Housing Sales and Housing Prices: Empirics and Theory", | |
| 510 | + "author": "Wheaton", | |
| 511 | + "year": "2009" | |
| 512 | + }, | |
| 513 | + { | |
| 514 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 515 | + "key": "10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003_br0340", | |
| 516 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 517 | + "first-page": "55", | |
| 518 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/8.1.55", | |
| 519 | + "article-title": "Pricing real assets with costly search", | |
| 520 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 521 | + "author": "Williams", | |
| 522 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 523 | + "journal-title": "The Review of Financial Studies" | |
| 524 | + } | |
| 525 | + ], | |
| 526 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 527 | + "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 528 | + ], | |
| 529 | + "language": "en", | |
| 530 | + "link": [ | |
| 531 | + { | |
| 532 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S1094202517300601?httpAccept=text/xml", | |
| 533 | + "content-type": "text/xml", | |
| 534 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 535 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 536 | + }, | |
| 537 | + { | |
| 538 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S1094202517300601?httpAccept=text/plain", | |
| 539 | + "content-type": "text/plain", | |
| 540 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 541 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 542 | + } | |
| 543 | + ], | |
| 544 | + "deposited": { | |
| 545 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 546 | + [ | |
| 547 | + 2025, | |
| 548 | + 10, | |
| 549 | + 21 | |
| 550 | + ] | |
| 551 | + ], | |
| 552 | + "date-time": "2025-10-21T21:23:26Z", | |
| 553 | + "timestamp": 1761081806000 | |
| 554 | + }, | |
| 555 | + "score": 79.81399, | |
| 556 | + "resource": { | |
| 557 | + "primary": { | |
| 558 | + "URL": "https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1094202517300601" | |
| 559 | + } | |
| 560 | + }, | |
| 561 | + "issued": { | |
| 562 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 563 | + [ | |
| 564 | + 2018, | |
| 565 | + 1 | |
| 566 | + ] | |
| 567 | + ] | |
| 568 | + }, | |
| 569 | + "references-count": 34, | |
| 570 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 571 | + "S1094202517300601" | |
| 572 | + ], | |
| 573 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003", | |
| 574 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 575 | + "1094-2025" | |
| 576 | + ], | |
| 577 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 578 | + { | |
| 579 | + "value": "1094-2025", | |
| 580 | + "type": "print" | |
| 581 | + } | |
| 582 | + ], | |
| 583 | + "published": { | |
| 584 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 585 | + [ | |
| 586 | + 2018, | |
| 587 | + 1 | |
| 588 | + ] | |
| 589 | + ] | |
| 590 | + }, | |
| 591 | + "assertion": [ | |
| 592 | + { | |
| 593 | + "value": "Elsevier", | |
| 594 | + "name": "publisher", | |
| 595 | + "label": "This article is maintained by" | |
| 596 | + }, | |
| 597 | + { | |
| 598 | + "value": "Borrowing constraints and housing market liquidity", | |
| 599 | + "name": "articletitle", | |
| 600 | + "label": "Article Title" | |
| 601 | + }, | |
| 602 | + { | |
| 603 | + "value": "Review of Economic Dynamics", | |
| 604 | + "name": "journaltitle", | |
| 605 | + "label": "Journal Title" | |
| 606 | + }, | |
| 607 | + { | |
| 608 | + "value": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.003", | |
| 609 | + "name": "articlelink", | |
| 610 | + "label": "CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version" | |
| 611 | + }, | |
| 612 | + { | |
| 613 | + "value": "article", | |
| 614 | + "name": "content_type", | |
| 615 | + "label": "Content Type" | |
| 616 | + }, | |
| 617 | + { | |
| 618 | + "value": "© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.", | |
| 619 | + "name": "copyright", | |
| 620 | + "label": "Copyright" | |
| 621 | + } | |
| 622 | + ] | |
| 623 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_fisher2003controlling.crossref.json
+400 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 6 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-06T05:16:59Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1791263819878, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.1.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 31, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2003, | |
| 23 | + 5, | |
| 24 | + 15 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2003-05-15T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1052956800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2003, | |
| 46 | + 6 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>Liquidity in private asset markets is notoriously variable over time. Therefore, indices of changes in market value that are based on asset transaction prices will systematically reflect intertemporal differences in the ease of selling a property. We define and develop a concept of “constant‐liquidity value” in the context of a model that is characterized by pro‐cyclical volume of trading. We then present an econometric model that allows for estimation of both a standard transaction‐based price index and a constant‐liquidity index. Our application to the NCREIF database reveals that, in the case of institutional commercial real estate investment, constant‐liquidity values tend to lead transaction‐based and appraisal‐based indices in time, and also to display greater volatility and cycle amplitude. The differences can be significant for strategic investment policy viewed from a mean‐variance portfolio optimization perspective.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00066", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2003, | |
| 57 | + 5, | |
| 58 | + 15 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2003-05-15T17:45:06Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1053020706000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "269-303", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 219, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "Jeffrey", | |
| 75 | + "family": "Fisher", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 78 | + "role": [ | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 81 | + "role": "author" | |
| 82 | + } | |
| 83 | + ] | |
| 84 | + }, | |
| 85 | + { | |
| 86 | + "given": "Dean", | |
| 87 | + "family": "Gatzlaff", | |
| 88 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 89 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 90 | + "role": [ | |
| 91 | + { | |
| 92 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 93 | + "role": "author" | |
| 94 | + } | |
| 95 | + ] | |
| 96 | + }, | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "given": "David", | |
| 99 | + "family": "Geltner", | |
| 100 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 101 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 102 | + "role": [ | |
| 103 | + { | |
| 104 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 105 | + "role": "author" | |
| 106 | + } | |
| 107 | + ] | |
| 108 | + }, | |
| 109 | + { | |
| 110 | + "given": "Donald", | |
| 111 | + "family": "Haurin", | |
| 112 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 113 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 114 | + "role": [ | |
| 115 | + { | |
| 116 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 117 | + "role": "author" | |
| 118 | + } | |
| 119 | + ] | |
| 120 | + } | |
| 121 | + ], | |
| 122 | + "member": "311", | |
| 123 | + "published-online": { | |
| 124 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 125 | + [ | |
| 126 | + 2003, | |
| 127 | + 5, | |
| 128 | + 15 | |
| 129 | + ] | |
| 130 | + ] | |
| 131 | + }, | |
| 132 | + "reference": [ | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_2_1", | |
| 135 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 136 | + "DOI": "10.1080/01621459.1963.10480679" | |
| 137 | + }, | |
| 138 | + { | |
| 139 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_3_1", | |
| 140 | + "volume-title": "Research in Real Estate", | |
| 141 | + "author": "Bryan T.", | |
| 142 | + "year": "1982" | |
| 143 | + }, | |
| 144 | + { | |
| 145 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_4_1", | |
| 146 | + "first-page": "45", | |
| 147 | + "article-title": "Prices of Single Family Homes since 1970: New Indexes for Four Cities", | |
| 148 | + "author": "Case K.", | |
| 149 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 150 | + "journal-title": "New England Economic Review" | |
| 151 | + }, | |
| 152 | + { | |
| 153 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_5_1", | |
| 154 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 155 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1080-8620.t01-1-00010" | |
| 156 | + }, | |
| 157 | + { | |
| 158 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_6_1", | |
| 159 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 160 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00045" | |
| 161 | + }, | |
| 162 | + { | |
| 163 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_7_1", | |
| 164 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 165 | + "DOI": "10.1080/01621459.1992.10475209" | |
| 166 | + }, | |
| 167 | + { | |
| 168 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_8_1", | |
| 169 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 170 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1080-8620.00014" | |
| 171 | + }, | |
| 172 | + { | |
| 173 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_9_1", | |
| 174 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 175 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00749" | |
| 176 | + }, | |
| 177 | + { | |
| 178 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 179 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_10_1", | |
| 180 | + "first-page": "7", | |
| 181 | + "article-title": "De‐Lagging the NCREIF Index: Transaction Prices and Reverse‐Engineering", | |
| 182 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 183 | + "author": "Fisher J.", | |
| 184 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 185 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Finance" | |
| 186 | + }, | |
| 187 | + { | |
| 188 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_11_1", | |
| 189 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 190 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF01099972" | |
| 191 | + }, | |
| 192 | + { | |
| 193 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_12_1", | |
| 194 | + "unstructured": "Fisher J.andS.Ong.2002.Optimal Trade‐off Between Random Error and Temporal Bias in Selection of Appraisal Comps. Working paper. Indiana University : Bloomington IN ." | |
| 195 | + }, | |
| 196 | + { | |
| 197 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_13_1", | |
| 198 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 199 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007763816289" | |
| 200 | + }, | |
| 201 | + { | |
| 202 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_14_1", | |
| 203 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 204 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.1997.2045" | |
| 205 | + }, | |
| 206 | + { | |
| 207 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_15_1", | |
| 208 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 209 | + "DOI": "10.1108/14635789710189191" | |
| 210 | + }, | |
| 211 | + { | |
| 212 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_16_1", | |
| 213 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 214 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00153997" | |
| 215 | + }, | |
| 216 | + { | |
| 217 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_17_1", | |
| 218 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 219 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00052-5" | |
| 220 | + }, | |
| 221 | + { | |
| 222 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_18_1", | |
| 223 | + "volume-title": "Economic Analysis", | |
| 224 | + "author": "Greene W.", | |
| 225 | + "year": "1999" | |
| 226 | + }, | |
| 227 | + { | |
| 228 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_19_1", | |
| 229 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 230 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912352" | |
| 231 | + }, | |
| 232 | + { | |
| 233 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_20_1", | |
| 234 | + "volume-title": "Distributions in Statistics: Continuous Multivariate Distributions", | |
| 235 | + "author": "Johnson N.", | |
| 236 | + "year": "1972" | |
| 237 | + }, | |
| 238 | + { | |
| 239 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 240 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_21_1", | |
| 241 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 242 | + "first-page": "71", | |
| 243 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1999.12089567", | |
| 244 | + "article-title": "Price Indexes for Commercial and Office Properties: An Application of the Assessed Value Method", | |
| 245 | + "volume": "5", | |
| 246 | + "author": "Judd G.D.", | |
| 247 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 248 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management" | |
| 249 | + }, | |
| 250 | + { | |
| 251 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_22_1", | |
| 252 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 253 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00781" | |
| 254 | + }, | |
| 255 | + { | |
| 256 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_23_1", | |
| 257 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 258 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0304-405X(96)00891-4" | |
| 259 | + }, | |
| 260 | + { | |
| 261 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_24_1", | |
| 262 | + "volume-title": "Limited‐Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics", | |
| 263 | + "author": "Maddala G.S.", | |
| 264 | + "year": "1985" | |
| 265 | + }, | |
| 266 | + { | |
| 267 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_25_1", | |
| 268 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 269 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007861303058" | |
| 270 | + }, | |
| 271 | + { | |
| 272 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_26_1", | |
| 273 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 274 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1080-8620.00003" | |
| 275 | + }, | |
| 276 | + { | |
| 277 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_27_1", | |
| 278 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 279 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00487" | |
| 280 | + }, | |
| 281 | + { | |
| 282 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_28_1", | |
| 283 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 284 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00173120" | |
| 285 | + }, | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 288 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_29_1", | |
| 289 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 290 | + "first-page": "33", | |
| 291 | + "DOI": "10.1086/260169", | |
| 292 | + "article-title": "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets", | |
| 293 | + "volume": "82", | |
| 294 | + "author": "Rosen S.", | |
| 295 | + "year": "1974", | |
| 296 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 297 | + }, | |
| 298 | + { | |
| 299 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_30_1", | |
| 300 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 301 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1051-1377(05)80028-2" | |
| 302 | + }, | |
| 303 | + { | |
| 304 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_31_1", | |
| 305 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 306 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04518.x" | |
| 307 | + }, | |
| 308 | + { | |
| 309 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_32_1", | |
| 310 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 311 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 312 | + } | |
| 313 | + ], | |
| 314 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 315 | + "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 316 | + ], | |
| 317 | + "language": "en", | |
| 318 | + "link": [ | |
| 319 | + { | |
| 320 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2F1540-6229.00066", | |
| 321 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 322 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 323 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 324 | + }, | |
| 325 | + { | |
| 326 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1540-6229.00066", | |
| 327 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 328 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 329 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 330 | + } | |
| 331 | + ], | |
| 332 | + "deposited": { | |
| 333 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 334 | + [ | |
| 335 | + 2023, | |
| 336 | + 11, | |
| 337 | + 16 | |
| 338 | + ] | |
| 339 | + ], | |
| 340 | + "date-time": "2023-11-16T18:01:14Z", | |
| 341 | + "timestamp": 1700157674000 | |
| 342 | + }, | |
| 343 | + "score": 119.065834, | |
| 344 | + "resource": { | |
| 345 | + "primary": { | |
| 346 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1540-6229.00066" | |
| 347 | + } | |
| 348 | + }, | |
| 349 | + "issued": { | |
| 350 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 351 | + [ | |
| 352 | + 2003, | |
| 353 | + 5, | |
| 354 | + 15 | |
| 355 | + ] | |
| 356 | + ] | |
| 357 | + }, | |
| 358 | + "references-count": 31, | |
| 359 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 360 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 361 | + "published-print": { | |
| 362 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 363 | + [ | |
| 364 | + 2003, | |
| 365 | + 6 | |
| 366 | + ] | |
| 367 | + ] | |
| 368 | + } | |
| 369 | + }, | |
| 370 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 371 | + "10.1111/1540-6229.00066" | |
| 372 | + ], | |
| 373 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00066", | |
| 374 | + "archive": [ | |
| 375 | + "Portico" | |
| 376 | + ], | |
| 377 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 378 | + "1080-8620", | |
| 379 | + "1540-6229" | |
| 380 | + ], | |
| 381 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 382 | + { | |
| 383 | + "value": "1080-8620", | |
| 384 | + "type": "print" | |
| 385 | + }, | |
| 386 | + { | |
| 387 | + "value": "1540-6229", | |
| 388 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 389 | + } | |
| 390 | + ], | |
| 391 | + "published": { | |
| 392 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 393 | + [ | |
| 394 | + 2003, | |
| 395 | + 5, | |
| 396 | + 15 | |
| 397 | + ] | |
| 398 | + ] | |
| 399 | + } | |
| 400 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_gabrovski2019beveridge.crossref.json
+829 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,829 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T08:22:42Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792398162063, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 59, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Elsevier BV", | |
| 16 | + "license": [ | |
| 17 | + { | |
| 18 | + "start": { | |
| 19 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 20 | + [ | |
| 21 | + 2019, | |
| 22 | + 5, | |
| 23 | + 1 | |
| 24 | + ] | |
| 25 | + ], | |
| 26 | + "date-time": "2019-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 27 | + "timestamp": 1556668800000 | |
| 28 | + }, | |
| 29 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 30 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 31 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/" | |
| 32 | + }, | |
| 33 | + { | |
| 34 | + "start": { | |
| 35 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 36 | + [ | |
| 37 | + 2019, | |
| 38 | + 5, | |
| 39 | + 1 | |
| 40 | + ] | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "date-time": "2019-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 43 | + "timestamp": 1556668800000 | |
| 44 | + }, | |
| 45 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 46 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 47 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license" | |
| 48 | + } | |
| 49 | + ], | |
| 50 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 51 | + "domain": [ | |
| 52 | + "elsevier.com", | |
| 53 | + "sciencedirect.com" | |
| 54 | + ], | |
| 55 | + "crossmark-restriction": true | |
| 56 | + }, | |
| 57 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 58 | + "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "published-print": { | |
| 61 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 62 | + [ | |
| 63 | + 2019, | |
| 64 | + 5 | |
| 65 | + ] | |
| 66 | + ] | |
| 67 | + }, | |
| 68 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003", | |
| 69 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 70 | + "created": { | |
| 71 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 72 | + [ | |
| 73 | + 2019, | |
| 74 | + 3, | |
| 75 | + 14 | |
| 76 | + ] | |
| 77 | + ], | |
| 78 | + "date-time": "2019-03-14T13:17:40Z", | |
| 79 | + "timestamp": 1552569460000 | |
| 80 | + }, | |
| 81 | + "page": "361-381", | |
| 82 | + "update-policy": "https://doi.org/10.1016/elsevier_cm_policy", | |
| 83 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 84 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 27, | |
| 85 | + "special_numbering": "C", | |
| 86 | + "title": [ | |
| 87 | + "The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market" | |
| 88 | + ], | |
| 89 | + "prefix": "10.1016", | |
| 90 | + "volume": "181", | |
| 91 | + "author": [ | |
| 92 | + { | |
| 93 | + "given": "Miroslav", | |
| 94 | + "family": "Gabrovski", | |
| 95 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 96 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 97 | + "role": [ | |
| 98 | + { | |
| 99 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 100 | + "role": "author" | |
| 101 | + } | |
| 102 | + ] | |
| 103 | + }, | |
| 104 | + { | |
| 105 | + "given": "Victor", | |
| 106 | + "family": "Ortego-Marti", | |
| 107 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 108 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 109 | + "role": [ | |
| 110 | + { | |
| 111 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 112 | + "role": "author" | |
| 113 | + } | |
| 114 | + ] | |
| 115 | + } | |
| 116 | + ], | |
| 117 | + "member": "78", | |
| 118 | + "reference": [ | |
| 119 | + { | |
| 120 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 121 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0010", | |
| 122 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 123 | + "first-page": "1449", | |
| 124 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12204", | |
| 125 | + "article-title": "Information frictions and housing market dynamics", | |
| 126 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 127 | + "author": "Anenberg", | |
| 128 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 129 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 130 | + }, | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 133 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0020", | |
| 134 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 135 | + "first-page": "5", | |
| 136 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00161714", | |
| 137 | + "article-title": "Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes", | |
| 138 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 139 | + "author": "Arnott", | |
| 140 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 141 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Finance Econ." | |
| 142 | + }, | |
| 143 | + { | |
| 144 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0030", | |
| 145 | + "unstructured": "Bachmann, R., Cooper, D., 2014. The ins and arounds in the US housing market. Mimeo." | |
| 146 | + }, | |
| 147 | + { | |
| 148 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 149 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0040", | |
| 150 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 151 | + "first-page": "191", | |
| 152 | + "DOI": "10.1257/app.20160214", | |
| 153 | + "article-title": "Conflicts of interest and steering in residential brokerage", | |
| 154 | + "volume": "9", | |
| 155 | + "author": "Barwick", | |
| 156 | + "year": "2017", | |
| 157 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ." | |
| 158 | + }, | |
| 159 | + { | |
| 160 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0050", | |
| 161 | + "series-title": "Full Employment in a Free Society", | |
| 162 | + "author": "Beveridge", | |
| 163 | + "year": "1944" | |
| 164 | + }, | |
| 165 | + { | |
| 166 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 167 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0060", | |
| 168 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 169 | + "first-page": "1088", | |
| 170 | + "DOI": "10.1086/686732", | |
| 171 | + "article-title": "Understanding booms and busts in housing markets", | |
| 172 | + "volume": "124", | |
| 173 | + "author": "Burnside", | |
| 174 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 175 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 176 | + }, | |
| 177 | + { | |
| 178 | + "issue": "s2", | |
| 179 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0070", | |
| 180 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 181 | + "first-page": "283", | |
| 182 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x", | |
| 183 | + "article-title": "Trading frictions and house price dynamics", | |
| 184 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 185 | + "author": "Caplin", | |
| 186 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 187 | + "journal-title": "J. Money Credit Bank." | |
| 188 | + }, | |
| 189 | + { | |
| 190 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 191 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0080", | |
| 192 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 193 | + "first-page": "331", | |
| 194 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00269", | |
| 195 | + "article-title": "Costs and pricing of home brokerage services", | |
| 196 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 197 | + "author": "Carney", | |
| 198 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 199 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 200 | + }, | |
| 201 | + { | |
| 202 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 203 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0090", | |
| 204 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 205 | + "first-page": "751", | |
| 206 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00345.x", | |
| 207 | + "article-title": "Housing and the business cycle", | |
| 208 | + "volume": "46", | |
| 209 | + "author": "Davis", | |
| 210 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 211 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 212 | + }, | |
| 213 | + { | |
| 214 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 215 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0100", | |
| 216 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 217 | + "first-page": "837", | |
| 218 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 219 | + "article-title": "House prices, sales, and time on the market: a search-theoretic framework", | |
| 220 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 221 | + "author": "Diaz", | |
| 222 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 223 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 224 | + }, | |
| 225 | + { | |
| 226 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 227 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0110", | |
| 228 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 229 | + "first-page": "28", | |
| 230 | + "DOI": "10.1086/298002", | |
| 231 | + "article-title": "Are unemployment and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor force states?", | |
| 232 | + "volume": "1", | |
| 233 | + "author": "Flinn", | |
| 234 | + "year": "1983", | |
| 235 | + "journal-title": "J. Labor Econ." | |
| 236 | + }, | |
| 237 | + { | |
| 238 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 239 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0120", | |
| 240 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 241 | + "first-page": "287", | |
| 242 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1993.12090709", | |
| 243 | + "article-title": "A note on agency size and brokerage commission splits", | |
| 244 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 245 | + "author": "Frew", | |
| 246 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 247 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 248 | + }, | |
| 249 | + { | |
| 250 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0130", | |
| 251 | + "unstructured": "Gabrovski, M., Ortego-Marti, V., 2018a. Housing market dynamics with search frictions. Mimeo. University of California Riverside." | |
| 252 | + }, | |
| 253 | + { | |
| 254 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0140", | |
| 255 | + "unstructured": "Gabrovski, M., Ortego-Marti, V., 2018b. Search and credit frictions in the housing market. Mimeo. University of California Riverside." | |
| 256 | + }, | |
| 257 | + { | |
| 258 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 259 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0150", | |
| 260 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 261 | + "first-page": "851", | |
| 262 | + "DOI": "10.1162/1542476054430807", | |
| 263 | + "article-title": "Equilibrium search unemployment, endogenous participation, and labor market flows", | |
| 264 | + "volume": "3", | |
| 265 | + "author": "Garibaldi", | |
| 266 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 267 | + "journal-title": "J. Eur. Econ. Assoc." | |
| 268 | + }, | |
| 269 | + { | |
| 270 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 271 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0160", | |
| 272 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 273 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 274 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002", | |
| 275 | + "article-title": "Search and matching in the housing market", | |
| 276 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 277 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 278 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 279 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 280 | + }, | |
| 281 | + { | |
| 282 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 283 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0180", | |
| 284 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 285 | + "article-title": "Equity and time to sale in the real estate market", | |
| 286 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 287 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 288 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 289 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 290 | + }, | |
| 291 | + { | |
| 292 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 293 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0170", | |
| 294 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 295 | + "first-page": "1233", | |
| 296 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355301753265561", | |
| 297 | + "article-title": "Loss aversion and seller behavior: evidence from the housing market", | |
| 298 | + "volume": "116", | |
| 299 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 300 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 301 | + "journal-title": "Q. J. Econ." | |
| 302 | + }, | |
| 303 | + { | |
| 304 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 305 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0190", | |
| 306 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 307 | + "first-page": "931", | |
| 308 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00516.x", | |
| 309 | + "article-title": "Infrequent housing adjustment, limited participation, and monetary policy", | |
| 310 | + "volume": "44", | |
| 311 | + "author": "Ghent", | |
| 312 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 313 | + "journal-title": "J. Money Credit Bank." | |
| 314 | + }, | |
| 315 | + { | |
| 316 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0200", | |
| 317 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 318 | + "unstructured": "Glaeser, E.L., Gyourko, J., 2006. Housing dynamics.", | |
| 319 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w12787" | |
| 320 | + }, | |
| 321 | + { | |
| 322 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0210", | |
| 323 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 324 | + "unstructured": "Glaeser, E.L., Gyourko, J., 2007. Arbitrage in housing markets.", | |
| 325 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w13704" | |
| 326 | + }, | |
| 327 | + { | |
| 328 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 329 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0220", | |
| 330 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 331 | + "first-page": "79", | |
| 332 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1988.12090557", | |
| 333 | + "article-title": "Brokerage firm competition in real estate commission rates", | |
| 334 | + "volume": "3", | |
| 335 | + "author": "Goolsby", | |
| 336 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 337 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 338 | + }, | |
| 339 | + { | |
| 340 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 341 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0230", | |
| 342 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 343 | + "first-page": "369", | |
| 344 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2534138", | |
| 345 | + "article-title": "Why is the unemployment rate so high at full employment?", | |
| 346 | + "volume": "1970", | |
| 347 | + "author": "Hall", | |
| 348 | + "year": "1970", | |
| 349 | + "journal-title": "Brookings Pap. Econ. Act." | |
| 350 | + }, | |
| 351 | + { | |
| 352 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 353 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0240", | |
| 354 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 355 | + "first-page": "1653", | |
| 356 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.98.4.1653", | |
| 357 | + "article-title": "The limited influence of unemployment on the wage bargain", | |
| 358 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 359 | + "author": "Hall", | |
| 360 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 361 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 362 | + }, | |
| 363 | + { | |
| 364 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0250", | |
| 365 | + "first-page": "813", | |
| 366 | + "article-title": "The microstructure of housing markets: search, bargaining, and brokerage", | |
| 367 | + "volume": "vol. 5", | |
| 368 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 369 | + "year": "2015" | |
| 370 | + }, | |
| 371 | + { | |
| 372 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 373 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0260", | |
| 374 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 375 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 376 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172", | |
| 377 | + "article-title": "Search, liquidity, and the dynamics of house prices and construction", | |
| 378 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 379 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 380 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 381 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 382 | + }, | |
| 383 | + { | |
| 384 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 385 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0270", | |
| 386 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 387 | + "first-page": "1214", | |
| 388 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.106.4.1214", | |
| 389 | + "article-title": "Search, liquidity, and the dynamics of house prices and construction: corrigendum", | |
| 390 | + "volume": "106", | |
| 391 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 392 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 393 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 394 | + }, | |
| 395 | + { | |
| 396 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 397 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0280", | |
| 398 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 399 | + "first-page": "1076", | |
| 400 | + "DOI": "10.1086/376953", | |
| 401 | + "article-title": "Can free entry be inefficient? Fixed commissions and social waste in the real estate industry", | |
| 402 | + "volume": "111", | |
| 403 | + "author": "Hsieh", | |
| 404 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 405 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 406 | + }, | |
| 407 | + { | |
| 408 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 409 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0300", | |
| 410 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 411 | + "first-page": "147", | |
| 412 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1468-0262.00007", | |
| 413 | + "article-title": "The measurement of unemployment: an empirical approach", | |
| 414 | + "volume": "67", | |
| 415 | + "author": "Jones", | |
| 416 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 417 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 418 | + }, | |
| 419 | + { | |
| 420 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 421 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0310", | |
| 422 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 423 | + "first-page": "314", | |
| 424 | + "DOI": "10.1162/rest.88.2.314", | |
| 425 | + "article-title": "Unemployment and nonemployment: heterogeneities in labor market states", | |
| 426 | + "volume": "88", | |
| 427 | + "author": "Jones", | |
| 428 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 429 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stat." | |
| 430 | + }, | |
| 431 | + { | |
| 432 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0320", | |
| 433 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 434 | + "first-page": "33", | |
| 435 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2014.07.001", | |
| 436 | + "article-title": "A search-theoretic model of the rental and homeownership markets", | |
| 437 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 438 | + "author": "Kashiwagi", | |
| 439 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 440 | + "journal-title": "J. Hous. Econ." | |
| 441 | + }, | |
| 442 | + { | |
| 443 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 444 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0330", | |
| 445 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 446 | + "first-page": "654", | |
| 447 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2014.01.004", | |
| 448 | + "article-title": "Sunspots and self-fulfilling beliefs in the US housing market", | |
| 449 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 450 | + "author": "Kashiwagi", | |
| 451 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 452 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Dyn." | |
| 453 | + }, | |
| 454 | + { | |
| 455 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 456 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0340", | |
| 457 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 458 | + "first-page": "701", | |
| 459 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2010.02.002", | |
| 460 | + "article-title": "Finite state Markov-chain approximations to highly persistent processes", | |
| 461 | + "volume": "13", | |
| 462 | + "author": "Kopecky", | |
| 463 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 464 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Dyn." | |
| 465 | + }, | |
| 466 | + { | |
| 467 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 468 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0350", | |
| 469 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 470 | + "first-page": "32", | |
| 471 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180", | |
| 472 | + "article-title": "A theory of liquidity in residential real estate markets", | |
| 473 | + "volume": "49", | |
| 474 | + "author": "Krainer", | |
| 475 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 476 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 477 | + }, | |
| 478 | + { | |
| 479 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0360", | |
| 480 | + "series-title": "FRBSF Economic Letter", | |
| 481 | + "article-title": "Falling house prices and rising time on the market", | |
| 482 | + "author": "Krainer", | |
| 483 | + "year": "2008" | |
| 484 | + }, | |
| 485 | + { | |
| 486 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 487 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0380", | |
| 488 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 489 | + "first-page": "327", | |
| 490 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2007.01.004", | |
| 491 | + "article-title": "More on unemployment and vacancy fluctuations", | |
| 492 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 493 | + "author": "Mortensen", | |
| 494 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 495 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Dyn." | |
| 496 | + }, | |
| 497 | + { | |
| 498 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 499 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0390", | |
| 500 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 501 | + "first-page": "397", | |
| 502 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297896", | |
| 503 | + "article-title": "Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment", | |
| 504 | + "volume": "61", | |
| 505 | + "author": "Mortensen", | |
| 506 | + "year": "1994", | |
| 507 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 508 | + }, | |
| 509 | + { | |
| 510 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 511 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0400", | |
| 512 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 513 | + "first-page": "155", | |
| 514 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1907266", | |
| 515 | + "article-title": "The bargaining problem", | |
| 516 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 517 | + "author": "Nash", | |
| 518 | + "year": "1950", | |
| 519 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 520 | + }, | |
| 521 | + { | |
| 522 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0410", | |
| 523 | + "unstructured": "Ngai, L.R., Sheedy, K.D., 2015. The ins and outs of selling houses. Mimeo. London School of Economics." | |
| 524 | + }, | |
| 525 | + { | |
| 526 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0420", | |
| 527 | + "unstructured": "Ngai, L.R., Sheedy, K.D., 2017. Moving house. Mimeo. London School of Economics." | |
| 528 | + }, | |
| 529 | + { | |
| 530 | + "issue": "12", | |
| 531 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0430", | |
| 532 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 533 | + "first-page": "3991", | |
| 534 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991", | |
| 535 | + "article-title": "Hot and cold seasons in the housing market", | |
| 536 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 537 | + "author": "Ngai", | |
| 538 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 539 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 540 | + }, | |
| 541 | + { | |
| 542 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 543 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0440", | |
| 544 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 545 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 546 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x", | |
| 547 | + "article-title": "Hot and cold markets", | |
| 548 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 549 | + "author": "Novy-Marx", | |
| 550 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 551 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 552 | + }, | |
| 553 | + { | |
| 554 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 555 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0450", | |
| 556 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 557 | + "first-page": "459", | |
| 558 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.383_1.x", | |
| 559 | + "article-title": "Housing market dynamics: on the contribution of income shocks and credit constraints", | |
| 560 | + "volume": "73", | |
| 561 | + "author": "Ortalo-Magne", | |
| 562 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 563 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 564 | + }, | |
| 565 | + { | |
| 566 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 567 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0460", | |
| 568 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 569 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 570 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406", | |
| 571 | + "article-title": "Momentum traders in the housing market: survey evidence and a search model", | |
| 572 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 573 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 574 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 575 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 576 | + }, | |
| 577 | + { | |
| 578 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0470", | |
| 579 | + "first-page": "1547", | |
| 580 | + "article-title": "Housing and Macroeconomics", | |
| 581 | + "volume": "vol. 2", | |
| 582 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 583 | + "year": "2016" | |
| 584 | + }, | |
| 585 | + { | |
| 586 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0480", | |
| 587 | + "series-title": "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory", | |
| 588 | + "author": "Pissarides", | |
| 589 | + "year": "2000" | |
| 590 | + }, | |
| 591 | + { | |
| 592 | + "issue": "4–5", | |
| 593 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0490", | |
| 594 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 595 | + "first-page": "1147", | |
| 596 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20161048", | |
| 597 | + "article-title": "Corporate finance and monetary policy", | |
| 598 | + "volume": "108", | |
| 599 | + "author": "Rocheteau", | |
| 600 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 601 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 602 | + }, | |
| 603 | + { | |
| 604 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0500", | |
| 605 | + "series-title": "Frontiers of Business Cycle Research", | |
| 606 | + "first-page": "294", | |
| 607 | + "article-title": "Asset pricing implications of equilibrium business cycle models", | |
| 608 | + "author": "Rouwenhorst", | |
| 609 | + "year": "1995" | |
| 610 | + }, | |
| 611 | + { | |
| 612 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 613 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0510", | |
| 614 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 615 | + "first-page": "97", | |
| 616 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912531", | |
| 617 | + "article-title": "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model", | |
| 618 | + "volume": "50", | |
| 619 | + "author": "Rubinstein", | |
| 620 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 621 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 622 | + }, | |
| 623 | + { | |
| 624 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0520", | |
| 625 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 626 | + "unstructured": "Schnare, A., Kulick, R., 2009. Do real estate agents compete on price? Evidence from seven metropolitan areas.", | |
| 627 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.1501256" | |
| 628 | + }, | |
| 629 | + { | |
| 630 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 631 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0530", | |
| 632 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 633 | + "first-page": "24", | |
| 634 | + "DOI": "10.1257/0002828053828572", | |
| 635 | + "article-title": "The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies", | |
| 636 | + "volume": "95", | |
| 637 | + "author": "Shimer", | |
| 638 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 639 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 640 | + }, | |
| 641 | + { | |
| 642 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 643 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0550", | |
| 644 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 645 | + "first-page": "102", | |
| 646 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.1996.1095", | |
| 647 | + "article-title": "Brokerage pricing under competition", | |
| 648 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 649 | + "author": "Sirmans", | |
| 650 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 651 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 652 | + }, | |
| 653 | + { | |
| 654 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0560", | |
| 655 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 656 | + "unstructured": "Smith, E., 2015. High and low activity spells in housing markets. Mimeo.", | |
| 657 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.2706395" | |
| 658 | + }, | |
| 659 | + { | |
| 660 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 661 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0570", | |
| 662 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 663 | + "first-page": "379", | |
| 664 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444", | |
| 665 | + "article-title": "Prices and trading volume in the housing market: a model with down-payment effects", | |
| 666 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 667 | + "author": "Stein", | |
| 668 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 669 | + "journal-title": "Q. J. Econ." | |
| 670 | + }, | |
| 671 | + { | |
| 672 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 673 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0580", | |
| 674 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 675 | + "first-page": "177", | |
| 676 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0165-1765(86)90168-0", | |
| 677 | + "article-title": "Finite state Markov-chain approximations to univariate and vector autoregressions", | |
| 678 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 679 | + "author": "Tauchen", | |
| 680 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 681 | + "journal-title": "Econ. Lett." | |
| 682 | + }, | |
| 683 | + { | |
| 684 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 685 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0590", | |
| 686 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 687 | + "first-page": "1567", | |
| 688 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00611.x", | |
| 689 | + "article-title": "Why has house price dispersion gone up?", | |
| 690 | + "volume": "77", | |
| 691 | + "author": "Van Nieuwerburgh", | |
| 692 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 693 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 694 | + }, | |
| 695 | + { | |
| 696 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 697 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0600", | |
| 698 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 699 | + "first-page": "944", | |
| 700 | + "DOI": "10.1257/0002828042002525", | |
| 701 | + "article-title": "The macroeconomics of labor and credit market imperfections", | |
| 702 | + "volume": "94", | |
| 703 | + "author": "Wasmer", | |
| 704 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 705 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 706 | + }, | |
| 707 | + { | |
| 708 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 709 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0610", | |
| 710 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 711 | + "first-page": "1270", | |
| 712 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734", | |
| 713 | + "article-title": "Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market matching model", | |
| 714 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 715 | + "author": "Wheaton", | |
| 716 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 717 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 718 | + }, | |
| 719 | + { | |
| 720 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 721 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003_br0620", | |
| 722 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 723 | + "first-page": "245", | |
| 724 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2001.12091053", | |
| 725 | + "article-title": "A note on buyer's agent commission and sale price", | |
| 726 | + "volume": "21", | |
| 727 | + "author": "Zietz", | |
| 728 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 729 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 730 | + } | |
| 731 | + ], | |
| 732 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 733 | + "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 734 | + ], | |
| 735 | + "language": "en", | |
| 736 | + "link": [ | |
| 737 | + { | |
| 738 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0022053119300274?httpAccept=text/xml", | |
| 739 | + "content-type": "text/xml", | |
| 740 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 741 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 742 | + }, | |
| 743 | + { | |
| 744 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0022053119300274?httpAccept=text/plain", | |
| 745 | + "content-type": "text/plain", | |
| 746 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 747 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 748 | + } | |
| 749 | + ], | |
| 750 | + "deposited": { | |
| 751 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 752 | + [ | |
| 753 | + 2025, | |
| 754 | + 9, | |
| 755 | + 19 | |
| 756 | + ] | |
| 757 | + ], | |
| 758 | + "date-time": "2025-09-19T11:58:01Z", | |
| 759 | + "timestamp": 1758283081000 | |
| 760 | + }, | |
| 761 | + "score": 87.00745, | |
| 762 | + "resource": { | |
| 763 | + "primary": { | |
| 764 | + "URL": "https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053119300274" | |
| 765 | + } | |
| 766 | + }, | |
| 767 | + "issued": { | |
| 768 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 769 | + [ | |
| 770 | + 2019, | |
| 771 | + 5 | |
| 772 | + ] | |
| 773 | + ] | |
| 774 | + }, | |
| 775 | + "references-count": 59, | |
| 776 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 777 | + "S0022053119300274" | |
| 778 | + ], | |
| 779 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003", | |
| 780 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 781 | + "0022-0531" | |
| 782 | + ], | |
| 783 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 784 | + { | |
| 785 | + "value": "0022-0531", | |
| 786 | + "type": "print" | |
| 787 | + } | |
| 788 | + ], | |
| 789 | + "published": { | |
| 790 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 791 | + [ | |
| 792 | + 2019, | |
| 793 | + 5 | |
| 794 | + ] | |
| 795 | + ] | |
| 796 | + }, | |
| 797 | + "assertion": [ | |
| 798 | + { | |
| 799 | + "value": "Elsevier", | |
| 800 | + "name": "publisher", | |
| 801 | + "label": "This article is maintained by" | |
| 802 | + }, | |
| 803 | + { | |
| 804 | + "value": "The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market", | |
| 805 | + "name": "articletitle", | |
| 806 | + "label": "Article Title" | |
| 807 | + }, | |
| 808 | + { | |
| 809 | + "value": "Journal of Economic Theory", | |
| 810 | + "name": "journaltitle", | |
| 811 | + "label": "Journal Title" | |
| 812 | + }, | |
| 813 | + { | |
| 814 | + "value": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003", | |
| 815 | + "name": "articlelink", | |
| 816 | + "label": "CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version" | |
| 817 | + }, | |
| 818 | + { | |
| 819 | + "value": "article", | |
| 820 | + "name": "content_type", | |
| 821 | + "label": "Content Type" | |
| 822 | + }, | |
| 823 | + { | |
| 824 | + "value": "© 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.", | |
| 825 | + "name": "copyright", | |
| 826 | + "label": "Copyright" | |
| 827 | + } | |
| 828 | + ] | |
| 829 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_gabrovski2021search.crossref.json
+916 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,916 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 8, | |
| 7 | + 5 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-08-05T04:01:40Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1785902500607, | |
| 12 | + "version": "3.56.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 60, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Elsevier BV", | |
| 16 | + "license": [ | |
| 17 | + { | |
| 18 | + "start": { | |
| 19 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 20 | + [ | |
| 21 | + 2021, | |
| 22 | + 5, | |
| 23 | + 1 | |
| 24 | + ] | |
| 25 | + ], | |
| 26 | + "date-time": "2021-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 27 | + "timestamp": 1619827200000 | |
| 28 | + }, | |
| 29 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 30 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 31 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/" | |
| 32 | + }, | |
| 33 | + { | |
| 34 | + "start": { | |
| 35 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 36 | + [ | |
| 37 | + 2021, | |
| 38 | + 5, | |
| 39 | + 1 | |
| 40 | + ] | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "date-time": "2021-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 43 | + "timestamp": 1619827200000 | |
| 44 | + }, | |
| 45 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 46 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 47 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license" | |
| 48 | + }, | |
| 49 | + { | |
| 50 | + "start": { | |
| 51 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 52 | + [ | |
| 53 | + 2021, | |
| 54 | + 5, | |
| 55 | + 1 | |
| 56 | + ] | |
| 57 | + ], | |
| 58 | + "date-time": "2021-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 59 | + "timestamp": 1619827200000 | |
| 60 | + }, | |
| 61 | + "content-version": "stm-asf", | |
| 62 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 63 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.15223/policy-017" | |
| 64 | + }, | |
| 65 | + { | |
| 66 | + "start": { | |
| 67 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 68 | + [ | |
| 69 | + 2021, | |
| 70 | + 5, | |
| 71 | + 1 | |
| 72 | + ] | |
| 73 | + ], | |
| 74 | + "date-time": "2021-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 75 | + "timestamp": 1619827200000 | |
| 76 | + }, | |
| 77 | + "content-version": "stm-asf", | |
| 78 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 79 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.15223/policy-037" | |
| 80 | + }, | |
| 81 | + { | |
| 82 | + "start": { | |
| 83 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 84 | + [ | |
| 85 | + 2021, | |
| 86 | + 5, | |
| 87 | + 1 | |
| 88 | + ] | |
| 89 | + ], | |
| 90 | + "date-time": "2021-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 91 | + "timestamp": 1619827200000 | |
| 92 | + }, | |
| 93 | + "content-version": "stm-asf", | |
| 94 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 95 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.15223/policy-012" | |
| 96 | + }, | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "start": { | |
| 99 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 100 | + [ | |
| 101 | + 2021, | |
| 102 | + 5, | |
| 103 | + 1 | |
| 104 | + ] | |
| 105 | + ], | |
| 106 | + "date-time": "2021-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 107 | + "timestamp": 1619827200000 | |
| 108 | + }, | |
| 109 | + "content-version": "stm-asf", | |
| 110 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 111 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.15223/policy-029" | |
| 112 | + }, | |
| 113 | + { | |
| 114 | + "start": { | |
| 115 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 116 | + [ | |
| 117 | + 2021, | |
| 118 | + 5, | |
| 119 | + 1 | |
| 120 | + ] | |
| 121 | + ], | |
| 122 | + "date-time": "2021-05-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 123 | + "timestamp": 1619827200000 | |
| 124 | + }, | |
| 125 | + "content-version": "stm-asf", | |
| 126 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 127 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.15223/policy-004" | |
| 128 | + } | |
| 129 | + ], | |
| 130 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 131 | + "domain": [ | |
| 132 | + "elsevier.com", | |
| 133 | + "sciencedirect.com" | |
| 134 | + ], | |
| 135 | + "crossmark-restriction": true | |
| 136 | + }, | |
| 137 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 138 | + "European Economic Review" | |
| 139 | + ], | |
| 140 | + "published-print": { | |
| 141 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 142 | + [ | |
| 143 | + 2021, | |
| 144 | + 5 | |
| 145 | + ] | |
| 146 | + ] | |
| 147 | + }, | |
| 148 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699", | |
| 149 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 150 | + "created": { | |
| 151 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 152 | + [ | |
| 153 | + 2021, | |
| 154 | + 2, | |
| 155 | + 24 | |
| 156 | + ] | |
| 157 | + ], | |
| 158 | + "date-time": "2021-02-24T21:52:51Z", | |
| 159 | + "timestamp": 1614203571000 | |
| 160 | + }, | |
| 161 | + "page": "103699", | |
| 162 | + "update-policy": "https://doi.org/10.1016/elsevier_cm_policy", | |
| 163 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 164 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 21, | |
| 165 | + "special_numbering": "C", | |
| 166 | + "title": [ | |
| 167 | + "Search and credit frictions in the housing market" | |
| 168 | + ], | |
| 169 | + "prefix": "10.1016", | |
| 170 | + "volume": "134", | |
| 171 | + "author": [ | |
| 172 | + { | |
| 173 | + "given": "Miroslav", | |
| 174 | + "family": "Gabrovski", | |
| 175 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 176 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 177 | + "role": [ | |
| 178 | + { | |
| 179 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 180 | + "role": "author" | |
| 181 | + } | |
| 182 | + ] | |
| 183 | + }, | |
| 184 | + { | |
| 185 | + "given": "Victor", | |
| 186 | + "family": "Ortego-Marti", | |
| 187 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 188 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 189 | + "role": [ | |
| 190 | + { | |
| 191 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 192 | + "role": "author" | |
| 193 | + } | |
| 194 | + ] | |
| 195 | + } | |
| 196 | + ], | |
| 197 | + "member": "78", | |
| 198 | + "reference": [ | |
| 199 | + { | |
| 200 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0001", | |
| 201 | + "series-title": "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Office of Research Working Paper", | |
| 202 | + "article-title": "No Shopping in the US Mortgage Market: Direct and Strategic Effects of Providing Information", | |
| 203 | + "author": "Alexandrov", | |
| 204 | + "year": "2018" | |
| 205 | + }, | |
| 206 | + { | |
| 207 | + "issue": "10", | |
| 208 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0002", | |
| 209 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 210 | + "first-page": "3365", | |
| 211 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.10.3365", | |
| 212 | + "article-title": "The effect of mergers in search markets: evidence from the canadian mortgage industry", | |
| 213 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 214 | + "author": "Allen", | |
| 215 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 216 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 217 | + }, | |
| 218 | + { | |
| 219 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 220 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0003", | |
| 221 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 222 | + "first-page": "377", | |
| 223 | + "DOI": "10.1111/joie.12046", | |
| 224 | + "article-title": "Price dispersion in mortgage markets", | |
| 225 | + "volume": "62", | |
| 226 | + "author": "Allen", | |
| 227 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 228 | + "journal-title": "J. Ind. Econ." | |
| 229 | + }, | |
| 230 | + { | |
| 231 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 232 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0004", | |
| 233 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 234 | + "first-page": "1550", | |
| 235 | + "DOI": "10.1086/701684", | |
| 236 | + "article-title": "Search frictions and market power in negotiated-price markets", | |
| 237 | + "volume": "127", | |
| 238 | + "author": "Allen", | |
| 239 | + "year": "2019", | |
| 240 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 241 | + }, | |
| 242 | + { | |
| 243 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_sbref0005", | |
| 244 | + "series-title": "Inaction, Search Costs, and Market Power in the US Mortgage Market", | |
| 245 | + "author": "Ambokar", | |
| 246 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 247 | + }, | |
| 248 | + { | |
| 249 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0006", | |
| 250 | + "unstructured": "Arefeva, A., 2020. How auctions amplify house-price fluctuations. Available at SSRN 2980095." | |
| 251 | + }, | |
| 252 | + { | |
| 253 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 254 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0007", | |
| 255 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 256 | + "first-page": "5", | |
| 257 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00161714", | |
| 258 | + "article-title": "Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes", | |
| 259 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 260 | + "author": "Arnott", | |
| 261 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 262 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 263 | + }, | |
| 264 | + { | |
| 265 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_sbref0008", | |
| 266 | + "series-title": "The ins and Arounds in the US Housing Market", | |
| 267 | + "author": "Bachmann", | |
| 268 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 269 | + }, | |
| 270 | + { | |
| 271 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 272 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0009", | |
| 273 | + "first-page": "257", | |
| 274 | + "article-title": "Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the great depression", | |
| 275 | + "volume": "73", | |
| 276 | + "author": "Bernanke", | |
| 277 | + "year": "1983", | |
| 278 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 279 | + }, | |
| 280 | + { | |
| 281 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0010", | |
| 282 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 283 | + "unstructured": "Bhutta, N., Fuster, A., Hizmo, A., 2019. Paying too much? Price dispersion in the US mortgage market. Mimeo.", | |
| 284 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.3422904" | |
| 285 | + }, | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0011", | |
| 288 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 289 | + "first-page": "103403", | |
| 290 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103403", | |
| 291 | + "article-title": "The transmission mechanism of credit support policies in the euro area", | |
| 292 | + "volume": "124", | |
| 293 | + "author": "Boeckx", | |
| 294 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 295 | + "journal-title": "Eur. Econ. Rev." | |
| 296 | + }, | |
| 297 | + { | |
| 298 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 299 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0012", | |
| 300 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 301 | + "first-page": "1088", | |
| 302 | + "DOI": "10.1086/686732", | |
| 303 | + "article-title": "Understanding booms and busts in housing markets", | |
| 304 | + "volume": "124", | |
| 305 | + "author": "Burnside", | |
| 306 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 307 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 308 | + }, | |
| 309 | + { | |
| 310 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 311 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0014", | |
| 312 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 313 | + "first-page": "751", | |
| 314 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00345.x", | |
| 315 | + "article-title": "Housing and the business cycle", | |
| 316 | + "volume": "46", | |
| 317 | + "author": "Davis", | |
| 318 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 319 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 320 | + }, | |
| 321 | + { | |
| 322 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0016", | |
| 323 | + "unstructured": "Donaldson, J., Piacentino, G., Lee, J., 2018. The opportunity cost of collateral. Mimeo." | |
| 324 | + }, | |
| 325 | + { | |
| 326 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 327 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0015", | |
| 328 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 329 | + "first-page": "837", | |
| 330 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 331 | + "article-title": "House prices, sales, and time on the market: a search-theoretic framework", | |
| 332 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 333 | + "author": "Diaz", | |
| 334 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 335 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 336 | + }, | |
| 337 | + { | |
| 338 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0017", | |
| 339 | + "series-title": "Working papers 201816", | |
| 340 | + "article-title": "Search and Credit Frictions in the Housing Market", | |
| 341 | + "author": "Gabrovski", | |
| 342 | + "year": "2018" | |
| 343 | + }, | |
| 344 | + { | |
| 345 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0018", | |
| 346 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 347 | + "first-page": "361", | |
| 348 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003", | |
| 349 | + "article-title": "The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge curve in the housing market", | |
| 350 | + "volume": "181", | |
| 351 | + "author": "Gabrovski", | |
| 352 | + "year": "2019", | |
| 353 | + "journal-title": "J. Econ. Theory" | |
| 354 | + }, | |
| 355 | + { | |
| 356 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_sbref0019", | |
| 357 | + "series-title": "Efficiency in the Housing Market With Search Frictions", | |
| 358 | + "author": "Gabrovski", | |
| 359 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 360 | + }, | |
| 361 | + { | |
| 362 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_sbref0020", | |
| 363 | + "series-title": "Endogenous Separations and Housing Market Dynamics", | |
| 364 | + "author": "Gabrovski", | |
| 365 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 366 | + }, | |
| 367 | + { | |
| 368 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 369 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0021", | |
| 370 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 371 | + "first-page": "792", | |
| 372 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.06.022", | |
| 373 | + "article-title": "How do banks set interest rates?", | |
| 374 | + "volume": "52", | |
| 375 | + "author": "Gambacorta", | |
| 376 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 377 | + "journal-title": "Eur. Econ. Rev." | |
| 378 | + }, | |
| 379 | + { | |
| 380 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 381 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0022", | |
| 382 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 383 | + "first-page": "1603", | |
| 384 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20170772", | |
| 385 | + "article-title": "Mortgage debt, consumption, and illiquid housing markets in the great recession", | |
| 386 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 387 | + "author": "Garriga", | |
| 388 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 389 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 390 | + }, | |
| 391 | + { | |
| 392 | + "issue": "8", | |
| 393 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0023", | |
| 394 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 395 | + "first-page": "1751", | |
| 396 | + "DOI": "10.1111/jmcb.12504", | |
| 397 | + "article-title": "Explaining the boom bust cycle in the US housing market: a reverse engineering approach", | |
| 398 | + "volume": "50", | |
| 399 | + "author": "Gelain", | |
| 400 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 401 | + "journal-title": "J. Money Credit Bank." | |
| 402 | + }, | |
| 403 | + { | |
| 404 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 405 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0024", | |
| 406 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 407 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 408 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002", | |
| 409 | + "article-title": "Search and matching in the housing market", | |
| 410 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 411 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 412 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 413 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 414 | + }, | |
| 415 | + { | |
| 416 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 417 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0025", | |
| 418 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 419 | + "first-page": "931", | |
| 420 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00516.x", | |
| 421 | + "article-title": "Infrequent housing adjustment, limited participation, and monetary policy", | |
| 422 | + "volume": "44", | |
| 423 | + "author": "Ghent", | |
| 424 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 425 | + "journal-title": "J. Money Credit Bank." | |
| 426 | + }, | |
| 427 | + { | |
| 428 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0026", | |
| 429 | + "series-title": "NBER working paper 13704", | |
| 430 | + "article-title": "Arbitrage in Housing Markets", | |
| 431 | + "author": "Glaeser", | |
| 432 | + "year": "2007" | |
| 433 | + }, | |
| 434 | + { | |
| 435 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 436 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0027", | |
| 437 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 438 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 439 | + "DOI": "10.1086/697207", | |
| 440 | + "article-title": "House price momentum and strategic complementarity", | |
| 441 | + "volume": "126", | |
| 442 | + "author": "Guren", | |
| 443 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 444 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 445 | + }, | |
| 446 | + { | |
| 447 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0028", | |
| 448 | + "series-title": "Working Paper", | |
| 449 | + "article-title": "How do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?", | |
| 450 | + "author": "Guren", | |
| 451 | + "year": "2018" | |
| 452 | + }, | |
| 453 | + { | |
| 454 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 455 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0030", | |
| 456 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 457 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 458 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172", | |
| 459 | + "article-title": "Search, liquidity, and the dynamics of house prices and construction", | |
| 460 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 461 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 462 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 463 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 464 | + }, | |
| 465 | + { | |
| 466 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 467 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0032", | |
| 468 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 469 | + "first-page": "1214", | |
| 470 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.106.4.1214", | |
| 471 | + "article-title": "Search, liquidity, and the dynamics of house prices and construction: corrigendum", | |
| 472 | + "volume": "106", | |
| 473 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 474 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 475 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 476 | + }, | |
| 477 | + { | |
| 478 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0034", | |
| 479 | + "series-title": "Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper 1359", | |
| 480 | + "article-title": "Default, mortgage standards and housing liquidity", | |
| 481 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 482 | + "year": "2016" | |
| 483 | + }, | |
| 484 | + { | |
| 485 | + "issue": "2016", | |
| 486 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0035", | |
| 487 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 488 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 489 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005", | |
| 490 | + "article-title": "Illiquidity and its discontents: trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market", | |
| 491 | + "volume": "83", | |
| 492 | + "author": "Hedlund", | |
| 493 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 494 | + "journal-title": "J. Monet. Econ." | |
| 495 | + }, | |
| 496 | + { | |
| 497 | + "issue": "10", | |
| 498 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0036", | |
| 499 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 500 | + "first-page": "2982", | |
| 501 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20151052", | |
| 502 | + "article-title": "Regional redistribution through the US mortgage market", | |
| 503 | + "volume": "106", | |
| 504 | + "author": "Hurst", | |
| 505 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 506 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 507 | + }, | |
| 508 | + { | |
| 509 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0038", | |
| 510 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 511 | + "first-page": "33", | |
| 512 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2014.07.001", | |
| 513 | + "article-title": "A search-theoretic model of the rental and homeownership markets", | |
| 514 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 515 | + "author": "Kashiwagi", | |
| 516 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 517 | + "journal-title": "J.Hous. Econ." | |
| 518 | + }, | |
| 519 | + { | |
| 520 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 521 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0039", | |
| 522 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 523 | + "first-page": "33", | |
| 524 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6261.00415", | |
| 525 | + "article-title": "Banks as liquidity providers: an explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit-taking", | |
| 526 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 527 | + "author": "Kashyap", | |
| 528 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 529 | + "journal-title": "J. Financ." | |
| 530 | + }, | |
| 531 | + { | |
| 532 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 533 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0040", | |
| 534 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 535 | + "first-page": "211", | |
| 536 | + "DOI": "10.1086/262072", | |
| 537 | + "article-title": "Credit cycles", | |
| 538 | + "volume": "105", | |
| 539 | + "author": "Kiyotaki", | |
| 540 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 541 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 542 | + }, | |
| 543 | + { | |
| 544 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_sbref0041", | |
| 545 | + "series-title": "Search Frictions and Idiosyncratic Price Dispersion in the US Housing Market", | |
| 546 | + "author": "Kotova", | |
| 547 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 548 | + }, | |
| 549 | + { | |
| 550 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 551 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0042", | |
| 552 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 553 | + "first-page": "32", | |
| 554 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180", | |
| 555 | + "article-title": "A theory of liquidity in residential real estate markets", | |
| 556 | + "volume": "49", | |
| 557 | + "author": "Krainer", | |
| 558 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 559 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 560 | + }, | |
| 561 | + { | |
| 562 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 563 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0043", | |
| 564 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 565 | + "first-page": "1149", | |
| 566 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12193", | |
| 567 | + "article-title": "Housing dynamics over the business cycle", | |
| 568 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 569 | + "author": "Kydland", | |
| 570 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 571 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 572 | + }, | |
| 573 | + { | |
| 574 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 575 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0044", | |
| 576 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 577 | + "first-page": "77", | |
| 578 | + "DOI": "10.1111/ijet.12204", | |
| 579 | + "article-title": "Real business cycles, animal spirits, and stock market valuation", | |
| 580 | + "volume": "15", | |
| 581 | + "author": "Lansing", | |
| 582 | + "year": "2019", | |
| 583 | + "journal-title": "Int. J. Econ. Theory" | |
| 584 | + }, | |
| 585 | + { | |
| 586 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 587 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0045", | |
| 588 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 589 | + "first-page": "277", | |
| 590 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1057-0810(01)00071-3", | |
| 591 | + "article-title": "Consumer information search for home mortgages: who, what, how much, and what else?", | |
| 592 | + "volume": "9", | |
| 593 | + "author": "Lee", | |
| 594 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 595 | + "journal-title": "Financ. Serv. Rev." | |
| 596 | + }, | |
| 597 | + { | |
| 598 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 599 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0046", | |
| 600 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 601 | + "first-page": "861", | |
| 602 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01451.x", | |
| 603 | + "article-title": "Securitization and the declining impact of bank finance on loan supply: evidence from mortgage originations", | |
| 604 | + "volume": "64", | |
| 605 | + "author": "Loutskina", | |
| 606 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 607 | + "journal-title": "J. Financ." | |
| 608 | + }, | |
| 609 | + { | |
| 610 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 611 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0047", | |
| 612 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 613 | + "first-page": "385", | |
| 614 | + "DOI": "10.1086/262077", | |
| 615 | + "article-title": "Competitive search equilibrium", | |
| 616 | + "volume": "105", | |
| 617 | + "author": "Moen", | |
| 618 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 619 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 620 | + }, | |
| 621 | + { | |
| 622 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 623 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0048", | |
| 624 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 625 | + "first-page": "155", | |
| 626 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1907266", | |
| 627 | + "article-title": "The bargaining problem", | |
| 628 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 629 | + "author": "Nash", | |
| 630 | + "year": "1950", | |
| 631 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 632 | + }, | |
| 633 | + { | |
| 634 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 635 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_sbref0049", | |
| 636 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 637 | + "first-page": "2487", | |
| 638 | + "DOI": "10.1093/jeea/jvaa001", | |
| 639 | + "article-title": "The decision to move house and aggregate housing-market dynamics", | |
| 640 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 641 | + "author": "Ngai", | |
| 642 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 643 | + "journal-title": "J. Eur. Econ.Assoc." | |
| 644 | + }, | |
| 645 | + { | |
| 646 | + "issue": "12", | |
| 647 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0050", | |
| 648 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 649 | + "first-page": "3991", | |
| 650 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991", | |
| 651 | + "article-title": "Hot and cold seasons in the housing market", | |
| 652 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 653 | + "author": "Ngai", | |
| 654 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 655 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 656 | + }, | |
| 657 | + { | |
| 658 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 659 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0051", | |
| 660 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 661 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 662 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x", | |
| 663 | + "article-title": "Hot and cold markets", | |
| 664 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 665 | + "author": "Novy-Marx", | |
| 666 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 667 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 668 | + }, | |
| 669 | + { | |
| 670 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0052", | |
| 671 | + "series-title": "Labor, Credit, and Goods Markets: the Macroeconomics of Search and Unemployment", | |
| 672 | + "author": "Petrosky-Nadeau", | |
| 673 | + "year": "2017" | |
| 674 | + }, | |
| 675 | + { | |
| 676 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 677 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0053", | |
| 678 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 679 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 680 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406", | |
| 681 | + "article-title": "Momentum traders in the housing market: survey evidence and a search model", | |
| 682 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 683 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 684 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 685 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 686 | + }, | |
| 687 | + { | |
| 688 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_sbref0054", | |
| 689 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 690 | + "DOI": "10.1016/bs.hesmac.2016.06.003", | |
| 691 | + "article-title": "Chapter 19 - housing and macroeconomics", | |
| 692 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 693 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 694 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 695 | + "journal-title": "Handb. Macroecon." | |
| 696 | + }, | |
| 697 | + { | |
| 698 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 699 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0055", | |
| 700 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 701 | + "first-page": "720", | |
| 702 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20141772", | |
| 703 | + "article-title": "Segmented housing search", | |
| 704 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 705 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 706 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 707 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 708 | + }, | |
| 709 | + { | |
| 710 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0056", | |
| 711 | + "series-title": "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory", | |
| 712 | + "author": "Pissarides", | |
| 713 | + "year": "2000" | |
| 714 | + }, | |
| 715 | + { | |
| 716 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 717 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0057", | |
| 718 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 719 | + "first-page": "97", | |
| 720 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912531", | |
| 721 | + "article-title": "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model", | |
| 722 | + "volume": "50", | |
| 723 | + "author": "Rubinstein", | |
| 724 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 725 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 726 | + }, | |
| 727 | + { | |
| 728 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 729 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0058", | |
| 730 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 731 | + "first-page": "24", | |
| 732 | + "DOI": "10.1257/0002828053828572", | |
| 733 | + "article-title": "The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies", | |
| 734 | + "volume": "95", | |
| 735 | + "author": "Shimer", | |
| 736 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 737 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 738 | + }, | |
| 739 | + { | |
| 740 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0059", | |
| 741 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 742 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 743 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2019.07.004", | |
| 744 | + "article-title": "High and low activity spells in housing markets", | |
| 745 | + "volume": "36", | |
| 746 | + "author": "Smith", | |
| 747 | + "year": "2020", | |
| 748 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Dyn." | |
| 749 | + }, | |
| 750 | + { | |
| 751 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 752 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0060", | |
| 753 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 754 | + "first-page": "213", | |
| 755 | + "DOI": "10.1086/258464", | |
| 756 | + "article-title": "The economics of information", | |
| 757 | + "volume": "69", | |
| 758 | + "author": "Stigler", | |
| 759 | + "year": "1961", | |
| 760 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 761 | + }, | |
| 762 | + { | |
| 763 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 764 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0061", | |
| 765 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 766 | + "first-page": "1567", | |
| 767 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00611.x", | |
| 768 | + "article-title": "Why has house price dispersion gone up?", | |
| 769 | + "volume": "77", | |
| 770 | + "author": "Van Nieuwerburgh", | |
| 771 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 772 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 773 | + }, | |
| 774 | + { | |
| 775 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 776 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0062", | |
| 777 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 778 | + "first-page": "944", | |
| 779 | + "DOI": "10.1257/0002828042002525", | |
| 780 | + "article-title": "The macroeconomics of labor and credit market imperfections", | |
| 781 | + "volume": "94", | |
| 782 | + "author": "Wasmer", | |
| 783 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 784 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 785 | + }, | |
| 786 | + { | |
| 787 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 788 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0063", | |
| 789 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 790 | + "first-page": "1270", | |
| 791 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734", | |
| 792 | + "article-title": "Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market matching model", | |
| 793 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 794 | + "author": "Wheaton", | |
| 795 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 796 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 797 | + }, | |
| 798 | + { | |
| 799 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0064", | |
| 800 | + "series-title": "Manuscript", | |
| 801 | + "article-title": "Consumer confusion in the mortgage market", | |
| 802 | + "author": "Woodward", | |
| 803 | + "year": "2003" | |
| 804 | + }, | |
| 805 | + { | |
| 806 | + "issue": "7", | |
| 807 | + "key": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699_bib0065", | |
| 808 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 809 | + "first-page": "3249", | |
| 810 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.102.7.3249", | |
| 811 | + "article-title": "Diagnosing consumer confusion and sub-optimal shopping effort: theory and mortgage-market evidence", | |
| 812 | + "volume": "102", | |
| 813 | + "author": "Woodward", | |
| 814 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 815 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 816 | + } | |
| 817 | + ], | |
| 818 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 819 | + "European Economic Review" | |
| 820 | + ], | |
| 821 | + "language": "en", | |
| 822 | + "link": [ | |
| 823 | + { | |
| 824 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0014292121000520?httpAccept=text/xml", | |
| 825 | + "content-type": "text/xml", | |
| 826 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 827 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 828 | + }, | |
| 829 | + { | |
| 830 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0014292121000520?httpAccept=text/plain", | |
| 831 | + "content-type": "text/plain", | |
| 832 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 833 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 834 | + } | |
| 835 | + ], | |
| 836 | + "deposited": { | |
| 837 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 838 | + [ | |
| 839 | + 2025, | |
| 840 | + 9, | |
| 841 | + 15 | |
| 842 | + ] | |
| 843 | + ], | |
| 844 | + "date-time": "2025-09-15T21:51:40Z", | |
| 845 | + "timestamp": 1757973100000 | |
| 846 | + }, | |
| 847 | + "score": 103.74973, | |
| 848 | + "resource": { | |
| 849 | + "primary": { | |
| 850 | + "URL": "https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0014292121000520" | |
| 851 | + } | |
| 852 | + }, | |
| 853 | + "issued": { | |
| 854 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 855 | + [ | |
| 856 | + 2021, | |
| 857 | + 5 | |
| 858 | + ] | |
| 859 | + ] | |
| 860 | + }, | |
| 861 | + "references-count": 60, | |
| 862 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 863 | + "S0014292121000520" | |
| 864 | + ], | |
| 865 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699", | |
| 866 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 867 | + "0014-2921" | |
| 868 | + ], | |
| 869 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 870 | + { | |
| 871 | + "value": "0014-2921", | |
| 872 | + "type": "print" | |
| 873 | + } | |
| 874 | + ], | |
| 875 | + "published": { | |
| 876 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 877 | + [ | |
| 878 | + 2021, | |
| 879 | + 5 | |
| 880 | + ] | |
| 881 | + ] | |
| 882 | + }, | |
| 883 | + "assertion": [ | |
| 884 | + { | |
| 885 | + "value": "Elsevier", | |
| 886 | + "name": "publisher", | |
| 887 | + "label": "This article is maintained by" | |
| 888 | + }, | |
| 889 | + { | |
| 890 | + "value": "Search and credit frictions in the housing market", | |
| 891 | + "name": "articletitle", | |
| 892 | + "label": "Article Title" | |
| 893 | + }, | |
| 894 | + { | |
| 895 | + "value": "European Economic Review", | |
| 896 | + "name": "journaltitle", | |
| 897 | + "label": "Journal Title" | |
| 898 | + }, | |
| 899 | + { | |
| 900 | + "value": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699", | |
| 901 | + "name": "articlelink", | |
| 902 | + "label": "CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version" | |
| 903 | + }, | |
| 904 | + { | |
| 905 | + "value": "article", | |
| 906 | + "name": "content_type", | |
| 907 | + "label": "Content Type" | |
| 908 | + }, | |
| 909 | + { | |
| 910 | + "value": "© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.", | |
| 911 | + "name": "copyright", | |
| 912 | + "label": "Copyright" | |
| 913 | + } | |
| 914 | + ], | |
| 915 | + "article-number": "103699" | |
| 916 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_gabrovski2025note.crossref.json
+457 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 7, | |
| 7 | + 30 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-07-30T13:02:49Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1785416569689, | |
| 12 | + "version": "3.56.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 50, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Cambridge University Press (CUP)", | |
| 16 | + "license": [ | |
| 17 | + { | |
| 18 | + "start": { | |
| 19 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 20 | + [ | |
| 21 | + 2026, | |
| 22 | + 1, | |
| 23 | + 19 | |
| 24 | + ] | |
| 25 | + ], | |
| 26 | + "date-time": "2026-01-19T00:00:00Z", | |
| 27 | + "timestamp": 1768780800000 | |
| 28 | + }, | |
| 29 | + "content-version": "unspecified", | |
| 30 | + "delay-in-days": 383, | |
| 31 | + "URL": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" | |
| 32 | + } | |
| 33 | + ], | |
| 34 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 35 | + "domain": [], | |
| 36 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 37 | + }, | |
| 38 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 39 | + "Macroecon. Dynam." | |
| 40 | + ], | |
| 41 | + "published-print": { | |
| 42 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 43 | + [ | |
| 44 | + 2025 | |
| 45 | + ] | |
| 46 | + ] | |
| 47 | + }, | |
| 48 | + "abstract": "<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>\n <jats:p>This paper studies efficiency in the housing market in the presence of search frictions and endogenous entry of buyers and sellers. These two features are essential to explain the housing market stylized facts and to generate an upward-sloping Beveridge Curve in the housing market. Search frictions and endogenous entry create two externalities in the market. First, there is a congestion externality common to markets with search frictions. Sellers do not internalize the effect of listing a house for sale on other sellers’ probability of finding a buyer. Second, the endogenous entry of buyers leads to a participation externality, as new entrants in the market raise search costs for all buyers. The equilibrium is inefficient even when the Hosios-Mortensen-Pissarides condition holds. Using a calibration to the US housing market, we quantify the size of these externalities and how far the housing market is from the optimal allocation. The optimal vacancy rate and time-to-sell are about half their equilibrium counterparts, whereas the optimal number of buyers and homeowners are above their decentralized equilibrium values. Finally, we investigate how housing market policies restore efficiency in the housing market.</jats:p>", | |
| 49 | + "DOI": "10.1017/s1365100525100692", | |
| 50 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 51 | + "created": { | |
| 52 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 53 | + [ | |
| 54 | + 2026, | |
| 55 | + 1, | |
| 56 | + 19 | |
| 57 | + ] | |
| 58 | + ], | |
| 59 | + "date-time": "2026-01-19T07:02:14Z", | |
| 60 | + "timestamp": 1768806134000 | |
| 61 | + }, | |
| 62 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 63 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 1, | |
| 64 | + "title": [ | |
| 65 | + "A note on the efficiency in the housing market with search frictions" | |
| 66 | + ], | |
| 67 | + "prefix": "10.1017", | |
| 68 | + "volume": "29", | |
| 69 | + "author": [ | |
| 70 | + { | |
| 71 | + "given": "Miroslav", | |
| 72 | + "family": "Gabrovski", | |
| 73 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 74 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 75 | + { | |
| 76 | + "name": "University of Hawaii at Manoa" | |
| 77 | + } | |
| 78 | + ], | |
| 79 | + "role": [ | |
| 80 | + { | |
| 81 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 82 | + "role": "author" | |
| 83 | + } | |
| 84 | + ] | |
| 85 | + }, | |
| 86 | + { | |
| 87 | + "given": "Victor", | |
| 88 | + "family": "Ortego-Marti", | |
| 89 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 90 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 91 | + { | |
| 92 | + "id": [ | |
| 93 | + { | |
| 94 | + "id": "https://ror.org/03nawhv43", | |
| 95 | + "id-type": "ROR", | |
| 96 | + "asserted-by": "publisher" | |
| 97 | + } | |
| 98 | + ], | |
| 99 | + "name": "University of California Riverside" | |
| 100 | + } | |
| 101 | + ], | |
| 102 | + "role": [ | |
| 103 | + { | |
| 104 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 105 | + "role": "author" | |
| 106 | + } | |
| 107 | + ] | |
| 108 | + } | |
| 109 | + ], | |
| 110 | + "member": "56", | |
| 111 | + "published-online": { | |
| 112 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 113 | + [ | |
| 114 | + 2026, | |
| 115 | + 1, | |
| 116 | + 19 | |
| 117 | + ] | |
| 118 | + ] | |
| 119 | + }, | |
| 120 | + "reference": [ | |
| 121 | + { | |
| 122 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref2", | |
| 123 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 124 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.022" | |
| 125 | + }, | |
| 126 | + { | |
| 127 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref26", | |
| 128 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 129 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104081" | |
| 130 | + }, | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref27", | |
| 133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 134 | + "DOI": "10.1086/697207" | |
| 135 | + }, | |
| 136 | + { | |
| 137 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref42", | |
| 138 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 139 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2021.105208" | |
| 140 | + }, | |
| 141 | + { | |
| 142 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref18", | |
| 143 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 144 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20170772" | |
| 145 | + }, | |
| 146 | + { | |
| 147 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref31", | |
| 148 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 149 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172" | |
| 150 | + }, | |
| 151 | + { | |
| 152 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref63", | |
| 153 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 154 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 155 | + }, | |
| 156 | + { | |
| 157 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref50", | |
| 158 | + "volume-title": "Endogenous TFP, Labor Market Policies and Loss of Skills", | |
| 159 | + "author": "Ortego-Marti", | |
| 160 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 161 | + }, | |
| 162 | + { | |
| 163 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref41", | |
| 164 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 165 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00405.x" | |
| 166 | + }, | |
| 167 | + { | |
| 168 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref7", | |
| 169 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 170 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00161714" | |
| 171 | + }, | |
| 172 | + { | |
| 173 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref13", | |
| 174 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 175 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.003" | |
| 176 | + }, | |
| 177 | + { | |
| 178 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref9", | |
| 179 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 180 | + "DOI": "10.1086/686732" | |
| 181 | + }, | |
| 182 | + { | |
| 183 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref35", | |
| 184 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 185 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297382" | |
| 186 | + }, | |
| 187 | + { | |
| 188 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref11", | |
| 189 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 190 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019" | |
| 191 | + }, | |
| 192 | + { | |
| 193 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref14", | |
| 194 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 195 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103699" | |
| 196 | + }, | |
| 197 | + { | |
| 198 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref47", | |
| 199 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 200 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991" | |
| 201 | + }, | |
| 202 | + { | |
| 203 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref1", | |
| 204 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 205 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x" | |
| 206 | + }, | |
| 207 | + { | |
| 208 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref20", | |
| 209 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 210 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002" | |
| 211 | + }, | |
| 212 | + { | |
| 213 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref46", | |
| 214 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 215 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12693" | |
| 216 | + }, | |
| 217 | + { | |
| 218 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref28", | |
| 219 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 220 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rdaa001" | |
| 221 | + }, | |
| 222 | + { | |
| 223 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref25", | |
| 224 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 225 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w13704" | |
| 226 | + }, | |
| 227 | + { | |
| 228 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref44", | |
| 229 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 230 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1907266" | |
| 231 | + }, | |
| 232 | + { | |
| 233 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref32", | |
| 234 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 235 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.106.4.1214" | |
| 236 | + }, | |
| 237 | + { | |
| 238 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref33", | |
| 239 | + "volume-title": "Default, mortgage standards and housing liquidity", | |
| 240 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 241 | + "year": "2016" | |
| 242 | + }, | |
| 243 | + { | |
| 244 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref37", | |
| 245 | + "volume-title": "Search Frictions and Idiosyncratic Price Dispersion in the Us Housing Market", | |
| 246 | + "author": "Kotova", | |
| 247 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 248 | + }, | |
| 249 | + { | |
| 250 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref43", | |
| 251 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 252 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.econlet.2015.07.002" | |
| 253 | + }, | |
| 254 | + { | |
| 255 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref56", | |
| 256 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 257 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912531" | |
| 258 | + }, | |
| 259 | + { | |
| 260 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref57", | |
| 261 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 262 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.1996.1095" | |
| 263 | + }, | |
| 264 | + { | |
| 265 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref34", | |
| 266 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 267 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005" | |
| 268 | + }, | |
| 269 | + { | |
| 270 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref55", | |
| 271 | + "volume-title": "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory", | |
| 272 | + "author": "Pissarides", | |
| 273 | + "year": "2000" | |
| 274 | + }, | |
| 275 | + { | |
| 276 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref59", | |
| 277 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 278 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.4259632" | |
| 279 | + }, | |
| 280 | + { | |
| 281 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref15", | |
| 282 | + "volume-title": "Efficiency in the Housing Market with Search Frictions", | |
| 283 | + "author": "Gabrovski", | |
| 284 | + "year": "2021" | |
| 285 | + }, | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref36", | |
| 288 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 289 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.042" | |
| 290 | + }, | |
| 291 | + { | |
| 292 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref45", | |
| 293 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 294 | + "DOI": "10.1093/jeea/jvaa001" | |
| 295 | + }, | |
| 296 | + { | |
| 297 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref54", | |
| 298 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 299 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20141772" | |
| 300 | + }, | |
| 301 | + { | |
| 302 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref4", | |
| 303 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 304 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12204" | |
| 305 | + }, | |
| 306 | + { | |
| 307 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref39", | |
| 308 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 309 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180" | |
| 310 | + }, | |
| 311 | + { | |
| 312 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref6", | |
| 313 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 314 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.5190537" | |
| 315 | + }, | |
| 316 | + { | |
| 317 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref16", | |
| 318 | + "first-page": "948", | |
| 319 | + "article-title": "On the slope of the beveridge curve in the housing market", | |
| 320 | + "volume": "44", | |
| 321 | + "author": "Gabrovski", | |
| 322 | + "year": "2024", | |
| 323 | + "journal-title": "Economics Bulletin" | |
| 324 | + }, | |
| 325 | + { | |
| 326 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref17", | |
| 327 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 328 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2024.101253" | |
| 329 | + }, | |
| 330 | + { | |
| 331 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref48", | |
| 332 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 333 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x" | |
| 334 | + }, | |
| 335 | + { | |
| 336 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref61", | |
| 337 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 338 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00611.x" | |
| 339 | + }, | |
| 340 | + { | |
| 341 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref58", | |
| 342 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 343 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2019.07.004" | |
| 344 | + }, | |
| 345 | + { | |
| 346 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref23", | |
| 347 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 348 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00516.x" | |
| 349 | + }, | |
| 350 | + { | |
| 351 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref5", | |
| 352 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 353 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107553" | |
| 354 | + }, | |
| 355 | + { | |
| 356 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref30", | |
| 357 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 358 | + "first-page": "813", | |
| 359 | + "DOI": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2", | |
| 360 | + "article-title": "The microstructure of housing markets: search, bargaining, and brokerage", | |
| 361 | + "volume": "5", | |
| 362 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 363 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 364 | + "journal-title": "Handbook of regional and urban economics" | |
| 365 | + }, | |
| 366 | + { | |
| 367 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref52", | |
| 368 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 369 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406" | |
| 370 | + }, | |
| 371 | + { | |
| 372 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref8", | |
| 373 | + "volume-title": "The ins and arounds in the US housing market", | |
| 374 | + "author": "Bachmann", | |
| 375 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 376 | + }, | |
| 377 | + { | |
| 378 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref29", | |
| 379 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 380 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rdaf092" | |
| 381 | + }, | |
| 382 | + { | |
| 383 | + "key": "S1365100525100692_ref12", | |
| 384 | + "volume-title": "Endogenous Separations and Housing Market Dynamics", | |
| 385 | + "author": "Gabrovski", | |
| 386 | + "year": "2024" | |
| 387 | + } | |
| 388 | + ], | |
| 389 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 390 | + "Macroeconomic Dynamics" | |
| 391 | + ], | |
| 392 | + "original-title": [], | |
| 393 | + "language": "en", | |
| 394 | + "link": [ | |
| 395 | + { | |
| 396 | + "URL": "https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S1365100525100692", | |
| 397 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 398 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 399 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 400 | + } | |
| 401 | + ], | |
| 402 | + "deposited": { | |
| 403 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 404 | + [ | |
| 405 | + 2026, | |
| 406 | + 1, | |
| 407 | + 23 | |
| 408 | + ] | |
| 409 | + ], | |
| 410 | + "date-time": "2026-01-23T00:05:43Z", | |
| 411 | + "timestamp": 1769126743000 | |
| 412 | + }, | |
| 413 | + "score": 1, | |
| 414 | + "resource": { | |
| 415 | + "primary": { | |
| 416 | + "URL": "https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1365100525100692/type/journal_article" | |
| 417 | + } | |
| 418 | + }, | |
| 419 | + "subtitle": [], | |
| 420 | + "short-title": [], | |
| 421 | + "issued": { | |
| 422 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 423 | + [ | |
| 424 | + 2025 | |
| 425 | + ] | |
| 426 | + ] | |
| 427 | + }, | |
| 428 | + "references-count": 50, | |
| 429 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 430 | + "S1365100525100692" | |
| 431 | + ], | |
| 432 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100525100692", | |
| 433 | + "relation": {}, | |
| 434 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 435 | + "1365-1005", | |
| 436 | + "1469-8056" | |
| 437 | + ], | |
| 438 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 439 | + { | |
| 440 | + "value": "1365-1005", | |
| 441 | + "type": "print" | |
| 442 | + }, | |
| 443 | + { | |
| 444 | + "value": "1469-8056", | |
| 445 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 446 | + } | |
| 447 | + ], | |
| 448 | + "subject": [], | |
| 449 | + "published": { | |
| 450 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 451 | + [ | |
| 452 | + 2025 | |
| 453 | + ] | |
| 454 | + ] | |
| 455 | + }, | |
| 456 | + "article-number": "e168" | |
| 457 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_garriga2020mortgage.crossref.json
+444 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 9, | |
| 7 | + 20 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-09-20T01:46:36Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1789868796194, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.0.1" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 51, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "American Economic Association", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 17 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 18 | + "domain": [], | |
| 19 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 20 | + }, | |
| 21 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 22 | + "American Economic Review" | |
| 23 | + ], | |
| 24 | + "published-print": { | |
| 25 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 26 | + [ | |
| 27 | + 2020, | |
| 28 | + 6, | |
| 29 | + 1 | |
| 30 | + ] | |
| 31 | + ] | |
| 32 | + }, | |
| 33 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>Using a quantitative heterogeneous agents macro-housing model and detailed microdata, this paper studies the drivers of the 2006–2011 housing bust, its spillovers to consumption and the credit market, and the ability of mortgage rate interventions to accelerate the recovery. The model features tenure choice between owning and renting, rich portfolio choice, long-term defaultable mortgages, and endogenously illiquid housing from search frictions. The equilibrium analysis and empirical evidence suggest that the deterioration in house prices and liquidity, transmitted to consumption via balance sheets that vary in composition and depth, is central to explaining the observed aggregate and cross-sectional patterns. (JEL E23, E32, E44, G21, R31)</jats:p>", | |
| 34 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20170772", | |
| 35 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 36 | + "created": { | |
| 37 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 38 | + [ | |
| 39 | + 2020, | |
| 40 | + 5, | |
| 41 | + 28 | |
| 42 | + ] | |
| 43 | + ], | |
| 44 | + "date-time": "2020-05-28T12:03:21Z", | |
| 45 | + "timestamp": 1590667401000 | |
| 46 | + }, | |
| 47 | + "page": "1603-1634", | |
| 48 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 49 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 120, | |
| 50 | + "title": [ | |
| 51 | + "Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession" | |
| 52 | + ], | |
| 53 | + "prefix": "10.1257", | |
| 54 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 55 | + "author": [ | |
| 56 | + { | |
| 57 | + "given": "Carlos", | |
| 58 | + "family": "Garriga", | |
| 59 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 60 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 61 | + { | |
| 62 | + "name": "Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (email: )" | |
| 63 | + } | |
| 64 | + ], | |
| 65 | + "role": [ | |
| 66 | + { | |
| 67 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 68 | + "role": "author" | |
| 69 | + } | |
| 70 | + ] | |
| 71 | + }, | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "given": "Aaron", | |
| 74 | + "family": "Hedlund", | |
| 75 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 76 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 77 | + { | |
| 78 | + "name": "University of Missouri, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University (email: )" | |
| 79 | + } | |
| 80 | + ], | |
| 81 | + "role": [ | |
| 82 | + { | |
| 83 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 84 | + "role": "author" | |
| 85 | + } | |
| 86 | + ] | |
| 87 | + } | |
| 88 | + ], | |
| 89 | + "member": "11", | |
| 90 | + "reference": [ | |
| 91 | + { | |
| 92 | + "key": "p_1", | |
| 93 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 94 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20150491" | |
| 95 | + }, | |
| 96 | + { | |
| 97 | + "key": "p_3", | |
| 98 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 99 | + "DOI": "10.3982/ECTA13795" | |
| 100 | + }, | |
| 101 | + { | |
| 102 | + "key": "p_4", | |
| 103 | + "first-page": "A169", | |
| 104 | + "author": "Avery Robert B", | |
| 105 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 106 | + "journal-title": "Federal Reserve Bulletin" | |
| 107 | + }, | |
| 108 | + { | |
| 109 | + "key": "p_6", | |
| 110 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 111 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12001" | |
| 112 | + }, | |
| 113 | + { | |
| 114 | + "key": "p_7", | |
| 115 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 116 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rdz010" | |
| 117 | + }, | |
| 118 | + { | |
| 119 | + "key": "p_8", | |
| 120 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 121 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rdx060" | |
| 122 | + }, | |
| 123 | + { | |
| 124 | + "key": "p_9", | |
| 125 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 126 | + "DOI": "10.3982/ECTA11254" | |
| 127 | + }, | |
| 128 | + { | |
| 129 | + "key": "p_10", | |
| 130 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 131 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.02.005" | |
| 132 | + }, | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "key": "p_11", | |
| 135 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 136 | + "DOI": "10.3982/ECTA10927" | |
| 137 | + }, | |
| 138 | + { | |
| 139 | + "key": "p_13", | |
| 140 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 141 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/hhn098" | |
| 142 | + }, | |
| 143 | + { | |
| 144 | + "key": "p_14", | |
| 145 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 146 | + "DOI": "10.1111/jofi.12252" | |
| 147 | + }, | |
| 148 | + { | |
| 149 | + "key": "p_15", | |
| 150 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 151 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x" | |
| 152 | + }, | |
| 153 | + { | |
| 154 | + "key": "p_16", | |
| 155 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 156 | + "DOI": "10.1086/375382" | |
| 157 | + }, | |
| 158 | + { | |
| 159 | + "key": "p_17", | |
| 160 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 161 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.9.2797" | |
| 162 | + }, | |
| 163 | + { | |
| 164 | + "key": "p_18", | |
| 165 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 166 | + "DOI": "10.1086/677349" | |
| 167 | + }, | |
| 168 | + { | |
| 169 | + "key": "p_21", | |
| 170 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 171 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1475-4991.2008.00274.x" | |
| 172 | + }, | |
| 173 | + { | |
| 174 | + "key": "p_23", | |
| 175 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 176 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019" | |
| 177 | + }, | |
| 178 | + { | |
| 179 | + "key": "p_24", | |
| 180 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 181 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00574.x" | |
| 182 | + }, | |
| 183 | + { | |
| 184 | + "key": "p_25", | |
| 185 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 186 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20141313" | |
| 187 | + }, | |
| 188 | + { | |
| 189 | + "key": "p_26", | |
| 190 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 191 | + "DOI": "10.1353/eca.2012.0001" | |
| 192 | + }, | |
| 193 | + { | |
| 194 | + "key": "p_28", | |
| 195 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 196 | + "DOI": "10.1086/689606" | |
| 197 | + }, | |
| 198 | + { | |
| 199 | + "key": "p_30", | |
| 200 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 201 | + "DOI": "10.1093/qje/qjy002" | |
| 202 | + }, | |
| 203 | + { | |
| 204 | + "key": "p_31", | |
| 205 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 206 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.98.1.474" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 210 | + "key": "p_32", | |
| 211 | + "first-page": "3", | |
| 212 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 213 | + "author": "Gagnon Joseph", | |
| 214 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 215 | + "journal-title": "International Journal of Central Banking" | |
| 216 | + }, | |
| 217 | + { | |
| 218 | + "key": "p_33", | |
| 219 | + "first-page": "18", | |
| 220 | + "author": "Gagnon Joseph E", | |
| 221 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 222 | + "journal-title": "Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief" | |
| 223 | + }, | |
| 224 | + { | |
| 225 | + "key": "p_37", | |
| 226 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 227 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20140193" | |
| 228 | + }, | |
| 229 | + { | |
| 230 | + "key": "p_38", | |
| 231 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 232 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/hhx115" | |
| 233 | + }, | |
| 234 | + { | |
| 235 | + "key": "p_39", | |
| 236 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 237 | + "first-page": "69", | |
| 238 | + "DOI": "10.1353/eca.0.0017", | |
| 239 | + "author": "Gerardi Kristopher", | |
| 240 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 241 | + "journal-title": "Brookings Papers on Economic Activity" | |
| 242 | + }, | |
| 243 | + { | |
| 244 | + "key": "p_43", | |
| 245 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 246 | + "DOI": "10.1086/675535" | |
| 247 | + }, | |
| 248 | + { | |
| 249 | + "key": "p_45", | |
| 250 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 251 | + "author": "Hamilton James D", | |
| 252 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 253 | + "journal-title": "Brookings Papers on Economic Activity" | |
| 254 | + }, | |
| 255 | + { | |
| 256 | + "key": "p_48", | |
| 257 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 258 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172" | |
| 259 | + }, | |
| 260 | + { | |
| 261 | + "key": "p_49", | |
| 262 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 263 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005" | |
| 264 | + }, | |
| 265 | + { | |
| 266 | + "key": "p_50", | |
| 267 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 268 | + "DOI": "10.3982/QE483" | |
| 269 | + }, | |
| 270 | + { | |
| 271 | + "key": "p_51", | |
| 272 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 273 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2018.11.002" | |
| 274 | + }, | |
| 275 | + { | |
| 276 | + "key": "p_52", | |
| 277 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 278 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.10.020" | |
| 279 | + }, | |
| 280 | + { | |
| 281 | + "key": "p_54", | |
| 282 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 283 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02551.x" | |
| 284 | + }, | |
| 285 | + { | |
| 286 | + "key": "p_55", | |
| 287 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 288 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2014.10.003" | |
| 289 | + }, | |
| 290 | + { | |
| 291 | + "key": "p_58", | |
| 292 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 293 | + "DOI": "10.1353/eca.2011.0019" | |
| 294 | + }, | |
| 295 | + { | |
| 296 | + "key": "p_60", | |
| 297 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 298 | + "DOI": "10.1257/jep.32.4.121" | |
| 299 | + }, | |
| 300 | + { | |
| 301 | + "key": "p_61", | |
| 302 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 303 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20111662" | |
| 304 | + }, | |
| 305 | + { | |
| 306 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 307 | + "key": "p_64", | |
| 308 | + "first-page": "1243", | |
| 309 | + "volume": "68", | |
| 310 | + "author": "Levitin Adam J", | |
| 311 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 312 | + "journal-title": "Vanderbilt Law Review" | |
| 313 | + }, | |
| 314 | + { | |
| 315 | + "key": "p_65", | |
| 316 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 317 | + "DOI": "10.1093/qje/qjt020" | |
| 318 | + }, | |
| 319 | + { | |
| 320 | + "key": "p_66", | |
| 321 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 322 | + "DOI": "10.3982/ECTA10451" | |
| 323 | + }, | |
| 324 | + { | |
| 325 | + "key": "p_68", | |
| 326 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 327 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991" | |
| 328 | + }, | |
| 329 | + { | |
| 330 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 331 | + "key": "p_69", | |
| 332 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 333 | + "first-page": "193", | |
| 334 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2006.12091177", | |
| 335 | + "volume": "28", | |
| 336 | + "author": "Pennington-Cross Anthony", | |
| 337 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 338 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 339 | + }, | |
| 340 | + { | |
| 341 | + "key": "p_70", | |
| 342 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 343 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406" | |
| 344 | + }, | |
| 345 | + { | |
| 346 | + "key": "p_72", | |
| 347 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 348 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.20141772" | |
| 349 | + }, | |
| 350 | + { | |
| 351 | + "key": "p_75", | |
| 352 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 353 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.04.017" | |
| 354 | + }, | |
| 355 | + { | |
| 356 | + "key": "p_76", | |
| 357 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 358 | + "DOI": "10.1353/eca.2012.0005" | |
| 359 | + }, | |
| 360 | + { | |
| 361 | + "key": "p_77", | |
| 362 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 363 | + "DOI": "10.1086/383105" | |
| 364 | + }, | |
| 365 | + { | |
| 366 | + "key": "p_79", | |
| 367 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 368 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 369 | + } | |
| 370 | + ], | |
| 371 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 372 | + "American Economic Review" | |
| 373 | + ], | |
| 374 | + "language": "en", | |
| 375 | + "link": [ | |
| 376 | + { | |
| 377 | + "URL": "https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/aer.20170772", | |
| 378 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 379 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 380 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 381 | + } | |
| 382 | + ], | |
| 383 | + "deposited": { | |
| 384 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 385 | + [ | |
| 386 | + 2024, | |
| 387 | + 8, | |
| 388 | + 6 | |
| 389 | + ] | |
| 390 | + ], | |
| 391 | + "date-time": "2024-08-06T15:34:02Z", | |
| 392 | + "timestamp": 1722958442000 | |
| 393 | + }, | |
| 394 | + "score": 97.37279, | |
| 395 | + "resource": { | |
| 396 | + "primary": { | |
| 397 | + "URL": "https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20170772" | |
| 398 | + } | |
| 399 | + }, | |
| 400 | + "issued": { | |
| 401 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 402 | + [ | |
| 403 | + 2020, | |
| 404 | + 6, | |
| 405 | + 1 | |
| 406 | + ] | |
| 407 | + ] | |
| 408 | + }, | |
| 409 | + "references-count": 51, | |
| 410 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 411 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 412 | + "published-print": { | |
| 413 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 414 | + [ | |
| 415 | + 2020, | |
| 416 | + 6, | |
| 417 | + 1 | |
| 418 | + ] | |
| 419 | + ] | |
| 420 | + } | |
| 421 | + }, | |
| 422 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 423 | + "10.1257/aer.20170772" | |
| 424 | + ], | |
| 425 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170772", | |
| 426 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 427 | + "0002-8282" | |
| 428 | + ], | |
| 429 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 430 | + { | |
| 431 | + "value": "0002-8282", | |
| 432 | + "type": "print" | |
| 433 | + } | |
| 434 | + ], | |
| 435 | + "published": { | |
| 436 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 437 | + [ | |
| 438 | + 2020, | |
| 439 | + 6, | |
| 440 | + 1 | |
| 441 | + ] | |
| 442 | + ] | |
| 443 | + } | |
| 444 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_genesove2012search.crossref.json
+777 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,777 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T08:22:42Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792398162058, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 61, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Elsevier BV", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2012, | |
| 23 | + 7, | |
| 24 | + 1 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2012-07-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1341100800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 2012, | |
| 46 | + 7 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002", | |
| 51 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 52 | + "created": { | |
| 53 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 54 | + [ | |
| 55 | + 2012, | |
| 56 | + 1, | |
| 57 | + 31 | |
| 58 | + ] | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "date-time": "2012-01-31T03:05:51Z", | |
| 61 | + "timestamp": 1327979151000 | |
| 62 | + }, | |
| 63 | + "page": "31-45", | |
| 64 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 65 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 210, | |
| 66 | + "title": [ | |
| 67 | + "Search and matching in the housing market" | |
| 68 | + ], | |
| 69 | + "prefix": "10.1016", | |
| 70 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 71 | + "author": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "given": "David", | |
| 74 | + "family": "Genesove", | |
| 75 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 76 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 77 | + "role": [ | |
| 78 | + { | |
| 79 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 80 | + "role": "author" | |
| 81 | + } | |
| 82 | + ] | |
| 83 | + }, | |
| 84 | + { | |
| 85 | + "given": "Lu", | |
| 86 | + "family": "Han", | |
| 87 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 88 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 89 | + "role": [ | |
| 90 | + { | |
| 91 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 92 | + "role": "author" | |
| 93 | + } | |
| 94 | + ] | |
| 95 | + } | |
| 96 | + ], | |
| 97 | + "member": "78", | |
| 98 | + "reference": [ | |
| 99 | + { | |
| 100 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0005", | |
| 101 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 102 | + "first-page": "1121", | |
| 103 | + "DOI": "10.1002/sim.4780071105", | |
| 104 | + "article-title": "Heterogeneity in survival analysis", | |
| 105 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 106 | + "author": "Aalen", | |
| 107 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 108 | + "journal-title": "Statistics in Medicine" | |
| 109 | + }, | |
| 110 | + { | |
| 111 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0015", | |
| 112 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 113 | + "first-page": "641", | |
| 114 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 115 | + "article-title": "Opportunistic matching in the housing market", | |
| 116 | + "volume": "42", | |
| 117 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 118 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 119 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 120 | + }, | |
| 121 | + { | |
| 122 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 123 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0020", | |
| 124 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 125 | + "first-page": "99", | |
| 126 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1080-8620.2003.00059.x", | |
| 127 | + "article-title": "House price appreciation, transactions and structural change in the British housing market: a macroeconomic perspective", | |
| 128 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 129 | + "author": "Andrew", | |
| 130 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 131 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 132 | + }, | |
| 133 | + { | |
| 134 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0025", | |
| 135 | + "unstructured": "Anglin, Paul M., 1994. A Summary of Some Data on Buying and Selling Houses. Working Paper, University of Windsor." | |
| 136 | + }, | |
| 137 | + { | |
| 138 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 139 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0030", | |
| 140 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 141 | + "first-page": "567", | |
| 142 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00728", | |
| 143 | + "article-title": "Determinants of buyer search in a housing market", | |
| 144 | + "volume": "25", | |
| 145 | + "author": "Anglin", | |
| 146 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 147 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 148 | + }, | |
| 149 | + { | |
| 150 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 151 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0035", | |
| 152 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 153 | + "first-page": "95", | |
| 154 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1021526332732", | |
| 155 | + "article-title": "The trade-off between the selling price of residential properties and time-on-the-market: the impact of price setting", | |
| 156 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 157 | + "author": "Anglin", | |
| 158 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 159 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 160 | + }, | |
| 161 | + { | |
| 162 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0040", | |
| 163 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 164 | + "unstructured": "Balestra, 1992. Fixed effect models and fixed coefficient models. In: Mátyás, László, Sevestre, Patrick (Eds.), The Econometrics of Panel Data: Handbook of Theory and Applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers (Chapter 3).", | |
| 165 | + "DOI": "10.1007/978-94-009-0375-3_3" | |
| 166 | + }, | |
| 167 | + { | |
| 168 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 169 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0045", | |
| 170 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 171 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 172 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1995.12090769", | |
| 173 | + "article-title": "Buyer search duration in the residential real estate market: the role of the real estate agent", | |
| 174 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 175 | + "author": "Baryla", | |
| 176 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 177 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 178 | + }, | |
| 179 | + { | |
| 180 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 181 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0050", | |
| 182 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 183 | + "first-page": "75", | |
| 184 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2000.12091036", | |
| 185 | + "article-title": "An investigation of buyer search in the residential real estate market under different market conditions", | |
| 186 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 187 | + "author": "Baryla", | |
| 188 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 189 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 190 | + }, | |
| 191 | + { | |
| 192 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 193 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0320", | |
| 194 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 195 | + "first-page": "421", | |
| 196 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00698", | |
| 197 | + "article-title": "Turnover as a measure of demand for existing homes", | |
| 198 | + "volume": "24", | |
| 199 | + "author": "Berkovec", | |
| 200 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 201 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 202 | + }, | |
| 203 | + { | |
| 204 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0055", | |
| 205 | + "unstructured": "Bernheim, Douglas, Jonathan, Meer, 2008. How Much Value Do Real Estate Brokers Add? A Case Study. NBER Working Paper No. 13796." | |
| 206 | + }, | |
| 207 | + { | |
| 208 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0060", | |
| 209 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 210 | + "unstructured": "Caplin, Andrew, Leahy, John, 2008. Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics. NBER Working Paper No. w14605.", | |
| 211 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w14605" | |
| 212 | + }, | |
| 213 | + { | |
| 214 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 215 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0065", | |
| 216 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 217 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 218 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1080-8620.2004.00082.x", | |
| 219 | + "article-title": "An anatomy of price dynamics in illiquid markets: analysis and evidence from local housing markets", | |
| 220 | + "volume": "32", | |
| 221 | + "author": "Capozza", | |
| 222 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 223 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 224 | + }, | |
| 225 | + { | |
| 226 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 227 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0075", | |
| 228 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 229 | + "first-page": "207", | |
| 230 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2555923", | |
| 231 | + "article-title": "On the use of ceiling-price commitments by monopolists", | |
| 232 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 233 | + "author": "Chen", | |
| 234 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 235 | + "journal-title": "RAND Journal of Economics" | |
| 236 | + }, | |
| 237 | + { | |
| 238 | + "issue": "252", | |
| 239 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0080", | |
| 240 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 241 | + "first-page": "589", | |
| 242 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2554997", | |
| 243 | + "article-title": "Cross-section estimation of the matching function, evidence from England and Wales", | |
| 244 | + "volume": "63", | |
| 245 | + "author": "Coles", | |
| 246 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 247 | + "journal-title": "Economica" | |
| 248 | + }, | |
| 249 | + { | |
| 250 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0085", | |
| 251 | + "unstructured": "Díaz, Antonia, Jerez, Belén, March 2009. House Prices, Sales and Time on the Market: A Search-Theoretic Framework, Mimeo." | |
| 252 | + }, | |
| 253 | + { | |
| 254 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0090", | |
| 255 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 256 | + "unstructured": "D’Urso, Victoria, 2002. Home Buyer Search Duration and the Internet. MIT Working Paper.", | |
| 257 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.360460" | |
| 258 | + }, | |
| 259 | + { | |
| 260 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 261 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0095", | |
| 262 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 263 | + "first-page": "351", | |
| 264 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007737102125", | |
| 265 | + "article-title": "Buyer search intensity and the role of the residential real estate broker", | |
| 266 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 267 | + "author": "Elder", | |
| 268 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 269 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics" | |
| 270 | + }, | |
| 271 | + { | |
| 272 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0100", | |
| 273 | + "unstructured": "Federal Trade Commission, 1983. The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry. US Government Printing Office, Washington." | |
| 274 | + }, | |
| 275 | + { | |
| 276 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0325", | |
| 277 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 278 | + "first-page": "93", | |
| 279 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jhec.1995.1005", | |
| 280 | + "article-title": "Incorporating the number of existing homes sales into a structural model of the market for owner-occupied housing", | |
| 281 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 282 | + "author": "Follain", | |
| 283 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 284 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 285 | + }, | |
| 286 | + { | |
| 287 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0105", | |
| 288 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 289 | + "first-page": "619", | |
| 290 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0166-0462(02)00007-8", | |
| 291 | + "article-title": "Compensating differentials and evolution in the quality-of-life among US states", | |
| 292 | + "volume": "33", | |
| 293 | + "author": "Gabriel", | |
| 294 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 295 | + "journal-title": "Regional Science and Urban Economics" | |
| 296 | + }, | |
| 297 | + { | |
| 298 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 299 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0110", | |
| 300 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 301 | + "first-page": "417", | |
| 302 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2006.00172.x", | |
| 303 | + "article-title": "The long-run relationship between house prices and income: evidence from local housing markets", | |
| 304 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 305 | + "author": "Gallin", | |
| 306 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 307 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 308 | + }, | |
| 309 | + { | |
| 310 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 311 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0115", | |
| 312 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 313 | + "article-title": "Equity and time to sale in the real estate market", | |
| 314 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 315 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 316 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 317 | + "journal-title": "The American Economic Review" | |
| 318 | + }, | |
| 319 | + { | |
| 320 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 321 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0120", | |
| 322 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 323 | + "first-page": "1233", | |
| 324 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355301753265561", | |
| 325 | + "article-title": "Loss aversion and seller behavior: evidence from the housing market", | |
| 326 | + "volume": "116", | |
| 327 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 328 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 329 | + "journal-title": "Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 330 | + }, | |
| 331 | + { | |
| 332 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 333 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0125", | |
| 334 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 335 | + "first-page": "345", | |
| 336 | + "DOI": "10.1086/427465", | |
| 337 | + "article-title": "Urban decline and durable housing", | |
| 338 | + "volume": "113", | |
| 339 | + "author": "Glaeser", | |
| 340 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 341 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 342 | + }, | |
| 343 | + { | |
| 344 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 345 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0130", | |
| 346 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 347 | + "first-page": "719", | |
| 348 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00763", | |
| 349 | + "article-title": "Selling time and selling price: the influence of seller motivation", | |
| 350 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 351 | + "author": "Glower", | |
| 352 | + "year": "1998", | |
| 353 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 354 | + }, | |
| 355 | + { | |
| 356 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 357 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0135", | |
| 358 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 359 | + "first-page": "774", | |
| 360 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261778", | |
| 361 | + "article-title": "The structure of local public finance and the quality of life", | |
| 362 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 363 | + "author": "Gyourko", | |
| 364 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 365 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 366 | + }, | |
| 367 | + { | |
| 368 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 369 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0140", | |
| 370 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 371 | + "first-page": "178", | |
| 372 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003465303762687794", | |
| 373 | + "article-title": "Estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes", | |
| 374 | + "volume": "83", | |
| 375 | + "author": "Harding", | |
| 376 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 377 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economics and Statistics" | |
| 378 | + }, | |
| 379 | + { | |
| 380 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 381 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0145", | |
| 382 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 383 | + "first-page": "396", | |
| 384 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00463", | |
| 385 | + "article-title": "The duration of marketing time of residential housing", | |
| 386 | + "volume": "16", | |
| 387 | + "author": "Haurin", | |
| 388 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 389 | + "journal-title": "American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Journal" | |
| 390 | + }, | |
| 391 | + { | |
| 392 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 393 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0150", | |
| 394 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 395 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.5.1878", | |
| 396 | + "article-title": "The relative performance of real estate marketing platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com", | |
| 397 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 398 | + "author": "Hendel", | |
| 399 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 400 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 401 | + }, | |
| 402 | + { | |
| 403 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0155", | |
| 404 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 405 | + "first-page": "99", | |
| 406 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0166-0462(99)00028-9", | |
| 407 | + "article-title": "Prices and turnover in the market for owner-occupied homes", | |
| 408 | + "volume": "30", | |
| 409 | + "author": "Hort", | |
| 410 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 411 | + "journal-title": "Regional Science and Urban Economics" | |
| 412 | + }, | |
| 413 | + { | |
| 414 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0160", | |
| 415 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 416 | + "first-page": "279", | |
| 417 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297382", | |
| 418 | + "article-title": "On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment", | |
| 419 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 420 | + "author": "Hosios", | |
| 421 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 422 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 423 | + }, | |
| 424 | + { | |
| 425 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 426 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0165", | |
| 427 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 428 | + "first-page": "387", | |
| 429 | + "DOI": "10.1093/biomet/73.2.387", | |
| 430 | + "article-title": "Survival models for heterogeneous populations derived from stable distributions", | |
| 431 | + "volume": "73", | |
| 432 | + "author": "Hougaard", | |
| 433 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 434 | + "journal-title": "Biometrika" | |
| 435 | + }, | |
| 436 | + { | |
| 437 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0175", | |
| 438 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 439 | + "first-page": "619", | |
| 440 | + "DOI": "10.1006/redy.1999.0089", | |
| 441 | + "article-title": "Bidding for labor", | |
| 442 | + "volume": "3", | |
| 443 | + "author": "Julien", | |
| 444 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 445 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 446 | + }, | |
| 447 | + { | |
| 448 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0180", | |
| 449 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 450 | + "first-page": "32", | |
| 451 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180", | |
| 452 | + "article-title": "A theory of liquidity in residential real estate markets", | |
| 453 | + "volume": "49", | |
| 454 | + "author": "Krainer", | |
| 455 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 456 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 457 | + }, | |
| 458 | + { | |
| 459 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0185", | |
| 460 | + "first-page": "14", | |
| 461 | + "article-title": "Retail pricing and clearance sales", | |
| 462 | + "volume": "76", | |
| 463 | + "author": "Lazear", | |
| 464 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 465 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 466 | + }, | |
| 467 | + { | |
| 468 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0190", | |
| 469 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 470 | + "first-page": "253", | |
| 471 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2002.12091081", | |
| 472 | + "article-title": "Testing alternative theories of the property price-trading volume correlation", | |
| 473 | + "volume": "23", | |
| 474 | + "author": "Leung", | |
| 475 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 476 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 477 | + }, | |
| 478 | + { | |
| 479 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 480 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0195", | |
| 481 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 482 | + "first-page": "599", | |
| 483 | + "DOI": "10.1162/rest.90.4.599", | |
| 484 | + "article-title": "Market distortions when agents are better informed: the value of information in real estate", | |
| 485 | + "volume": "90", | |
| 486 | + "author": "Levitt", | |
| 487 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 488 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economics and Statistics" | |
| 489 | + }, | |
| 490 | + { | |
| 491 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0200", | |
| 492 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 493 | + "first-page": "101", | |
| 494 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0022-0531(72)90142-1", | |
| 495 | + "article-title": "Expectations and neutrality of money", | |
| 496 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 497 | + "author": "Lucas", | |
| 498 | + "year": "1972", | |
| 499 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Economic Theory" | |
| 500 | + }, | |
| 501 | + { | |
| 502 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0205", | |
| 503 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 504 | + "first-page": "14", | |
| 505 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0094-1190(91)90023-Z", | |
| 506 | + "article-title": "Urban land value functions with endogenous zoning", | |
| 507 | + "volume": "9", | |
| 508 | + "author": "McMillen", | |
| 509 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 510 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 511 | + }, | |
| 512 | + { | |
| 513 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0210", | |
| 514 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 515 | + "first-page": "192", | |
| 516 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004", | |
| 517 | + "article-title": "Bargaining over residential properties: evidence from England", | |
| 518 | + "volume": "56", | |
| 519 | + "author": "Merlo", | |
| 520 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 521 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 522 | + }, | |
| 523 | + { | |
| 524 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 525 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0215", | |
| 526 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 527 | + "first-page": "140", | |
| 528 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2009.03.001", | |
| 529 | + "article-title": "Do house prices reflect fundamentals? Aggregate and panel data evidence", | |
| 530 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 531 | + "author": "Mikhed", | |
| 532 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 533 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 534 | + }, | |
| 535 | + { | |
| 536 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0220", | |
| 537 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 538 | + "unstructured": "Moretti, Enrico, 2004. Human capital externalities in cities. In: Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics. Cities and Geography, vol. 4. Elsevier, pp. 2243–2291.", | |
| 539 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1574-0080(04)80008-7" | |
| 540 | + }, | |
| 541 | + { | |
| 542 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0225", | |
| 543 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 544 | + "unstructured": "Mortensen, Dale, 1986. Labor search and market analysis. In: Ashenfelter, O.C., Layard, R.C. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, North Holland (Chapter 15).", | |
| 545 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1573-4463(86)02005-9" | |
| 546 | + }, | |
| 547 | + { | |
| 548 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0230", | |
| 549 | + "unstructured": "Mortensen, Dale, Pissarides, Christopher, 1996. Job reallocation, employment fluctuations, and unemployment. Handbook of Macroeconomics." | |
| 550 | + }, | |
| 551 | + { | |
| 552 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0235", | |
| 553 | + "unstructured": "Ngai, Rachael, Tenreyro, Silvana, 2009. Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market, LSE wp." | |
| 554 | + }, | |
| 555 | + { | |
| 556 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0240", | |
| 557 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 558 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 559 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x", | |
| 560 | + "article-title": "Hot and cold markets", | |
| 561 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 562 | + "author": "Novy-Marx", | |
| 563 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 564 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 565 | + }, | |
| 566 | + { | |
| 567 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0245", | |
| 568 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 569 | + "first-page": "288", | |
| 570 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2004.09.005", | |
| 571 | + "article-title": "Housing transactions and macroeconomic fluctuations: a case study of England and Wales", | |
| 572 | + "volume": "13", | |
| 573 | + "author": "Ortalo-Magné", | |
| 574 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 575 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Housing Economics" | |
| 576 | + }, | |
| 577 | + { | |
| 578 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0250", | |
| 579 | + "unstructured": "Pissarides, Christopher, 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, second ed." | |
| 580 | + }, | |
| 581 | + { | |
| 582 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0330", | |
| 583 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 584 | + "first-page": "380", | |
| 585 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.1993.1042", | |
| 586 | + "article-title": "Productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital: evidence from the cities", | |
| 587 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 588 | + "author": "Rauch", | |
| 589 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 590 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 591 | + }, | |
| 592 | + { | |
| 593 | + "issue": "December", | |
| 594 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0260", | |
| 595 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 596 | + "first-page": "1257", | |
| 597 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261120", | |
| 598 | + "article-title": "Wages, rents and the quality of life", | |
| 599 | + "volume": "90", | |
| 600 | + "author": "Roback", | |
| 601 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 602 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 603 | + }, | |
| 604 | + { | |
| 605 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 606 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0265", | |
| 607 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 608 | + "first-page": "1133", | |
| 609 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1911015", | |
| 610 | + "article-title": "Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining", | |
| 611 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 612 | + "author": "Rubinstein", | |
| 613 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 614 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 615 | + }, | |
| 616 | + { | |
| 617 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 618 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0270", | |
| 619 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 620 | + "first-page": "336", | |
| 621 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1928319", | |
| 622 | + "article-title": "A note on optimal price cutting behavior under demand uncertainty", | |
| 623 | + "volume": "70", | |
| 624 | + "author": "Sass", | |
| 625 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 626 | + "journal-title": "The Review of Economics and Statistics" | |
| 627 | + }, | |
| 628 | + { | |
| 629 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0275", | |
| 630 | + "series-title": "Taxation, User-Cost, and Household Mobility Decisions", | |
| 631 | + "author": "Sinai", | |
| 632 | + "year": "1997" | |
| 633 | + }, | |
| 634 | + { | |
| 635 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 636 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0280", | |
| 637 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 638 | + "first-page": "379", | |
| 639 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444", | |
| 640 | + "article-title": "Prices and trading volume in the housing market: a model with down-payment effects", | |
| 641 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 642 | + "author": "Stein", | |
| 643 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 644 | + "journal-title": "Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 645 | + }, | |
| 646 | + { | |
| 647 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0290", | |
| 648 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 649 | + "first-page": "439", | |
| 650 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2061224", | |
| 651 | + "article-title": "The impact of heterogeneity in individual frailty on the dynamics of mortality", | |
| 652 | + "volume": "16", | |
| 653 | + "author": "Vaupel", | |
| 654 | + "year": "1979", | |
| 655 | + "journal-title": "Demography" | |
| 656 | + }, | |
| 657 | + { | |
| 658 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0295", | |
| 659 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 660 | + "first-page": "307", | |
| 661 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0094-1190(88)90021-6", | |
| 662 | + "article-title": "The market effects of zoning undeveloped land: does zoning follow the market?", | |
| 663 | + "volume": "23", | |
| 664 | + "author": "Wallace", | |
| 665 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 666 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 667 | + }, | |
| 668 | + { | |
| 669 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0300", | |
| 670 | + "unstructured": "Washington Center for Real Estate Research, November 2003. Buying or Selling a Home in Washington: 2002 Survey of Recent Home Buyers." | |
| 671 | + }, | |
| 672 | + { | |
| 673 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 674 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0305", | |
| 675 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 676 | + "first-page": "1270", | |
| 677 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734", | |
| 678 | + "article-title": "Vacancy, search and prices in a housing market matching model", | |
| 679 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 680 | + "author": "Wheaton", | |
| 681 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 682 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 683 | + }, | |
| 684 | + { | |
| 685 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 686 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0310", | |
| 687 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 688 | + "first-page": "55", | |
| 689 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/8.1.55", | |
| 690 | + "article-title": "Pricing real assets with costly search", | |
| 691 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 692 | + "author": "Williams", | |
| 693 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 694 | + "journal-title": "Review of Financial Studies" | |
| 695 | + }, | |
| 696 | + { | |
| 697 | + "key": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002_b0335", | |
| 698 | + "unstructured": "Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT Press." | |
| 699 | + } | |
| 700 | + ], | |
| 701 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 702 | + "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 703 | + ], | |
| 704 | + "language": "en", | |
| 705 | + "link": [ | |
| 706 | + { | |
| 707 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0094119012000034?httpAccept=text/xml", | |
| 708 | + "content-type": "text/xml", | |
| 709 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 710 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 711 | + }, | |
| 712 | + { | |
| 713 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0094119012000034?httpAccept=text/plain", | |
| 714 | + "content-type": "text/plain", | |
| 715 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 716 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 717 | + } | |
| 718 | + ], | |
| 719 | + "deposited": { | |
| 720 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 721 | + [ | |
| 722 | + 2021, | |
| 723 | + 12, | |
| 724 | + 27 | |
| 725 | + ] | |
| 726 | + ], | |
| 727 | + "date-time": "2021-12-27T05:22:36Z", | |
| 728 | + "timestamp": 1640582556000 | |
| 729 | + }, | |
| 730 | + "score": 70.73729, | |
| 731 | + "resource": { | |
| 732 | + "primary": { | |
| 733 | + "URL": "https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0094119012000034" | |
| 734 | + } | |
| 735 | + }, | |
| 736 | + "issued": { | |
| 737 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 738 | + [ | |
| 739 | + 2012, | |
| 740 | + 7 | |
| 741 | + ] | |
| 742 | + ] | |
| 743 | + }, | |
| 744 | + "references-count": 61, | |
| 745 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 746 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 747 | + "published-print": { | |
| 748 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 749 | + [ | |
| 750 | + 2012, | |
| 751 | + 7 | |
| 752 | + ] | |
| 753 | + ] | |
| 754 | + } | |
| 755 | + }, | |
| 756 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 757 | + "S0094119012000034" | |
| 758 | + ], | |
| 759 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002", | |
| 760 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 761 | + "0094-1190" | |
| 762 | + ], | |
| 763 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 764 | + { | |
| 765 | + "value": "0094-1190", | |
| 766 | + "type": "print" | |
| 767 | + } | |
| 768 | + ], | |
| 769 | + "published": { | |
| 770 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 771 | + [ | |
| 772 | + 2012, | |
| 773 | + 7 | |
| 774 | + ] | |
| 775 | + ] | |
| 776 | + } | |
| 777 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_glower1998selling.crossref.json
+390 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 20 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-20T02:41:28Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792464088611, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.5.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 31, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Wiley", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2003, | |
| 23 | + 9, | |
| 24 | + 22 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2003-09-22T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1064188800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 1756, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 40 | + "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "published-print": { | |
| 43 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 44 | + [ | |
| 45 | + 1998, | |
| 46 | + 12 | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + ] | |
| 49 | + }, | |
| 50 | + "abstract": "<jats:p>We consider the role that seller motivation plays in determining selling time, list price and sale price. A new survey of home sellers suggests that sellers are heterogeneous in their motivation to sell. Our findings are that a seller who, at the time of listing, has a planned date to move sells more quickly than one who does not. Also, the shorter the planned time until a move at the time of listing, the shorter the actual duration of marketing time. We find that seller motivation affects sale price, but not the list‐price markup. Our results suggest that theoretical models of the housing search process should be recast to allow for heterogeneous sellers.</jats:p>", | |
| 51 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00763", | |
| 52 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 53 | + "created": { | |
| 54 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 55 | + [ | |
| 56 | + 2003, | |
| 57 | + 9, | |
| 58 | + 22 | |
| 59 | + ] | |
| 60 | + ], | |
| 61 | + "date-time": "2003-09-22T15:40:12Z", | |
| 62 | + "timestamp": 1064245212000 | |
| 63 | + }, | |
| 64 | + "page": "719-740", | |
| 65 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 66 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 208, | |
| 67 | + "title": [ | |
| 68 | + "Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation" | |
| 69 | + ], | |
| 70 | + "prefix": "10.1111", | |
| 71 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 72 | + "author": [ | |
| 73 | + { | |
| 74 | + "given": "Michel", | |
| 75 | + "family": "Glower", | |
| 76 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 77 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 78 | + "role": [ | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 81 | + "role": "author" | |
| 82 | + } | |
| 83 | + ] | |
| 84 | + }, | |
| 85 | + { | |
| 86 | + "given": "Donald R.", | |
| 87 | + "family": "Haurin", | |
| 88 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 89 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 90 | + "role": [ | |
| 91 | + { | |
| 92 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 93 | + "role": "author" | |
| 94 | + } | |
| 95 | + ] | |
| 96 | + }, | |
| 97 | + { | |
| 98 | + "given": "Patric H.", | |
| 99 | + "family": "Hendershott", | |
| 100 | + "sequence": "additional", | |
| 101 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 102 | + "role": [ | |
| 103 | + { | |
| 104 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 105 | + "role": "author" | |
| 106 | + } | |
| 107 | + ] | |
| 108 | + } | |
| 109 | + ], | |
| 110 | + "member": "311", | |
| 111 | + "published-online": { | |
| 112 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 113 | + [ | |
| 114 | + 2003, | |
| 115 | + 9, | |
| 116 | + 22 | |
| 117 | + ] | |
| 118 | + ] | |
| 119 | + }, | |
| 120 | + "reference": [ | |
| 121 | + { | |
| 122 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_2_1", | |
| 123 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 124 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00573" | |
| 125 | + }, | |
| 126 | + { | |
| 127 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_3_1", | |
| 128 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 129 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF01097024" | |
| 130 | + }, | |
| 131 | + { | |
| 132 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_4_1", | |
| 133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 134 | + "first-page": "149", | |
| 135 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1993.12090697", | |
| 136 | + "article-title": "Mispricing and Optimal Time on the Market", | |
| 137 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 138 | + "author": "Asabere", | |
| 139 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 140 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 141 | + }, | |
| 142 | + { | |
| 143 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_5_1", | |
| 144 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 145 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00156" | |
| 146 | + }, | |
| 147 | + { | |
| 148 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_6_1", | |
| 149 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 150 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jfin.1994.1012" | |
| 151 | + }, | |
| 152 | + { | |
| 153 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_7_1", | |
| 154 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 155 | + "DOI": "10.1080/00036847400000017" | |
| 156 | + }, | |
| 157 | + { | |
| 158 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_8_1", | |
| 159 | + "volume-title": "Optimal Statistical Decisions", | |
| 160 | + "author": "DeGroot", | |
| 161 | + "year": "1970" | |
| 162 | + }, | |
| 163 | + { | |
| 164 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_9_1", | |
| 165 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 166 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jhec.1995.1010" | |
| 167 | + }, | |
| 168 | + { | |
| 169 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_10_1", | |
| 170 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 171 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00152349" | |
| 172 | + }, | |
| 173 | + { | |
| 174 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_11_1", | |
| 175 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 176 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00691" | |
| 177 | + }, | |
| 178 | + { | |
| 179 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_12_1", | |
| 180 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 181 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007763816289" | |
| 182 | + }, | |
| 183 | + { | |
| 184 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_13_1", | |
| 185 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 186 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.1997.2045" | |
| 187 | + }, | |
| 188 | + { | |
| 189 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_14_1", | |
| 190 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 191 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00537" | |
| 192 | + }, | |
| 193 | + { | |
| 194 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_15_1", | |
| 195 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 196 | + "article-title": "Equity and Time to Sale in the Real Estate Market", | |
| 197 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 198 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 199 | + "year": "1994", | |
| 200 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 201 | + }, | |
| 202 | + { | |
| 203 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_16_1", | |
| 204 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 205 | + "unstructured": "Glower M.1994.List Prices Selling Prices and Days to Closing: The Impact of Seller Motivation.Ph.D. Dissertation.Ohio State University: Columbus OH .", | |
| 206 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w5071" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_17_1", | |
| 210 | + "unstructured": "Green R.andK.Vandell.1994.Optimal Asking Price and Bid Strategies for Residential Sales.Working Paper.University of Wisconsin: Madison WI ." | |
| 211 | + }, | |
| 212 | + { | |
| 213 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_18_1", | |
| 214 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 215 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00463" | |
| 216 | + }, | |
| 217 | + { | |
| 218 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_19_1", | |
| 219 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 220 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jhec.1996.0018" | |
| 221 | + }, | |
| 222 | + { | |
| 223 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_20_1", | |
| 224 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 225 | + "first-page": "153", | |
| 226 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912352", | |
| 227 | + "article-title": "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error", | |
| 228 | + "volume": "47", | |
| 229 | + "author": "Heckman", | |
| 230 | + "year": "1978", | |
| 231 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 232 | + }, | |
| 233 | + { | |
| 234 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_21_1", | |
| 235 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 236 | + "first-page": "21", | |
| 237 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1989.12090570", | |
| 238 | + "article-title": "Selling Price, Listing Time, Housing Features, and Marketing Time in the Residential Real Estate Market", | |
| 239 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 240 | + "author": "Kang", | |
| 241 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 242 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 243 | + }, | |
| 244 | + { | |
| 245 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_22_1", | |
| 246 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 247 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00501" | |
| 248 | + }, | |
| 249 | + { | |
| 250 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_23_1", | |
| 251 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 252 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00662" | |
| 253 | + }, | |
| 254 | + { | |
| 255 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_24_1", | |
| 256 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 257 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00491" | |
| 258 | + }, | |
| 259 | + { | |
| 260 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_25_1", | |
| 261 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 262 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00174" | |
| 263 | + }, | |
| 264 | + { | |
| 265 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_26_1", | |
| 266 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 267 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 268 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1987.12090529", | |
| 269 | + "article-title": "Pricing Strategies and Residential Property Selling Prices", | |
| 270 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 271 | + "author": "Miller", | |
| 272 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 273 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Real Estate Research" | |
| 274 | + }, | |
| 275 | + { | |
| 276 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_27_1", | |
| 277 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 278 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00173120" | |
| 279 | + }, | |
| 280 | + { | |
| 281 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_28_1", | |
| 282 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 283 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00462" | |
| 284 | + }, | |
| 285 | + { | |
| 286 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_29_1", | |
| 287 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 288 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jhec.1995.1011" | |
| 289 | + }, | |
| 290 | + { | |
| 291 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_30_1", | |
| 292 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 293 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00217393" | |
| 294 | + }, | |
| 295 | + { | |
| 296 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_31_1", | |
| 297 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 298 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00595" | |
| 299 | + }, | |
| 300 | + { | |
| 301 | + "key": "e_1_2_1_32_1", | |
| 302 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 303 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1994.12090040" | |
| 304 | + } | |
| 305 | + ], | |
| 306 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 307 | + "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 308 | + ], | |
| 309 | + "language": "en", | |
| 310 | + "link": [ | |
| 311 | + { | |
| 312 | + "URL": "https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2F1540-6229.00763", | |
| 313 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 314 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 315 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 316 | + }, | |
| 317 | + { | |
| 318 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1540-6229.00763", | |
| 319 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 320 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 321 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 322 | + } | |
| 323 | + ], | |
| 324 | + "deposited": { | |
| 325 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 326 | + [ | |
| 327 | + 2023, | |
| 328 | + 10, | |
| 329 | + 28 | |
| 330 | + ] | |
| 331 | + ], | |
| 332 | + "date-time": "2023-10-28T16:47:29Z", | |
| 333 | + "timestamp": 1698511649000 | |
| 334 | + }, | |
| 335 | + "score": 103.063644, | |
| 336 | + "resource": { | |
| 337 | + "primary": { | |
| 338 | + "URL": "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1540-6229.00763" | |
| 339 | + } | |
| 340 | + }, | |
| 341 | + "issued": { | |
| 342 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 343 | + [ | |
| 344 | + 1998, | |
| 345 | + 12 | |
| 346 | + ] | |
| 347 | + ] | |
| 348 | + }, | |
| 349 | + "references-count": 31, | |
| 350 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 351 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 352 | + "published-print": { | |
| 353 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 354 | + [ | |
| 355 | + 1998, | |
| 356 | + 12 | |
| 357 | + ] | |
| 358 | + ] | |
| 359 | + } | |
| 360 | + }, | |
| 361 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 362 | + "10.1111/1540-6229.00763" | |
| 363 | + ], | |
| 364 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00763", | |
| 365 | + "archive": [ | |
| 366 | + "Portico" | |
| 367 | + ], | |
| 368 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 369 | + "1080-8620", | |
| 370 | + "1540-6229" | |
| 371 | + ], | |
| 372 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 373 | + { | |
| 374 | + "value": "1080-8620", | |
| 375 | + "type": "print" | |
| 376 | + }, | |
| 377 | + { | |
| 378 | + "value": "1540-6229", | |
| 379 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 380 | + } | |
| 381 | + ], | |
| 382 | + "published": { | |
| 383 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 384 | + [ | |
| 385 | + 1998, | |
| 386 | + 12 | |
| 387 | + ] | |
| 388 | + ] | |
| 389 | + } | |
| 390 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_guren2018house.crossref.json
+453 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T08:22:42Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792398162615, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 52, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "University of Chicago Press", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 17 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 18 | + "domain": [], | |
| 19 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 20 | + }, | |
| 21 | + "short-container-title": [ | |
| 22 | + "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 23 | + ], | |
| 24 | + "published-print": { | |
| 25 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 26 | + [ | |
| 27 | + 2018, | |
| 28 | + 6 | |
| 29 | + ] | |
| 30 | + ] | |
| 31 | + }, | |
| 32 | + "DOI": "10.1086/697207", | |
| 33 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 34 | + "created": { | |
| 35 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 36 | + [ | |
| 37 | + 2018, | |
| 38 | + 1, | |
| 39 | + 29 | |
| 40 | + ] | |
| 41 | + ], | |
| 42 | + "date-time": "2018-01-29T16:03:09Z", | |
| 43 | + "timestamp": 1517241789000 | |
| 44 | + }, | |
| 45 | + "page": "1172-1218", | |
| 46 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 47 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 142, | |
| 48 | + "title": [ | |
| 49 | + "House Price Momentum and Strategic Complementarity" | |
| 50 | + ], | |
| 51 | + "prefix": "10.1086", | |
| 52 | + "volume": "126", | |
| 53 | + "author": [ | |
| 54 | + { | |
| 55 | + "given": "Adam M.", | |
| 56 | + "family": "Guren", | |
| 57 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 58 | + "affiliation": [], | |
| 59 | + "role": [ | |
| 60 | + { | |
| 61 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 62 | + "role": "author" | |
| 63 | + } | |
| 64 | + ] | |
| 65 | + } | |
| 66 | + ], | |
| 67 | + "member": "200", | |
| 68 | + "reference": [ | |
| 69 | + { | |
| 70 | + "key": "rf2", | |
| 71 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 72 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002" | |
| 73 | + }, | |
| 74 | + { | |
| 75 | + "key": "rf3", | |
| 76 | + "volume-title": "Working Paper no. 22119 (March), NBER", | |
| 77 | + "author": "Amiti Mary" | |
| 78 | + }, | |
| 79 | + { | |
| 80 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 81 | + "key": "rf4", | |
| 82 | + "first-page": "67", | |
| 83 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 84 | + "author": "Anenberg Elliot", | |
| 85 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 86 | + "journal-title": "and Urban Econ." | |
| 87 | + }, | |
| 88 | + { | |
| 89 | + "key": "rf5", | |
| 90 | + "volume-title": "Information Frictions and Housing Market Dynamics", | |
| 91 | + "author": "Anenberg Elliot" | |
| 92 | + }, | |
| 93 | + { | |
| 94 | + "key": "rf7", | |
| 95 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 96 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297377" | |
| 97 | + }, | |
| 98 | + { | |
| 99 | + "key": "rf8", | |
| 100 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 101 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00027-0" | |
| 102 | + }, | |
| 103 | + { | |
| 104 | + "key": "rf9", | |
| 105 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 106 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00698" | |
| 107 | + }, | |
| 108 | + { | |
| 109 | + "key": "rf10", | |
| 110 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 111 | + "DOI": "10.1086/686732" | |
| 112 | + }, | |
| 113 | + { | |
| 114 | + "key": "rf11", | |
| 115 | + "volume-title": "NBER Macroeconomics Annual", | |
| 116 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 117 | + "author": "Campbell John Y" | |
| 118 | + }, | |
| 119 | + { | |
| 120 | + "key": "rf12", | |
| 121 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 122 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1080-8620.2004.00082.x" | |
| 123 | + }, | |
| 124 | + { | |
| 125 | + "key": "rf13", | |
| 126 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 127 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x" | |
| 128 | + }, | |
| 129 | + { | |
| 130 | + "key": "rf14", | |
| 131 | + "first-page": "45", | |
| 132 | + "author": "Case Karl E", | |
| 133 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 134 | + "journal-title": "New England Econ. Rev." | |
| 135 | + }, | |
| 136 | + { | |
| 137 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 138 | + "key": "rf15", | |
| 139 | + "first-page": "125", | |
| 140 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 141 | + "author": "Case Karl E", | |
| 142 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 143 | + "journal-title": "A.E.R." | |
| 144 | + }, | |
| 145 | + { | |
| 146 | + "key": "rf16", | |
| 147 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 148 | + "DOI": "10.1353/eca.2012.0014" | |
| 149 | + }, | |
| 150 | + { | |
| 151 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 152 | + "key": "rf17", | |
| 153 | + "first-page": "145", | |
| 154 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 155 | + "author": "Cho Man", | |
| 156 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 157 | + "journal-title": "J. Housing Res." | |
| 158 | + }, | |
| 159 | + { | |
| 160 | + "key": "rf18", | |
| 161 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 162 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1885539" | |
| 163 | + }, | |
| 164 | + { | |
| 165 | + "key": "rf19", | |
| 166 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 167 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2298010" | |
| 168 | + }, | |
| 169 | + { | |
| 170 | + "key": "rf20", | |
| 171 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 172 | + "DOI": "10.1111/jofi.12602" | |
| 173 | + }, | |
| 174 | + { | |
| 175 | + "key": "rf21", | |
| 176 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 177 | + "DOI": "10.1257/089533005775196651" | |
| 178 | + }, | |
| 179 | + { | |
| 180 | + "key": "rf22", | |
| 181 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 182 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00896.x" | |
| 183 | + }, | |
| 184 | + { | |
| 185 | + "key": "rf23", | |
| 186 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 187 | + "DOI": "10.1257/jep.24.4.67" | |
| 188 | + }, | |
| 189 | + { | |
| 190 | + "key": "rf24", | |
| 191 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 192 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S0304-3932(99)00023-9" | |
| 193 | + }, | |
| 194 | + { | |
| 195 | + "key": "rf25", | |
| 196 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 197 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002" | |
| 198 | + }, | |
| 199 | + { | |
| 200 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 201 | + "key": "rf26", | |
| 202 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 203 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 204 | + "author": "Genesove David", | |
| 205 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 206 | + "journal-title": "A.E.R." | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "rf27", | |
| 210 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 211 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355301753265561" | |
| 212 | + }, | |
| 213 | + { | |
| 214 | + "key": "rf28", | |
| 215 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 216 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2014.02.003" | |
| 217 | + }, | |
| 218 | + { | |
| 219 | + "key": "rf29", | |
| 220 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 221 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.012" | |
| 222 | + }, | |
| 223 | + { | |
| 224 | + "key": "rf30", | |
| 225 | + "volume-title": "NBER Macroeconomics Annual", | |
| 226 | + "volume": "25", | |
| 227 | + "author": "Gopinath Gita" | |
| 228 | + }, | |
| 229 | + { | |
| 230 | + "key": "rf31", | |
| 231 | + "volume-title": "The Causes and Consequences of House Price Momentum", | |
| 232 | + "author": "Guren Adam" | |
| 233 | + }, | |
| 234 | + { | |
| 235 | + "key": "rf32", | |
| 236 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 237 | + "volume-title": "How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?", | |
| 238 | + "author": "Guren Adam", | |
| 239 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w26216" | |
| 240 | + }, | |
| 241 | + { | |
| 242 | + "key": "rf33", | |
| 243 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 244 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2937806" | |
| 245 | + }, | |
| 246 | + { | |
| 247 | + "key": "rf34", | |
| 248 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 249 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.008" | |
| 250 | + }, | |
| 251 | + { | |
| 252 | + "key": "rf35", | |
| 253 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 254 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0304-4076(91)90022-6" | |
| 255 | + }, | |
| 256 | + { | |
| 257 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 258 | + "key": "rf36", | |
| 259 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 260 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 261 | + "author": "Head Allen", | |
| 262 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 263 | + "journal-title": "A.E.R." | |
| 264 | + }, | |
| 265 | + { | |
| 266 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 267 | + "key": "rf200", | |
| 268 | + "first-page": "1214", | |
| 269 | + "volume": "106", | |
| 270 | + "author": "Head Allen", | |
| 271 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 272 | + "journal-title": "A.E.R." | |
| 273 | + }, | |
| 274 | + { | |
| 275 | + "key": "rf38", | |
| 276 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 277 | + "DOI": "10.1111/0022-1082.00184" | |
| 278 | + }, | |
| 279 | + { | |
| 280 | + "key": "rf39", | |
| 281 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 282 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jedc.2008.02.003" | |
| 283 | + }, | |
| 284 | + { | |
| 285 | + "key": "rf40", | |
| 286 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 287 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2078048" | |
| 288 | + }, | |
| 289 | + { | |
| 290 | + "key": "rf41", | |
| 291 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 292 | + "DOI": "10.1111/ecca.12191" | |
| 293 | + }, | |
| 294 | + { | |
| 295 | + "key": "rf42", | |
| 296 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 297 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180" | |
| 298 | + }, | |
| 299 | + { | |
| 300 | + "key": "rf43", | |
| 301 | + "volume-title": "Manuscript, Dept. Finance, Stern School Bus.", | |
| 302 | + "author": "Kuchler Theresa" | |
| 303 | + }, | |
| 304 | + { | |
| 305 | + "key": "rf44", | |
| 306 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 307 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.11.003" | |
| 308 | + }, | |
| 309 | + { | |
| 310 | + "key": "rf45", | |
| 311 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 312 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.589.x" | |
| 313 | + }, | |
| 314 | + { | |
| 315 | + "issue": "12", | |
| 316 | + "key": "rf46", | |
| 317 | + "first-page": "3991", | |
| 318 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 319 | + "author": "Ngai L. Rachel", | |
| 320 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 321 | + "journal-title": "A.E.R." | |
| 322 | + }, | |
| 323 | + { | |
| 324 | + "key": "rf47", | |
| 325 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 326 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x" | |
| 327 | + }, | |
| 328 | + { | |
| 329 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 330 | + "key": "rf48", | |
| 331 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 332 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 333 | + "author": "Piazzesi Monika", | |
| 334 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 335 | + "journal-title": "A.E.R." | |
| 336 | + }, | |
| 337 | + { | |
| 338 | + "key": "rf49", | |
| 339 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 340 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444" | |
| 341 | + }, | |
| 342 | + { | |
| 343 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 344 | + "key": "rf50", | |
| 345 | + "first-page": "339", | |
| 346 | + "volume": "69", | |
| 347 | + "author": "Stiglitz Joseph", | |
| 348 | + "year": "1979", | |
| 349 | + "journal-title": "A.E.R." | |
| 350 | + }, | |
| 351 | + { | |
| 352 | + "key": "rf51", | |
| 353 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 354 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1467-937X.00098" | |
| 355 | + }, | |
| 356 | + { | |
| 357 | + "key": "rf52", | |
| 358 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 359 | + "DOI": "10.1086/260845" | |
| 360 | + }, | |
| 361 | + { | |
| 362 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 363 | + "key": "rf53", | |
| 364 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 365 | + "first-page": "283", | |
| 366 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2014.12091394", | |
| 367 | + "volume": "36", | |
| 368 | + "author": "Titman Sheridan", | |
| 369 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 370 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 371 | + }, | |
| 372 | + { | |
| 373 | + "key": "rf54", | |
| 374 | + "doi-asserted-by": "publisher", | |
| 375 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734" | |
| 376 | + } | |
| 377 | + ], | |
| 378 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 379 | + "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 380 | + ], | |
| 381 | + "language": "en", | |
| 382 | + "link": [ | |
| 383 | + { | |
| 384 | + "URL": "https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/697207", | |
| 385 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 386 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 387 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 388 | + } | |
| 389 | + ], | |
| 390 | + "deposited": { | |
| 391 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 392 | + [ | |
| 393 | + 2022, | |
| 394 | + 8, | |
| 395 | + 13 | |
| 396 | + ] | |
| 397 | + ], | |
| 398 | + "date-time": "2022-08-13T11:36:35Z", | |
| 399 | + "timestamp": 1660390595000 | |
| 400 | + }, | |
| 401 | + "score": 75.47079, | |
| 402 | + "resource": { | |
| 403 | + "primary": { | |
| 404 | + "URL": "https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/697207" | |
| 405 | + } | |
| 406 | + }, | |
| 407 | + "issued": { | |
| 408 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 409 | + [ | |
| 410 | + 2018, | |
| 411 | + 6 | |
| 412 | + ] | |
| 413 | + ] | |
| 414 | + }, | |
| 415 | + "references-count": 52, | |
| 416 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 417 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 418 | + "published-print": { | |
| 419 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 420 | + [ | |
| 421 | + 2018, | |
| 422 | + 6 | |
| 423 | + ] | |
| 424 | + ] | |
| 425 | + } | |
| 426 | + }, | |
| 427 | + "alternative-id": [ | |
| 428 | + "10.1086/697207" | |
| 429 | + ], | |
| 430 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1086/697207", | |
| 431 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 432 | + "0022-3808", | |
| 433 | + "1537-534X" | |
| 434 | + ], | |
| 435 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 436 | + { | |
| 437 | + "value": "0022-3808", | |
| 438 | + "type": "print" | |
| 439 | + }, | |
| 440 | + { | |
| 441 | + "value": "1537-534X", | |
| 442 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 443 | + } | |
| 444 | + ], | |
| 445 | + "published": { | |
| 446 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 447 | + [ | |
| 448 | + 2018, | |
| 449 | + 6 | |
| 450 | + ] | |
| 451 | + ] | |
| 452 | + } | |
| 453 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_guren2020foreclosures.crossref.json
+682 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 19 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-19T08:22:43Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792398163895, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 46, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Oxford University Press (OUP)", | |
| 16 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 17 | + "license": [ | |
| 18 | + { | |
| 19 | + "start": { | |
| 20 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 21 | + [ | |
| 22 | + 2020, | |
| 23 | + 1, | |
| 24 | + 11 | |
| 25 | + ] | |
| 26 | + ], | |
| 27 | + "date-time": "2020-01-11T00:00:00Z", | |
| 28 | + "timestamp": 1578700800000 | |
| 29 | + }, | |
| 30 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 31 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 32 | + "URL": "https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model" | |
| 33 | + } | |
| 34 | + ], | |
| 35 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 36 | + "domain": [], | |
| 37 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + "short-container-title": [], | |
| 40 | + "published-print": { | |
| 41 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 42 | + [ | |
| 43 | + 2020, | |
| 44 | + 5, | |
| 45 | + 1 | |
| 46 | + ] | |
| 47 | + ] | |
| 48 | + }, | |
| 49 | + "abstract": "<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>\n <jats:p>This article uses a structural model to show that foreclosures played a crucial role in exacerbating the recent housing bust and to analyse foreclosure mitigation policy. We consider a dynamic search model in which foreclosures freeze the market for non-foreclosures and reduce price and sales volume by eroding lender equity, destroying the credit of potential buyers, and making buyers more selective. These effects cause price-default spirals that amplify an initial shock and help the model fit both national and cross-sectional moments better than a model without foreclosure. When calibrated to the recent bust, the model reveals that the amplification generated by foreclosures is significant: ruined credit and choosey buyers account for 25.4% of the total decline in non-distressed prices and lender losses account for an additional 22.6%. For policy, we find that principal reduction is less cost-effective than lender equity injections or introducing a single seller that holds foreclosures off the market until demand rebounds. We also show that policies that slow down the pace of foreclosures can be counterproductive.</jats:p>", | |
| 50 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rdaa001", | |
| 51 | + "type": "journal-article", | |
| 52 | + "created": { | |
| 53 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 54 | + [ | |
| 55 | + 2020, | |
| 56 | + 1, | |
| 57 | + 8 | |
| 58 | + ] | |
| 59 | + ], | |
| 60 | + "date-time": "2020-01-08T23:20:07Z", | |
| 61 | + "timestamp": 1578525607000 | |
| 62 | + }, | |
| 63 | + "page": "1331-1364", | |
| 64 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 65 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 67, | |
| 66 | + "title": [ | |
| 67 | + "How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?" | |
| 68 | + ], | |
| 69 | + "prefix": "10.1093", | |
| 70 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 71 | + "author": [ | |
| 72 | + { | |
| 73 | + "given": "Adam M", | |
| 74 | + "family": "Guren", | |
| 75 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 76 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 77 | + { | |
| 78 | + "name": "Boston University and NBER" | |
| 79 | + } | |
| 80 | + ], | |
| 81 | + "role": [ | |
| 82 | + { | |
| 83 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 84 | + "role": "author" | |
| 85 | + } | |
| 86 | + ] | |
| 87 | + }, | |
| 88 | + { | |
| 89 | + "given": "Timothy J", | |
| 90 | + "family": "McQuade", | |
| 91 | + "sequence": "first", | |
| 92 | + "affiliation": [ | |
| 93 | + { | |
| 94 | + "name": "Stanford University" | |
| 95 | + } | |
| 96 | + ], | |
| 97 | + "role": [ | |
| 98 | + { | |
| 99 | + "vocabulary": "crossref", | |
| 100 | + "role": "author" | |
| 101 | + } | |
| 102 | + ] | |
| 103 | + } | |
| 104 | + ], | |
| 105 | + "member": "286", | |
| 106 | + "published-online": { | |
| 107 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 108 | + [ | |
| 109 | + 2020, | |
| 110 | + 1, | |
| 111 | + 11 | |
| 112 | + ] | |
| 113 | + ] | |
| 114 | + }, | |
| 115 | + "reference": [ | |
| 116 | + { | |
| 117 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B1", | |
| 118 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 119 | + "first-page": "288", | |
| 120 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.03.005", | |
| 121 | + "article-title": "House Prices, Collateral, and Self-employment", | |
| 122 | + "volume": "117", | |
| 123 | + "author": "ADELINO,", | |
| 124 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 125 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Financial Economics" | |
| 126 | + }, | |
| 127 | + { | |
| 128 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B2", | |
| 129 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 130 | + "first-page": "641", | |
| 131 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 132 | + "article-title": "Opportunistic Matching in the Housing Market", | |
| 133 | + "volume": "48", | |
| 134 | + "author": "ALBRECHT,", | |
| 135 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 136 | + "journal-title": "International Economic Review" | |
| 137 | + }, | |
| 138 | + { | |
| 139 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B3", | |
| 140 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 141 | + "first-page": "2527", | |
| 142 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.8.2527", | |
| 143 | + "article-title": "Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures", | |
| 144 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 145 | + "author": "ANENBERG,", | |
| 146 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 147 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 148 | + }, | |
| 149 | + { | |
| 150 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B4", | |
| 151 | + "article-title": "Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model", | |
| 152 | + "author": "BEGENAU,", | |
| 153 | + "year": "2019", | |
| 154 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Financial Economics," | |
| 155 | + }, | |
| 156 | + { | |
| 157 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B5", | |
| 158 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 159 | + "DOI": "10.2139/ssrn.3394601", | |
| 160 | + "article-title": "Banks Adjust Slowly: Evidence and Lessons For Modeling", | |
| 161 | + "author": "BEGENAU,", | |
| 162 | + "year": "2019" | |
| 163 | + }, | |
| 164 | + { | |
| 165 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B6", | |
| 166 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 167 | + "first-page": "2433", | |
| 168 | + "DOI": "10.1111/jofi.12523", | |
| 169 | + "article-title": "Consumer Ruthlessness and Mortgage Default During the 2007 to 2009 Housing Bust", | |
| 170 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 171 | + "author": "BHUTTA,", | |
| 172 | + "year": "2017", | |
| 173 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Finance" | |
| 174 | + }, | |
| 175 | + { | |
| 176 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B7", | |
| 177 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 178 | + "first-page": "747", | |
| 179 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.12021", | |
| 180 | + "article-title": "Foreclosure’s Wake: The Credit Experiences of Individuals Following Foreclosure", | |
| 181 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 182 | + "author": "BREVOORT,", | |
| 183 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 184 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 185 | + }, | |
| 186 | + { | |
| 187 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B8", | |
| 188 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 189 | + "first-page": "2108", | |
| 190 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.101.5.2108", | |
| 191 | + "article-title": "Forced Sales and House Prices", | |
| 192 | + "volume": "101", | |
| 193 | + "author": "CAMPBELL,", | |
| 194 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 195 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 196 | + }, | |
| 197 | + { | |
| 198 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B9", | |
| 199 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 200 | + "first-page": "2381", | |
| 201 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.102.6.2381", | |
| 202 | + "article-title": "The Collateral Channel: How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment", | |
| 203 | + "volume": "102", | |
| 204 | + "author": "CHANEY,", | |
| 205 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 206 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 207 | + }, | |
| 208 | + { | |
| 209 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B10", | |
| 210 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 211 | + "first-page": "165", | |
| 212 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.red.2015.02.004", | |
| 213 | + "article-title": "A Quantitative Analysis of the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis", | |
| 214 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 215 | + "author": "CHATTERJEE,", | |
| 216 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 217 | + "journal-title": "Review of Economic Dynamics" | |
| 218 | + }, | |
| 219 | + { | |
| 220 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B11", | |
| 221 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 222 | + "first-page": "43", | |
| 223 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00234.x", | |
| 224 | + "article-title": "Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time", | |
| 225 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 226 | + "author": "CLAURETIE,", | |
| 227 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 228 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 229 | + }, | |
| 230 | + { | |
| 231 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B12", | |
| 232 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 233 | + "DOI": "10.3386/w27358", | |
| 234 | + "article-title": "The Effect of Foreclosures on Homeowners, Tenants, and Landlords", | |
| 235 | + "author": "DIAMOND,", | |
| 236 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 237 | + }, | |
| 238 | + { | |
| 239 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B13", | |
| 240 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 241 | + "first-page": "1865", | |
| 242 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/hhm037", | |
| 243 | + "article-title": "Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets", | |
| 244 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 245 | + "author": "DUFFIE,", | |
| 246 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 247 | + "journal-title": "Review of Financial Studies" | |
| 248 | + }, | |
| 249 | + { | |
| 250 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B14", | |
| 251 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 252 | + "first-page": "111", | |
| 253 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.06.003", | |
| 254 | + "article-title": "Phasing Out the GSEs", | |
| 255 | + "volume": "81", | |
| 256 | + "author": "ELENEV,", | |
| 257 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 258 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 259 | + }, | |
| 260 | + { | |
| 261 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B15", | |
| 262 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 263 | + "first-page": "490", | |
| 264 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.100.2.490", | |
| 265 | + "article-title": "What ‘Triggers’ Mortgage Default?", | |
| 266 | + "volume": "100", | |
| 267 | + "author": "ELUL,", | |
| 268 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 269 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 270 | + }, | |
| 271 | + { | |
| 272 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B16", | |
| 273 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 274 | + "first-page": "234", | |
| 275 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2008.07.006", | |
| 276 | + "article-title": "Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence", | |
| 277 | + "volume": "64", | |
| 278 | + "author": "FOOTE,", | |
| 279 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 280 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 281 | + }, | |
| 282 | + { | |
| 283 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B17", | |
| 284 | + "article-title": "The Effect of Debt on Default and Consumption: Evidence from Housing Policy in the Great Recession", | |
| 285 | + "author": "GANONG,", | |
| 286 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 287 | + }, | |
| 288 | + { | |
| 289 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B18", | |
| 290 | + "article-title": "Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages? A New Test Using High-Frequency Data", | |
| 291 | + "author": "GANONG,", | |
| 292 | + "year": "2020" | |
| 293 | + }, | |
| 294 | + { | |
| 295 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B19", | |
| 296 | + "article-title": "Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession", | |
| 297 | + "author": "HEDLUND,", | |
| 298 | + "year": "2019" | |
| 299 | + }, | |
| 300 | + { | |
| 301 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B20", | |
| 302 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 303 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 304 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002", | |
| 305 | + "article-title": "Search and Matching in the Housing Market", | |
| 306 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 307 | + "author": "GENESOVE,", | |
| 308 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 309 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 310 | + }, | |
| 311 | + { | |
| 312 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B21", | |
| 313 | + "article-title": "Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default", | |
| 314 | + "author": "GERARDI,", | |
| 315 | + "year": "2017" | |
| 316 | + }, | |
| 317 | + { | |
| 318 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B22", | |
| 319 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 320 | + "first-page": "42", | |
| 321 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2015.02.004", | |
| 322 | + "article-title": "Foreclosure Externalities: New Evidence", | |
| 323 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 324 | + "author": "GERARDI,", | |
| 325 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 326 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 327 | + }, | |
| 328 | + { | |
| 329 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B23", | |
| 330 | + "article-title": "Financial Fragility with SAM?", | |
| 331 | + "author": "GREENWALD,", | |
| 332 | + "year": "2019" | |
| 333 | + }, | |
| 334 | + { | |
| 335 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B24", | |
| 336 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 337 | + "first-page": "1473", | |
| 338 | + "DOI": "10.1111/jofi.12044", | |
| 339 | + "article-title": "The Determinants of Attitudes Toward Strategic Default on Mortgages", | |
| 340 | + "volume": "68", | |
| 341 | + "author": "GUISO,", | |
| 342 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 343 | + "journal-title": "The Journal of Finance" | |
| 344 | + }, | |
| 345 | + { | |
| 346 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B25", | |
| 347 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 348 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 349 | + "DOI": "10.1086/697207", | |
| 350 | + "article-title": "House Price Momentum and Strategic Complementarity", | |
| 351 | + "volume": "126", | |
| 352 | + "author": "GUREN,", | |
| 353 | + "year": "2018", | |
| 354 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 355 | + }, | |
| 356 | + { | |
| 357 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B26", | |
| 358 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 359 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 360 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172", | |
| 361 | + "article-title": "Search, Liquidity, and the Dynamics of House Prices and Construction", | |
| 362 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 363 | + "author": "HEAD,", | |
| 364 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 365 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 366 | + }, | |
| 367 | + { | |
| 368 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B27", | |
| 369 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 370 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 371 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.005", | |
| 372 | + "article-title": "Illiquidity and Its Discontents: Trading Delays and Foreclosures in the Housing Market", | |
| 373 | + "volume": "83", | |
| 374 | + "author": "HEDLUND,", | |
| 375 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 376 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Monetary Economics" | |
| 377 | + }, | |
| 378 | + { | |
| 379 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B28", | |
| 380 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 381 | + "first-page": "289", | |
| 382 | + "DOI": "10.3982/QE483", | |
| 383 | + "article-title": "The Cyclical Dynamics of Illiquid Housing, Debt, and Foreclosures", | |
| 384 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 385 | + "author": "HEDLUND,", | |
| 386 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 387 | + "journal-title": "Quantitative Economics" | |
| 388 | + }, | |
| 389 | + { | |
| 390 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B29", | |
| 391 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 392 | + "first-page": "739", | |
| 393 | + "DOI": "10.1257/0002828054201477", | |
| 394 | + "article-title": "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle", | |
| 395 | + "volume": "95", | |
| 396 | + "author": "IACOVIELLO,", | |
| 397 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 398 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 399 | + }, | |
| 400 | + { | |
| 401 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B30", | |
| 402 | + "article-title": "The Housing Boom and Bust: Model Meets Evidence", | |
| 403 | + "author": "KAPLAN,", | |
| 404 | + "year": "2019", | |
| 405 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 406 | + }, | |
| 407 | + { | |
| 408 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B31", | |
| 409 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 410 | + "first-page": "32", | |
| 411 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180", | |
| 412 | + "article-title": "A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets", | |
| 413 | + "volume": "49", | |
| 414 | + "author": "KRAINER,", | |
| 415 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 416 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Urban Economics" | |
| 417 | + }, | |
| 418 | + { | |
| 419 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B32", | |
| 420 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 421 | + "first-page": "498", | |
| 422 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2556060", | |
| 423 | + "article-title": "Leverage and House-Price Dynamics in U.S. Cities", | |
| 424 | + "author": "LAMONT,", | |
| 425 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 426 | + "journal-title": "RAND Journal of Economics" | |
| 427 | + }, | |
| 428 | + { | |
| 429 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B33", | |
| 430 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 431 | + "first-page": "2132", | |
| 432 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.101.5.2132", | |
| 433 | + "article-title": "House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis", | |
| 434 | + "volume": "101", | |
| 435 | + "author": "MIAN,", | |
| 436 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 437 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 438 | + }, | |
| 439 | + { | |
| 440 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B34", | |
| 441 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 442 | + "first-page": "2197", | |
| 443 | + "DOI": "10.3982/ECTA10451", | |
| 444 | + "article-title": "What Explains the 2007-2009 Drop in Employment?", | |
| 445 | + "volume": "82", | |
| 446 | + "author": "MIAN,", | |
| 447 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 448 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 449 | + }, | |
| 450 | + { | |
| 451 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B35", | |
| 452 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 453 | + "first-page": "2587", | |
| 454 | + "DOI": "10.1111/jofi.12310", | |
| 455 | + "article-title": "Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy", | |
| 456 | + "volume": "70", | |
| 457 | + "author": "MIAN,", | |
| 458 | + "year": "2015", | |
| 459 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Finance" | |
| 460 | + }, | |
| 461 | + { | |
| 462 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B36", | |
| 463 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 464 | + "first-page": "225", | |
| 465 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2012.00344.x", | |
| 466 | + "article-title": "The Postforeclosure Experience of U.S. Households", | |
| 467 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 468 | + "author": "MOLLOY,", | |
| 469 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 470 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 471 | + }, | |
| 472 | + { | |
| 473 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B37", | |
| 474 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 475 | + "first-page": "3991", | |
| 476 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.12.3991", | |
| 477 | + "article-title": "Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market", | |
| 478 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 479 | + "author": "NGAI,", | |
| 480 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 481 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 482 | + }, | |
| 483 | + { | |
| 484 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B38", | |
| 485 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 486 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 487 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x", | |
| 488 | + "article-title": "Hot and Cold Markets", | |
| 489 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 490 | + "author": "NOVY-MARX,", | |
| 491 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 492 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Economics" | |
| 493 | + }, | |
| 494 | + { | |
| 495 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B39", | |
| 496 | + "article-title": "Housing Prices and Consumer Spending: The Bank Balance Sheet Channel", | |
| 497 | + "author": "PAIXAO,", | |
| 498 | + "year": "2017" | |
| 499 | + }, | |
| 500 | + { | |
| 501 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B40", | |
| 502 | + "article-title": "Propagation of House Price Shocks Through the Banking System", | |
| 503 | + "author": "PAIXAO,", | |
| 504 | + "year": "2019" | |
| 505 | + }, | |
| 506 | + { | |
| 507 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B41", | |
| 508 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 509 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 510 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406", | |
| 511 | + "article-title": "Momentum Traders in the Housing Market: Survey Evidence and a Search Model", | |
| 512 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 513 | + "author": "PIAZZESI,", | |
| 514 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 515 | + "journal-title": "American Economic Review" | |
| 516 | + }, | |
| 517 | + { | |
| 518 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B42", | |
| 519 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 520 | + "first-page": "2850", | |
| 521 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/hhw034", | |
| 522 | + "article-title": "The Effect of Negative Equity on Mortgage Default: Evidence from HAMP’s Principal Reduction Alternative", | |
| 523 | + "volume": "29", | |
| 524 | + "author": "SCHARLEMANN,", | |
| 525 | + "year": "2016", | |
| 526 | + "journal-title": "Review of Financial Studies" | |
| 527 | + }, | |
| 528 | + { | |
| 529 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B43", | |
| 530 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 531 | + "first-page": "1145", | |
| 532 | + "DOI": "10.1162/qjec.122.3.1145", | |
| 533 | + "article-title": "Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance", | |
| 534 | + "volume": "122", | |
| 535 | + "author": "SHIMER,", | |
| 536 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 537 | + "journal-title": "Quarterly Journal of Economics" | |
| 538 | + }, | |
| 539 | + { | |
| 540 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B44", | |
| 541 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 542 | + "first-page": "339", | |
| 543 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.011", | |
| 544 | + "article-title": "Paulson’s Gift", | |
| 545 | + "volume": "97", | |
| 546 | + "author": "VERONESI,", | |
| 547 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 548 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Financial Economics" | |
| 549 | + }, | |
| 550 | + { | |
| 551 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B45", | |
| 552 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 553 | + "first-page": "1270", | |
| 554 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734", | |
| 555 | + "article-title": "Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model", | |
| 556 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 557 | + "author": "WHEATON,", | |
| 558 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 559 | + "journal-title": "Journal of Political Economy" | |
| 560 | + }, | |
| 561 | + { | |
| 562 | + "key": "2020042804062657900_B46", | |
| 563 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 564 | + "first-page": "55", | |
| 565 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/8.1.55", | |
| 566 | + "article-title": "Pricing Real Assets With Costly Search", | |
| 567 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 568 | + "author": "WILLIAMS,", | |
| 569 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 570 | + "journal-title": "Review of Financial Studies" | |
| 571 | + } | |
| 572 | + ], | |
| 573 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 574 | + "The Review of Economic Studies" | |
| 575 | + ], | |
| 576 | + "original-title": [], | |
| 577 | + "language": "en", | |
| 578 | + "link": [ | |
| 579 | + { | |
| 580 | + "URL": "http://academic.oup.com/restud/advance-article-pdf/doi/10.1093/restud/rdaa001/32926711/rdaa001.pdf", | |
| 581 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 582 | + "content-version": "am", | |
| 583 | + "intended-application": "syndication" | |
| 584 | + }, | |
| 585 | + { | |
| 586 | + "URL": "http://academic.oup.com/restud/article-pdf/87/3/1331/33137089/rdaa001.pdf", | |
| 587 | + "content-type": "application/pdf", | |
| 588 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 589 | + "intended-application": "syndication" | |
| 590 | + }, | |
| 591 | + { | |
| 592 | + "URL": "http://academic.oup.com/restud/article-pdf/87/3/1331/33137089/rdaa001.pdf", | |
| 593 | + "content-type": "unspecified", | |
| 594 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 595 | + "intended-application": "similarity-checking" | |
| 596 | + } | |
| 597 | + ], | |
| 598 | + "deposited": { | |
| 599 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 600 | + [ | |
| 601 | + 2022, | |
| 602 | + 10, | |
| 603 | + 10 | |
| 604 | + ] | |
| 605 | + ], | |
| 606 | + "date-time": "2022-10-10T08:46:42Z", | |
| 607 | + "timestamp": 1665391602000 | |
| 608 | + }, | |
| 609 | + "score": 1, | |
| 610 | + "resource": { | |
| 611 | + "primary": { | |
| 612 | + "URL": "https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/87/3/1331/5700747" | |
| 613 | + } | |
| 614 | + }, | |
| 615 | + "subtitle": [], | |
| 616 | + "short-title": [], | |
| 617 | + "issued": { | |
| 618 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 619 | + [ | |
| 620 | + 2020, | |
| 621 | + 1, | |
| 622 | + 11 | |
| 623 | + ] | |
| 624 | + ] | |
| 625 | + }, | |
| 626 | + "references-count": 46, | |
| 627 | + "journal-issue": { | |
| 628 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 629 | + "published-online": { | |
| 630 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 631 | + [ | |
| 632 | + 2020, | |
| 633 | + 1, | |
| 634 | + 11 | |
| 635 | + ] | |
| 636 | + ] | |
| 637 | + }, | |
| 638 | + "published-print": { | |
| 639 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 640 | + [ | |
| 641 | + 2020, | |
| 642 | + 5, | |
| 643 | + 1 | |
| 644 | + ] | |
| 645 | + ] | |
| 646 | + } | |
| 647 | + }, | |
| 648 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa001", | |
| 649 | + "relation": {}, | |
| 650 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 651 | + "0034-6527", | |
| 652 | + "1467-937X" | |
| 653 | + ], | |
| 654 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 655 | + { | |
| 656 | + "value": "0034-6527", | |
| 657 | + "type": "print" | |
| 658 | + }, | |
| 659 | + { | |
| 660 | + "value": "1467-937X", | |
| 661 | + "type": "electronic" | |
| 662 | + } | |
| 663 | + ], | |
| 664 | + "subject": [], | |
| 665 | + "published-other": { | |
| 666 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 667 | + [ | |
| 668 | + 2020, | |
| 669 | + 5 | |
| 670 | + ] | |
| 671 | + ] | |
| 672 | + }, | |
| 673 | + "published": { | |
| 674 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 675 | + [ | |
| 676 | + 2020, | |
| 677 | + 1, | |
| 678 | + 11 | |
| 679 | + ] | |
| 680 | + ] | |
| 681 | + } | |
| 682 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_han2015microstructure.crossref.json
+2307 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,2307 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
| 6 | + 10, | |
| 7 | + 16 | |
| 8 | + ] | |
| 9 | + ], | |
| 10 | + "date-time": "2026-10-16T02:42:17Z", | |
| 11 | + "timestamp": 1792118537330, | |
| 12 | + "version": "4.4.0" | |
| 13 | + }, | |
| 14 | + "reference-count": 209, | |
| 15 | + "publisher": "Elsevier", | |
| 16 | + "isbn-type": [ | |
| 17 | + { | |
| 18 | + "value": "9780444595331", | |
| 19 | + "type": "print" | |
| 20 | + } | |
| 21 | + ], | |
| 22 | + "license": [ | |
| 23 | + { | |
| 24 | + "start": { | |
| 25 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 26 | + [ | |
| 27 | + 2015, | |
| 28 | + 1, | |
| 29 | + 1 | |
| 30 | + ] | |
| 31 | + ], | |
| 32 | + "date-time": "2015-01-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 33 | + "timestamp": 1420070400000 | |
| 34 | + }, | |
| 35 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 36 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 37 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/" | |
| 38 | + }, | |
| 39 | + { | |
| 40 | + "start": { | |
| 41 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 42 | + [ | |
| 43 | + 2015, | |
| 44 | + 1, | |
| 45 | + 1 | |
| 46 | + ] | |
| 47 | + ], | |
| 48 | + "date-time": "2015-01-01T00:00:00Z", | |
| 49 | + "timestamp": 1420070400000 | |
| 50 | + }, | |
| 51 | + "content-version": "tdm", | |
| 52 | + "delay-in-days": 0, | |
| 53 | + "URL": "https://www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license" | |
| 54 | + } | |
| 55 | + ], | |
| 56 | + "content-domain": { | |
| 57 | + "domain": [], | |
| 58 | + "crossmark-restriction": false | |
| 59 | + }, | |
| 60 | + "short-container-title": [], | |
| 61 | + "published-print": { | |
| 62 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 63 | + [ | |
| 64 | + 2015 | |
| 65 | + ] | |
| 66 | + ] | |
| 67 | + }, | |
| 68 | + "DOI": "10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2", | |
| 69 | + "type": "book-chapter", | |
| 70 | + "created": { | |
| 71 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 72 | + [ | |
| 73 | + 2015, | |
| 74 | + 5, | |
| 75 | + 1 | |
| 76 | + ] | |
| 77 | + ], | |
| 78 | + "date-time": "2015-05-01T06:33:29Z", | |
| 79 | + "timestamp": 1430462009000 | |
| 80 | + }, | |
| 81 | + "page": "813-886", | |
| 82 | + "source": "Crossref", | |
| 83 | + "is-referenced-by-count": 93, | |
| 84 | + "title": [ | |
| 85 | + "The Microstructure of Housing Markets" | |
| 86 | + ], | |
| 87 | + "prefix": "10.1016", | |
| 88 | + "member": "78", | |
| 89 | + "reference": [ | |
| 90 | + { | |
| 91 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 92 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0005", | |
| 93 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 94 | + "first-page": "239", | |
| 95 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF02341912", | |
| 96 | + "article-title": "Integrating auction and search markets: the slow Dutch auction", | |
| 97 | + "volume": "5", | |
| 98 | + "author": "Adams", | |
| 99 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 100 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 101 | + }, | |
| 102 | + { | |
| 103 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0010", | |
| 104 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 105 | + "first-page": "1519", | |
| 106 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1468-0262.00340", | |
| 107 | + "article-title": "Swapping the nested fixed point algorithm: a class of estimators for discrete Markov decision models", | |
| 108 | + "volume": "70", | |
| 109 | + "author": "Aguirregabiria", | |
| 110 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 111 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 112 | + }, | |
| 113 | + { | |
| 114 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0015", | |
| 115 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 116 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 117 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00731.x", | |
| 118 | + "article-title": "Sequential estimation of dynamic discrete games", | |
| 119 | + "volume": "75", | |
| 120 | + "author": "Aguirregabiria", | |
| 121 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 122 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 123 | + }, | |
| 124 | + { | |
| 125 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0020", | |
| 126 | + "article-title": "Recent developments in empirical IO: Dynamic demand and dynamic games, Working paper.", | |
| 127 | + "author": "Aguirregabiria", | |
| 128 | + "year": "2010" | |
| 129 | + }, | |
| 130 | + { | |
| 131 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 132 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0025", | |
| 133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 134 | + "first-page": "641", | |
| 135 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00440.x", | |
| 136 | + "article-title": "Opportunistic matching in the housing market", | |
| 137 | + "volume": "48", | |
| 138 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 139 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 140 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 141 | + }, | |
| 142 | + { | |
| 143 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0030", | |
| 144 | + "series-title": "Directed search in the housing market", | |
| 145 | + "author": "Albrecht", | |
| 146 | + "year": "2012" | |
| 147 | + }, | |
| 148 | + { | |
| 149 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0035", | |
| 150 | + "first-page": "62", | |
| 151 | + "article-title": "Salespersons compensation and performance in the housing market", | |
| 152 | + "volume": "1", | |
| 153 | + "author": "Allen", | |
| 154 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 155 | + "journal-title": "J. Acad. Financ." | |
| 156 | + }, | |
| 157 | + { | |
| 158 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 159 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0040", | |
| 160 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 161 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 162 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2000.12090087", | |
| 163 | + "article-title": "Operating efficiencies in real estate: a critical review of the literature", | |
| 164 | + "volume": "8", | |
| 165 | + "author": "Anderson", | |
| 166 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 167 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Lit." | |
| 168 | + }, | |
| 169 | + { | |
| 170 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 171 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0045", | |
| 172 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 173 | + "first-page": "93", | |
| 174 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2000.12091027", | |
| 175 | + "article-title": "X-inefficiencies in the residential real estate market: a stochastic frontier approach", | |
| 176 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 177 | + "author": "Anderson", | |
| 178 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 179 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 180 | + }, | |
| 181 | + { | |
| 182 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 183 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0050", | |
| 184 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 185 | + "first-page": "295", | |
| 186 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007889209994", | |
| 187 | + "article-title": "Residential real estate brokerage efficiency from a cost and profit perspective", | |
| 188 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 189 | + "author": "Anderson", | |
| 190 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 191 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 192 | + }, | |
| 193 | + { | |
| 194 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0055", | |
| 195 | + "series-title": "Endogenous Sources of Volatility in Housing Markets: The Joint Buyer-Seller Problem (No. w18980)", | |
| 196 | + "author": "Anenberg", | |
| 197 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 198 | + }, | |
| 199 | + { | |
| 200 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 201 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0060", | |
| 202 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 203 | + "first-page": "567", | |
| 204 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00728", | |
| 205 | + "article-title": "Determinants of buyer search in a housing market", | |
| 206 | + "volume": "25", | |
| 207 | + "author": "Anglin", | |
| 208 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 209 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 210 | + }, | |
| 211 | + { | |
| 212 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 213 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0065", | |
| 214 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 215 | + "first-page": "99", | |
| 216 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00173119", | |
| 217 | + "article-title": "Residential real estate brokerage as a principal-agent problem", | |
| 218 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 219 | + "author": "Anglin", | |
| 220 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 221 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 222 | + }, | |
| 223 | + { | |
| 224 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 225 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0070", | |
| 226 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 227 | + "first-page": "719", | |
| 228 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00790", | |
| 229 | + "article-title": "Are brokers' commission rates on home sales too high? A conceptual analysis", | |
| 230 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 231 | + "author": "Anglin", | |
| 232 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 233 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 234 | + }, | |
| 235 | + { | |
| 236 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 237 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0075", | |
| 238 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 239 | + "first-page": "95", | |
| 240 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1021526332732", | |
| 241 | + "article-title": "The trade-off between the selling price of residential properties and time-on-the-market: the impact of price setting", | |
| 242 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 243 | + "author": "Anglin", | |
| 244 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 245 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 246 | + }, | |
| 247 | + { | |
| 248 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 249 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0080", | |
| 250 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 251 | + "first-page": "453", | |
| 252 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00780", | |
| 253 | + "article-title": "Search, bargaining and optimal asking prices", | |
| 254 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 255 | + "author": "Arnold", | |
| 256 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 257 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 258 | + }, | |
| 259 | + { | |
| 260 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0085", | |
| 261 | + "first-page": "959", | |
| 262 | + "article-title": "Economic theory and housing", | |
| 263 | + "volume": "vol. 2", | |
| 264 | + "author": "Arnott", | |
| 265 | + "year": "1987" | |
| 266 | + }, | |
| 267 | + { | |
| 268 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0090", | |
| 269 | + "first-page": "501", | |
| 270 | + "article-title": "Testing for price anomalies in real estate markets", | |
| 271 | + "volume": "82", | |
| 272 | + "author": "Ashenfelter", | |
| 273 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 274 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 275 | + }, | |
| 276 | + { | |
| 277 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0095", | |
| 278 | + "series-title": "Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market", | |
| 279 | + "author": "Bar-Isaac", | |
| 280 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 281 | + }, | |
| 282 | + { | |
| 283 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0100", | |
| 284 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 285 | + "first-page": "79", | |
| 286 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2098088", | |
| 287 | + "article-title": "Property rights and the pricing of real estate brokerage", | |
| 288 | + "volume": "30", | |
| 289 | + "author": "Bartlett", | |
| 290 | + "year": "1981", | |
| 291 | + "journal-title": "J. Ind. Econ." | |
| 292 | + }, | |
| 293 | + { | |
| 294 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0105", | |
| 295 | + "first-page": "475", | |
| 296 | + "article-title": "The impact of commissions on home sales in Greater Boston", | |
| 297 | + "volume": "100", | |
| 298 | + "author": "Barwick", | |
| 299 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 300 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc." | |
| 301 | + }, | |
| 302 | + { | |
| 303 | + "issue": "527", | |
| 304 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0115", | |
| 305 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 306 | + "first-page": "311", | |
| 307 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02122.x", | |
| 308 | + "article-title": "Housing tenure, job mobility and unemployment in the UK", | |
| 309 | + "volume": "118", | |
| 310 | + "author": "Battu", | |
| 311 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 312 | + "journal-title": "Econ. J." | |
| 313 | + }, | |
| 314 | + { | |
| 315 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0120", | |
| 316 | + "series-title": "Speculators and middlemen: the role of flippers in the housing market", | |
| 317 | + "author": "Bayer", | |
| 318 | + "year": "2011" | |
| 319 | + }, | |
| 320 | + { | |
| 321 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0125", | |
| 322 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 323 | + "first-page": "5", | |
| 324 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2000.12091034", | |
| 325 | + "article-title": "What do we know about real estate brokerage?", | |
| 326 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 327 | + "author": "Benjamin", | |
| 328 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 329 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 330 | + }, | |
| 331 | + { | |
| 332 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 333 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0135", | |
| 334 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 335 | + "first-page": "189", | |
| 336 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9008-z", | |
| 337 | + "article-title": "Sorting, franchising and real estate brokerage firms", | |
| 338 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 339 | + "author": "Benjamin", | |
| 340 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 341 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 342 | + }, | |
| 343 | + { | |
| 344 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 345 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0140", | |
| 346 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 347 | + "first-page": "1166", | |
| 348 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00473.x", | |
| 349 | + "article-title": "Do real estate brokers add value when listing services are unbundled?", | |
| 350 | + "volume": "51", | |
| 351 | + "author": "Bernheim", | |
| 352 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 353 | + "journal-title": "Econ. Inq." | |
| 354 | + }, | |
| 355 | + { | |
| 356 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb8000", | |
| 357 | + "first-page": "1845", | |
| 358 | + "article-title": "Empirical models of entry and market structure", | |
| 359 | + "volume": "vol. 3", | |
| 360 | + "author": "Berry", | |
| 361 | + "year": "2007" | |
| 362 | + }, | |
| 363 | + { | |
| 364 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0145", | |
| 365 | + "series-title": "How many listings are too many? The impact of agent inventory externalities on selling price and liquidity of client properties", | |
| 366 | + "author": "Bian", | |
| 367 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 368 | + }, | |
| 369 | + { | |
| 370 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 371 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0150", | |
| 372 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 373 | + "first-page": "271", | |
| 374 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1744-1714.1992.tb00661.x", | |
| 375 | + "article-title": "The residential real estate brokerage industry: a proposal for reform", | |
| 376 | + "volume": "30", | |
| 377 | + "author": "Braswell", | |
| 378 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 379 | + "journal-title": "Am. Business Law J." | |
| 380 | + }, | |
| 381 | + { | |
| 382 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 383 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0155", | |
| 384 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 385 | + "first-page": "1544", | |
| 386 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.4.1544", | |
| 387 | + "article-title": "Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions?", | |
| 388 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 389 | + "author": "Bulow", | |
| 390 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 391 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 392 | + }, | |
| 393 | + { | |
| 394 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0160", | |
| 395 | + "series-title": "Understanding booms and busts in housing markets", | |
| 396 | + "author": "Burnside", | |
| 397 | + "year": "2011" | |
| 398 | + }, | |
| 399 | + { | |
| 400 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0165", | |
| 401 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 402 | + "first-page": "2108", | |
| 403 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.101.5.2108", | |
| 404 | + "article-title": "Forced sales and house prices", | |
| 405 | + "volume": "101", | |
| 406 | + "author": "Campbell", | |
| 407 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 408 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 409 | + }, | |
| 410 | + { | |
| 411 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 412 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0170", | |
| 413 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 414 | + "first-page": "283", | |
| 415 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00436.x", | |
| 416 | + "article-title": "Trading frictions and house price dynamics", | |
| 417 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 418 | + "author": "Caplin", | |
| 419 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 420 | + "journal-title": "J. Money Credit Bank." | |
| 421 | + }, | |
| 422 | + { | |
| 423 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0175", | |
| 424 | + "series-title": "Housing Partnerships", | |
| 425 | + "author": "Caplin", | |
| 426 | + "year": "1997" | |
| 427 | + }, | |
| 428 | + { | |
| 429 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 430 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0180", | |
| 431 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 432 | + "first-page": "331", | |
| 433 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00269", | |
| 434 | + "article-title": "Costs and pricing of home brokerage services", | |
| 435 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 436 | + "author": "Carney", | |
| 437 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 438 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 439 | + }, | |
| 440 | + { | |
| 441 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0185", | |
| 442 | + "series-title": "Information and real estate transactions: the effects of pictures and virtual tours on home sales", | |
| 443 | + "author": "Carrillo", | |
| 444 | + "year": "2008" | |
| 445 | + }, | |
| 446 | + { | |
| 447 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 448 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0190", | |
| 449 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 450 | + "first-page": "203", | |
| 451 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x", | |
| 452 | + "article-title": "An empirical stationary equilibrium search model of the housing market", | |
| 453 | + "volume": "53", | |
| 454 | + "author": "Carrillo", | |
| 455 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 456 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 457 | + }, | |
| 458 | + { | |
| 459 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 460 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0195", | |
| 461 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 462 | + "first-page": "310", | |
| 463 | + "DOI": "10.1111/reec.12003", | |
| 464 | + "article-title": "To sell or not to sell: measuring the heat of the housing market", | |
| 465 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 466 | + "author": "Carrillo", | |
| 467 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 468 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 469 | + }, | |
| 470 | + { | |
| 471 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0200", | |
| 472 | + "article-title": "Can tightness in the housing market help predict subsequent home price appreciation? Evidence from the U.S. and the Netherlands", | |
| 473 | + "author": "Carrillo", | |
| 474 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 475 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ" | |
| 476 | + }, | |
| 477 | + { | |
| 478 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 479 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0205", | |
| 480 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 481 | + "first-page": "349", | |
| 482 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00177953", | |
| 483 | + "article-title": "Fixed-percentage commissions and moral hazard in residential real estate brokerage", | |
| 484 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 485 | + "author": "Carroll", | |
| 486 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 487 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 488 | + }, | |
| 489 | + { | |
| 490 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 491 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0210", | |
| 492 | + "first-page": "125", | |
| 493 | + "article-title": "The efficiency of the market for single-family homes", | |
| 494 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 495 | + "author": "Case", | |
| 496 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 497 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 498 | + }, | |
| 499 | + { | |
| 500 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0215", | |
| 501 | + "first-page": "29", | |
| 502 | + "article-title": "The behavior of home buyers in boom and post-boom markets", | |
| 503 | + "volume": "11", | |
| 504 | + "author": "Case", | |
| 505 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 506 | + "journal-title": "N. Engl. Econ. Rev." | |
| 507 | + }, | |
| 508 | + { | |
| 509 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0220", | |
| 510 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 511 | + "first-page": "299", | |
| 512 | + "DOI": "10.1353/eca.2004.0004", | |
| 513 | + "article-title": "Is there a bubble in the housing market?", | |
| 514 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 515 | + "author": "Case", | |
| 516 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 517 | + "journal-title": "Brook. Pap. Econ. Act." | |
| 518 | + }, | |
| 519 | + { | |
| 520 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0225", | |
| 521 | + "series-title": "Fear and loathing in the housing market: evidence from search query data", | |
| 522 | + "author": "Chauvet", | |
| 523 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 524 | + }, | |
| 525 | + { | |
| 526 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 527 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0230", | |
| 528 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 529 | + "first-page": "207", | |
| 530 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2555923", | |
| 531 | + "article-title": "On the use of ceiling-price commitments by monopolists", | |
| 532 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 533 | + "author": "Chen", | |
| 534 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 535 | + "journal-title": "RAND J. Econ." | |
| 536 | + }, | |
| 537 | + { | |
| 538 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0235", | |
| 539 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 540 | + "first-page": "129", | |
| 541 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2527250", | |
| 542 | + "article-title": "Asking prices as commitment devices", | |
| 543 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 544 | + "author": "Chen", | |
| 545 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 546 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 547 | + }, | |
| 548 | + { | |
| 549 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0240", | |
| 550 | + "series-title": "Auction versus negotiated sale: evidence from real estate sales", | |
| 551 | + "author": "Chow", | |
| 552 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 553 | + }, | |
| 554 | + { | |
| 555 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 556 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0245", | |
| 557 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 558 | + "first-page": "35", | |
| 559 | + "DOI": "10.1080/02673030120105875", | |
| 560 | + "article-title": "Tenure choice and labour market outcomes", | |
| 561 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 562 | + "author": "Coulson", | |
| 563 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 564 | + "journal-title": "Hous. Stud." | |
| 565 | + }, | |
| 566 | + { | |
| 567 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 568 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0250", | |
| 569 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 570 | + "first-page": "252", | |
| 571 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.003", | |
| 572 | + "article-title": "Housing tenure and labor market impacts: the search goes on", | |
| 573 | + "volume": "65", | |
| 574 | + "author": "Coulson", | |
| 575 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 576 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 577 | + }, | |
| 578 | + { | |
| 579 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 580 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0255", | |
| 581 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 582 | + "first-page": "329", | |
| 583 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0094-1190(78)90014-1", | |
| 584 | + "article-title": "Racial prejudice in a search model of the urban housing market", | |
| 585 | + "volume": "5", | |
| 586 | + "author": "Courant", | |
| 587 | + "year": "1978", | |
| 588 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 589 | + }, | |
| 590 | + { | |
| 591 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 592 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0260", | |
| 593 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 594 | + "first-page": "209", | |
| 595 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00264", | |
| 596 | + "article-title": "Competition and efficiency in transacting: the case of residential real estate brokerage", | |
| 597 | + "volume": "10", | |
| 598 | + "author": "Crockett", | |
| 599 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 600 | + "journal-title": "Am. Real Estate Urban Econ. Assoc." | |
| 601 | + }, | |
| 602 | + { | |
| 603 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 604 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0265", | |
| 605 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 606 | + "first-page": "171", | |
| 607 | + "DOI": "10.1080/00036847400000017", | |
| 608 | + "article-title": "Price, quality, and selling time in the housing market", | |
| 609 | + "volume": "6", | |
| 610 | + "author": "Cubbin", | |
| 611 | + "year": "1974", | |
| 612 | + "journal-title": "Appl. Econ." | |
| 613 | + }, | |
| 614 | + { | |
| 615 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0270", | |
| 616 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 617 | + "first-page": "265", | |
| 618 | + "DOI": "10.1086/467455", | |
| 619 | + "article-title": "Does it matter whom an agent serves? Evidence from recent changes in real estate agency law", | |
| 620 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 621 | + "author": "Curran", | |
| 622 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 623 | + "journal-title": "J. Law Econ." | |
| 624 | + }, | |
| 625 | + { | |
| 626 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0275", | |
| 627 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 628 | + "article-title": "The effects of land transfer taxes on real estate markets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto", | |
| 629 | + "volume": "11", | |
| 630 | + "author": "Dachis", | |
| 631 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 632 | + "journal-title": "J. Econ. Geogr." | |
| 633 | + }, | |
| 634 | + { | |
| 635 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0280", | |
| 636 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 637 | + "first-page": "217", | |
| 638 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297271", | |
| 639 | + "article-title": "Wage determination and efficiency in search equilibrium", | |
| 640 | + "volume": "49", | |
| 641 | + "author": "Diamond", | |
| 642 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 643 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 644 | + }, | |
| 645 | + { | |
| 646 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 647 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0285", | |
| 648 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 649 | + "first-page": "837", | |
| 650 | + "DOI": "10.1111/iere.12019", | |
| 651 | + "article-title": "House prices, sales, and time-on-market: a search-theoretic framework", | |
| 652 | + "volume": "54", | |
| 653 | + "author": "Díaz", | |
| 654 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 655 | + "journal-title": "Int. Econ. Rev." | |
| 656 | + }, | |
| 657 | + { | |
| 658 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0290", | |
| 659 | + "series-title": "Price and time to sale dynamics in the housing market: the role of incomplete information", | |
| 660 | + "author": "Ehrlich", | |
| 661 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 662 | + }, | |
| 663 | + { | |
| 664 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 665 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0295", | |
| 666 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 667 | + "first-page": "351", | |
| 668 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007737102125", | |
| 669 | + "article-title": "Buyer search intensity and the role of the residential real estate broker", | |
| 670 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 671 | + "author": "Elder", | |
| 672 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 673 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 674 | + }, | |
| 675 | + { | |
| 676 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 677 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0300", | |
| 678 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 679 | + "first-page": "337", | |
| 680 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00804", | |
| 681 | + "article-title": "Buyer brokers: do they make a difference? Their influence on selling price and search duration", | |
| 682 | + "volume": "28", | |
| 683 | + "author": "Elder", | |
| 684 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 685 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 686 | + }, | |
| 687 | + { | |
| 688 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0305", | |
| 689 | + "first-page": "325", | |
| 690 | + "article-title": "Antitrust economics of multi-sided platform markets", | |
| 691 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 692 | + "author": "Evans", | |
| 693 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 694 | + "journal-title": "Yale J. Regul." | |
| 695 | + }, | |
| 696 | + { | |
| 697 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 698 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb8005", | |
| 699 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 700 | + "first-page": "267", | |
| 701 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2005.12091162", | |
| 702 | + "article-title": "Homeowners' repeat sales gains, dual agency and repeated use of the same agent", | |
| 703 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 704 | + "author": "Evans", | |
| 705 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 706 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 707 | + }, | |
| 708 | + { | |
| 709 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 710 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0310", | |
| 711 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 712 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 713 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-008-9139-x", | |
| 714 | + "article-title": "A case for percentage commission contracts: the impact of a “race” among agents", | |
| 715 | + "volume": "40", | |
| 716 | + "author": "Fisher", | |
| 717 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 718 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 719 | + }, | |
| 720 | + { | |
| 721 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 722 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0315", | |
| 723 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 724 | + "first-page": "269", | |
| 725 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00066", | |
| 726 | + "article-title": "Controlling for the impact of variable liquidity in commercial real estate price indices", | |
| 727 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 728 | + "author": "Fisher", | |
| 729 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 730 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 731 | + }, | |
| 732 | + { | |
| 733 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 734 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0320", | |
| 735 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 736 | + "first-page": "92", | |
| 737 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jhe.2005.06.003", | |
| 738 | + "article-title": "The effects of the internet on marketing residential real estate", | |
| 739 | + "volume": "14", | |
| 740 | + "author": "Ford", | |
| 741 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 742 | + "journal-title": "J. Hous. Econ." | |
| 743 | + }, | |
| 744 | + { | |
| 745 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0325", | |
| 746 | + "series-title": "The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry", | |
| 747 | + "author": "FTC Report", | |
| 748 | + "year": "1983" | |
| 749 | + }, | |
| 750 | + { | |
| 751 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0330", | |
| 752 | + "series-title": "Competition in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry", | |
| 753 | + "author": "FTC Report", | |
| 754 | + "year": "2007" | |
| 755 | + }, | |
| 756 | + { | |
| 757 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 758 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0335", | |
| 759 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 760 | + "first-page": "39", | |
| 761 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9028-8", | |
| 762 | + "article-title": "The impact of dual agency", | |
| 763 | + "volume": "35", | |
| 764 | + "author": "Gardiner", | |
| 765 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 766 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 767 | + }, | |
| 768 | + { | |
| 769 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 770 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0340", | |
| 771 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 772 | + "first-page": "405", | |
| 773 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/hhg037", | |
| 774 | + "article-title": "Confronting information asymmetries: evidence from real estate markets", | |
| 775 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 776 | + "author": "Garmaise", | |
| 777 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 778 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Financ. Stud." | |
| 779 | + }, | |
| 780 | + { | |
| 781 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 782 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0345", | |
| 783 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 784 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 785 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00537", | |
| 786 | + "article-title": "Optimal price and selling effort from perspectives of the broker and seller", | |
| 787 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 788 | + "author": "Geltner", | |
| 789 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 790 | + "journal-title": "J. Am. Real Estate Urban Econ. Assoc." | |
| 791 | + }, | |
| 792 | + { | |
| 793 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0350", | |
| 794 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 795 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 796 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2012.01.002", | |
| 797 | + "article-title": "Search and matching in the housing markets", | |
| 798 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 799 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 800 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 801 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 802 | + }, | |
| 803 | + { | |
| 804 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0355", | |
| 805 | + "series-title": "Measuring the thinness of real estate markets", | |
| 806 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 807 | + "year": "2012" | |
| 808 | + }, | |
| 809 | + { | |
| 810 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 811 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0360", | |
| 812 | + "first-page": "255", | |
| 813 | + "article-title": "Equity and time to sale in the real estate market", | |
| 814 | + "volume": "87", | |
| 815 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 816 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 817 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 818 | + }, | |
| 819 | + { | |
| 820 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 821 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0365", | |
| 822 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 823 | + "first-page": "1233", | |
| 824 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003355301753265561", | |
| 825 | + "article-title": "Loss aversion and seller behavior: evidence from housing markets", | |
| 826 | + "volume": "116", | |
| 827 | + "author": "Genesove", | |
| 828 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 829 | + "journal-title": "Q. J. Econ." | |
| 830 | + }, | |
| 831 | + { | |
| 832 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0375", | |
| 833 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 834 | + "first-page": "45", | |
| 835 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2014.02.003", | |
| 836 | + "article-title": "Housing dynamics: an urban approach", | |
| 837 | + "volume": "81", | |
| 838 | + "author": "Glaeser", | |
| 839 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 840 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 841 | + }, | |
| 842 | + { | |
| 843 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 844 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0380", | |
| 845 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 846 | + "first-page": "719", | |
| 847 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00763", | |
| 848 | + "article-title": "Selling time and selling price: the influence of seller motivation", | |
| 849 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 850 | + "author": "Glower", | |
| 851 | + "year": "1998", | |
| 852 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 853 | + }, | |
| 854 | + { | |
| 855 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 856 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0385", | |
| 857 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 858 | + "first-page": "100", | |
| 859 | + "DOI": "10.1162/rest.2006.88.1.100", | |
| 860 | + "article-title": "Estimating house price indexes in the presence of seller reservation prices", | |
| 861 | + "volume": "88", | |
| 862 | + "author": "Goetzmann", | |
| 863 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 864 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stat." | |
| 865 | + }, | |
| 866 | + { | |
| 867 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 868 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0390", | |
| 869 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 870 | + "first-page": "79", | |
| 871 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1988.12090557", | |
| 872 | + "article-title": "Brokerage firm competition in real estate commission rates", | |
| 873 | + "volume": "3", | |
| 874 | + "author": "Goolsby", | |
| 875 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 876 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 877 | + }, | |
| 878 | + { | |
| 879 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0395", | |
| 880 | + "series-title": "Optimal asking price and bid acceptance strategies for residential sales", | |
| 881 | + "author": "Green", | |
| 882 | + "year": "1998" | |
| 883 | + }, | |
| 884 | + { | |
| 885 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 886 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0400", | |
| 887 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 888 | + "first-page": "99", | |
| 889 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2555794", | |
| 890 | + "article-title": "Physician financial incentives and cesarean section delivery", | |
| 891 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 892 | + "author": "Gruber", | |
| 893 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 894 | + "journal-title": "RAND J. Econ." | |
| 895 | + }, | |
| 896 | + { | |
| 897 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 898 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0405", | |
| 899 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 900 | + "first-page": "208", | |
| 901 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0094-1190(85)90047-6", | |
| 902 | + "article-title": "An analysis of vacancy patterns in the rental housing market", | |
| 903 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 904 | + "author": "Guasch", | |
| 905 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 906 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 907 | + }, | |
| 908 | + { | |
| 909 | + "issue": "11", | |
| 910 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0410", | |
| 911 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 912 | + "first-page": "3889", | |
| 913 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/hhq088", | |
| 914 | + "article-title": "The effects of price risk on housing demand: empirical evidence from US markets", | |
| 915 | + "volume": "23", | |
| 916 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 917 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 918 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Financ. Stud." | |
| 919 | + }, | |
| 920 | + { | |
| 921 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 922 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0415", | |
| 923 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 924 | + "first-page": "564", | |
| 925 | + "DOI": "10.1198/jbes.2011.08314", | |
| 926 | + "article-title": "Testing cost inefficiency under free entry in the real estate brokerage industry", | |
| 927 | + "volume": "29", | |
| 928 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 929 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 930 | + "journal-title": "J. Bus. Econ. Stat." | |
| 931 | + }, | |
| 932 | + { | |
| 933 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0420", | |
| 934 | + "series-title": "In-House Transactions in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Working paper", | |
| 935 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 936 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 937 | + }, | |
| 938 | + { | |
| 939 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 940 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0425", | |
| 941 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 942 | + "article-title": "Bidding wars for houses", | |
| 943 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 944 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 945 | + "year": "2013", | |
| 946 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 947 | + }, | |
| 948 | + { | |
| 949 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0430", | |
| 950 | + "series-title": "What is the role of the asking price for a house?", | |
| 951 | + "author": "Han", | |
| 952 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 953 | + }, | |
| 954 | + { | |
| 955 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 956 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0435", | |
| 957 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 958 | + "first-page": "178", | |
| 959 | + "DOI": "10.1162/003465303762687794", | |
| 960 | + "article-title": "Estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes", | |
| 961 | + "volume": "85", | |
| 962 | + "author": "Harding", | |
| 963 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 964 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stat." | |
| 965 | + }, | |
| 966 | + { | |
| 967 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 968 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0440", | |
| 969 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 970 | + "first-page": "396", | |
| 971 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00463", | |
| 972 | + "article-title": "The duration of marketing time of residential housing", | |
| 973 | + "volume": "16", | |
| 974 | + "author": "Haurin", | |
| 975 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 976 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 977 | + }, | |
| 978 | + { | |
| 979 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 980 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0445", | |
| 981 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 982 | + "first-page": "563", | |
| 983 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2001.2258", | |
| 984 | + "article-title": "The impact of transaction costs and the expected length of stay on homeownership", | |
| 985 | + "volume": "51", | |
| 986 | + "author": "Haurin", | |
| 987 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 988 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 989 | + }, | |
| 990 | + { | |
| 991 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 992 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0450", | |
| 993 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 994 | + "first-page": "659", | |
| 995 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00279.x", | |
| 996 | + "article-title": "List prices, sale prices, and marketing time: an application to U.S. housing markets", | |
| 997 | + "volume": "38", | |
| 998 | + "author": "Haurin", | |
| 999 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 1000 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1001 | + }, | |
| 1002 | + { | |
| 1003 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1004 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0455", | |
| 1005 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1006 | + "first-page": "1559", | |
| 1007 | + "DOI": "10.1093/restud/rds004", | |
| 1008 | + "article-title": "Housing liquidity, mobility, and the labour market", | |
| 1009 | + "volume": "79", | |
| 1010 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 1011 | + "year": "2012", | |
| 1012 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 1013 | + }, | |
| 1014 | + { | |
| 1015 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1016 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0460", | |
| 1017 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1018 | + "first-page": "1172", | |
| 1019 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.104.4.1172", | |
| 1020 | + "article-title": "Search and the dynamics of house prices and construction", | |
| 1021 | + "volume": "104", | |
| 1022 | + "author": "Head", | |
| 1023 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 1024 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 1025 | + }, | |
| 1026 | + { | |
| 1027 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb8010", | |
| 1028 | + "series-title": "Sample selection bias as a specification error", | |
| 1029 | + "first-page": "153", | |
| 1030 | + "volume": "47", | |
| 1031 | + "author": "Heckman", | |
| 1032 | + "year": "1979" | |
| 1033 | + }, | |
| 1034 | + { | |
| 1035 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 1036 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0465", | |
| 1037 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1038 | + "first-page": "1878", | |
| 1039 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.5.1878", | |
| 1040 | + "article-title": "The relative performance of real estate marketing platforms: MLS versus FSBO Madison.com", | |
| 1041 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 1042 | + "author": "Hendel", | |
| 1043 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 1044 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 1045 | + }, | |
| 1046 | + { | |
| 1047 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1048 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0470", | |
| 1049 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1050 | + "first-page": "115", | |
| 1051 | + "DOI": "10.1002/jae.3950070202", | |
| 1052 | + "article-title": "The role of the list price in housing markets: theory and an econometric model", | |
| 1053 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 1054 | + "author": "Horowitz", | |
| 1055 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 1056 | + "journal-title": "J. Appl. Econ." | |
| 1057 | + }, | |
| 1058 | + { | |
| 1059 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1060 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0475", | |
| 1061 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1062 | + "first-page": "279", | |
| 1063 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297382", | |
| 1064 | + "article-title": "On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment", | |
| 1065 | + "volume": "57", | |
| 1066 | + "author": "Hosios", | |
| 1067 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 1068 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 1069 | + }, | |
| 1070 | + { | |
| 1071 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 1072 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0480", | |
| 1073 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1074 | + "first-page": "1076", | |
| 1075 | + "DOI": "10.1086/376953", | |
| 1076 | + "article-title": "Can free entry be efficient? Fixed commissions and social waste in the real estate industry", | |
| 1077 | + "volume": "111", | |
| 1078 | + "author": "Hsieh", | |
| 1079 | + "year": "2003", | |
| 1080 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 1081 | + }, | |
| 1082 | + { | |
| 1083 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1084 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0485", | |
| 1085 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1086 | + "first-page": "77", | |
| 1087 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9029-7", | |
| 1088 | + "article-title": "Who you going to call? Performance of realtors and non-realtors in a MLS setting", | |
| 1089 | + "volume": "35", | |
| 1090 | + "author": "Huang", | |
| 1091 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 1092 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1093 | + }, | |
| 1094 | + { | |
| 1095 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0490", | |
| 1096 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1097 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 1098 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2555895", | |
| 1099 | + "article-title": "An empirical examination of moral hazard in the vehicle inspection market", | |
| 1100 | + "volume": "29", | |
| 1101 | + "author": "Hubbard", | |
| 1102 | + "year": "1998", | |
| 1103 | + "journal-title": "RAND J. Econ." | |
| 1104 | + }, | |
| 1105 | + { | |
| 1106 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb8015", | |
| 1107 | + "series-title": "The costs of free entry: an empirical study of real estate agents in Greater Boston", | |
| 1108 | + "author": "Jia", | |
| 1109 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 1110 | + }, | |
| 1111 | + { | |
| 1112 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0495", | |
| 1113 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1114 | + "first-page": "423", | |
| 1115 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2008.12091228", | |
| 1116 | + "article-title": "Intra-firm real estate brokerage compensation choices and agent performance", | |
| 1117 | + "volume": "30", | |
| 1118 | + "author": "Johnson", | |
| 1119 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 1120 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 1121 | + }, | |
| 1122 | + { | |
| 1123 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0500", | |
| 1124 | + "article-title": "Dual agent distortions in real estate transactions", | |
| 1125 | + "author": "Johnson", | |
| 1126 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 1127 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1128 | + }, | |
| 1129 | + { | |
| 1130 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0505", | |
| 1131 | + "first-page": "168", | |
| 1132 | + "article-title": "Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: empirical evidence from coal markets", | |
| 1133 | + "volume": "77", | |
| 1134 | + "author": "Joskow", | |
| 1135 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 1136 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 1137 | + }, | |
| 1138 | + { | |
| 1139 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0510", | |
| 1140 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1141 | + "first-page": "36", | |
| 1142 | + "DOI": "10.2307/3003428", | |
| 1143 | + "article-title": "Truthful disclosure of information", | |
| 1144 | + "volume": "13", | |
| 1145 | + "author": "Jovanovic", | |
| 1146 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 1147 | + "journal-title": "Bell J. Econ." | |
| 1148 | + }, | |
| 1149 | + { | |
| 1150 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0515", | |
| 1151 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1152 | + "first-page": "21", | |
| 1153 | + "DOI": "10.1080/00420988620080031", | |
| 1154 | + "article-title": "Real estate brokers, housing prices, and the demand for brokers", | |
| 1155 | + "volume": "23", | |
| 1156 | + "author": "Jud", | |
| 1157 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 1158 | + "journal-title": "Urban Stud." | |
| 1159 | + }, | |
| 1160 | + { | |
| 1161 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1162 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0525", | |
| 1163 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1164 | + "first-page": "164", | |
| 1165 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-012-9385-9", | |
| 1166 | + "article-title": "Is dual agency in real estate a cause for concern?", | |
| 1167 | + "volume": "48", | |
| 1168 | + "author": "Kadiyali", | |
| 1169 | + "year": "2014", | |
| 1170 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1171 | + }, | |
| 1172 | + { | |
| 1173 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0530", | |
| 1174 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1175 | + "first-page": "503", | |
| 1176 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2109495", | |
| 1177 | + "article-title": "Search, hedonic prices and housing demand", | |
| 1178 | + "volume": "74", | |
| 1179 | + "author": "Kim", | |
| 1180 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 1181 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stat." | |
| 1182 | + }, | |
| 1183 | + { | |
| 1184 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0535", | |
| 1185 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1186 | + "first-page": "249", | |
| 1187 | + "DOI": "10.1086/467156", | |
| 1188 | + "article-title": "Uncertainty, efficiency, and the brokerage industry", | |
| 1189 | + "volume": "31", | |
| 1190 | + "author": "Knoll", | |
| 1191 | + "year": "1988", | |
| 1192 | + "journal-title": "J. Law Econ." | |
| 1193 | + }, | |
| 1194 | + { | |
| 1195 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0540", | |
| 1196 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1197 | + "first-page": "32", | |
| 1198 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.2000.2180", | |
| 1199 | + "article-title": "A theory of liquidity in residential real estate markets", | |
| 1200 | + "volume": "49", | |
| 1201 | + "author": "Krainer", | |
| 1202 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 1203 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 1204 | + }, | |
| 1205 | + { | |
| 1206 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1207 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0545", | |
| 1208 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1209 | + "first-page": "223", | |
| 1210 | + "DOI": "10.1007/PL00004214", | |
| 1211 | + "article-title": "Equilibrium valuation of illiquid assets", | |
| 1212 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 1213 | + "author": "Krainer", | |
| 1214 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 1215 | + "journal-title": "Econ. Theory" | |
| 1216 | + }, | |
| 1217 | + { | |
| 1218 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0550", | |
| 1219 | + "series-title": "Auction Theory", | |
| 1220 | + "author": "Krishna", | |
| 1221 | + "year": "2009" | |
| 1222 | + }, | |
| 1223 | + { | |
| 1224 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0555", | |
| 1225 | + "series-title": "Testing for information asymmetries in real estate markets", | |
| 1226 | + "author": "Kurlat", | |
| 1227 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 1228 | + }, | |
| 1229 | + { | |
| 1230 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0560", | |
| 1231 | + "series-title": "The Housing Market(s) of San Diego", | |
| 1232 | + "author": "Landvoigt", | |
| 1233 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 1234 | + }, | |
| 1235 | + { | |
| 1236 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1237 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0565", | |
| 1238 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1239 | + "first-page": "422", | |
| 1240 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00501", | |
| 1241 | + "article-title": "Non-uniform percentage brokerage commissions and real estate market performance", | |
| 1242 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 1243 | + "author": "Larsen", | |
| 1244 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 1245 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1246 | + }, | |
| 1247 | + { | |
| 1248 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0570", | |
| 1249 | + "series-title": "Competing with asking prices", | |
| 1250 | + "author": "Lester", | |
| 1251 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 1252 | + }, | |
| 1253 | + { | |
| 1254 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1255 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0580", | |
| 1256 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1257 | + "first-page": "599", | |
| 1258 | + "DOI": "10.1162/rest.90.4.599", | |
| 1259 | + "article-title": "Market distortions when agents are better informed: the value of information in real estate transactions", | |
| 1260 | + "volume": "90", | |
| 1261 | + "author": "Levitt", | |
| 1262 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 1263 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stat." | |
| 1264 | + }, | |
| 1265 | + { | |
| 1266 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0585", | |
| 1267 | + "article-title": "Antitrust implications of home seller outcomes when using flat-fee real estate agents", | |
| 1268 | + "volume": "2008", | |
| 1269 | + "author": "Levitt", | |
| 1270 | + "year": "2008" | |
| 1271 | + }, | |
| 1272 | + { | |
| 1273 | + "issue": "1/2", | |
| 1274 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0590", | |
| 1275 | + "first-page": "377", | |
| 1276 | + "article-title": "Attrition of agency in real estate brokerage", | |
| 1277 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 1278 | + "author": "Lindeman", | |
| 1279 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 1280 | + "journal-title": "J. Am. Acad. Bus." | |
| 1281 | + }, | |
| 1282 | + { | |
| 1283 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0595", | |
| 1284 | + "series-title": "Bubbles, post-crash dynamics, and the housing market", | |
| 1285 | + "author": "Liu", | |
| 1286 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 1287 | + }, | |
| 1288 | + { | |
| 1289 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1290 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0600", | |
| 1291 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1292 | + "first-page": "517", | |
| 1293 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00702", | |
| 1294 | + "article-title": "A comparison of prices brought by English auctions and private negotiations", | |
| 1295 | + "volume": "24", | |
| 1296 | + "author": "Lusht", | |
| 1297 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 1298 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1299 | + }, | |
| 1300 | + { | |
| 1301 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1302 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0605", | |
| 1303 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1304 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 1305 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.1995.1020", | |
| 1306 | + "article-title": "A model of negotiated sales applied to real estate auctions", | |
| 1307 | + "volume": "38", | |
| 1308 | + "author": "Mayer", | |
| 1309 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 1310 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 1311 | + }, | |
| 1312 | + { | |
| 1313 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1314 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0610", | |
| 1315 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1316 | + "first-page": "41", | |
| 1317 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00737", | |
| 1318 | + "article-title": "Assessing the performance of real estate auctions", | |
| 1319 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 1320 | + "author": "Mayer", | |
| 1321 | + "year": "1998", | |
| 1322 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1323 | + }, | |
| 1324 | + { | |
| 1325 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0615", | |
| 1326 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1327 | + "first-page": "1281", | |
| 1328 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2951643", | |
| 1329 | + "article-title": "Mechanism design by competing sellers", | |
| 1330 | + "volume": "61", | |
| 1331 | + "author": "McAfee", | |
| 1332 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 1333 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 1334 | + }, | |
| 1335 | + { | |
| 1336 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1337 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0620", | |
| 1338 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1339 | + "first-page": "267", | |
| 1340 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.001", | |
| 1341 | + "article-title": "The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions", | |
| 1342 | + "volume": "85", | |
| 1343 | + "author": "Mehran", | |
| 1344 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 1345 | + "journal-title": "J. Financ. Econ." | |
| 1346 | + }, | |
| 1347 | + { | |
| 1348 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0625", | |
| 1349 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1350 | + "first-page": "192", | |
| 1351 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2004.05.004", | |
| 1352 | + "article-title": "Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England", | |
| 1353 | + "volume": "56", | |
| 1354 | + "author": "Merlo", | |
| 1355 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 1356 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 1357 | + }, | |
| 1358 | + { | |
| 1359 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0630", | |
| 1360 | + "series-title": "The home selling problem: theory and evidence", | |
| 1361 | + "author": "Merlo", | |
| 1362 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 1363 | + }, | |
| 1364 | + { | |
| 1365 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1366 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0635", | |
| 1367 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1368 | + "first-page": "267", | |
| 1369 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00491", | |
| 1370 | + "article-title": "The optimal duration of real estate listing contracts", | |
| 1371 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 1372 | + "author": "Miceli", | |
| 1373 | + "year": "1989", | |
| 1374 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1375 | + }, | |
| 1376 | + { | |
| 1377 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1378 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0640", | |
| 1379 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1380 | + "first-page": "548", | |
| 1381 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00567", | |
| 1382 | + "article-title": "The multiple listing service, commission splits, and broker effort", | |
| 1383 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 1384 | + "author": "Miceli", | |
| 1385 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 1386 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1387 | + }, | |
| 1388 | + { | |
| 1389 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1390 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0645", | |
| 1391 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1392 | + "first-page": "519", | |
| 1393 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00594", | |
| 1394 | + "article-title": "The welfare effects of non-price competition among real estate brokers", | |
| 1395 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 1396 | + "author": "Miceli", | |
| 1397 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 1398 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1399 | + }, | |
| 1400 | + { | |
| 1401 | + "issue": "1/2", | |
| 1402 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0650", | |
| 1403 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1404 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 1405 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2000.12091025", | |
| 1406 | + "article-title": "Restructuring agency relationships in the real estate brokerage industry: an economic analysis", | |
| 1407 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 1408 | + "author": "Miceli", | |
| 1409 | + "year": "2000", | |
| 1410 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 1411 | + }, | |
| 1412 | + { | |
| 1413 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1414 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0655", | |
| 1415 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1416 | + "first-page": "7", | |
| 1417 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9026-x", | |
| 1418 | + "article-title": "Is the compensation model for real estate brokers obsolete?", | |
| 1419 | + "volume": "35", | |
| 1420 | + "author": "Miceli", | |
| 1421 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 1422 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1423 | + }, | |
| 1424 | + { | |
| 1425 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1426 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0660", | |
| 1427 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1428 | + "first-page": "164", | |
| 1429 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00174", | |
| 1430 | + "article-title": "Time-on-market and selling price", | |
| 1431 | + "volume": "6", | |
| 1432 | + "author": "Miller", | |
| 1433 | + "year": "1978", | |
| 1434 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1435 | + }, | |
| 1436 | + { | |
| 1437 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1438 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0665", | |
| 1439 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1440 | + "first-page": "313", | |
| 1441 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1744-1714.1979.tb00006.x", | |
| 1442 | + "article-title": "Do antitrust laws apply to the real estate brokerage industry?", | |
| 1443 | + "volume": "17", | |
| 1444 | + "author": "Miller", | |
| 1445 | + "year": "1979", | |
| 1446 | + "journal-title": "Am. Business Law J." | |
| 1447 | + }, | |
| 1448 | + { | |
| 1449 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1450 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0670", | |
| 1451 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1452 | + "first-page": "31", | |
| 1453 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.1987.12090529", | |
| 1454 | + "article-title": "Residential property selling prices", | |
| 1455 | + "volume": "2", | |
| 1456 | + "author": "Miller", | |
| 1457 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 1458 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 1459 | + }, | |
| 1460 | + { | |
| 1461 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1462 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0675", | |
| 1463 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1464 | + "first-page": "385", | |
| 1465 | + "DOI": "10.1086/262077", | |
| 1466 | + "article-title": "Competitive search equilibrium", | |
| 1467 | + "volume": "105", | |
| 1468 | + "author": "Moen", | |
| 1469 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 1470 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 1471 | + }, | |
| 1472 | + { | |
| 1473 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 1474 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0680", | |
| 1475 | + "first-page": "968", | |
| 1476 | + "article-title": "Property rights and efficiency in mating, racing, and related games", | |
| 1477 | + "volume": "72", | |
| 1478 | + "author": "Mortensen", | |
| 1479 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 1480 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 1481 | + }, | |
| 1482 | + { | |
| 1483 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0685", | |
| 1484 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1485 | + "first-page": "397", | |
| 1486 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2297896", | |
| 1487 | + "article-title": "Job creation and job destruction in a theory of unemployment", | |
| 1488 | + "volume": "61", | |
| 1489 | + "author": "Mortensen", | |
| 1490 | + "year": "1994", | |
| 1491 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stud." | |
| 1492 | + }, | |
| 1493 | + { | |
| 1494 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1495 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0690", | |
| 1496 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1497 | + "first-page": "130", | |
| 1498 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jue.2007.01.003", | |
| 1499 | + "article-title": "Home ownership, job duration, and wages", | |
| 1500 | + "volume": "63", | |
| 1501 | + "author": "Munch", | |
| 1502 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 1503 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 1504 | + }, | |
| 1505 | + { | |
| 1506 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1507 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0695", | |
| 1508 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1509 | + "first-page": "5", | |
| 1510 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007879109026", | |
| 1511 | + "article-title": "Incentives and performance in real estate brokerage", | |
| 1512 | + "volume": "22", | |
| 1513 | + "author": "Munneke", | |
| 1514 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 1515 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1516 | + }, | |
| 1517 | + { | |
| 1518 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb8020", | |
| 1519 | + "series-title": "Annual Report. The National Association of Realtors", | |
| 1520 | + "author": "National Association of Realtors", | |
| 1521 | + "year": "2002" | |
| 1522 | + }, | |
| 1523 | + { | |
| 1524 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0700", | |
| 1525 | + "series-title": "Structure, Conduct, and Performance of the Real Estate Brokerage Industry", | |
| 1526 | + "author": "National Association of Realtors Report", | |
| 1527 | + "year": "2005" | |
| 1528 | + }, | |
| 1529 | + { | |
| 1530 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0705", | |
| 1531 | + "series-title": "Moving house", | |
| 1532 | + "author": "Ngai", | |
| 1533 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 1534 | + }, | |
| 1535 | + { | |
| 1536 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0710", | |
| 1537 | + "series-title": "Hot and cold seasons in the housing market", | |
| 1538 | + "author": "Ngai", | |
| 1539 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 1540 | + }, | |
| 1541 | + { | |
| 1542 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1543 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0715", | |
| 1544 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1545 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 1546 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00232.x", | |
| 1547 | + "article-title": "Hot and cold markets", | |
| 1548 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 1549 | + "author": "Novy-Marx", | |
| 1550 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 1551 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1552 | + }, | |
| 1553 | + { | |
| 1554 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1555 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0720", | |
| 1556 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1557 | + "first-page": "51", | |
| 1558 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2006.00159.x", | |
| 1559 | + "article-title": "Price formation under small numbers competition: evidence from land auctions in Singapore", | |
| 1560 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 1561 | + "author": "Ooi", | |
| 1562 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 1563 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1564 | + }, | |
| 1565 | + { | |
| 1566 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0725", | |
| 1567 | + "series-title": "Theory of homes and jobs", | |
| 1568 | + "author": "Oswald", | |
| 1569 | + "year": "1997" | |
| 1570 | + }, | |
| 1571 | + { | |
| 1572 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0730", | |
| 1573 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1574 | + "first-page": "931", | |
| 1575 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1228140", | |
| 1576 | + "article-title": "Kickbacks, specialization, price fixing, and efficiency in residential real estate markets", | |
| 1577 | + "volume": "29", | |
| 1578 | + "author": "Owen", | |
| 1579 | + "year": "1977", | |
| 1580 | + "journal-title": "Stan. Law Rev." | |
| 1581 | + }, | |
| 1582 | + { | |
| 1583 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0735", | |
| 1584 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1585 | + "first-page": "1117", | |
| 1586 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1910990", | |
| 1587 | + "article-title": "Bertrand equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility", | |
| 1588 | + "volume": "52", | |
| 1589 | + "author": "Peters", | |
| 1590 | + "year": "1984", | |
| 1591 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 1592 | + }, | |
| 1593 | + { | |
| 1594 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0740", | |
| 1595 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1596 | + "first-page": "1425", | |
| 1597 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2938374", | |
| 1598 | + "article-title": "Ex Ante price offers in matching games: non-steady states", | |
| 1599 | + "volume": "59", | |
| 1600 | + "author": "Peters", | |
| 1601 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 1602 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 1603 | + }, | |
| 1604 | + { | |
| 1605 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1606 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0745", | |
| 1607 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1608 | + "first-page": "141", | |
| 1609 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jeth.1997.2278", | |
| 1610 | + "article-title": "Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices", | |
| 1611 | + "volume": "75", | |
| 1612 | + "author": "Peters", | |
| 1613 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 1614 | + "journal-title": "J. Econ. Theory" | |
| 1615 | + }, | |
| 1616 | + { | |
| 1617 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0750", | |
| 1618 | + "series-title": "Fooled by search: housing prices, turnover, and bubbles", | |
| 1619 | + "author": "Peterson", | |
| 1620 | + "year": "2012" | |
| 1621 | + }, | |
| 1622 | + { | |
| 1623 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0755", | |
| 1624 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1625 | + "first-page": "390", | |
| 1626 | + "DOI": "10.1257/jel.39.2.390", | |
| 1627 | + "article-title": "Looking into the black box: a survey of the matching function", | |
| 1628 | + "volume": "39", | |
| 1629 | + "author": "Petrongolo", | |
| 1630 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 1631 | + "journal-title": "J. Econ. Lit." | |
| 1632 | + }, | |
| 1633 | + { | |
| 1634 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1635 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0760", | |
| 1636 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1637 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 1638 | + "DOI": "10.1257/aer.99.2.406", | |
| 1639 | + "article-title": "Momentum traders in the housing market: survey evidence and a search model", | |
| 1640 | + "volume": "99", | |
| 1641 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 1642 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 1643 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc." | |
| 1644 | + }, | |
| 1645 | + { | |
| 1646 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0765", | |
| 1647 | + "series-title": "Segmented housing search", | |
| 1648 | + "author": "Piazzesi", | |
| 1649 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 1650 | + }, | |
| 1651 | + { | |
| 1652 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0770", | |
| 1653 | + "series-title": "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory", | |
| 1654 | + "author": "Pissarides", | |
| 1655 | + "year": "2000" | |
| 1656 | + }, | |
| 1657 | + { | |
| 1658 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1659 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0775", | |
| 1660 | + "first-page": "676", | |
| 1661 | + "article-title": "Short-run equilibrium dynamics of unemployment vacancies, and real wages", | |
| 1662 | + "volume": "75", | |
| 1663 | + "author": "Pissarides", | |
| 1664 | + "year": "1985", | |
| 1665 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 1666 | + }, | |
| 1667 | + { | |
| 1668 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1669 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0780", | |
| 1670 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1671 | + "first-page": "765", | |
| 1672 | + "DOI": "10.1177/0042098010363496", | |
| 1673 | + "article-title": "Bidding conventions and the degree of overpricing in the market for houses", | |
| 1674 | + "volume": "48", | |
| 1675 | + "author": "Pryce", | |
| 1676 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 1677 | + "journal-title": "Urban Stud." | |
| 1678 | + }, | |
| 1679 | + { | |
| 1680 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1681 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0785", | |
| 1682 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1683 | + "first-page": "377", | |
| 1684 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1540-6229.2006.00171.x", | |
| 1685 | + "article-title": "Submarket dynamics of time to sale", | |
| 1686 | + "volume": "34", | |
| 1687 | + "author": "Pryce", | |
| 1688 | + "year": "2006", | |
| 1689 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1690 | + }, | |
| 1691 | + { | |
| 1692 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1693 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0790", | |
| 1694 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1695 | + "first-page": "23", | |
| 1696 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF01153587", | |
| 1697 | + "article-title": "Real estate auctions: a survey of theory and practice", | |
| 1698 | + "volume": "9", | |
| 1699 | + "author": "Quan", | |
| 1700 | + "year": "1994", | |
| 1701 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1702 | + }, | |
| 1703 | + { | |
| 1704 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1705 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0795", | |
| 1706 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1707 | + "first-page": "365", | |
| 1708 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00043", | |
| 1709 | + "article-title": "Market mechanism choice and real estate disposition: search versus auction", | |
| 1710 | + "volume": "30", | |
| 1711 | + "author": "Quan", | |
| 1712 | + "year": "2002", | |
| 1713 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1714 | + }, | |
| 1715 | + { | |
| 1716 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0800", | |
| 1717 | + "series-title": "Current Issues in Urban Economics", | |
| 1718 | + "first-page": "391", | |
| 1719 | + "article-title": "What have we learned about urban housing markets", | |
| 1720 | + "author": "Quigley", | |
| 1721 | + "year": "1979" | |
| 1722 | + }, | |
| 1723 | + { | |
| 1724 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0805", | |
| 1725 | + "first-page": "619", | |
| 1726 | + "article-title": "Search in macroeconomic models of the labor market", | |
| 1727 | + "volume": "vol. 4", | |
| 1728 | + "author": "Rogerson", | |
| 1729 | + "year": "2011" | |
| 1730 | + }, | |
| 1731 | + { | |
| 1732 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1733 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0810", | |
| 1734 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1735 | + "first-page": "959", | |
| 1736 | + "DOI": "10.1257/002205105775362014", | |
| 1737 | + "article-title": "Search-theoretic models of the labor market: a survey", | |
| 1738 | + "volume": "43", | |
| 1739 | + "author": "Rogerson", | |
| 1740 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 1741 | + "journal-title": "J. Econ. Lit." | |
| 1742 | + }, | |
| 1743 | + { | |
| 1744 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1745 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0815", | |
| 1746 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1747 | + "first-page": "97", | |
| 1748 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1912531", | |
| 1749 | + "article-title": "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model", | |
| 1750 | + "volume": "50", | |
| 1751 | + "author": "Rubinstein", | |
| 1752 | + "year": "1982", | |
| 1753 | + "journal-title": "Econometrica" | |
| 1754 | + }, | |
| 1755 | + { | |
| 1756 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1757 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0820", | |
| 1758 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1759 | + "first-page": "389", | |
| 1760 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1080-8620.00016", | |
| 1761 | + "article-title": "The impact of contract type of broker performance", | |
| 1762 | + "volume": "29", | |
| 1763 | + "author": "Rutherford", | |
| 1764 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 1765 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1766 | + }, | |
| 1767 | + { | |
| 1768 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1769 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0825", | |
| 1770 | + "first-page": "277", | |
| 1771 | + "article-title": "The impact of contract type of broker performance: submarket effects", | |
| 1772 | + "volume": "26", | |
| 1773 | + "author": "Rutherford", | |
| 1774 | + "year": "2004", | |
| 1775 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 1776 | + }, | |
| 1777 | + { | |
| 1778 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1779 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0830", | |
| 1780 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1781 | + "first-page": "627", | |
| 1782 | + "DOI": "10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.006", | |
| 1783 | + "article-title": "Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from residential brokerage", | |
| 1784 | + "volume": "76", | |
| 1785 | + "author": "Rutherford", | |
| 1786 | + "year": "2005", | |
| 1787 | + "journal-title": "J. Financ. Econ." | |
| 1788 | + }, | |
| 1789 | + { | |
| 1790 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1791 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0840", | |
| 1792 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1793 | + "first-page": "157", | |
| 1794 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00173122", | |
| 1795 | + "article-title": "For sale by owner: when to use a broker and how to price the house", | |
| 1796 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 1797 | + "author": "Salant", | |
| 1798 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 1799 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1800 | + }, | |
| 1801 | + { | |
| 1802 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1803 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0845", | |
| 1804 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1805 | + "first-page": "129", | |
| 1806 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2007.12089772", | |
| 1807 | + "article-title": "Theory of the real estate brokerage firm: a portfolio approach", | |
| 1808 | + "volume": "13", | |
| 1809 | + "author": "Salter", | |
| 1810 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 1811 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Portfolio Manag." | |
| 1812 | + }, | |
| 1813 | + { | |
| 1814 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0855", | |
| 1815 | + "series-title": "Housing Markets and the Economy: Risk, Regulation and Policy", | |
| 1816 | + "first-page": "308", | |
| 1817 | + "article-title": "Do real estate agents compete on price? Evidence from seven metropolitan areas", | |
| 1818 | + "author": "Schnare", | |
| 1819 | + "year": "2009" | |
| 1820 | + }, | |
| 1821 | + { | |
| 1822 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0860", | |
| 1823 | + "first-page": "29", | |
| 1824 | + "article-title": "Competition and value-of-service pricing in the residential real estate brokerage market", | |
| 1825 | + "volume": "27", | |
| 1826 | + "author": "Schroeter", | |
| 1827 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 1828 | + "journal-title": "Quart. Rev. Econ. Business" | |
| 1829 | + }, | |
| 1830 | + { | |
| 1831 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0865", | |
| 1832 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1833 | + "first-page": "232", | |
| 1834 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jeth.2000.2713", | |
| 1835 | + "article-title": "Frictional assignment I: efficiency", | |
| 1836 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 1837 | + "author": "Shi", | |
| 1838 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 1839 | + "journal-title": "J. Econ. Theory" | |
| 1840 | + }, | |
| 1841 | + { | |
| 1842 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0870", | |
| 1843 | + "series-title": "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, second ed. Palgrave Macmillan", | |
| 1844 | + "article-title": "Search theory (new perspectives)", | |
| 1845 | + "author": "Shi", | |
| 1846 | + "year": "2008" | |
| 1847 | + }, | |
| 1848 | + { | |
| 1849 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0875", | |
| 1850 | + "series-title": "The discipline effects of concern for referrals: evidence from real estate agents", | |
| 1851 | + "author": "Shi", | |
| 1852 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 1853 | + }, | |
| 1854 | + { | |
| 1855 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0880", | |
| 1856 | + "series-title": "Market Volatility", | |
| 1857 | + "author": "Shiller", | |
| 1858 | + "year": "1982" | |
| 1859 | + }, | |
| 1860 | + { | |
| 1861 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0885", | |
| 1862 | + "first-page": "1305", | |
| 1863 | + "article-title": "Human behavior and the efficiency of the financial system", | |
| 1864 | + "volume": "vol. 1", | |
| 1865 | + "author": "Shiller", | |
| 1866 | + "year": "1999" | |
| 1867 | + }, | |
| 1868 | + { | |
| 1869 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1870 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0890", | |
| 1871 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1872 | + "first-page": "99", | |
| 1873 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1884852", | |
| 1874 | + "article-title": "A behavioral model of rational choice", | |
| 1875 | + "volume": "69", | |
| 1876 | + "author": "Simon", | |
| 1877 | + "year": "1955", | |
| 1878 | + "journal-title": "Q. J. Econ." | |
| 1879 | + }, | |
| 1880 | + { | |
| 1881 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1882 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0895", | |
| 1883 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1884 | + "first-page": "102", | |
| 1885 | + "DOI": "10.1006/juec.1996.1095", | |
| 1886 | + "article-title": "Brokerage pricing under competition", | |
| 1887 | + "volume": "41", | |
| 1888 | + "author": "Sirmans", | |
| 1889 | + "year": "1997", | |
| 1890 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 1891 | + }, | |
| 1892 | + { | |
| 1893 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1894 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0900", | |
| 1895 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1896 | + "first-page": "207", | |
| 1897 | + "DOI": "10.1016/S1051-1377(05)80033-6", | |
| 1898 | + "article-title": "The markets for housing and real estate broker services", | |
| 1899 | + "volume": "1", | |
| 1900 | + "author": "Sirmans", | |
| 1901 | + "year": "1991", | |
| 1902 | + "journal-title": "J. Hous. Econ." | |
| 1903 | + }, | |
| 1904 | + { | |
| 1905 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1906 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0905", | |
| 1907 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1908 | + "first-page": "237", | |
| 1909 | + "DOI": "10.1007/BF00217393", | |
| 1910 | + "article-title": "Single-family housing transactions: seller motivations, price, and marketing time", | |
| 1911 | + "volume": "13", | |
| 1912 | + "author": "Springer", | |
| 1913 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 1914 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1915 | + }, | |
| 1916 | + { | |
| 1917 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0910", | |
| 1918 | + "series-title": "Information, commitment, and separation in illiquid housing markets", | |
| 1919 | + "author": "Stacey", | |
| 1920 | + "year": "2013" | |
| 1921 | + }, | |
| 1922 | + { | |
| 1923 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 1924 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0915", | |
| 1925 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1926 | + "first-page": "379", | |
| 1927 | + "DOI": "10.2307/2118444", | |
| 1928 | + "article-title": "Prices and trading volume in the housing market: a model with down-payment effects", | |
| 1929 | + "volume": "110", | |
| 1930 | + "author": "Stein", | |
| 1931 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 1932 | + "journal-title": "Q. J. Econ." | |
| 1933 | + }, | |
| 1934 | + { | |
| 1935 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 1936 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0920", | |
| 1937 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1938 | + "first-page": "213", | |
| 1939 | + "DOI": "10.1086/258464", | |
| 1940 | + "article-title": "The economics of information", | |
| 1941 | + "volume": "69", | |
| 1942 | + "author": "Stigler", | |
| 1943 | + "year": "1961", | |
| 1944 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 1945 | + }, | |
| 1946 | + { | |
| 1947 | + "issue": "5", | |
| 1948 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0925", | |
| 1949 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1950 | + "first-page": "94", | |
| 1951 | + "DOI": "10.1086/258727", | |
| 1952 | + "article-title": "Information in the labor market", | |
| 1953 | + "volume": "70", | |
| 1954 | + "author": "Stigler", | |
| 1955 | + "year": "1962", | |
| 1956 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 1957 | + }, | |
| 1958 | + { | |
| 1959 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1960 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0930", | |
| 1961 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1962 | + "first-page": "101", | |
| 1963 | + "DOI": "10.1016/0094-1190(78)90039-6", | |
| 1964 | + "article-title": "The landlord's dilemma: asking rent strategies in a heterogeneous housing market", | |
| 1965 | + "volume": "5", | |
| 1966 | + "author": "Stull", | |
| 1967 | + "year": "1978", | |
| 1968 | + "journal-title": "J. Urban Econ." | |
| 1969 | + }, | |
| 1970 | + { | |
| 1971 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 1972 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0935", | |
| 1973 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 1974 | + "article-title": "Stocks in the household portfolio: a look back at the 1990s", | |
| 1975 | + "volume": "7", | |
| 1976 | + "author": "Tracy", | |
| 1977 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 1978 | + "journal-title": "Curr. Issues Econ. Financ." | |
| 1979 | + }, | |
| 1980 | + { | |
| 1981 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 1982 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0940", | |
| 1983 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 1984 | + "first-page": "57", | |
| 1985 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9025-y", | |
| 1986 | + "article-title": "Individual agents, firms, and the real estate brokerage process", | |
| 1987 | + "volume": "35", | |
| 1988 | + "author": "Turnbull", | |
| 1989 | + "year": "2007", | |
| 1990 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 1991 | + }, | |
| 1992 | + { | |
| 1993 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0945", | |
| 1994 | + "first-page": "189", | |
| 1995 | + "article-title": "Residential real estate brokerage: rate uniformity andmoral hazard", | |
| 1996 | + "volume": "vol. 10", | |
| 1997 | + "author": "Wachter", | |
| 1998 | + "year": "1987" | |
| 1999 | + }, | |
| 2000 | + { | |
| 2001 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 2002 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0950", | |
| 2003 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2004 | + "first-page": "271", | |
| 2005 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2010.12091285", | |
| 2006 | + "article-title": "Listing contract length and time-on-market", | |
| 2007 | + "volume": "32", | |
| 2008 | + "author": "Waller", | |
| 2009 | + "year": "2010", | |
| 2010 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 2011 | + }, | |
| 2012 | + { | |
| 2013 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 2014 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0955", | |
| 2015 | + "first-page": "838", | |
| 2016 | + "article-title": "Auctions vs. posted price setting", | |
| 2017 | + "volume": "83", | |
| 2018 | + "author": "Wang", | |
| 2019 | + "year": "1993", | |
| 2020 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 2021 | + }, | |
| 2022 | + { | |
| 2023 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 2024 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0960", | |
| 2025 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2026 | + "first-page": "321", | |
| 2027 | + "DOI": "10.1111/j.1467-6451.2011.00452.x", | |
| 2028 | + "article-title": "Listing prices as signals of quality in markets with negotiation", | |
| 2029 | + "volume": "59", | |
| 2030 | + "author": "Wang", | |
| 2031 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 2032 | + "journal-title": "J. Ind. Econ." | |
| 2033 | + }, | |
| 2034 | + { | |
| 2035 | + "issue": "6", | |
| 2036 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0965", | |
| 2037 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2038 | + "first-page": "1270", | |
| 2039 | + "DOI": "10.1086/261734", | |
| 2040 | + "article-title": "Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market matching model", | |
| 2041 | + "volume": "98", | |
| 2042 | + "author": "Wheaton", | |
| 2043 | + "year": "1990", | |
| 2044 | + "journal-title": "J. Polit. Econ." | |
| 2045 | + }, | |
| 2046 | + { | |
| 2047 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0970", | |
| 2048 | + "series-title": "The residential real estate brokerage industry: what would more vigorous competition look like?", | |
| 2049 | + "author": "White", | |
| 2050 | + "year": "2006" | |
| 2051 | + }, | |
| 2052 | + { | |
| 2053 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 2054 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0985", | |
| 2055 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2056 | + "first-page": "239", | |
| 2057 | + "DOI": "10.1093/rfs/11.2.239", | |
| 2058 | + "article-title": "Agency and brokerage of real assets in competitive equilibrium", | |
| 2059 | + "volume": "11", | |
| 2060 | + "author": "Williams", | |
| 2061 | + "year": "1998", | |
| 2062 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Financ. Stud." | |
| 2063 | + }, | |
| 2064 | + { | |
| 2065 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0990", | |
| 2066 | + "series-title": "Housing markets with construction, screening, and focused search", | |
| 2067 | + "author": "Williams", | |
| 2068 | + "year": "2014" | |
| 2069 | + }, | |
| 2070 | + { | |
| 2071 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 2072 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0995", | |
| 2073 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2074 | + "first-page": "1", | |
| 2075 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00366", | |
| 2076 | + "article-title": "Equilibrium of housing and real estate brokerage markets under uncertainty", | |
| 2077 | + "volume": "14", | |
| 2078 | + "author": "Wu", | |
| 2079 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 2080 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 2081 | + }, | |
| 2082 | + { | |
| 2083 | + "issue": "4", | |
| 2084 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1000", | |
| 2085 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2086 | + "first-page": "533", | |
| 2087 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00595", | |
| 2088 | + "article-title": "A simple search and bargaining model of real estate markets", | |
| 2089 | + "volume": "20", | |
| 2090 | + "author": "Yavaş", | |
| 2091 | + "year": "1992", | |
| 2092 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 2093 | + }, | |
| 2094 | + { | |
| 2095 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 2096 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1005", | |
| 2097 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2098 | + "first-page": "406", | |
| 2099 | + "DOI": "10.1086/298350", | |
| 2100 | + "article-title": "Middlemen in bilateral search markets", | |
| 2101 | + "volume": "12", | |
| 2102 | + "author": "Yavaş", | |
| 2103 | + "year": "1994", | |
| 2104 | + "journal-title": "J. Labor Econ." | |
| 2105 | + }, | |
| 2106 | + { | |
| 2107 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 2108 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1010", | |
| 2109 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2110 | + "first-page": "244", | |
| 2111 | + "DOI": "10.1006/jhec.1995.1012", | |
| 2112 | + "article-title": "Seller-broker relationship as a double moral hazard problem", | |
| 2113 | + "volume": "4", | |
| 2114 | + "author": "Yavaş", | |
| 2115 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 2116 | + "journal-title": "J. Hous. Econ." | |
| 2117 | + }, | |
| 2118 | + { | |
| 2119 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 2120 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1015", | |
| 2121 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2122 | + "first-page": "97", | |
| 2123 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00682", | |
| 2124 | + "article-title": "Matching of buyers and sellers by brokers: a comparison of alternative commission structures", | |
| 2125 | + "volume": "24", | |
| 2126 | + "author": "Yavaş", | |
| 2127 | + "year": "1996", | |
| 2128 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 2129 | + }, | |
| 2130 | + { | |
| 2131 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 2132 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1020", | |
| 2133 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2134 | + "first-page": "187", | |
| 2135 | + "DOI": "10.1080/10835547.2001.12091051", | |
| 2136 | + "article-title": "Impossibility of a competitive equilibrium in the real estate brokerage industry", | |
| 2137 | + "volume": "21", | |
| 2138 | + "author": "Yavaş", | |
| 2139 | + "year": "2001", | |
| 2140 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Res." | |
| 2141 | + }, | |
| 2142 | + { | |
| 2143 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 2144 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1025", | |
| 2145 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2146 | + "first-page": "259", | |
| 2147 | + "DOI": "10.1023/A:1007733916238", | |
| 2148 | + "article-title": "Buyer brokerage: incentive and efficiency implications", | |
| 2149 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 2150 | + "author": "Yavaş", | |
| 2151 | + "year": "1999", | |
| 2152 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 2153 | + }, | |
| 2154 | + { | |
| 2155 | + "issue": "3", | |
| 2156 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1030", | |
| 2157 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2158 | + "first-page": "347", | |
| 2159 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00668", | |
| 2160 | + "article-title": "The strategic role of listing price in marketing real estate: theory and evidence", | |
| 2161 | + "volume": "23", | |
| 2162 | + "author": "Yavaş", | |
| 2163 | + "year": "1995", | |
| 2164 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 2165 | + }, | |
| 2166 | + { | |
| 2167 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1035", | |
| 2168 | + "first-page": "591", | |
| 2169 | + "article-title": "A search model of real estate broker behavior", | |
| 2170 | + "volume": "71", | |
| 2171 | + "author": "Yinger", | |
| 2172 | + "year": "1981", | |
| 2173 | + "journal-title": "Am. Econ. Rev." | |
| 2174 | + }, | |
| 2175 | + { | |
| 2176 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 2177 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1040", | |
| 2178 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2179 | + "first-page": "113", | |
| 2180 | + "DOI": "10.1007/s11146-007-9081-3", | |
| 2181 | + "article-title": "School quality, house prices and liquidity", | |
| 2182 | + "volume": "37", | |
| 2183 | + "author": "Zahirovic-Herbert", | |
| 2184 | + "year": "2008", | |
| 2185 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Financ. Econ." | |
| 2186 | + }, | |
| 2187 | + { | |
| 2188 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 2189 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1050", | |
| 2190 | + "first-page": "5", | |
| 2191 | + "article-title": "Real estate brokerage research in the new millennium", | |
| 2192 | + "volume": "19", | |
| 2193 | + "author": "Zietz", | |
| 2194 | + "year": "2011", | |
| 2195 | + "journal-title": "J. Real Estate Lit." | |
| 2196 | + }, | |
| 2197 | + { | |
| 2198 | + "issue": "1", | |
| 2199 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1055", | |
| 2200 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2201 | + "first-page": "24", | |
| 2202 | + "DOI": "10.1111/1540-6229.00367", | |
| 2203 | + "article-title": "The incentive effects of flat-fee and percentage commissions for real estate brokers", | |
| 2204 | + "volume": "14", | |
| 2205 | + "author": "Zorn", | |
| 2206 | + "year": "1986", | |
| 2207 | + "journal-title": "Real Estate Econ." | |
| 2208 | + }, | |
| 2209 | + { | |
| 2210 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1060", | |
| 2211 | + "doi-asserted-by": "crossref", | |
| 2212 | + "first-page": "701", | |
| 2213 | + "DOI": "10.2307/1935966", | |
| 2214 | + "article-title": "Duration dependence in the housing market", | |
| 2215 | + "volume": "69", | |
| 2216 | + "author": "Zuehlke", | |
| 2217 | + "year": "1987", | |
| 2218 | + "journal-title": "Rev. Econ. Stat." | |
| 2219 | + }, | |
| 2220 | + { | |
| 2221 | + "issue": "2", | |
| 2222 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb1070", | |
| 2223 | + "first-page": "195", | |
| 2224 | + "article-title": "Determinants of real estate agent compensation Choice", | |
| 2225 | + "volume": "18", | |
| 2226 | + "author": "Zumpano", | |
| 2227 | + "year": "2009", | |
| 2228 | + "journal-title": "J. Hous. Econ." | |
| 2229 | + }, | |
| 2230 | + { | |
| 2231 | + "key": "10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2_bb0370", | |
| 2232 | + "first-page": "699", | |
| 2233 | + "article-title": "Housing bubbles", | |
| 2234 | + "volume": "vol. 5", | |
| 2235 | + "author": "Glaeser", | |
| 2236 | + "year": "2015" | |
| 2237 | + } | |
| 2238 | + ], | |
| 2239 | + "container-title": [ | |
| 2240 | + "Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics" | |
| 2241 | + ], | |
| 2242 | + "original-title": [], | |
| 2243 | + "language": "en", | |
| 2244 | + "link": [ | |
| 2245 | + { | |
| 2246 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:B9780444595317000132?httpAccept=text/xml", | |
| 2247 | + "content-type": "text/xml", | |
| 2248 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 2249 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 2250 | + }, | |
| 2251 | + { | |
| 2252 | + "URL": "https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:B9780444595317000132?httpAccept=text/plain", | |
| 2253 | + "content-type": "text/plain", | |
| 2254 | + "content-version": "vor", | |
| 2255 | + "intended-application": "text-mining" | |
| 2256 | + } | |
| 2257 | + ], | |
| 2258 | + "deposited": { | |
| 2259 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 2260 | + [ | |
| 2261 | + 2025, | |
| 2262 | + 9, | |
| 2263 | + 10 | |
| 2264 | + ] | |
| 2265 | + ], | |
| 2266 | + "date-time": "2025-09-10T12:13:42Z", | |
| 2267 | + "timestamp": 1757506422000 | |
| 2268 | + }, | |
| 2269 | + "score": 1, | |
| 2270 | + "resource": { | |
| 2271 | + "primary": { | |
| 2272 | + "URL": "https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/B9780444595317000132" | |
| 2273 | + } | |
| 2274 | + }, | |
| 2275 | + "subtitle": [], | |
| 2276 | + "short-title": [], | |
| 2277 | + "issued": { | |
| 2278 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 2279 | + [ | |
| 2280 | + 2015 | |
| 2281 | + ] | |
| 2282 | + ] | |
| 2283 | + }, | |
| 2284 | + "ISBN": [ | |
| 2285 | + "9780444595331" | |
| 2286 | + ], | |
| 2287 | + "references-count": 209, | |
| 2288 | + "URL": "https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2", | |
| 2289 | + "relation": {}, | |
| 2290 | + "ISSN": [ | |
| 2291 | + "1574-0080" | |
| 2292 | + ], | |
| 2293 | + "issn-type": [ | |
| 2294 | + { | |
| 2295 | + "value": "1574-0080", | |
| 2296 | + "type": "print" | |
| 2297 | + } | |
| 2298 | + ], | |
| 2299 | + "subject": [], | |
| 2300 | + "published": { | |
| 2301 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 2302 | + [ | |
| 2303 | + 2015 | |
| 2304 | + ] | |
| 2305 | + ] | |
| 2306 | + } | |
| 2307 | +} | |
| \ No newline at end of file | ||
added
research/verification/A_han2015microstructure.evidence.txt
+4 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ | ||
| 1 | +Supplementary evidence for Crossref record 10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2 (Crossref metadata lacks author names) — retrieved 2026-10-20 via WebFetch | |
| 2 | +URL: https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/regchp/5-813.html | |
| 3 | +Seen on page: "The Microstructure of Housing Markets" — Lu Han and William C. Strange — Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, 2015, pages 813-886 — Elsevier — editors Gilles Duranton, J. V. Henderson, William C. Strange — DOI 10.1016/B978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2. | |
| 4 | +Abstract (paraphrased on page): surveys search (one-sided, random matching, directed), post-match bargaining and multiparty auctions, and real estate brokerage (matching, competition/entry, incentive problems). | |
added
research/verification/A_han2024cash.crossref.json
+5 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ | ||
| 1 | +{ | |
| 2 | + "indexed": { | |
| 3 | + "date-parts": [ | |
| 4 | + [ | |
| 5 | + 2026, | |
Diff truncated — file too large.