1[2 {"id":"C1","text":"The competitive equilibrium relative price is p1/p2 = 0.875.","results_keys":["price_ratio_p1_over_p2"],"status":"supported","caveat":"Conditional on using the individual endowments (aggregate good 1 = 12) rather than the inconsistent summary-sheet value of 14."},3 {"id":"C2","text":"Independent root-finding of the aggregate excess demand for good 1 reproduces the closed-form price to machine precision.","results_keys":["price_ratio_numerical","price_ratio_p1_over_p2"],"status":"supported","caveat":"Brent's method within a bracket; uniqueness comes from theory."},4 {"id":"C3","text":"Equilibrium allocation: A consumes (4.1143, 5.4), B consumes (7.8857, 4.6).","results_keys":["x1_A","x2_A","x1_B","x2_B"],"status":"supported","caveat":"Same aggregate-endowment caveat as C1."},5 {"id":"C4","text":"Markets clear and Walras' law holds at the reported price (excess demand and Walras residual are 0).","results_keys":["excess_demand_good1","walras_law_residual"],"status":"supported","caveat":"Zero up to floating-point precision."},6 {"id":"C5","text":"The summary sheet's aggregate endowment of good 1 (14) contradicts the individual endowments (sum 12); the latter were used.","results_keys":["data_issues","aggregate_endowment_good1"],"status":"supported","caveat":"Which source is in error cannot be determined from the data."}7]8