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Robustness uses no-change and old-board subsamples and pension fund fixed effects that exploit changes in composition. Channel tests rely on fund types, in-state overweighting, investment selection, political contributions and trustee experience.",28 "key_assumptions": [29 "Board composition, fixed by statute long ago, is not driven by the fund's past investment styles or outcomes",30 "Within-state differences in board charters are unrelated to unobserved determinants of PE performance",31 "Observed controls capture differences in consultants, risk-taking and PE experience"32 ],33 "threats_addressed": [34 "reverse causality / endogenous board structure",35 "state-level confounders (state fixed effects)",36 "changes in board structure during the sample (no-change and old-board subsamples)",37 "investment consultant choice, risk-taking, PE experience"38 ],39 "causal_language_strength": 3,40 "uses_causal_claim": true41 },42 "abstract_moves": {43 "question": {44 "present": false,45 "sentence_index": -146 },47 "gap": {48 "present": false,49 "sentence_index": -150 },51 "method": {52 "present": false,53 "sentence_index": -154 },55 "results": {56 "present": true,57 "sentence_index": 058 },59 "magnitude": {60 "present": false,61 "sentence_index": -162 },63 "contribution": {64 "present": false,65 "sentence_index": -166 }67 },68 "introduction": {69 "moves": [70 {71 "paragraph_index": 0,72 "move": "motivation"73 },74 {75 "paragraph_index": 0,76 "move": "literature_gap"77 },78 {79 "paragraph_index": 0,80 "move": "preview_of_approach"81 },82 {83 "paragraph_index": 1,84 "move": "preview_of_results"85 },86 {87 "paragraph_index": 1,88 "move": "robustness_mention"89 },90 {91 "paragraph_index": 2,92 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"93 },94 {95 "paragraph_index": 3,96 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"97 },98 {99 "paragraph_index": 3,100 "move": "preview_of_results"101 },102 {103 "paragraph_index": 4,104 "move": "preview_of_results"105 },106 {107 "paragraph_index": 5,108 "move": "identification_defense"109 },110 {111 "paragraph_index": 6,112 "move": "contribution_statement"113 },114 {115 "paragraph_index": 6,116 "move": "related_literature_positioning"117 },118 {119 "paragraph_index": 7,120 "move": "related_literature_positioning"121 }122 ],123 "contribution_paragraph_index": 6,124 "contribution_types": [125 "new_evidence"126 ],127 "roadmap_present": false,128 "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"129 },130 "section_roles": [131 {132 "idx": 0,133 "role": "introduction"134 },135 {136 "idx": 1,137 "role": "other"138 },139 {140 "idx": 2,141 "role": "data"142 },143 {144 "idx": 3,145 "role": "results"146 },147 {148 "idx": 4,149 "role": "results"150 },151 {152 "idx": 5,153 "role": "results"154 },155 {156 "idx": 6,157 "role": "results"158 },159 {160 "idx": 7,161 "role": "conclusion"162 }163 ],164 "results_presentation": {165 "economic_significance_discussed": true,166 "statistical_significance_language": "unclear",167 "magnitude_statements_in_intro": true168 },169 "robustness": {170 "location": "mixed",171 "types": [172 "subsample",173 "alternative_specification",174 "alternative_measure"175 ]176 },177 "tables": {178 "convention_notes": "Table notes give sample period, observation level (LP-investment or LP-vintage), the performance measure used (net IRR vs. multiple), and sample restrictions. Alternative-measure versions are often moved to the Internet Appendix. Standard-error treatment is not visible in the excerpts.",179 "units_stated_in_notes": true,180 "standard_errors_description": "unclear"181 },182 "figures": {183 "uncertainty_shown": "unclear"184 },185 "conclusion": {186 "bounded_claims": true,187 "policy_implications": false,188 "open_questions": false,189 "restates_contribution": true190 },191 "hedging": {192 "level": "moderate",193 "typical_devices": [194 "'suggestive evidence/support'",195 "'appears to be partly driven'",196 "'consistent with'",197 "explicit caveat that channels are hard to disentangle",198 "'may' in hypothesis statements"199 ]200 },201 "claim_evidence": [202 {203 "claim": "Each 10pp increase in state-appointed (ex officio) trustees lowers PE net IRR by about 0.9 (0.5) percentage points relative to participant-appointed trustees.",204 "evidence_type": "table",205 "evidence_ref": "Table III"206 },207 {208 "claim": "Underperformance is robust to excluding funds with board changes, to state fixed effects, and to pension fund fixed effects.",209 "evidence_type": "table",210 "evidence_ref": "Tables IV, V"211 },212 {213 "claim": "Fund-type controls explain 20–30% of the gap, mainly through state-heavy boards' tilt toward real estate; the rest arises within VC and RE.",214 "evidence_type": "table",215 "evidence_ref": "Table VI"216 },217 {218 "claim": "Political boards overweight in-state investments and select small funds with few co-investors and inexperienced GPs.",219 "evidence_type": "table",220 "evidence_ref": "Tables VII, VIII, IX"221 },222 {223 "claim": "Underperformance is positively related to finance-industry political contributions to board members.",224 "evidence_type": "table",225 "evidence_ref": "Table X"226 },227 {228 "claim": "Lower financial experience explains the underperformance of participant-elected trustees but not that of state officials.",229 "evidence_type": "table",230 "evidence_ref": "Table XI"231 }232 ],233 "structural_summary": "The paper opens with a question about how politicians shape governance and frames public pension boards as an unexplored channel of political influence. The introduction previews the baseline magnitudes, maps Shleifer's Control, Corruption and Confusion channels onto the setting, and defends identification by pointing to statutory board composition and fixed-effects tests. It then positions the work against four literatures. After an institutional overview and a data section, four results sections follow: baseline performance with robustness, the Control channel via investment selection, the Corruption channel via political contributions, and the Confusion channel via trustee experience. The conclusion restates the findings and frames them as suggestive evidence.",234 "writing_profile_keywords": [235 "political economy of finance",236 "pension fund governance",237 "private equity performance",238 "channel decomposition",239 "Shleifer three-channel framework",240 "suggestive causal framing",241 "results-first abstract"242 ],243 "confidence": 0.8,244 "notes": "The abstract consists only of results statements, with no explicit method or question sentence. The robustness table sits inside the results section, and some alternative-measure results are placed in the Internet Appendix. 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