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The conclusion restates the contribution with a conservative fallback interpretation, and proofs and numerical details sit in the appendices.",248 "writing_profile_keywords": [249 "contrarian thesis",250 "challenge conventional wisdom",251 "named mechanism",252 "intuition-first introduction",253 "calibration for relevance",254 "policy-oriented",255 "proofs in appendix"256 ],257 "confidence": 0.85,258 "notes": "Theory paper with a calibration section, so empirical identification fields are marked not applicable. 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