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Uses bank fixed effects in a panel, a border closest-neighbor-pair sample, and cross-county variation in the WWI agricultural price boom.",28 "key_assumptions": [29 "Insured and uninsured banks in the same and neighboring states would have followed parallel trends absent insurance",30 "Adoption of insurance was not driven by idiosyncratic banking shocks (states where it may have been are excluded)",31 "Adjacent non-insurance states form a valid comparison group"32 ],33 "threats_addressed": [34 "Omitted factors coinciding with deposit insurance adoption, the weakness of cross-country studies",35 "Pre-existing trends, tested with state-level pretrend regressions for 1900-1908",36 "Geographic heterogeneity, addressed with border closest-neighbor pairs",37 "Endogenous adoption, addressed by excluding Mississippi and Washington",38 "Voluntary versus mandatory insurance differences"39 ],40 "causal_language_strength": 4,41 "uses_causal_claim": true42 },43 "abstract_moves": {44 "question": {45 "present": true,46 "sentence_index": 047 },48 "gap": {49 "present": false,50 "sentence_index": -151 },52 "method": {53 "present": true,54 "sentence_index": 255 },56 "results": {57 "present": true,58 "sentence_index": 359 },60 "magnitude": {61 "present": false,62 "sentence_index": -163 },64 "contribution": {65 "present": true,66 "sentence_index": 267 }68 },69 "introduction": {70 "moves": [71 {72 "paragraph_index": 0,73 "move": "motivation"74 },75 {76 "paragraph_index": 0,77 "move": "tension_or_puzzle"78 },79 {80 "paragraph_index": 0,81 "move": "literature_gap"82 },83 {84 "paragraph_index": 1,85 "move": "preview_of_results"86 },87 {88 "paragraph_index": 1,89 "move": "contribution_statement"90 },91 {92 "paragraph_index": 1,93 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"94 },95 {96 "paragraph_index": 2,97 "move": "preview_of_results"98 },99 {100 "paragraph_index": 3,101 "move": "roadmap"102 }103 ],104 "contribution_paragraph_index": 1,105 "contribution_types": [106 "new_evidence",107 "new_identification",108 "new_data_or_measure"109 ],110 "roadmap_present": true,111 "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"112 },113 "section_roles": [114 {115 "idx": 0,116 "role": "introduction"117 },118 {119 "idx": 1,120 "role": "other"121 },122 {123 "idx": 2,124 "role": "data"125 },126 {127 "idx": 3,128 "role": "results"129 },130 {131 "idx": 4,132 "role": "results"133 },134 {135 "idx": 5,136 "role": "results"137 },138 {139 "idx": 6,140 "role": "conclusion"141 }142 ],143 "results_presentation": {144 "economic_significance_discussed": true,145 "statistical_significance_language": "unclear",146 "magnitude_statements_in_intro": false147 },148 "robustness": {149 "location": "within_results",150 "types": [151 "subsample",152 "alternative_specification"153 ]154 },155 "tables": {156 "convention_notes": "Notes define the dependent variable (given in the column titles) and the DI and DI Area indicators, and state the sample states and data sources. Most tables report linear regressions at the state or bank level.",157 "units_stated_in_notes": false,158 "standard_errors_description": "unclear"159 },160 "figures": {161 "uncertainty_shown": "unclear"162 },163 "conclusion": {164 "bounded_claims": true,165 "policy_implications": true,166 "open_questions": false,167 "restates_contribution": true168 },169 "hedging": {170 "level": "moderate",171 "typical_devices": [172 "seemingly",173 "apparently",174 "presumably",175 "it is conceivable that",176 "framing results as a conservative measure"177 ]178 },179 "claim_evidence": [180 {181 "claim": "Deposit insurance raised insured banks' deposits and loans and lowered their cash and capital ratios",182 "evidence_type": "table",183 "evidence_ref": "Tables V, VI"184 },185 {186 "claim": "State-level aggregates show deposits shifting toward insured state banks after adoption",187 "evidence_type": "figure",188 "evidence_ref": "Figures 2, 4, 6; Table IV"189 },190 {191 "claim": "No differential pretrends existed before deposit insurance",192 "evidence_type": "table",193 "evidence_ref": "Table III"194 },195 {196 "claim": "Insurance removed market discipline: deposit growth at insured banks was less sensitive to risk measures",197 "evidence_type": "table",198 "evidence_ref": "Tables VIII, IX"199 },200 {201 "claim": "Results hold in a closest-neighbor border sample",202 "evidence_type": "table",203 "evidence_ref": "Table VII"204 },205 {206 "claim": "After the price collapse, banks fled the insurance systems by converting to national charters",207 "evidence_type": "table",208 "evidence_ref": "Table X"209 },210 {211 "claim": "The WWI price boom explains one- to two-thirds of the deposit insurance effects",212 "evidence_type": "none_stated",213 "evidence_ref": "Section III.D.2 (stated in conclusion)"214 }215 ],216 "structural_summary": "The introduction sets broad policy support for deposit insurance against empirical evidence of moral hazard. It argues that cross-country studies are confounded and positions within-state historical variation as a cleaner test. It previews findings on risk-taking, loss of market discipline, and the WWI agricultural boom and bust, then gives a roadmap. The body covers institutional history with aggregate trends, then data, then bank-level difference-style regressions with pretrend, border-sample and voluntary-versus-mandatory extensions. A deposit-flow market discipline analysis follows, and finally the post-1920 collapse. The conclusion restates the three findings, draws methodological lessons on time-varying risk-taking opportunities, and offers policy and political-economy implications.",217 "writing_profile_keywords": [218 "economic history",219 "natural experiment",220 "moral hazard",221 "market discipline",222 "bank-level panel",223 "policy implication",224 "state deposit insurance"225 ],226 "confidence": 0.8,227 "notes": "No standard error or significance details are visible in the excerpts. Theory is in the Internet Appendix. 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