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Endogeneity is addressed by using new loans, Taylor rule residuals, regional business-cycle asynchrony, and small-bank and state exclusions.",28 "key_assumptions": [29 "Policy rate is plausibly exogenous to individual bank lending risk at loan origination",30 "Internal risk ratings comparably measure ex ante loan risk across banks",31 "Controls capture demand-side and economic-condition confounders"32 ],33 "threats_addressed": [34 "Reverse causality of monetary policy responding to bank risk-taking",35 "Changes in economic conditions",36 "Securitization and loan sales",37 "Loans under preexisting commitment",38 "Large-bank influence on policy",39 "Liquidity versus capital as the relevant bank characteristic"40 ],41 "causal_language_strength": 3,42 "uses_causal_claim": true43 },44 "abstract_moves": {45 "question": {46 "present": true,47 "sentence_index": 048 },49 "gap": {50 "present": false,51 "sentence_index": -152 },53 "method": {54 "present": true,55 "sentence_index": 156 },57 "results": {58 "present": true,59 "sentence_index": 260 },61 "magnitude": {62 "present": false,63 "sentence_index": -164 },65 "contribution": {66 "present": true,67 "sentence_index": 068 }69 },70 "introduction": {71 "moves": [72 {73 "paragraph_index": 0,74 "move": "motivation"75 },76 {77 "paragraph_index": 0,78 "move": "policy_or_broader_implication"79 },80 {81 "paragraph_index": 0,82 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"83 },84 {85 "paragraph_index": 1,86 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"87 },88 {89 "paragraph_index": 2,90 "move": "tension_or_puzzle"91 },92 {93 "paragraph_index": 3,94 "move": "preview_of_approach"95 },96 {97 "paragraph_index": 3,98 "move": "preview_of_results"99 },100 {101 "paragraph_index": 3,102 "move": "identification_defense"103 },104 {105 "paragraph_index": 4,106 "move": "related_literature_positioning"107 },108 {109 "paragraph_index": 4,110 "move": "contribution_statement"111 },112 {113 "paragraph_index": 5,114 "move": "related_literature_positioning"115 }116 ],117 "contribution_paragraph_index": 4,118 "contribution_types": [119 "new_evidence",120 "new_data_or_measure"121 ],122 "roadmap_present": false,123 "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"124 },125 "section_roles": [126 {127 "idx": 0,128 "role": "introduction"129 },130 {131 "idx": 1,132 "role": "empirical_design"133 },134 {135 "idx": 2,136 "role": "data"137 },138 {139 "idx": 3,140 "role": "results"141 },142 {143 "idx": 4,144 "role": "conclusion"145 },146 {147 "idx": 5,148 "role": "appendix"149 }150 ],151 "results_presentation": {152 "economic_significance_discussed": true,153 "statistical_significance_language": "unclear",154 "magnitude_statements_in_intro": true155 },156 "robustness": {157 "location": "within_results",158 "types": [159 "subsample",160 "alternative_measure",161 "alternative_specification",162 "other"163 ]164 },165 "tables": {166 "convention_notes": "Table notes state the sample period (1997Q2–2011Q4), define the dependent variable as the STBL internal risk rating on a 1–5 scale, list the data sources for the controls, and describe sample restrictions column by column.",167 "units_stated_in_notes": true,168 "standard_errors_description": "unclear"169 },170 "figures": {171 "uncertainty_shown": "unclear"172 },173 "conclusion": {174 "bounded_claims": true,175 "policy_implications": false,176 "open_questions": true,177 "restates_contribution": true178 },179 "hedging": {180 "level": "moderate",181 "typical_devices": [182 "'associated with' wording alongside causal claims",183 "'consistent with' a theoretical channel",184 "scope qualifier limiting results to the new-loan margin",185 "noting difficulty of quantifying the channel versus establishing it"186 ]187 },188 "claim_evidence": [189 {190 "claim": "Loan risk ratings rise when the federal funds rate falls; a one-SD rate decrease raises ratings by about 0.11",191 "evidence_type": "table",192 "evidence_ref": "Table IV"193 },194 {195 "claim": "The negative rate–risk relationship is weaker for poorly capitalized banks, consistent with risk-shifting",196 "evidence_type": "table",197 "evidence_ref": "Table IV"198 },199 {200 "claim": "Average loan risk rating co-moves negatively with the target federal funds rate over time",201 "evidence_type": "figure",202 "evidence_ref": "Figure 1"203 },204 {205 "claim": "Results are robust to Taylor rule residuals and to controls for economic conditions",206 "evidence_type": "table",207 "evidence_ref": "Table VIII"208 },209 {210 "claim": "Theory gives ambiguous predictions depending on maturity mismatch and leverage",211 "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",212 "evidence_ref": "Appendix A"213 },214 {215 "claim": "Capital, not liquidity, drives the heterogeneity",216 "evidence_type": "table",217 "evidence_ref": "Table VI"218 }219 ],220 "structural_summary": "The introduction motivates the topic with post-crisis policy debate and lays out competing theoretical channels (portfolio, risk-shifting, search for yield), concluding that the sign is an empirical question. It previews confidential loan-level data, main results with magnitudes, and an endogeneity defense, then positions the paper against prior risk measures and Jimenez et al. The body follows a short methodology section, a data section, and a long results section whose subsections are mostly robustness checks. The conclusion restates magnitudes and contrasts the findings with Spain, and a simple theoretical model sits in an appendix.",221 "writing_profile_keywords": [222 "loan-level confidential data",223 "interaction with bank capital",224 "risk-taking channel",225 "competing theoretical predictions",226 "extensive robustness subsections",227 "policy-relevant motivation"228 ],229 "confidence": 0.8,230 "notes": "Standard-error and significance conventions are not visible in the table-note excerpts. 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