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some dollar units are stated in millions.",179 "units_stated_in_notes": true,180 "standard_errors_description": "unclear"181 },182 "figures": {183 "uncertainty_shown": "unclear"184 },185 "conclusion": {186 "bounded_claims": true,187 "policy_implications": false,188 "open_questions": false,189 "restates_contribution": true190 },191 "hedging": {192 "level": "moderate",193 "typical_devices": [194 "results suggest / are consistent with",195 "explicit caveats on legality and generalizability",196 "admits difficulty identifying the information source",197 "'important (but not the exclusive)' qualifiers"198 ]199 },200 "claim_evidence": [201 {202 "claim": "No link between connections and informed trading before the crisis or before TARP creation",203 "evidence_type": "table",204 "evidence_ref": "Table III, Table IV, Figure 3"205 },206 {207 "claim": "After TARP creation, the purchase-sale return spread is much larger for connected than for unconnected insiders",208 "evidence_type": "table",209 "evidence_ref": "Table III, Table IV"210 },211 {212 "claim": "Connected insiders outperform unconnected peers within the same firm",213 "evidence_type": "table",214 "evidence_ref": "Table V"215 },216 {217 "claim": "The advantage is strongest for insiders with recent, direct connections",218 "evidence_type": "table",219 "evidence_ref": "Table VI, Figure 4"220 },221 {222 "claim": "Connected insiders trade abnormally 30 days before TARP infusions, anticipating the market reaction",223 "evidence_type": "table",224 "evidence_ref": "Table VII, Figures 5-6"225 },226 {227 "claim": "Front-running is not found on placebo dates, around earnings announcements, or in non-TARP firms",228 "evidence_type": "table",229 "evidence_ref": "Tables VIII, IX"230 },231 {232 "claim": "Purchases rise with the infusion amount relative to the requested amount",233 "evidence_type": "table",234 "evidence_ref": "Table X"235 }236 ],237 "structural_summary": "The paper identifies a gap on whether political connections enable insider opportunism and uses the crisis and TARP as its setting. 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