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Figure 3"219 },220 {221 "claim": "Multiple equilibria arise when gains from trade are large",222 "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",223 "evidence_ref": "Section III.A; Appendix E"224 },225 {226 "claim": "Optimal mechanism decentralized via differential retention rules and transfers across securities",227 "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",228 "evidence_ref": "Section IV"229 },230 {231 "claim": "Retention correlates with better CMBS performance, consistent with model",232 "evidence_type": "prior_literature",233 "evidence_ref": "Ashcraft, Gooriah, and Kermani (2014)"234 },235 {236 "claim": "Securitization associated with declining lending standards and originator private information",237 "evidence_type": "prior_literature",238 "evidence_ref": "Keys et al. (2010), Mian and Sufi (2009), others"239 }240 ],241 "structural_summary": "Theory paper. The introduction motivates the question with securitization facts and empirical literature on two frictions, sketches the model, and previews second-best and equilibrium results. It links predictions to crisis-era patterns, discusses policy and commitment, and closes with literature positioning; there is no roadmap. The body runs model, then optimal mechanism, then market equilibria (including multiplicity), then efficiency and policy with a securitization application. The conclusion restates findings and regulatory implications. Appendices hold the microfoundation, proofs, and alternative information structures.",242 "writing_profile_keywords": [243 "mechanism design",244 "adverse selection",245 "moral hazard",246 "securitization",247 "retention",248 "policy decentralization",249 "multiple equilibria",250 "first-person singular"251 ],252 "confidence": 0.85,253 "notes": "The role_rule labels for Section II (robustness) and Sections III–IV (other) were overridden to theory. 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