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The running variable is an exchange-rate-adjusted debt share, so currency movements push a bank's share across the 20% threshold. 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Establishes a descriptive default–credit association first. It then uses a regulatory threshold combined with currency-driven variation as an RD to isolate information-free downgrades. The design is validated through first stage, covariate balance, density and placebo checks. Effects are traced on financing, borrower actions and broader outcomes, and the paper ends with a decomposition of the post-default decline. Policy implications about macro-contingent credit-history forgiveness close both the introduction and the conclusion.",234 "writing_profile_keywords": [235 "regression discontinuity",236 "regulatory threshold",237 "credit reporting",238 "consumer credit",239 "Peru",240 "exchange rate variation",241 "decomposition",242 "policy implication"243 ],244 "confidence": 0.85,245 "notes": "Standard-error type is not visible in the excerpts. Robustness checks are embedded in results subsections rather than a separate section. 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