1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"empirical\",\"subfield\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"household_finance; peer effects in financial misconduct\",\"primary_method\":\"natural_experiment_event_study\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"Effect of new coworkers' prior misconduct history on an advisor's probability of committing misconduct in the three years after a merger (coworker/peer influence)\",\"strategy\":\"Coworker changes induced by mergers of financial advisory firms. Merger-firm fixed effects in conditional logit and linear models compare branches of the same premerger firm that are combined with high- versus low-misconduct branches. Coworker misconduct is measured before the merger to avoid the reflection problem.\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"Conditional on a merger, firms do not select which branches or advisors to combine based on misconduct-related characteristics\",\"Merger-firm fixed effects absorb firm-level and time-specific endogeneity of mergers\",\"Premerger coworker misconduct is predetermined relative to the advisor's postmerger behavior\"],\"threats_addressed\":[\"selection of advisors into branches\",\"correlated branch environment\",\"reflection problem\",\"endogenous merger motives\",\"premerger trends\",\"geographic confounding\",\"complex products or productivity\",\"regulatory actions\",\"supervisor influence versus peer influence\",\"individual selection following mergers\"],\"causal_language_strength\":4,\"uses_causal_claim\":true},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":3},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"identification_defense\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"robustness_mention\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"identification_defense\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"roadmap\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":5,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_evidence\",\"new_data_or_measure\",\"new_identification\"],\"roadmap_present\":true,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"inside_introduction\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"data\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"empirical_design\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"robustness\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"robustness\"},{\"idx\":7,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":8,\"role\":\"conclusion\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":true,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"unclear\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":true},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"mixed\",\"types\":[\"placebo\",\"alternative_specification\",\"subsample\",\"falsification\",\"other\"]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"Notes report odds ratios from conditional logit models grouped by merger-firm, with linear-model columns alongside. Notes state the unit of observation (advisor or branch), the sample (477 mergers, 1999–2011), the three-year pre- and postmerger windows, and variable definitions.\",\"units_stated_in_notes\":true,\"standard_errors_description\":\"unclear\"},\"figures\":{\"uncertainty_shown\":\"unclear\"},\"conclusion\":{\"bounded_claims\":false,\"policy_implications\":true,\"open_questions\":false,\"restates_contribution\":true},\"hedging\":{\"level\":\"low\",\"typical_devices\":[\"'consistent with' for the mechanism interpretation\",\"'may occur' for candidate channels\",\"'attempt to' isolate peer versus supervisor effects\"]},\"claim_evidence\":[{\"claim\":\"Advisors are 37% more likely to commit misconduct when their merger-introduced coworkers have a misconduct history\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table III\"},{\"claim\":\"Coworker influence is asymmetric: misconduct spreads but there is no significant evidence that good conduct spreads\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section II.B\"},{\"claim\":\"Placebo reassignment of branches yields odds ratios well below the actual estimate\",\"evidence_type\":\"figure\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Figure 1\"},{\"claim\":\"No differential premerger trends in misconduct by introduced-branch misconduct status\",\"evidence_type\":\"figure\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Figure 2\"},{\"claim\":\"Selection bias tests do not undermine the identification\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table IV\"},{\"claim\":\"The effect is stronger among demographically similar coworkers\",\"evidence_type\":\"none_stated\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section IV\"},{\"claim\":\"Implied social multiplier of 1.59\",\"evidence_type\":\"none_stated\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Conclusion\"},{\"claim\":\"Results are not driven by branch environment, monitoring, or supervision differences\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Tables V, VI\"}],\"structural_summary\":\"The introduction states the contagion finding up front and sketches two channels (social learning and social utility). It then gives a stylized merger example to explain identification and shows how timing of the coworker measure avoids the reflection problem. Results, including a magnitude and the asymmetry-based mechanism inference, are previewed next, followed by positioning against crime peer-effects, firm-level misconduct, and advisory-industry literatures. The body moves from data to the design and main results, then to a series of threat-specific sections: selection tests, similarity-based peer effects, confounders, and supervisors. The conclusion restates the magnitude and social multiplier and draws policy implications for penalties and disclosure.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"peer effects\",\"quasi-experiment via mergers\",\"merger-firm fixed effects\",\"conditional logit odds ratios\",\"Manski reflection problem\",\"threat-by-threat sections\",\"policy implications\",\"stylized illustrative example\"],\"confidence\":0.82,\"notes\":\"Section idx 3 has a garbled heading (an equation fragment); it contains the main results and placebo/trend subsections. Standard errors and significance conventions are not visible in the excerpts. Figure 1 uses cluster bootstrap placebo draws.\"}", "json": {"genre": "empirical", "subfield": "financial_intermediation_banking", "subfield_secondary": "household_finance; peer effects in financial misconduct", "primary_method": "natural_experiment_event_study", "identification": {"estimand": "Effect of new coworkers' prior misconduct history on an advisor's probability of committing misconduct in the three years after a merger (coworker/peer influence)", "strategy": "Coworker changes induced by mergers of financial advisory firms. Merger-firm fixed effects in conditional logit and linear models compare branches of the same premerger firm that are combined with high- versus low-misconduct branches. Coworker misconduct is measured before the merger to avoid the reflection problem.", "key_assumptions": ["Conditional on a merger, firms do not select which branches or advisors to combine based on misconduct-related characteristics", "Merger-firm fixed effects absorb firm-level and time-specific endogeneity of mergers", "Premerger coworker misconduct is predetermined relative to the advisor's postmerger behavior"], "threats_addressed": ["selection of advisors into branches", "correlated branch environment", "reflection problem", "endogenous merger motives", "premerger trends", "geographic confounding", "complex products or productivity", "regulatory actions", "supervisor influence versus peer influence", "individual selection following mergers"], "causal_language_strength": 4, "uses_causal_claim": true}, "abstract_moves": {"question": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}, "gap": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}, "method": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 1}, "results": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 3}, "magnitude": {"present": false, "sentence_index": -1}, "contribution": {"present": true, "sentence_index": 0}}, "introduction": {"moves": [{"paragraph_index": 0, "move": "motivation"}, {"paragraph_index": 0, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 0, "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"}, {"paragraph_index": 1, "move": "preview_of_approach"}, {"paragraph_index": 2, "move": "identification_defense"}, {"paragraph_index": 3, "move": "preview_of_results"}, {"paragraph_index": 3, "move": "robustness_mention"}, {"paragraph_index": 3, "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"}, {"paragraph_index": 3, "move": "identification_defense"}, {"paragraph_index": 4, "move": "related_literature_positioning"}, {"paragraph_index": 5, "move": "contribution_statement"}, {"paragraph_index": 5, "move": "policy_or_broader_implication"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "contribution_statement"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "policy_or_broader_implication"}, {"paragraph_index": 6, "move": "roadmap"}], "contribution_paragraph_index": 5, "contribution_types": ["new_evidence", "new_data_or_measure", "new_identification"], "roadmap_present": true, "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"}, "section_roles": [{"idx": 0, "role": "introduction"}, {"idx": 1, "role": "data"}, {"idx": 2, "role": "empirical_design"}, {"idx": 3, "role": "results"}, {"idx": 4, "role": "robustness"}, {"idx": 5, "role": "results"}, {"idx": 6, "role": "robustness"}, {"idx": 7, "role": "results"}, {"idx": 8, "role": "conclusion"}], "results_presentation": {"economic_significance_discussed": true, "statistical_significance_language": "unclear", "magnitude_statements_in_intro": true}, "robustness": {"location": "mixed", "types": ["placebo", "alternative_specification", "subsample", "falsification", "other"]}, "tables": {"convention_notes": "Notes report odds ratios from conditional logit models grouped by merger-firm, with linear-model columns alongside. 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