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(2012)"228 }229 ],230 "structural_summary": "The paper is theory-led and adds a short empirical test. The introduction motivates a tension between replacing managers to seize growth and the cost of incentive provision. It then previews the mechanism and the main contract results (two firm types, drift adjustment, no severance pay), positions the work against the CEO-match and dynamic-contracting literatures, lists technical contributions, and closes with a roadmap. The body builds a two-period model with derived empirical implications, then a continuous-time model with a state-space representation of contracts. Next it characterizes the optimal contract with numerical illustrations, and finally reports probit and compensation regressions on ExecuComp data. 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