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Supplemented by bootstrap simulations of randomly assigned contracts and by change regressions around switches of advisory firm.",28 "key_assumptions": [29 "Proxies (clientele dispersion, financial affiliations, ownership) capture the intensity of agency conflicts",30 "Disclosed SAI compensation descriptions accurately reflect actual contracts",31 "Contract choice reflects an optimal contracting equilibrium"32 ],33 "threats_addressed": [34 "Spurious correlation from contract clustering within families, addressed with randomly assigned contract simulations",35 "Time-invariant unobservables, addressed with changes in contracts around advisory firm changes"36 ],37 "causal_language_strength": 2,38 "uses_causal_claim": false39 },40 "abstract_moves": {41 "question": {42 "present": true,43 "sentence_index": 044 },45 "gap": {46 "present": false,47 "sentence_index": -148 },49 "method": {50 "present": true,51 "sentence_index": 052 },53 "results": {54 "present": true,55 "sentence_index": 256 },57 "magnitude": {58 "present": false,59 "sentence_index": -160 },61 "contribution": {62 "present": true,63 "sentence_index": 164 }65 },66 "introduction": {67 "moves": [68 {69 "paragraph_index": 0,70 "move": "motivation"71 },72 {73 "paragraph_index": 0,74 "move": "literature_gap"75 },76 {77 "paragraph_index": 0,78 "move": "other"79 },80 {81 "paragraph_index": 1,82 "move": "preview_of_results"83 },84 {85 "paragraph_index": 2,86 "move": "preview_of_approach"87 },88 {89 "paragraph_index": 3,90 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"91 },92 {93 "paragraph_index": 3,94 "move": "preview_of_results"95 },96 {97 "paragraph_index": 4,98 "move": "preview_of_results"99 },100 {101 "paragraph_index": 5,102 "move": "preview_of_results"103 },104 {105 "paragraph_index": 6,106 "move": "contribution_statement"107 },108 {109 "paragraph_index": 7,110 "move": "related_literature_positioning"111 },112 {113 "paragraph_index": 7,114 "move": "tension_or_puzzle"115 }116 ],117 "contribution_paragraph_index": 6,118 "contribution_types": [119 "new_evidence",120 "new_data_or_measure"121 ],122 "roadmap_present": false,123 "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"124 },125 "section_roles": [126 {127 "idx": 0,128 "role": "introduction"129 },130 {131 "idx": 1,132 "role": "other"133 },134 {135 "idx": 2,136 "role": "data"137 },138 {139 "idx": 3,140 "role": "results"141 },142 {143 "idx": 4,144 "role": "results"145 },146 {147 "idx": 5,148 "role": "results"149 },150 {151 "idx": 6,152 "role": "conclusion"153 },154 {155 "idx": 7,156 "role": "appendix"157 },158 {159 "idx": 8,160 "role": "appendix"161 }162 ],163 "results_presentation": {164 "economic_significance_discussed": true,165 "statistical_significance_language": "unclear",166 "magnitude_statements_in_intro": true167 },168 "robustness": {169 "location": "within_results",170 "types": [171 "placebo",172 "alternative_specification",173 "other"174 ]175 },176 "tables": {177 "convention_notes": "Table notes describe the regression type (logit with coefficients and marginal effects at means; OLS) and the sample. Variables are deferred to the Appendix, whose definitions include units and sources. Summary tables report mean, SD and percentiles. The bootstrap table reports simulated t-statistic distributions.",178 "units_stated_in_notes": true,179 "standard_errors_description": "unclear"180 },181 "figures": {182 "uncertainty_shown": "no_figures"183 },184 "conclusion": {185 "bounded_claims": true,186 "policy_implications": false,187 "open_questions": false,188 "restates_contribution": true189 },190 "hedging": {191 "level": "moderate",192 "typical_devices": [193 "'broadly consistent with' an optimal contracting equilibrium",194 "'as proxied by'",195 "'arguably'",196 "'we speculate'",197 "'little evidence'",198 "'mixed evidence'"199 ]200 },201 "claim_evidence": [202 {203 "claim": "Most portfolio managers receive explicit performance-linked bonuses, often large relative to base salary.",204 "evidence_type": "table",205 "evidence_ref": "Table I"206 },207 {208 "claim": "Performance-based pay and deferred pay are more likely when agency conflicts are more intense.",209 "evidence_type": "table",210 "evidence_ref": "Table III"211 },212 {213 "claim": "Investor sophistication, flow discipline and outsourcing dismissal threat substitute for explicit incentives; managerial ownership does not.",214 "evidence_type": "table",215 "evidence_ref": "Table III"216 },217 {218 "claim": "Determinant results are not an artifact of chance, per randomly assigned contract simulations.",219 "evidence_type": "table",220 "evidence_ref": "Table IV"221 },222 {223 "claim": "Contract changes after advisory firm switches track changes in determinants.",224 "evidence_type": "table",225 "evidence_ref": "Table V"226 },227 {228 "claim": "Compensation arrangements are not associated with differences in future fund performance.",229 "evidence_type": "table",230 "evidence_ref": "Table VII"231 },232 {233 "claim": "Performance pay goes with higher advisory fees and lower distribution fees, leaving total fees unchanged.",234 "evidence_type": "table",235 "evidence_ref": "Table VIII"236 }237 ],238 "structural_summary": "The paper motivates the topic with the economic importance of mutual funds and the lack of data on manager-level incentives. It then introduces a new data source created by an SEC disclosure rule and describes pay patterns. Three hypotheses (agency intensity, substitute monitoring, manager characteristics) are previewed with findings. The body runs: institutional background; data and construction of compensation variables; a large determinants section with hypothesis development, logit results and robustness (simulation, advisory firm changes); evaluation-period determinants; and links to performance and fees. The conclusion restates findings within an optimal-contracting interpretation.",239 "writing_profile_keywords": [240 "hand-collected data",241 "first systematic evidence",242 "hypothesis-testing structure",243 "optimal contracting interpretation",244 "agency theory",245 "descriptive-then-determinants",246 "null result on performance"247 ],248 "confidence": 0.8,249 "notes": "No roadmap paragraph is visible in the excerpts. The way statistical significance is reported is not visible in the table notes. 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