1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"theoretical\",\"subfield\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"securitization and credit ratings; information economics\",\"primary_method\":\"theoretical_model_analytical\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"not applicable (theoretical model; comparative statics of equilibrium lending standards, retention and welfare with respect to rating accuracy and screening precision)\",\"strategy\":\"not applicable; signaling game with D1 refinement, equilibrium characterization and comparative statics\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"risk-neutral agents\",\"competitive investors who break even\",\"banks have private screening information at origination\",\"retention is costly\",\"ratings are an imperfect public signal\"],\"threats_addressed\":[],\"causal_language_strength\":1,\"uses_causal_claim\":false},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":3}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":-1,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_theory_or_model\"],\"roadmap_present\":false,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"separate_section\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"literature\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"other\"},{\"idx\":7,\"role\":\"conclusion\"},{\"idx\":8,\"role\":\"appendix\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":false,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"unclear\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":false},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"none_seen\",\"types\":[]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"No tables. 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It then sketches a no-ratings signaling benchmark and previews how ratings shift the economy to an originate-to-distribute equilibrium, along with the efficiency trade-off and screening interactions. A separate literature section links model implications to empirical evidence, states testable implications and positions the paper in theory. The model, benchmarks and equilibrium characterization come next, followed by comparative statics on rating accuracy and screening and a policy analysis section. A brief conclusion restates the findings, and an appendix collects the proofs.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"signaling game\",\"originate-to-distribute\",\"comparative statics\",\"proposition-driven\",\"policy analysis\",\"welfare trade-off\",\"numerical illustrations\"],\"confidence\":0.85,\"notes\":\"The introduction excerpt is truncated, and no explicit contribution or roadmap paragraph is visible. 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