1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"mixed_theory_empirical\",\"subfield\":\"asset_pricing\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"corporate_finance (theory of the firm, internal capital allocation in mutual fund firms)\",\"primary_method\":\"reduced_form_regression\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"Change in manager value added (excess return over benchmark times AUM) following a firm-initiated capital reallocation (promotion/demotion), bounded from below\",\"strategy\":\"Panel regressions of manager value added on firm capital reallocation dummies, with counterfactual adjustments (e.g., excluding poorly performing funds, filling in zeros for fired managers) to produce a lower bound; external-hire comparisons and probit predictability tests support the information channel\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"Vanguard index fund benchmarks correctly measure the investor's alternative investment opportunity\",\"Counterfactual adjustments yield a conservative lower bound\",\"Null hypothesis that reallocation decisions add no value is the appropriate test\"],\"threats_addressed\":[\"Endogeneity of manager moves in firm/manager fixed-effects attribution models\",\"Survivorship from managers dropping out after demotion\",\"Predictability of reallocations from public information\",\"Behavioral explanations such as investor inattention (acknowledged, not ruled out)\"],\"causal_language_strength\":4,\"uses_causal_claim\":true},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"other\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"roadmap\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":0,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_evidence\",\"new_theory_or_model\"],\"roadmap_present\":true,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"both\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"literature\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"data\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"data\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":7,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":8,\"role\":\"robustness\"},{\"idx\":9,\"role\":\"conclusion\"},{\"idx\":10,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":11,\"role\":\"appendix\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":true,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"unclear\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":true},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"mixed\",\"types\":[\"alternative_measure\",\"sensitivity_to_parameters\",\"alternative_specification\"]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"Table notes name the dependent variable and point to its defining equation number; units are given for value added ($ millions/month). 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