1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"empirical\",\"subfield\":\"behavioral_finance\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"primary_method\":\"survey_or_experiment\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"Effect of nonincentivized rank feedback and of payout-relevant tournament incentives on the share invested in a risky asset, conditional on prior rank, compared with a linear-incentive baseline.\",\"strategy\":\"Randomized between-subject treatments (baseline, ranking, tournament) run as lab-in-the-field experiments with professionals, lab experiments with students, and further treatments varying frame, payoff recipient, and identity prime. 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Notes define the dependent variable and the lagged return controls.\",\"units_stated_in_notes\":true,\"standard_errors_description\":\"unclear\"},\"figures\":{\"uncertainty_shown\":\"unclear\"},\"conclusion\":{\"bounded_claims\":true,\"policy_implications\":true,\"open_questions\":true,\"restates_contribution\":true},\"hedging\":{\"level\":\"moderate\",\"typical_devices\":[\"results suggest\",\"could\",\"may indicate\",\"consistent with\",\"less clear-cut\"]},\"claim_evidence\":[{\"claim\":\"Underperforming professionals take more risk when a nonincentivized ranking is shown, relative to baseline\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table I; Figure 1\"},{\"claim\":\"Students respond only to payout-relevant tournament rankings, not to pure rank feedback\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table II; Figure 2\"},{\"claim\":\"Rank-driven risk-taking differs between professionals and students\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table III\"},{\"claim\":\"The rank effect is robust to an abstract lottery frame and to family-return payoffs\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table IV; Figure 4\"},{\"claim\":\"The rank effect persists under private-identity priming, with no gender differences\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table V; Figure 5\"},{\"claim\":\"Professionals report stronger preferences for relative performance than students\",\"evidence_type\":\"figure\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Figure 3\"}],\"structural_summary\":\"The introduction motivates the paper with tournament incentives and the financial crisis, then splits incentives into monetary and nonmonetary rank components. It previews the professional experiment, a student comparison, and identity-transfer tests, followed by three literature contributions and a list of policy implications. The body has one section per experiment (professionals, students), then a section of additional experiments on identity and framing. The conclusion restates findings, discusses possible sources of the effect (self-selection, industry culture), gives implications for regulators and employers, and calls for future research.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"lab-in-the-field experiment\",\"financial professionals\",\"rank incentives\",\"subject-pool comparison\",\"social identity\",\"policy implications\"],\"confidence\":0.8,\"notes\":\"The abstract text is truncated and includes the first line of the introduction. Introduction paragraph 4 is a fragment split into single-word items. The significance reporting convention is not visible in the table notes shown.\"}", "json": {"genre": "empirical", "subfield": "behavioral_finance", "subfield_secondary": "financial_intermediation_banking", "primary_method": "survey_or_experiment", "identification": {"estimand": "Effect of nonincentivized rank feedback and of payout-relevant tournament incentives on the share invested in a risky asset, conditional on prior rank, compared with a linear-incentive baseline.", "strategy": "Randomized between-subject treatments (baseline, ranking, tournament) run as lab-in-the-field experiments with professionals, lab experiments with students, and further treatments varying frame, payoff recipient, and identity prime. 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It previews the professional experiment, a student comparison, and identity-transfer tests, followed by three literature contributions and a list of policy implications. The body has one section per experiment (professionals, students), then a section of additional experiments on identity and framing. The conclusion restates findings, discusses possible sources of the effect (self-selection, industry culture), gives implications for regulators and employers, and calls for future research.", "writing_profile_keywords": ["lab-in-the-field experiment", "financial professionals", "rank incentives", "subject-pool comparison", "social identity", "policy implications"], "confidence": 0.8, "notes": "The abstract text is truncated and includes the first line of the introduction. Introduction paragraph 4 is a fragment split into single-word items. 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