1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"theoretical\",\"subfield\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"household_finance\",\"primary_method\":\"theoretical_model_analytical\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"not applicable (theoretical model)\",\"strategy\":\"not applicable; equilibrium characterization and comparative statics in a matching model with Bayesian persuasion\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"advisers compensated only upon customer investment (conflicted fee)\",\"rational customers heterogeneous in ex ante information quality\",\"frictionless matching market with pairwise stability\",\"advisers on short side of market (scarce) for fee irrelevance\"],\"threats_addressed\":[],\"causal_language_strength\":1,\"uses_causal_claim\":false},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":4}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"literature_gap\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":4,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_theory_or_model\",\"resolution_of_puzzle\"],\"roadmap_present\":false,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"inside_introduction\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"robustness\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"other\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"conclusion\"},{\"idx\":7,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":8,\"role\":\"appendix\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":false,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"unclear\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":false},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"mixed\",\"types\":[\"alternative_specification\",\"other\"]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"No tables; results are stated as propositions, with proofs in the appendix and illustrative figures.\",\"units_stated_in_notes\":false,\"standard_errors_description\":\"none\"},\"figures\":{\"uncertainty_shown\":\"no\"},\"conclusion\":{\"bounded_claims\":true,\"policy_implications\":true,\"open_questions\":false,\"restates_contribution\":true},\"hedging\":{\"level\":\"low\",\"typical_devices\":[\"conditioning results on model assumptions (e.g., 'in our model', 'when advisers are scarce')\",\"'suggest' when drawing empirical implications\"]},\"claim_evidence\":[{\"claim\":\"Competitive equilibrium features dispersed, partially disclosed information under conflicted fees\",\"evidence_type\":\"equation_or_proof\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section II; Appendix A\"},{\"claim\":\"Banning or lowering conflicted fees changes information quality but not customer welfare when advisers are scarce\",\"evidence_type\":\"equation_or_proof\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section III.A\"},{\"claim\":\"Financial literacy education for least informed customers raises all customers' welfare via spillover\",\"evidence_type\":\"equation_or_proof\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section III.B\"},{\"claim\":\"Advised customers earn lower returns due to selection, rationalizing empirical findings\",\"evidence_type\":\"prior_literature\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section V; Bergstresser et al. 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