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Complemented by panel firm fixed effects models interacting CSR with crisis and post-crisis dummies, and a continuous-treatment difference-in-differences design for operating outcomes.",28 "key_assumptions": [29 "The 2008-2009 crisis was an unexpected shock to the importance of trust",30 "Pre-crisis CSR is not proxying for omitted firm characteristics that independently drive crisis returns",31 "CSR ratings capture firm-level social capital"32 ],33 "threats_addressed": [34 "confounding by the credit supply shock (tested July 2007-July 2008)",35 "CSR firms outperforming generally rather than only in crises (tested via pre/post comparison with firm fixed effects)",36 "time-invariant unobservables (firm fixed effects)",37 "alternative trust shock as external validity check (Enron/Worldcom)",38 "measurement timing of CSR (2005, 2007, 2008 measures)",39 "industry differences (industry dummies)",40 "governance and transparency controls"41 ],42 "causal_language_strength": 3,43 "uses_causal_claim": true44 },45 "abstract_moves": {46 "question": {47 "present": false,48 "sentence_index": -149 },50 "gap": {51 "present": false,52 "sentence_index": -153 },54 "method": {55 "present": false,56 "sentence_index": -157 },58 "results": {59 "present": true,60 "sentence_index": 061 },62 "magnitude": {63 "present": true,64 "sentence_index": 065 },66 "contribution": {67 "present": true,68 "sentence_index": 269 }70 },71 "introduction": {72 "moves": [73 {74 "paragraph_index": 0,75 "move": "motivation"76 },77 {78 "paragraph_index": 13,79 "move": "motivation"80 },81 {82 "paragraph_index": 13,83 "move": "literature_gap"84 },85 {86 "paragraph_index": 13,87 "move": "identification_defense"88 },89 {90 "paragraph_index": 14,91 "move": "preview_of_approach"92 },93 {94 "paragraph_index": 14,95 "move": "preview_of_results"96 },97 {98 "paragraph_index": 15,99 "move": "identification_defense"100 },101 {102 "paragraph_index": 15,103 "move": "robustness_mention"104 },105 {106 "paragraph_index": 16,107 "move": "identification_defense"108 },109 {110 "paragraph_index": 16,111 "move": "preview_of_results"112 },113 {114 "paragraph_index": 16,115 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"116 },117 {118 "paragraph_index": 16,119 "move": "contribution_statement"120 }121 ],122 "contribution_paragraph_index": 16,123 "contribution_types": [124 "new_evidence"125 ],126 "roadmap_present": false,127 "literature_positioning_location": "both"128 },129 "section_roles": [130 {131 "idx": 0,132 "role": "introduction"133 },134 {135 "idx": 1,136 "role": "literature"137 },138 {139 "idx": 2,140 "role": "data"141 },142 {143 "idx": 3,144 "role": "results"145 },146 {147 "idx": 4,148 "role": "results"149 },150 {151 "idx": 5,152 "role": "conclusion"153 }154 ],155 "results_presentation": {156 "economic_significance_discussed": true,157 "statistical_significance_language": "unclear",158 "magnitude_statements_in_intro": true159 },160 "robustness": {161 "location": "within_results",162 "types": [163 "alternative_sample_period",164 "falsification",165 "alternative_measure",166 "subsample",167 "alternative_specification"168 ]169 },170 "tables": {171 "convention_notes": "Table notes define the sample, the CSR construction (strengths minus concerns), return windows, and the abnormal return model, and they write out the panel regression equations. Dependent variables are given as both raw and market-model-adjusted returns.",172 "units_stated_in_notes": false,173 "standard_errors_description": "unclear"174 },175 "figures": {176 "uncertainty_shown": "no_figures"177 },178 "conclusion": {179 "bounded_claims": true,180 "policy_implications": false,181 "open_questions": false,182 "restates_contribution": true183 },184 "hedging": {185 "level": "moderate",186 "typical_devices": [187 "suggests",188 "consistent with",189 "indicate",190 "to alleviate concerns"191 ]192 },193 "claim_evidence": [194 {195 "claim": "High-CSR firms earned 4-7 percentage points higher returns during the 2008-09 crisis",196 "evidence_type": "table",197 "evidence_ref": "Table II"198 },199 {200 "claim": "High-CSR firms also outperformed during the Enron/Worldcom trust shock",201 "evidence_type": "table",202 "evidence_ref": "Table III"203 },204 {205 "claim": "The CSR return effect appears only in the crisis period, not in pre- or post-crisis periods, under firm fixed effects",206 "evidence_type": "table",207 "evidence_ref": "Table IV"208 },209 {210 "claim": "Results are robust to measuring CSR in other years",211 "evidence_type": "table",212 "evidence_ref": "Table V"213 },214 {215 "claim": "High-CSR firms had higher profitability, sales growth, sales per employee, and debt raising during the crisis",216 "evidence_type": "table",217 "evidence_ref": "Table VI"218 },219 {220 "claim": "The relation between CSR and returns is stronger in high-trust regions",221 "evidence_type": "none_stated",222 "evidence_ref": "Section III.E"223 }224 ],225 "structural_summary": "The paper opens with epigraphs on the crisis as a collapse of trust, then gives macro-level literature on social capital and identifies a gap at the firm level. The introduction previews the main return result with magnitudes and three tests that rule out alternatives, followed by panel and mechanism results. A separate conceptual section links trust, social capital, and CSR. After the data section, a long results section presents baseline regressions, alternative shock episodes, the credit-shock placebo, regional trust heterogeneity, CSR components, and robustness. A difference-in-differences section on operating outcomes and capital raising follows, and a brief conclusion restates the findings.",226 "writing_profile_keywords": [227 "epigraph opening",228 "trust shock framing",229 "alternative-explanation tests",230 "mechanism via real outcomes",231 "CSR measurement",232 "crisis-period returns"233 ],234 "confidence": 0.8,235 "notes": "The introduction paragraphs at indices 0-12 are epigraph fragments, so the substantive introduction text begins at index 13. 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