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Contract types are hand-collected from SAI filings. Treated funds (performance contracts) are matched to control funds (no performance contracts) on observables. A placebo test randomly reassigns benchmarks.",31 "key_assumptions": [32 "After matching on observables, contract type is uncorrelated with unobservables",33 "The self-designated prospectus benchmark is the relevant compensation benchmark",34 "The ratio of tracking-error volatility captures managerial risk-shifting"35 ],36 "threats_addressed": [37 "selection into contract type on observables",38 "spurious benchmark effects (placebo randomization)",39 "competing flow-performance tournament incentives",40 "managerial ownership, active share and tenure as confounds",41 "alternative risk-shifting measures"42 ],43 "causal_language_strength": 4,44 "uses_causal_claim": true45 },46 "abstract_moves": {47 "question": {48 "present": false,49 "sentence_index": -150 },51 "gap": {52 "present": false,53 "sentence_index": -154 },55 "method": {56 "present": true,57 "sentence_index": 158 },59 "results": {60 "present": true,61 "sentence_index": 262 },63 "magnitude": {64 "present": false,65 "sentence_index": -166 },67 "contribution": {68 "present": true,69 "sentence_index": 370 }71 },72 "introduction": {73 "moves": [74 {75 "paragraph_index": 0,76 "move": "motivation"77 },78 {79 "paragraph_index": 0,80 "move": "literature_gap"81 },82 {83 "paragraph_index": 1,84 "move": "mechanism_or_theory_sketch"85 },86 {87 "paragraph_index": 1,88 "move": "related_literature_positioning"89 },90 {91 "paragraph_index": 2,92 "move": "preview_of_approach"93 },94 {95 "paragraph_index": 2,96 "move": "preview_of_results"97 },98 {99 "paragraph_index": 2,100 "move": "identification_defense"101 },102 {103 "paragraph_index": 3,104 "move": "preview_of_results"105 },106 {107 "paragraph_index": 4,108 "move": "robustness_mention"109 },110 {111 "paragraph_index": 4,112 "move": "contribution_statement"113 },114 {115 "paragraph_index": 4,116 "move": "related_literature_positioning"117 },118 {119 "paragraph_index": 5,120 "move": "related_literature_positioning"121 },122 {123 "paragraph_index": 6,124 "move": "roadmap"125 }126 ],127 "contribution_paragraph_index": 4,128 "contribution_types": [129 "new_evidence",130 "new_data_or_measure",131 "resolution_of_puzzle"132 ],133 "roadmap_present": true,134 "literature_positioning_location": "inside_introduction"135 },136 "section_roles": [137 {138 "idx": 0,139 "role": "introduction"140 },141 {142 "idx": 1,143 "role": "theory"144 },145 {146 "idx": 2,147 "role": "data"148 },149 {150 "idx": 3,151 "role": "results"152 },153 {154 "idx": 4,155 "role": "conclusion"156 },157 {158 "idx": 5,159 "role": "appendix"160 }161 ],162 "results_presentation": {163 "economic_significance_discussed": false,164 "statistical_significance_language": "unclear",165 "magnitude_statements_in_intro": false166 },167 "robustness": {168 "location": "mixed",169 "types": [170 "placebo",171 "alternative_measure",172 "subsample",173 "alternative_specification"174 ]175 },176 "tables": {177 "convention_notes": "Table notes define dependent variables (risk adjustment ratio as a second-half versus first-half tracking-error volatility ratio) and give the quantile-regression specification. Pooled OLS and median quantile regressions are reported side by side. A bootstrap placebo table summarizes 500 benchmark randomizations.",178 "units_stated_in_notes": false,179 "standard_errors_description": "unclear"180 },181 "figures": {182 "uncertainty_shown": "no_figures"183 },184 "conclusion": {185 "bounded_claims": true,186 "policy_implications": false,187 "open_questions": true,188 "restates_contribution": true189 },190 "hedging": {191 "level": "moderate",192 "typical_devices": [193 "'our results suggest'",194 "stating that the contract and tournament channels are not mutually exclusive",195 "declaring agnosticism on contract optimality",196 "explicitly stating the matching assumption"197 ]198 },199 "claim_evidence": [200 {201 "claim": "An asymmetric bonus contract is valued like an exchange option whose vega peaks when the portfolio's return is close to the benchmark's",202 "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",203 "evidence_ref": "Section I; Appendix A (Margrabe 1978)"204 },205 {206 "claim": "Funds performing closer to the benchmark at mid-year increase relative risk more in the second half",207 "evidence_type": "table",208 "evidence_ref": "Table II"209 },210 {211 "claim": "Risk-shifting is concentrated among funds with a clear compensation benchmark and is absent without performance pay",212 "evidence_type": "table",213 "evidence_ref": "Table III"214 },215 {216 "claim": "Matched treated-control comparison supports a causal effect of contracts on risk-shifting",217 "evidence_type": "table",218 "evidence_ref": "Table IV"219 },220 {221 "claim": "Manager ownership reduces risk-shifting, active share increases it, and tenure mitigates it; Distance remains important",222 "evidence_type": "table",223 "evidence_ref": "Table VI"224 },225 {226 "claim": "Random benchmark assignment does not reproduce the effect",227 "evidence_type": "table",228 "evidence_ref": "Table VII"229 },230 {231 "claim": "The contract-based incentive dominates flow-performance tournament incentives",232 "evidence_type": "table",233 "evidence_ref": "Section III.G"234 }235 ],236 "structural_summary": "The paper opens with an agency-and-contracting motivation, then sketches an option-based theory of the manager's bonus that predicts a hypothesis, priced in the appendix. After describing the data, one long empirical section moves through baseline quantile regressions, hand-collected contract heterogeneity, a matched-sample causal analysis, cross-sectional moderators, a placebo, a horse race against flow incentives, and robustness checks. A brief conclusion bounds the interpretation.",237 "writing_profile_keywords": [238 "option-pricing hypothesis",239 "quantile regression",240 "hand-collected compensation data",241 "matching for causality",242 "placebo bootstrap",243 "tournament versus contract"244 ],245 "confidence": 0.8,246 "notes": "The empirical section is a single large section with robustness checks as subsections, so robustness location is coded as mixed. 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