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Figures are numerical or illustrative plots of equilibrium objects, and the parameter values are stated in captions.",166 "units_stated_in_notes": false,167 "standard_errors_description": "none"168 },169 "figures": {170 "uncertainty_shown": "no"171 },172 "conclusion": {173 "bounded_claims": true,174 "policy_implications": false,175 "open_questions": false,176 "restates_contribution": true177 },178 "hedging": {179 "level": "moderate",180 "typical_devices": [181 "'may' for equilibrium possibilities",182 "'consistent with' empirical findings",183 "'our theory suggests'"184 ]185 },186 "claim_evidence": [187 {188 "claim": "Star upgrades are associated with large abnormal flows in prior empirical work, which motivates the puzzle.",189 "evidence_type": "prior_literature",190 "evidence_ref": "Del Guercio and Tkac (2008); Reuter and Zitzewitz (2015)"191 },192 {193 "claim": "In equilibrium, reputation takes only finitely many values even though past performance is continuous (the star rating property).",194 "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",195 "evidence_ref": "Section III, Proposition 2; Appendix A"196 },197 {198 "claim": "Two-star equilibria exist, may be multiple, and the set of equilibria varies with the information acquisition cost.",199 "evidence_type": "figure",200 "evidence_ref": "Figure 4, Figure 5"201 },202 {203 "claim": "An uninformed fund never strictly prefers to acquire information in equilibrium.",204 "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",205 "evidence_ref": "Section II.C"206 },207 {208 "claim": "Higher-rated funds are more likely to be informed and perform better, consistent with the evidence on ratings' predictive power.",209 "evidence_type": "prior_literature",210 "evidence_ref": "Blake and Morey (2000); Reuter and Zitzewitz (2015)"211 },212 {213 "claim": "The star rating property extends to equilibria with more than two groups.",214 "evidence_type": "figure",215 "evidence_ref": "Section IV; Figures 8-9"216 }217 ],218 "structural_summary": "The introduction opens with documented star-rating flow effects and poses a puzzle: why would rational investors respond to coarse ratings that add no new information? 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