1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"theoretical\",\"subfield\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"corporate_finance (security design, securitization regulation)\",\"primary_method\":\"theoretical_model_analytical\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"not applicable (theoretical model)\",\"strategy\":\"not applicable; analytical characterization of first-best, second-best optimal mechanism and market equilibria\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"risk-neutral agents, three periods\",\"manager more impatient than investors (gains from trade)\",\"screening effort and asset quality are manager's private information\",\"lack of commitment in market equilibria\"],\"threats_addressed\":[],\"causal_language_strength\":1,\"uses_causal_claim\":false},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":3},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"tension_or_puzzle\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"policy_or_broader_implication\"},{\"paragraph_index\":7,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":8,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":8,\"move\":\"literature_gap\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":8,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_theory_or_model\"],\"roadmap_present\":false,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"inside_introduction\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"conclusion\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":7,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":8,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":9,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":10,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":11,\"role\":\"appendix\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":false,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"unclear\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":false},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"appendix\",\"types\":[\"other\"]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"No tables; results are stated as propositions and lemmas, with proofs in appendices and a numerical illustration in a figure.\",\"units_stated_in_notes\":false,\"standard_errors_description\":\"none\"},\"figures\":{\"uncertainty_shown\":\"no\"},\"conclusion\":{\"bounded_claims\":true,\"policy_implications\":true,\"open_questions\":false,\"restates_contribution\":true},\"hedging\":{\"level\":\"moderate\",\"typical_devices\":[\"'can feature' / 'may' modal verbs\",\"acknowledging the model is stylized\",\"'consistent with' / 'in line with' when linking to evidence\",\"scope limits on where policy implications apply\"],\"typical_devices_note\":null},\"claim_evidence\":[{\"claim\":\"Costly cash flow retention is essential to implement positive screening under the optimal mechanism\",\"evidence_type\":\"equation_or_proof\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section II; Appendix D\"},{\"claim\":\"Market allocations can have too much or too little screening relative to second-best\",\"evidence_type\":\"figure\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section III; Figure 3\"},{\"claim\":\"Multiple equilibria arise when gains from trade are large\",\"evidence_type\":\"equation_or_proof\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section III.A; Appendix E\"},{\"claim\":\"Optimal mechanism decentralized via differential retention rules and transfers across securities\",\"evidence_type\":\"equation_or_proof\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section IV\"},{\"claim\":\"Retention correlates with better CMBS performance, consistent with model\",\"evidence_type\":\"prior_literature\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Ashcraft, Gooriah, and Kermani (2014)\"},{\"claim\":\"Securitization associated with declining lending standards and originator private information\",\"evidence_type\":\"prior_literature\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Keys et al. 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