1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"empirical\",\"subfield\":\"asset_pricing\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"primary_method\":\"reduced_form_regression\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"Effect of protection sellers' CDS-portfolio capital shocks (dollar margin payments) on weekly log changes in a firm's CDS spread\",\"strategy\":\"Panel regressions of weekly spread changes on seller and buyer capital shocks that exclude positions on same-industry firms, with firm-level credit controls and macro controls. Supplemented by placebo tests, horizon dynamics, and a 2011 Japanese tsunami case study treated as an exogenous shock to seller capital.\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"Seller capital shocks built from positions on other-industry firms are not driven by the target firm's fundamentals\",\"Controls such as EDF, LGD and equity returns absorb changes in fundamental credit risk\",\"Sellers are not fully hedged, so mark-to-market losses change their risk appetite\"],\"threats_addressed\":[\"common fundamental shocks driving both seller losses and spreads\",\"hedging by sellers or buyers\",\"whether capital shocks are large enough to matter\",\"construction methodology of capital measures\",\"institution-wide versus desk-level constraints\"],\"causal_language_strength\":4,\"uses_causal_claim\":true},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":3}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"tension_or_puzzle\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":-1,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_evidence\",\"new_data_or_measure\"],\"roadmap_present\":false,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"inside_introduction\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"data\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"results\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"robustness\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"robustness\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"conclusion\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"appendix\"},{\"idx\":7,\"role\":\"appendix\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":true,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"stars_and_tstats\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":true},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"mixed\",\"types\":[\"placebo\",\"alternative_measure\",\"subsample\",\"alternative_sample_period\",\"other\"]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"Notes write out the regression equation, list the control vectors, and define variables with their units (dollar changes in $ billion). Standard errors appear below the estimates, double-clustered, with stars marking p-value thresholds.\",\"units_stated_in_notes\":true,\"standard_errors_description\":\"clustered\"},\"figures\":{\"uncertainty_shown\":\"unclear\"},\"conclusion\":{\"bounded_claims\":true,\"policy_implications\":true,\"open_questions\":false,\"restates_contribution\":true},\"hedging\":{\"level\":\"moderate\",\"typical_devices\":[\"suggest\",\"imply\",\"in part\",\"at least partially\",\"likely explanation\",\"potential unintended consequence\"]},\"claim_evidence\":[{\"claim\":\"A $1bn seller capital loss raises CDS spreads about 2.7% per week; seller shocks explain 12% of weekly spread variation.\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table III\"},{\"claim\":\"Desk-level seller shocks carry information beyond institution-wide capital constraints.\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table IV\"},{\"claim\":\"The spread effect of seller losses reverts fully after about nine weeks.\",\"evidence_type\":\"figure\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Figure 2\"},{\"claim\":\"Incumbent sellers barely adjust positions after losses, and no new sellers enter.\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table VI\"},{\"claim\":\"Seller exposure to Japanese firms predicts U.S. CDS spread changes around the 2011 tsunami.\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table VII\"},{\"claim\":\"Asset managers have replaced dealers as the main net sellers of protection since 2010.\",\"evidence_type\":\"figure\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Figure 5\"}],\"structural_summary\":\"The introduction frames frictionless capital flow as a neoclassical benchmark, then sketches intermediary and slow-moving-capital theories and notes that causal identification is hard. It previews results paragraph by paragraph, giving magnitudes, desk-specific effects, horizon decay, mechanism, and dealer versus asset manager heterogeneity. The data section documents concentration in the market. The main section builds a simple pricing framework, runs a workhorse regression, and adds internal capital market, segmentation/placebo, horizon, and mechanism analyses. Robustness and additional analyses (hedging, shock size, tsunami case study, bond market) follow. The conclusion restates the segmentation interpretation and notes possible regulatory side effects.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"proprietary regulatory data\",\"slow-moving capital\",\"market segmentation\",\"first-person singular\",\"economic magnitude emphasis\",\"case-study corroboration\",\"policy implication\"],\"confidence\":0.8,\"notes\":\"The introduction excerpt is truncated, so contribution and roadmap paragraphs may exist but are not visible. Figure captions do not say whether confidence bands are shown.\"}", "json": {"genre": "empirical", "subfield": "asset_pricing", "subfield_secondary": "financial_intermediation_banking", "primary_method": "reduced_form_regression", "identification": {"estimand": "Effect of protection sellers' CDS-portfolio capital shocks (dollar margin payments) on weekly log changes in a firm's CDS spread", "strategy": "Panel regressions of weekly spread changes on seller and buyer capital shocks that exclude positions on same-industry firms, with firm-level credit controls and macro controls. 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It previews results paragraph by paragraph, giving magnitudes, desk-specific effects, horizon decay, mechanism, and dealer versus asset manager heterogeneity. The data section documents concentration in the market. The main section builds a simple pricing framework, runs a workhorse regression, and adds internal capital market, segmentation/placebo, horizon, and mechanism analyses. Robustness and additional analyses (hedging, shock size, tsunami case study, bond market) follow. The conclusion restates the segmentation interpretation and notes possible regulatory side effects.", "writing_profile_keywords": ["proprietary regulatory data", "slow-moving capital", "market segmentation", "first-person singular", "economic magnitude emphasis", "case-study corroboration", "policy implication"], "confidence": 0.8, "notes": "The introduction excerpt is truncated, so contribution and roadmap paragraphs may exist but are not visible. 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