1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"theoretical\",\"subfield\":\"asset_pricing\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"mutual funds; reputation theory; rating coarseness\",\"primary_method\":\"theoretical_model_analytical\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"not applicable (theoretical model)\",\"strategy\":\"not applicable; equilibrium characterization of a dynamic reputation game\",\"key_assumptions\":[\"fully rational investors who form beliefs from past performance\",\"the fund can acquire information, which then decays stochastically\",\"the fund decides on information acquisition after the type shock\"],\"threats_addressed\":[],\"causal_language_strength\":1,\"uses_causal_claim\":false},\"abstract_moves\":{\"question\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0},\"gap\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"method\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":1},\"results\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":4},\"magnitude\":{\"present\":false,\"sentence_index\":-1},\"contribution\":{\"present\":true,\"sentence_index\":0}},\"introduction\":{\"moves\":[{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"motivation\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"tension_or_puzzle\"},{\"paragraph_index\":0,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":1,\"move\":\"preview_of_approach\"},{\"paragraph_index\":2,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":3,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":4,\"move\":\"preview_of_results\"},{\"paragraph_index\":5,\"move\":\"mechanism_or_theory_sketch\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":6,\"move\":\"contribution_statement\"},{\"paragraph_index\":7,\"move\":\"related_literature_positioning\"},{\"paragraph_index\":7,\"move\":\"roadmap\"}],\"contribution_paragraph_index\":6,\"contribution_types\":[\"new_theory_or_model\",\"resolution_of_puzzle\"],\"roadmap_present\":true,\"literature_positioning_location\":\"inside_introduction\"},\"section_roles\":[{\"idx\":0,\"role\":\"introduction\"},{\"idx\":1,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":2,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":3,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":4,\"role\":\"theory\"},{\"idx\":5,\"role\":\"conclusion\"},{\"idx\":6,\"role\":\"appendix\"}],\"results_presentation\":{\"economic_significance_discussed\":false,\"statistical_significance_language\":\"unclear\",\"magnitude_statements_in_intro\":false},\"robustness\":{\"location\":\"none_seen\",\"types\":[]},\"tables\":{\"convention_notes\":\"The paper has no tables. 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It then sketches a reputation model with endogenous information acquisition that decays stochastically. It previews two-star equilibria and the empirical implications they match, gives the intuition for why the star rating property is general, and positions the paper against the rating-coarseness and reputation literatures before a roadmap. The body sets up the model, then a preliminary analysis, two-star equilibria with their empirical implications, and a generalization to other equilibria. Proofs are in the appendix, and the conclusion restates the contributions.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"rational explanation of anomaly\",\"dynamic reputation game\",\"equilibrium characterization\",\"empirical consistency discussion\",\"proofs in appendix\",\"no empirical estimation\"],\"confidence\":0.85,\"notes\":\"This is a pure theory paper. 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