1{"text": "{\"genre\":\"mixed_theory_empirical\",\"subfield\":\"corporate_finance\",\"subfield_secondary\":\"financial_intermediation_banking\",\"primary_method\":\"reduced_form_regression\",\"identification\":{\"estimand\":\"Effect of issuer-paid rating optimism (S&P rating above investor-paid EJR rating) on secondary-market bond spreads and on the probability of choosing private over public debt\",\"strategy\":\"Validation of the overrating measure through default and incentive-conflict regressions, hazard models and a DiD on broker mergers/closures. Symmetric one-notch split-rating comparisons of bond spreads. 2SLS using analyst coverage shocks. Becker-Ivashina conditional-issuance approach to debt choice. 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Table I and Table AI tabulate model outcomes.\",\"units_stated_in_notes\":true,\"standard_errors_description\":\"unclear\"},\"figures\":{\"uncertainty_shown\":\"unclear\"},\"conclusion\":{\"bounded_claims\":true,\"policy_implications\":false,\"open_questions\":false,\"restates_contribution\":true},\"hedging\":{\"level\":\"moderate\",\"typical_devices\":[\"results suggest\",\"consistent with\",\"evidence is more consistent with\",\"may lead\"]},\"claim_evidence\":[{\"claim\":\"S&P overrating is more frequent for issuers contributing more rating revenue and with stronger rating-shopping incentives\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table IV\"},{\"claim\":\"S&P converges toward EJR faster when it was initially more optimistic, indicating lower timeliness\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Tables V-VI\"},{\"claim\":\"Loss of analyst coverage from broker mergers or closures raises the likelihood of S&P overrating\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table VII\"},{\"claim\":\"Bonds of firms S&P overrates carry higher spreads than symmetric split-rated counterparts\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Tables VIII-IX\"},{\"claim\":\"Overrated firms are more likely to issue private debt than public bonds\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Table X\"},{\"claim\":\"The overrating spread premium shrinks after private debt issuance\",\"evidence_type\":\"table\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Tables XI-XII\"},{\"claim\":\"Inflation in issuer-paid ratings pools risks and worsens information asymmetry even when investors price it\",\"evidence_type\":\"equation_or_proof\",\"evidence_ref\":\"Section I, Appendix A\"}],\"structural_summary\":\"Opens with the role of rating agencies and prior evidence on issuer-pay bias. A simple model (proofs in the appendix) motivates the tests. A long validation section establishes S&P-minus-EJR overrating as a quality measure, using default regressions, conflict proxies, convergence dynamics and a broker-merger DiD. The paper then tests bond-spread pricing via symmetric split ratings and 2SLS, followed by debt-choice substitution and spread changes after private debt issuance. A short conclusion restates the findings.\",\"writing_profile_keywords\":[\"model-motivated empirics\",\"measure validation\",\"split ratings\",\"quasi-natural experiment\",\"debt choice\",\"lemons discount\"],\"confidence\":0.8,\"notes\":\"Standard error type and significance notation are not visible in the excerpts. 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