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(2004), Gompers et al. (2006)"194 },195 {196 "claim": "Results survive extensions such as assets in place, IPO discount, nonlinear flow-performance and partially informed VCs",197 "evidence_type": "equation_or_proof",198 "evidence_ref": "Section IV"199 }200 ],201 "structural_summary": "Theory paper. The introduction contrasts the known harms of career concerns in secondary markets with the unexplored primary market, poses the question for VCs, and previews a counterintuitive result and its mechanism. It then discusses the realism of the assumptions and empirical proxies, and positions the paper against the career-concerns literature. The body sets up the model, characterizes the equilibria under profit and reputation motivation, compares their costs and benefits, and runs extensions as robustness checks. 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