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A brief theory section derives four testable predictions. Long data and empirical-strategy sections then defend the use of staggered state adoption as exogenous, drawing on the historical record. Results proceed sequentially through portfolios, credit markets, sectoral labor and capital intensity, combining nationwide and border-pair designs with randomization tests. A short conclusion restates the findings and suggests broader applicability to groups still denied economic rights.",230 "writing_profile_keywords": [231 "economic history",232 "law and finance",233 "staggered adoption",234 "border-pair design",235 "prediction-by-prediction results",236 "historical narrative",237 "investor protection"238 ],239 "confidence": 0.8,240 "notes": "Section idx 5 is a parsing artifact: it continues the Results section, covering credit markets and subsections C-D. Table VI is referenced but not excerpted. The intro uses 'difference-in-discontinuities' for the border exercise. 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