spb/wp5_uqo Public

1<!-- Author: Simon-Pierre Boucher — contact@spboucher.ai -->23# UPGRADE_REPORT — Scholarly deepening of the paper (2026-08-05)45Scope: literature, framing, and prose only. **No result, number, table, or figure6was changed.** The paper grew from 43 to **51 pages**; references from 24 to7**56** (all cited); the PDF builds cleanly (0 unresolved references/citations,80 BibTeX warnings). The pre-upgrade critical assessment is in `PAPER_REVIEW.md`.910## 1. New references added (32) — with verification and one-line justification1112Every entry was verified against **Crossref** (title, authors, year, volume,13issue, pages, DOI) — the JMLR paper against jmlr.org — before being added.14No citation was written from memory alone.1516### STR platforms and housing costs (8)17| Key | Reference | Why |18|---|---|---|19| `koster2021short` | Koster, van Ommeren & Volkhausen (2021), *J. Urban Econ.* 124 | The benchmark quasi-experiment (LA ordinances); anchors §2.1 and the magnitude comparison in §7.1 |20| `valentin2021regulating` | Valentin (2021), *Real Estate Economics* 49(1) | New Orleans regulation capitalisation; second quasi-experimental anchor |21| `duso2024airbnb` | Duso, Michelsen, Schäfer & Tran (2024), *Reg. Sci. Urban Econ.* 106 | Berlin per-listing rent effect (7–13 €/month) — the closest comparable magnitude to ours |22| `franco2021impact` | Franco & Santos (2021), *Reg. Sci. Urban Econ.* 88 | Portugal-wide price/rent effects; European breadth |23| `ayouba2020airbnb` | Ayouba, Breuillé, Grivault & Le Gallo (2020), *Int. Reg. Sci. Rev.* 43(1–2) | Spatial panel evidence for French cities; documents cross-market heterogeneity |24| `shabrina2022airbnb` | Shabrina, Arcaute & Batty (2022), *Urban Studies* 59(1) | London neighbourhood evidence; ties commercial "misuse" to rents |25| `li2022market` | Li, Kim & Srinivasan (2022), *Management Science* 68(11) | Structural landlord-choice evidence on the STR/long-term margin |26| `guttentag2015airbnb` | Guttentag (2015), *Current Issues in Tourism* 18(12) | Foundational framing of Airbnb as disruptive tourism innovation |2728### Canadian evidence (2)29| Key | Reference | Why |30|---|---|---|31| `combs2020short` | Combs, Kerrigan & Wachsmuth (2020), *Can. J. Urban Research* 29(1) | The national Canadian STR analysis (~31k units removed); indispensable for the "first for Quebec" claim |32| `grisdale2021displacement` | Grisdale (2021), *Urban Geography* 42(5) | Toronto STR displacement; completes the Canadian evidence base |3334### Sharing-economy economics (3)35| Key | Reference | Why |36|---|---|---|37| `zervas2017rise` | Zervas, Proserpio & Byers (2017), *J. Marketing Research* 54(5) | Canonical hotel-displacement estimate; grounds the supply-diversion incentive |38| `farronato2022welfare` | Farronato & Fradkin (2022), *American Economic Review* 112(6) | Welfare effects of peer entry; the flexible-supply mechanism |39| `einav2016peer` | Einav, Farronato & Levin (2016), *Annual Review of Economics* 8 | P2P market theory framing |4041### STR pricing hedonics (3)42| Key | Reference | Why |43|---|---|---|44| `wang2017price` | Wang & Nicolau (2017), *Int. J. Hospitality Mgmt.* 62 | 33-city Airbnb price determinants; benchmark for Model 2 |45| `gibbs2018pricing` | Gibbs et al. (2018), *J. Travel & Tourism Marketing* 35(1) | Canadian Airbnb hedonics — geographically closest antecedent to Model 2 |46| `ert2016trust` | Ert, Fleischer & Magen (2016), *Tourism Management* 55 | Reputation/trust capitalisation; frames our contrarian superhost discount |4748### Hedonic theory & practice (4)49`lancaster1966new` (*JPE* 74(2) — characteristics demand), `sirmans2005composition`50(*J. Real Estate Lit.* 13(1) — survey of model composition), `malpezzi2003hedonic`51(Blackwell chapter — applied review), `kuminoff2010which` (*JEEM* 60(3) —52specification guidance that our FE + functional-form strategy follows).5354### Spatial econometrics (4)55`kelejian1998generalized` (*JREFE* 17(1)) and `kelejian1999generalized` (*IER*5640(2)) — the actual sources of the GM_Lag/GM_Error estimators used in Model 457(previously uncited: a genuine methods-citation hole); `can1992specification`58(*RSUE* 22(3)) and `dubin1988estimation` (*REStat* 70(3)) — spatial dependence59in hedonic housing models.6061### Quantile & distribution (2)62`koenker2001quantile` (*JEP* 15(4) — canonical applied reference),63`mcmillen2008changes` (*JUE* 64(3) — house-price distribution decomposition).6465### ML & software (2)66`zou2005regularization` (*JRSS-B* 67(2) — elastic net, used but uncited),67`pedregosa2011scikit` (*JMLR* 12 — the software that produced every ML number).6869### Tourism gentrification & regulation (3)70`gotham2005tourism` (*Urban Studies* 42(7) — coined "tourism gentrification"),71`cocola2016holiday` (*Sociological Research Online* 21(3)), `gurran2017when`72(*JAPA* 83(1) — planners' response to Airbnb).7374### Book (1)75`sundararajan2016sharing` (MIT Press, 2016 — crowd-based capitalism; verified76via publisher metadata/reviews, no DOI as is normal for books).7778### Bibliographic fix to an existing entry79`glaeser2005urban` (Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks, "Urban Growth and Housing Supply",80*J. Econ. Geography* 6(1): 71–89) had year 2005; the article is **2006**.81Corrected. Note the key name still says 2005 (citations render correctly as 2006).8283## 2. Sections expanded and how8485- **§1 Introduction** (+~40%): P2P framing with citations (¶1); the86  correlational/quasi-experimental evidence base (¶2); the Canadian gap made87  explicit with Combs et al. and Grisdale (¶3); a **new magnitude-preview88  paragraph** comparing our $6–10/listing to Berlin's 7–13 €/listing; the three89  contributions rewritten with citations and a sharper novelty claim90  ("first listing-level econometric analysis … in any Canadian market").91- **§2 Literature Review** (fully rebuilt, ~3× longer): now 10 thematic92  subsections with signposted structure — STR & housing costs (correlational93  vs. quasi-experimental waves), Canadian/Quebec evidence, P2P economics, STR94  pricing, hedonic theory/practice, spatial econometrics, quantile methods, ML95  in housing, tourism gentrification & regulation, and an explicit96  **Positioning and Contribution** subsection stating the three gaps the paper97  fills. Every strand ends by connecting to this paper rather than summarising98  in isolation.99- **§4 Methodology**: every methodological choice now grounded — Rosen/Malpezzi100  at the hedonic equation, Kuminoff et al. for the FE strategy, Kelejian &101  Prucha for GM_Lag/GM_Error, Koenker & Hallock for quantiles, Tibshirani /102  Zou–Hastie / Breiman / Friedman / Pedregosa for the ML stack.103- **§5 Results**: two literature anchors added — the superhost discount is now104  explicitly contrasted with the premia in Wang & Nicolau / Ert et al., and the105  quantile pattern tied to Zietz et al. / McMillen.106- **§7 Discussion** (+~50%): **new subsection 7.1 "Findings in the Context of107  the Literature"** with three quantitative benchmarks (Berlin per-listing,108  LA ordinance, Boston standardised) and two candid disagreements (superhost109  discount; null entire-home share); **Limitations** expanded from 6 to 7 items110  with citations, adding exposure measurement error (attenuation argument) and111  buffer/MAUP sensitivity; **new "Future Work" subsection** with four112  extensions ordered by data requirements (repeated scrapes → panel; Quebec's113  2023 enforcement change as a natural experiment; host-resolved data; lease114  registry rents).115- **§8 Conclusion**: strengthened contribution sentence (Canadian evidence116  base), cross-design corroboration sentence; no overselling added.117118## 3. Claims flagged for the author's verification (not resolved by me)1191201. **Intro ¶3 factual claims** — "over 11 million visitors annually",121   "vacancy rates … historically low": still uncited (kept verbatim from the122   original). Cite Tourisme Montréal / CMHC Rental Market Survey, or soften.1232. **Regulatory description** (§7.3 and §2.10): CITQ registration and Montreal124   zoning are described from the original text; verify against the current125   state of Quebec's Bill 25 (2023) and Montreal by-laws before submission.1263. **"First listing-level econometric analysis in any Canadian market"** —127   worded to be defensible against Combs et al. (descriptive) and Grisdale128   (qualitative), but a final search for very recent Canadian working papers129   is advisable before submission.1304. **Berlin magnitude comparison** (§7.1): 7–13 €/month per listing is taken131   from Duso et al. (2024)'s headline range; double-check the exact figure in132   the published version when quoting it in referee responses.133134## 4. Literature that potentially contradicts or complicates the findings135136Reported in the paper itself (§7.1), not hidden:137138- **Superhost premium literature** (Wang & Nicolau 2017; Ert et al. 2016;139  Gibbs et al. 2018) finds *positive* reputation premia; our Model 2 finds a140  significant superhost **discount**. The paper now states the disagreement and141  offers a composition interpretation.142- **Entire-home composition**: Horn & Merante (2017) find effects concentrated143  in entire-home density, and Combs et al. (2020) build the Canadian144  housing-loss argument on frequently-rented entire homes; our Model 1e finds145  **no** significant entire-home-share association. Stated as a non-supported146  prediction with two candidate explanations.147- **Cross-market heterogeneity**: Ayouba et al. (2020) find *no* significant148  rent effect in several French cities — a caution against generalising our149  positive association across all Quebec markets, reflected in the external-150  validity limitation.151- **Model 2 null** (no city-rent premium in nightly prices) runs against the152  opportunity-cost intuition articulated in, e.g., Barron et al.; the paper153  frames this as an informative null driven by resort/urban composition.154155## 5. Build status156157`latexmk` clean build: **51 pages**, 0 unresolved references, 0 unresolved158citations, 0 BibTeX warnings, all 56 bibliography entries cited in the text.159