0005 — Passkeys only; opaque server-side sessions; out-of-band recovery
Decision.
- The only credential is a WebAuthn passkey (RP ID
clustr.spboucher.ai), shared by the web app and the Apple apps through Associated Domains. No passwords, no TOTP, no magic links. User verification is required; attestation isnone(we do not restrict authenticator models; we verify origin, RP ID, UV and the signature counter). - Sessions are opaque random tokens stored hashed: a
__Host-cookie (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict, 30 min idle / 12 h absolute) for the web, and a 10-minute bearer token + rotating, device-bound refresh token for native apps. Reuse of a rotated refresh token revokes the session. - Sensitive operations require a passkey ceremony less than 5 minutes old (step-up), checked by the server.
- Accounts are created only from single-use invitations (256-bit token, hash stored, 15 min by default, atomic consumption, short setup transaction). An invitation can never attach a passkey to an existing account unless that account's owner is signed in, has just re-verified, and confirms.
- First owner and account recovery are performed with
mccctlon the host over SSH. This is the documented out-of-band procedure; there is no other bypass. Recovery revokes the account's previous passkeys and sessions.
Why opaque tokens rather than JWTs. Immediate revocation (session, device, user) is a requirement; a database lookup per request is cheap at this scale and avoids key distribution and unrevocable tokens.