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0005-passkeys-only-identity.md 1.5 KB 11 lines markdown

1# 0005 — Passkeys only; opaque server-side sessions; out-of-band recovery23**Decision.**4- The only credential is a WebAuthn passkey (RP ID `clustr.spboucher.ai`), shared by the web app and the Apple apps through Associated Domains. No passwords, no TOTP, no magic links. User verification is required; attestation is `none` (we do not restrict authenticator models; we verify origin, RP ID, UV and the signature counter).5- Sessions are opaque random tokens stored hashed: a `__Host-` cookie (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict, 30 min idle / 12 h absolute) for the web, and a 10-minute bearer token + rotating, device-bound refresh token for native apps. Reuse of a rotated refresh token revokes the session.6- Sensitive operations require a passkey ceremony less than 5 minutes old (step-up), checked by the server.7- Accounts are created only from single-use invitations (256-bit token, hash stored, 15 min by default, atomic consumption, short setup transaction). An invitation can never attach a passkey to an existing account unless that account's owner is signed in, has just re-verified, and confirms.8- First owner and account recovery are performed with `mccctl` on the host over SSH. This is the documented out-of-band procedure; there is no other bypass. Recovery revokes the account's previous passkeys and sessions.910**Why opaque tokens rather than JWTs.** Immediate revocation (session, device, user) is a requirement; a database lookup per request is cheap at this scale and avoids key distribution and unrevocable tokens.11
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